Jain Journal 1980 07

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 35

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nor agnosticism as some might think it to be. Similarly, it has to be distinguished from the pragmatic theory of judgement as advocated by Schiller. This is because Schiller and other pragmatists naturally have idealistic leaning whereas Jainas are avowedly realists. So, this is the theory of realistic relativism.
JAIN JOURNAL
Now, we see that the doctrine of saptabhangi naya is the most important application of this theory of syādvāda. We have pointed out earlier that Samantabhadra (600 A.D.) has presented an exhaustive and critical exposition of this doctrine in his celebrated work Aptamīmānsā. Umasvami and other Jaina scholars also attached considerable importance to this doctrine in their works. Bhadrabahu has also mentioned this doctrine in his Sutra-kṛtānga-niryukti." This doctrine formulates the following seven forms of judgement :
1. Syat asti-May be, it is.
2. Syāt nāsti-May be, it is not.
3. Syat asti nästi-May be, it is and is not.
4. Syar avaktavyah-May be, it is indescribable.
5. Syat astica avaktavyah-May be, it is and is indescribable.
6. Syāt nāstica avaktavyah-May be, it is not and is indescribable. 7. Syat astica nastica avaktavyah-May be, it is, is not and is indescribable.
The first two forms are simple affiramative and simple negative forms of judgements and the rest are more or less combinations of these two basic or elementary forms of judgements or propositions. We shall try to explain and illustrate them further. As shown earlier, the significance of this theory is that our knowledge regarding anything is relative or conditional. It contains only relative or partial truth. To consider it as absolutely true would be fallacious. Dr. Mahadevan rightly observes thus: "The doctrine of nayas wants us to take into account the standpoint from which an object is understood. If this is ignored, confusion and error will result, i.e., there would be nayabhāsa (fallacy of naya)." Perhaps, Jaina philosophers held that other schools of Indian philosophy like Vedantins and Buddhists were ekantavadins and that is why, they advocated doctrines of eternalism and momentariness as unconditionally true. But, it is unfortunate that even Jainas themselves did not fully follow the implications of their doctrines of anekāntavāda and syādvāda in the field of metaphysics. Dr. Ruth Reyna has rightly observed thus:
11 Vide Dr. Satischandra Vidyabhusan's book, A History of Indian Logic, p. 167. 12 Op. cit., p. 93.
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