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Nyāyabhāșya) Dharmakīrti has ruled out the possiblity to know any type of object with the help of any type of valid cognition, because it is redundant and dispensable..
A second thought should be given for deciding the school of Dharmakīrti, to which he belonged to, Nyāya-bindu should not be ignored. Categorical presentation is made as under :Vijñānavadin's objection:
Existence of the external object, independent to the subject or vijñāna, is known when it is perceived hence external objects existence is not real. It is the reality of experience of knowing only. The Objects exist because they are knwon. Dharmakīrti answers:
1. 'ete niyatasya arthasya pradarsake tena te (pratyakşamanumānam-ca) pramāņe nanyd vijñānam. 16,
2. ‘arthasya ca pratibhāsahetutvāt niyatam pratibhāsam.'17 3. ‘arthasarupyamasya prmāņam'18 4. 'tat sārūpyatadutpattibhyām viņayatvam'.
There are two things - (a) cause of the knowledge (b) cause of the existence of the object (thing) itself. Reality of external objects common to all minds is easily proved. Cognition and object are two different identities.
4. 'jñānasahaburevārtho bhogyatvāt sukhādivat'-external objects are also co-existentive with their cognitions.
Above references prove that Dharmakīrti was an advocate of 'Bahyārtha-Astitva-Vāda' and not of Vijñānavāda.
There is not a single passage in Dhramakīrti's works that should be understood as a statement of unmistakably Madhymika character and content. Ernest steinkeliner (vienna)" also concludes that there is no sufficient evidence to prove Dharmakīrti as a Madhyamika.
16. NBT, I.1;12 17. NBT,1.5 18. NB, 1.20 19. "Is Dharmakirti a Madhyamika", Earliest Buddism and Madhymika (Ed.)
Davidseyfort ruegg and Lambest schmithausem. Leiden, 1990, p. 92
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