Book Title: Antarvyapti Interpreted in Jainism
Author(s): Atsushi Uno
Publisher: Z_Nirgranth_Aetihasik_Lekh_Samucchay_Part_1_002105.pdf and Nirgranth_Aetihasik_Lekh_Samucchay_Part_2

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________________ 'Antarvyāpti' Interpreted in Jainism 311 by Ratnaprabha), and the Pramānamimāmsā (abbr. PrM) by Hemacandra (1089-1172). The description of antarvyāpti in the NyA has been taken over in the PNT almost ad verbatim, yet it may hardly be possible to grasp the meaning of the verse without the help of commentaries. It is due to the ambiguity of the expression that came to allow different interpretat about the verse. Though the idea of antarvyāpti took its rise in Jainism, it is a wonder that the term itself disappeared in later Jaina works. However, Ratnakaraśānti of the later Buddhist logic employed this term antarvyảpti. His way of using the antarvyāpti is somewhat different from that of Jainism and it is, as it were, a modified "kevalānvayi” inference of the NyāyaVaiśesika school. This thesis aims at having a general look at the Vivíti and later Jaina works in order to clarify the purport of Siddhasena's antarvyāpti. Before entering the main issue, I would like to give an outline of the syllogistic form of Indian logic and my opinion of antarvyāpti. Technical terms used for the definition of antarvyāpti will be understood in the following way. Antah (internal example) indicating paksa or the subject of argument, and vyāpti residing in the antaḥ is antarvyāpti. Opposite term for "antarvyāpti" is "bahirvyāpti" (or bāhyavyāpti : external invariable concomitance), residing in the bahiḥ. The bahiḥ (external example; the basis other than paksa) refers to the twofold example, which is to be cited as the third member of the syllogism. When one accepts the function of the antarvyāpti, the mention of bahir-drstānta (the external example) as well as of bahirvyāpti (external variable concomitance) is cumbersome. That is, the external example (bahih) is useless. Inference is divided into two : inference for oneself (svārthấnumána) and inference for others (parārthănumāna). The former, being useful for oneself and primarily non-verbal, functions in one's consciousness only. That is, inferential knowledge of probandum (sādhya), secured by the cognition of probans (hetu; smoke) and of invariable concomitant + He was the disciple of Devasüri of Brhad-gaccha. The date of Ratnakaravatārikā is c. A. D. 1165. — Editors. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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