Antarvyapti Interpreted in Jainism

Author(s): Atsushi Uno
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‘Antarvyāpti’ Interpreted in Jainism
Atsushi Uno
The term "antarvyāpti" used in the syllogism of Jaina logic is, together with the opposite term "bahirvyāpti", found in the Jaina and the Buddhist texts alone. Among scholars, there is a great divergence of opinions on the first user of the term. To the best of my understanding, the Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasen. Divākara (the 8th century)* was the first to use the term. The Nyāyāvatāra (abbr. Nya), a short manual of Jaina logic cast in 32 verses, mentions the antarvyāpti immediately after two verses treating two kinds of drstāntas.
antarvyāptyaiva sādhyasya siddher bahir-udāhrtih i
vyarthā syāt tad-asadbhāve'py evaṁ nyāya-vido viduḥ 1120||
[Running rendering] When the establishment of probandum (sādhya) is secured exclusively by internal variable concomitance (antarvyāpti), the citation of external example (bahir-udāhrti) will be useless. And such will also be the case even when internal concomitance is absent (or unknown). Thus say those who are conversant with logic.
The NyA has a sole commentary Vivști by Siddharşi (c. A. D. 906) and it has a sub-commentary Tippana by Devabhadra (the latter half of the 12th century) scarcely referring to the verse under consideration. Among the subsequent Jaina works which developed the theory of antarvyāpti on the basis of the NyA and the Vivrti are : the Pramānanayatattvāloka (abbr. PNT) by Devasūri (1080-1169), its auto-commentary the Syādvādaratnākara (abbr. SyR), its abridged commentary the Ratnākarāvatārikā (abbr. RaA;
* Siddhasena Divākara, as recent researches show, was not the author of the Nyāyāvatāra but of Nayāvatāra. He was either Siddharsi alias Siddhasena (late 9th-early 10th cent.) or may be some other pre-medieval Siddhasena. — Editors.

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by Ratnaprabha), and the Pramānamimāmsā (abbr. PrM) by Hemacandra (1089-1172). The description of antarvyāpti in the NyA has been taken over in the PNT almost ad verbatim, yet it may hardly be possible to grasp the meaning of the verse without the help of commentaries. It is due to the ambiguity of the expression that came to allow different interpretat about the verse.
Though the idea of antarvyāpti took its rise in Jainism, it is a wonder that the term itself disappeared in later Jaina works. However, Ratnakaraśānti of the later Buddhist logic employed this term antarvyảpti. His way of using the antarvyāpti is somewhat different from that of Jainism and it is, as it were, a modified "kevalānvayi” inference of the NyāyaVaiśesika school.
This thesis aims at having a general look at the Vivíti and later Jaina works in order to clarify the purport of Siddhasena's antarvyāpti. Before entering the main issue, I would like to give an outline of the syllogistic form of Indian logic and my opinion of antarvyāpti.
Technical terms used for the definition of antarvyāpti will be understood in the following way. Antah (internal example) indicating paksa or the subject of argument, and vyāpti residing in the antaḥ is antarvyāpti. Opposite term for "antarvyāpti" is "bahirvyāpti" (or bāhyavyāpti : external invariable concomitance), residing in the bahiḥ. The bahiḥ (external example; the basis other than paksa) refers to the twofold example, which is to be cited as the third member of the syllogism. When one accepts the function of the antarvyāpti, the mention of bahir-drstānta (the external example) as well as of bahirvyāpti (external variable concomitance) is cumbersome. That is, the external example (bahih) is useless.
Inference is divided into two : inference for oneself (svārthấnumána) and inference for others (parārthănumāna). The former, being useful for oneself and primarily non-verbal, functions in one's consciousness only. That is, inferential knowledge of probandum (sādhya), secured by the cognition of probans (hetu; smoke) and of invariable concomitant
+ He was the disciple of Devasüri of Brhad-gaccha. The date of Ratnakaravatārikā is c. A. D. 1165. — Editors.

