Jain Journal 1982 10

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 12

JAIN JOURNAL
Thus the above schools of thought advocate views which conflict with one another. As a reconciliation between the conflicting claims of the above thinkers, the Jainas introduce their celebrated doctrine of anekāntavāda.
The Jainas find the views of the Vedantins, the Buddhists or Vaisesikas as one-sided and partial, for each one of them lays emphasis either on the permanent nature of Being or on the changing modes. But according to Jainism, nature of Reality is permanent in-change. The nature of Reality (sat, substance, dravya) is characterised by trio of origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dharuvya) that it is both permanent and impermanent at one and the same time. Again dravya possesses some permanent qualities as well as some changing ones. The permanent qualities are the essential qualities of the substance, they are eternal and the changing qualities are the modes of the substance. The permanent qualities of the self for example, are conciousness (caitanya), etc. The changing qualities of the self are for example, the different thoughts and ideas. The permanent qualities are called guna and the changing qualities are called paryāya. The Jaina's stand thus is looked upon from the point of view of the qualities which constitute it, or from that of the modes or modifications which constantly occuring in those qualities. This view is a blended form of the completely static view of the Vedantins and the completely dynamic view held by the Buddhists. Jaina philosophy steers clear its way between these extremist views. This gives, in a nutshell, the main metaphysical tenet of anekāntavāda, which the Jainas advocate, regarding the nature of Reality.
Several objections have been raised by the Advaita Vedantins and Ramanuja, against the view of anekāntavāda. They object, how the nature of Reality can be considered to be inclusive of attributes both existent and non-existent, which are contradictory to each other?
As an answer to this objection, the Jaina philosophers remark that the Real is simply composed of infinite attributes and what is not so, is also not any existent entity. In experience we get examples of co-existing conflicting attributes. For instance, the branches may be in motion but the tree does not move. The same individual may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y.
It may be mentioned that this peculiar feature of Jaina logic of anekāntavāda has a great similarity to the views of some leading contemporary Western thinkers, who also seem to have been guided by the