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256 Harmless Souls different conclusions I draw from my own analysis, rather than offering any detailed criticism of Bhatt's thesis.
The difficulties presented to commentators by the juxtaposition within the text of gāthās containing contradictory 'two truths' doctrines should not be underestimated. Perhaps the most acute problem occurs in the attempt to accommodate the second pattern (where the vyavahāra and niscaya views contradict each other) to standard Jaina teachings about bondage. If there is really no contact between the self and karma, how is bondage to be explained? (Underlying this is the even more fundamental problem of Jaina philosophy, viz. how can the immaterial (the self] and the material [karma) ever really be said to be in contact?)
From the perspective of practical soteriology it might be objected that the important thing is the nonidentification of the self with karmic matter and that the ontological status of the two is not strictly relevant. That is to say, whether or not there is actual contact between them, the liberating 'action' is for the self to maintain an attitude of absolute separateness from matter. However, such a claim can hardly be sustained theoretically unless it is also claimed that in reality - i.e. ontologically - there is no relation between them. Liberating knowledge (gnosis) is knowledge of the way things really are; there has to be a correspondence between what is known and what is the case. In other words, transferred to the philosophical or theoretical level (which in the Indian tradition is where they are propagated and defended against criticism) soteriological and ethical doctrines entail ontological or metaphysical counterparts.
The type of problem arising can be illustrated by the following. Gāthā 19 [= 22] of the Samayasāra reads:
So long as there is the understanding 'I am in or I am identical with karmic and quasi-karmic [body] matter, etc. [no-karman],' there is
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