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(vyāpti). The latter, however, primarily verbal (vacanātmaka) in nature, being useful to convince the opponent (prativādin) of the knowledge of the probandum (sādhya). But each school of Indian logic came to tend to decrease the number of syllogism in later times, though such decrease depends on the faculty of opponents.
(i) pratijñā (argument) : the mountain has fire,
The argument itself is called paksa, and the subject (mountain) is also called pakșa. Fire which is predicate of the argument is called probandum (sādhya), and the mountain possessing fire (dharmin; Sp) is sometimes sādhya.
(ii) hetu (reason) : because of smoke.
Generally "reason," which enables one to obtain the inferential knowledge, is expressed by the ablative case of hetu (e.g. smoke) as a phrase. It is also called sādhana or sādhaka.
However, how does the opponent (prativădin) act upon hearing pratijñā and heru succeedingly ? Does he not show any effect or response, saying to himself "what about smoke ?" It may be because he does not know invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between smoke and fire, or he may come to know the vyāpti only after he is shown any example like a kitchen. [Three cases, on the part of the opponent, will be introduced later.)
If the opponent is, after hearing the hetu, aware of the fact that there is fire wherever smoke occurs, he is compelled to construct in his mind the idea of vyāpti. However, this vyāpti is not expressed verbally by either the speaker (vādin; instructor) or the opponent (prativadin). This vyāpti is not installed in the syllogism as an independent member, though happening after the two members. Some are of the opinion that this vyšpti is included in the third member "udāharana" (or drstānta), but I do not accept this opinion. For drstānta should be literally an instance of basis on which to affirm the vyāpti. However, the paksa (subject of the argument; e.g. mountain) eventually comes to be regarded as the locus of the vyāpti, and the inference finishes. Thus any school of Indian logic beginning with the Nyāya-Vaišeșika generally accepts the drstānta as any locus outside the paksa, but does not consider the paksa to be a drstānta.

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There is almost no material referring to the function of drstänta, but it is used as the third member, convincing the [dull-minded] opponent of the locus of vyāpti which comes from the preceding two members. The ambiguous character of the drstānta is originally derived from other reasons, which will be referred to later.
However, is the drstänta an indispensable member to the opponent of slow understanding in the inference for others ? I shall show some instances of establishing the probandum (inferential knowledge) even without the help of drstānta. (1) In the three-membered syllogism of Western logic, the major premise
(equivalent to vyāpti; M - P) and the minor premise (roughly equivalent to pakşadharmatā; S - M) are necessary for acquiring the conclusion (inferential knowledge; S. P), dispensing with any example.
(3)
(2) In the case of Indian logic, later Buddhism, the Mimāṁsaka, and
the Śänkara-Vedānta accept vyāpti (hetu sādhya) and paksadharmată (hetu + paksa) only for acquiring inferential knowledge, omitting drstāna. [The antecedent here is meant to occur in the consequent.] The Nyaya-Vaiśesika accepts parāmarśa by combining the abovementioned two elements into one. That is, vyāpti-viśistapaksadharmatā-jñānam (the knowledge of paksadharmatā possessed of vyāpti).
As has been shown above, to accept the existence of the vyāpti in the antaḥ (paksa) exclusively is antarvyāpti, without approving of the function of bahiḥ and bahirvyāpti as the main cause (gamaka) of inferential knowledge.

Drstānta (or udaharana), the third member of the syllogism, was originally set forth in the Nyāyasutra (abbr. NS) and the Nyāyabhāsya (abbr. NBh), and was quite different in nature from what generally has been understood in later schools of logic.

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In the NS and the NBh, the dharmin of pratijñă (e.g, mountain) is compared with either homogeneous example (e.g. kitchen) or heterogeneous example (e.g. pond) by virture of sādharmya (e.g. smoke) or vaidharmya (e.g. -smoke) between the two (dharmin and drstānta), one analyses in the dharmin fire. Inference in the NS and the NBH is, strictly speaking, not inference, but analogy in nature, and has nothing to do with vyāpti in the process of thinking. NS 1..34 : Whatever establishes the probandum (Sp or p), on the basis
of the similarity with the [homogeneous) example (in accordance that probandum possesses similarity with the example) is the probans (hetu; M).
NBh 1.1.34: Whatever establishes the probandum i.e., dharma (S or Sp) in
accordance with the similarity with the example is probans (hetu, smoke). By perceiving a certain dharma (e.g. smoke) in the probandum (subject; mountain) and the same dharma in the example (e.g. kitchen), what describes that it (smoke) establishes the probandum (Sp or P) is probans (hetu).
(Comment) Accoding to the NBh, probandum (sādhya) is used in two ways, by indicating first S, and then Sp or P.
NS 1.1.35: In similar manner, whatever establishes the probandum (Sp
or P) is the probans (hetu), on the basis of the dissimilarity with the [heterogeneous) example (e.g. pond) (in accordance that probandum (mountain) does not possess similarity with example).
NS 1.7.36:
On the basis of the similarity with probandum (sādhya; dharmin; S, mountain), whatever things possess the dharmas (e.g. smoke) of the probandum (mountain) is (homogeneous] example.
NS 1.1.37 :
On the basis of the dissimilarity with probandum (sādhya; dharmin; S, mountain), whatever things possess things other than the dharmas (e.g. smoke) of the probandum (mountain) is [heterogeneous) example.

