Jain Journal 1980 07

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 36

JULY, 1980
"The theory that reality and interpretation are inseparable suggests that the Jaina metaphysics are monistic rather than pluralistic, and unless the Jainas can point to an Absolute Reality which projects and particularizes itself in the objects of the world, it betrays its own logic and elevates a relative view into an absolute truth."13 Dr. Radhakrishnan and Prof. Hiriyanna also see the same defect here.
Before we come to other critical observations, we should like to make some general observations regarding the doctrine of naya. Firstly, it is desirable to discuss these seven forms more clearly and critically. We
een that the first two forms are of simple affirmative and simple negative judgements. A thing (say, a pot) exists from a particular point of view (its substance, place, time and mode) and likewise it does not exist from another point of view (from the point of view of another substance etc.). Again, it (say, the pot) may be said to exist and not exist if both earlier points of views are made successively. If these two points of views are made, not successively but simultaneously, then the thing is said to be indescribable. The remaining three forms are combinations of 'indescribable with 'is', 'is not' and 'is and is not respectively. Thus, they propound this theory of seven forms of judgements, which is perhaps unique in the history of logic. Perhaps, nobody else has given such unique and important theory in the history of logic. Naturally, Jainas are very much proud of this doctrine. Mrs. Stevenson has also aptly remarked : “The Jainas claim not to be Ekāntavadin..., but Anekāntavādin....., and the part of their philosophy of which they
most proud is the Saptabhangi Naya."'14 As a matter of fact, its importance and uniqueness can hardly be denied. No doubt, sometimes some scholars including Samkara and Ramanuja have seen contradictions and absurdity here. They have held that according to this formulation, contradictory attributes are ascribed to the same object at the same time. But this is not the fact. This simply means that the thing is of complex nature and is endowed with infinite attributes and so any judgement about the thing is only partially or relatively true from the particular point of view. 'A' may be red from one particular point of view. 'A' may be ‘not-red' from another point of view. So, in reality, there is no contradiction or absurbity. As a matter of fact, this is simply the theory of logical relativism. So, all the criticisms and charges against this celebrated doctrine can be considered to be misplaced and misdirected.
Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p. 93, by Ruth Reyna, M.A., Ph.D. (TataMcGraw Hill Publishing Co., Ltd., Bombay-New Delhi, 1971). The Heart of Jainism, p. 91, by Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson (Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1915).