Jain Journal 1968 10

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 35

80
ruction and otherwise, the substance would be two as ghata and pata, not one which removes abhedatva with them." Further he says, if the bhedabheda is accepted, the bheda (difference) would be fictitious due to not leaving the abheda (identity), and hence abheda would be proved as false in character. Here Arcata thinks in terms of ubhayavada that if the substance and modes are completely different, all the evils of both the "identity-view and difference-view" will play upon this conception.11
JAIN JOURNAL
Here, the Buddhist philosophers misunderstood the theory of Syādvāda, since they treated the dual characteristic of the nature of reality as absolutely different from each other. This theory originally belonged to the Vaiseṣikas, and not to the Jainas. The theory of the Vaiseşikas called ubhayavāda is criticised by the Jainas themselves, who observed in it the defects of self-contradiction, commingling, doubt etc. The Buddhist philosophers have found the very same defects in the Jaina theory of Syadväda.
The foremost argument against this doctrine is the violation of the Law of Contradiction, which means that "be" and "not be❞ cannot exist together. But the Jainas do not accept this formula in toto. They say that the validity of the Laws of Thoughts should be considered by the testimony of experience (samvedana) and not by pre-conception. Experience certifies that the dual character of entities exists in respect of its own individuality and does not exist apart from and outside this nature (sarvamasti svarūpeṇa pararūpeṇa nāsti ca) as we have already seen. In relativistic standpoint both, being and non-being can exist together. Everything is real only in relation to and distinction from every other thing. The Law of Contradiction is denied absolutely in this respect. The point is only that the absolute distinction is not a correct view of things according to Jainism.
Dharmakirti urged with regard to the universal-cum-particular character of reality that this theory compelled one to recognize the curd and camel as one entity. In connection with the fallacious middle term (hetvābhāṣa) Akalanka points out that the Buddhist philosophers discover defects to censure the Jainas on the basis of invalid arguments (mithyājāti).12 For instance Dharmakirti ignores the formula "sarvo
11 abhedasya parityage bhedan syat kalpanakratah tasya'vitathabhve va syadabhede mrsarthata bhedabhedoktadosasca tayoristau katham na va
pratyekam ye prasajyante dvayorbhave katham na te-HBT. v. 20 & 25, p. 106. 12 bhutadosasyodbhavayitumasakyatvena asaddusanenodbhavanam sa jatih-Nyayaviniscaya-vivarana, vol. ii p. 233.