Jain Journal 1980 07

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 32

JULY, 1980
23
cal and linguistic analysis in their own way. Likewise, Jainas in their own way have made remarkable contributions in this direction as well, to some extent.
After making these critical observations, now we come to the Jaina logic—specially to the doctrine of nayas. Both pramāņa and naya have been given their due by Jaina philosophers, Umasvami rightly thus asserted : “Pramāņa nayairadhigamah.”4 This means that pramāna and naya play their roles in right knowledge. Pramāņa is the means of valid knowledge whereas naya is the standpoint from which one knows things and beings. This conception of naya is the unique feature of Jaina logic and epistemology but the problem of pramāņa is tackled by all systems of Indian philosophy. So, the doctrine of naya deserves special attention here. Before discussing this doctrine further, it would be proper here to distinguish naya from nikşepa because both appear to be relative concepts. It is rightly observed in this context thus : “Nikşepa is an aspect of the thing itself. Naya is a point of view from which we make some statement about the thing. ... If we consider the statement merely as such, its point of view is naya ; if we consider the fact which justifies the point of view it is niksepa.”5 So, it becomes clear that naya is the standpoint of the knower which gives partial or relative knowledge of a thing. Here we may make it more clear and consistent by pointing out that Jainas propound the theory of anekantavāda and they hold that things have infinite aspects and only a Kevali (omniscient being) can know things in its all aspects with all its ramifications. Ordinary imperfect beings can know things only partially from a particular point of view. So, they advocate this doctrine of naya. Thus, the doctrine of naya may be considered to be the logical corollary of the doctrine of anekantavāda.
Before this is further discussed, it may be mentioned here that Siddhasena Divakara was perhaps the first Jaina writer on systematic logic. Samantabhadra (607 A.D.) wrote Aptamimānsā and this is concerned with exhaustive and critical exposition of the Jaina doctrine of naya, specially syād-vāda or sapta-bhangi-naya. Umasvami and other Jaina philosophers have also treated this problem of naya quite clearly and critically.
Tatvartha Sutram, 6 (p. 13) by Umaswami, edited by J. L. Jaini (Republished by Barrister Champat Rai Jaina Trust, Delhi, 1956). A source book in Indian Philosophy, p. 253. (edited by S. Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, Princeton, New Jersey, 1957).