Jain Journal 1982 10

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 13

OCTOBER, 1982
principle of relative pluralism and empiricism in ascertaining the nature of Reality as the Jainas.
In this connection it may be mentioned that the Jaina view of Reality comes very close to the views of some Western idealists like Hegel and Bradley, who, too, do not find any contradiction when qualities of opposed nature co-exist in a thing. Hegel says, “Everything contains within itself its opposite. It is impossible to conceive of anything without conceiving anything of its opposite. A cow is a cow, and is at the same time not a cat. A thing is itself only because at the sametime it is not something else. Every thesis for an agrument has its anti-thesis. Truth lies on both sides of every question. The truth is either sided. All nature is a reconciliation of opposites.” Bradley observes : “The object possesses this diversity, so far, all together and at once. The qualities thus seem simply joined and are called compatible ... The object has these qualities. It has them one and now another, according to the conditions."
The only difference between the Jainas and the idealist thinkers lies in this that the view of the former are governed by their ontology of realistic pluralism where as the views of Hegel or Bradley stem out of their monistic idealistic thought.
Bertrand Russel, while discussing the 'Nature of Matter' makes a sharp distinction of physical objects in their private spaces and those that are in public spaces. According to him, in the sphere of epistemology, we are ordinarily concerned with the existence of objects in their private spaces and their true pature as is given to experience, is ascertained in accordance with the different stand-points of the observer although their intrinsic nature “which is what concerns science most be in real space, not the same as anybody's apparent space". As a matter of fact an existent entity in the real space, which is primarily public, transcends a percipients view. What one is ordinarily concerned is whithin therefore, a thing in its private space which varies according to the different points of view or nayas the Jaina might say. Russell says, "A circular coin for example though we should always judge it as to be circular, will look oval unless we are straight in front of it... In different people's private spaces the same objects seem to have different shapes."
The ordinary percipient beings are concerned only with the sensedata concerning knowledge of physical objects. The relative position