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Kundakunda: The Samayasāra 259
reads:
From the vyavahāra view the self is the agent and experiencer (of the effects) of material karma; but from the niscaya view the self is the agent and experiencer through mental states which have arisen from karma.
This differs from Samayasāra (24) (see above) in that it makes it clear that, according to this niscaya view, particular bhāvas which arise in the self, of which it is the agent or material cause, and which, in turn, are the causes of bondage, only do so through the instrumental influence of pudgala-karman. That is to say, the niścaya view presented here [Niyamasāra 18] corresponds to what Jayasena calls the aśuddha-niścaya-naya. In this way the connection between material karma and the self is kept, but mediated or attenuated through mental states (bhāva). Such a reading clearly belongs to the first vyavahāra-niscaya pattern.
None of this, of course, comes any closer to explaining how. pure consciousness (self) can be subject to impure thought-activity in the first place; all it does do is offer an apparently arbitrary explanation of how the soul, from the niścaya point of view, can be said to be both pure and impure at the same time. In other words, faced in the same text with the two vyavahāra-niscaya patterns outlined above, Jayasena tries to run them together by designating as aśuddha-niscaya-naya what would be considered a vyavahāra view from the perspective of the second pattern. But logically - as perhaps Amrtacandra recognised in avoiding the juxtaposition of these gāthās (Samayasāra 1924 and [23]-[24]) - this makes no difference. The contradictions are unresolved and the problem is left hanging.
Why then did Jayasena feel it so important to attempt to reconcile the two views instead of following what would be a logical solution, that of pattern two - viz. to maintain that in reality the self does not have and cannot have impure
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