Jain Journal 1991 01

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 10

108
which recognizes the unsublatable existence of the external material world and at the same time refuses to reduce mental and spiritual phenomena to the level of the material. Thus in the case of, e.g., universals, the Jainas accept the existence of many qualities simultaneously in a given object, which are different from the object in question and at the same time identical with it.
JAIN JOURNAL
In Dvaita, the problem of the universals was solved by means of the concept of viseșa or 'distinction'. This concept first appears in a theological discussion concerning the viśvarupa of Viṣņu, viz. whether he is identical with the viśvarupa or different from it.20 Madhva quotes an earlier text, ascribed to Vyasa, which says that through viseṣa Viṣņu can have one and many forms at the same time. Višeșa is described as vastusvarupa, the essence of a thing, and is self-supporting. In his commentary, Jayatirtha points out how the Nyaya solution leads to infinite regress, 21 as the Jainas have said earlier. There is nothing without viseșa and it is only due to višesa that any thing can exist at all. There is no fallacy involved here, says the text, "because we experience oneness and also experience viseṣa": we know it through our direct experience of the oneness of the distinction and what is distinguished by it. Jayatirtha calls viseșa the padartha-sakti,22 the 'power of the object' which acts as the representative or substitute of difference. In this arguing in favour of the notion of the one which is at the same time many, of the substance which is one with its qualities and yet different, of differences which exist only in a certain, qualified sense, we see something which is basically the same as stadvāda, although the Dvaitis have further elaborated the doctrime with additional terminology.
As I have mentioned earlier, Dvaita accepts the svataḥ-prāmāṇya of knowledge, meaning that any piece of knowledge is to be considered truthful until and unless proven untrue. Truthfulness is known through the säkşin or witness, the ultimate pramāṇa. This is an aspect of the soul, is therefore also called the svarupendriya and is described as jñānarūpa, pramatṛsvarūpa and ātmasvarūpa or 'of the nature of the self', 23 This last description is most interesting, since here again we
20 D. Prahladachar (ed.), Srimadanandatirthabhagavat padaviracitah Gitatat paryanirnayah, Bangalore: Purnaprajna Vidyapitha, 1987, p. 208.
21 Jayatirtha's Nyayadipika on the Gitatatparyanirnaya, p. 210.
22 P. Nagaraja Rao (ed., tr.), Vadavali by Jayatirtha, Adyar : The Adyar Library, 1943, 471, p. 134.
23 PL, p. 123.