Jain Journal 1968 10

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 33

JAIN JOURNAL
Karnakagomin also tried to show the defects in the Jainas' theory of universal-cum-particular character or ürdhvatāsāmānyātmaka and tir yakasāmānyātmaka vastu. He then rejected the theory saying that there should be either abheda or atyantābheda. Both characters cannot co-exist in the same substance. Hence the urdhvatāsāmānya could be destroyed because things are not permanent.
As regards tiryakasämānya, that is also defective in character in his opinion. He says : if the universality were in the substance, the ghata (pot) and pața(linen) or dadhi (curd) and ușțra (camel) would be identical. Hence a shape of a water-pot should be found in cloth and a curd-eater should consume a camel. Therefore Syādvāda doctrine is false (mithyavāda) in his opinion.
(2) The second point is that the triple character (production, destruction, and permanence) of reality in Jainism is itself a self-contradictory formula, as it cannot be associated with reality, since a thesis is faulty on account of anvasthā-doșa (regressus ad infinitum).5
Prajnakaragupta (660-720 A.D.), the well-known commentator and a pupil of Dharmakirti also points out that origination, destruction and permanence cannot exist together. If it is destroyed how can it be a reality ; if it is permanent, how can there be destruction, and if it is permanent, it should always be borne in mind. He then argues that the reality cannot be realised as both eternal and non-eternal. It should be accepted as either eternal or non-eternal.6
Arcata follows the arguments of Nagarjuna and Prajnakaragupta. He says : origination and destruction cannot exist together in one dharm since they are contradiction in character. The argument “they take place relatively” would not solve the question, because, in the course of origination and destruction, permanence would not be there, and likewise in the presence of a pernament character the other two would be absent. Therefore a triple-charactered nature of reality as the Jainas assert, is not possible according to Arcata's way of thinking.?
• Pramanayartika Syavrtti Tika, p. 332-42. utpadadyastrayo vyasta nalam laksanakarmani samskrtasya samastasya rekatra kathamekada utpadasthitibhanganamanyat samskrtalaksanam
asti cedanvasthaivannasti cette na samskrtah-Madhyamika Karika, 45-46. • Pramanavartikalamkara, p. 142. ? Hetubindu Tika, p. 146.