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NyA, Vivrti Here a summary of Vivíti will be introduced.
based on Vivrti : (1) When the opponent remembers the Vyāpti, since the probandum
(sādhya) is established by antarvyāpti (vyāpti in the paksa), external
example (bahih) is useless to mention. (2) Even when the vyāpti is not known to the opponent, since antaryāpti
is absent (or not known) external example (bahih) is useless to mention. Thus the expert on logic says. (20)
(Running rendering] When the opponent forgets the vyāpti, example is mentioned for him. Otherwise (if he does not forget the vyāpti) it is not the case (example is not mentioned). "Otherwise" means (1) the opponent remembers the vyāpti (is versant with the vyāpti) or (2) he is ignorant of the vyāpti. In the case (1), the example is not mentioned. For when the opponent remembers the hetu (probans) which is avinäbhāvin of the probandum (inseparable from probandum), he knows the probans (hetu) in the paksa also. He necessarily comes to know the probandum in the paksa.
Thus the vyāpti in antah (paksa) establishes invariably probandum, and the vyāpti outside the paksa (bahirvyāpti) is useless to mention, In the case (2), antarvyāpti is either absent or unknown and it is useless to mention the "bahih" (external example). For an observation of the coëxistence in a certain place cannot entail the establishment of the vyāpti (coëxistence) in all places, vyabhicāra being observable. Thus when the opponent (student; prativādin) is ignorant of the vyāpti, the vyāpti is first to be grasped by means of tarka (as pramāna), and then comes the sādhya-siddhi.
[Comment) According to the Vivrti, the opponents are divided into two groups, and example is considered useful or useless in conformity to these divisions :
I.
One who forgets tho vyāpti (vismrta-sambandha)
External example is useful to mention.

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II.
One who does not forget the vyāpti (avismrta-sambandha)
(a) One who remembers the vyāpti (smaryamāna-sambandha)
External example (or external vyảpti) is useless, since the antarvyāpti here functions.
(b) One who is ignorant of the vyāpti (agrhīta-sambandha)
Pramāņa "tarka" is first necessary to enable the opponent to know the vyāpti. So bahirvyāpti is useless, and antarvyāpti does not function.
Vivrti regards antarvyāpti as principal. It rather neglects bahirvyāpti, than regards it as subordinate. In accordance with antarvyāpti under varied conditions, bahirvyāpti is taken cumbrous or impossible and eventually useless (vyartha). Even in the case (1), the Vivsti does not even refer to the dull-minded opponent. Vivrti's view-point may be diagrammed as follows : [0 = obtainable, * = unobtainable] (1) The first “useless'
(a) antarvyāpti (0) bahirvyāpti (0) cumbrous useless
(b) antarvyāpti (0) bahirvyāpti (X) impossible useless (II) The second "useless"
(c) antarvyāpti (X) bahirvyāpti (X) impossible useless Rendering
As for the problem under consideration, the NyA does not describe directly remaining members "upanaya”, “nigamana", and "corroborative five members”, because this treatise aims at brevity, yet they may be conjectured by the sharp-minded on the basis of the described those members. For so far as the form and the number of members are concerned, the description may be divided into three : the lowest (jaghanya; simple), the middle (madhyama; ordinary) and superior (utkrsta; detailed). The lowest is the description of the hetu only, the middle is the description of two members and so forth, and the superior is the description of all the ten members. Here the middle description of members are described directly, and the lowest (simplest) and the superior (detailed) descriptions of members are indirectly suggested, because there is proof.

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(Comment] Though three kinds may be based on the form and number, these three kinds may be applicable to opponents' intelligence in the reverse order. "Suddhi" (corroboration; correctness) in the five corroborative members such as "pratijñā-suddhi' etc., is referred to by the NBh and the Nijjutti of Bhadrabāhu (5th cent. A. D.). Five members being added by five corroborative members, they may have eventually accepted tenmembered syllogism. It is doubtful whether ten members withstood the practical use.
III
Later Works : PNT (SYR, RaA), PrM
After the Vivrti's opinion, I would like to introduce antarvyäpti's theory taught in the later Jaina works. The Nya and the PNT are substantially almost the same. In the NYA primary cause of “sādhyasiddhi" (inference) is antarvyāpti, while in the PNT it is the probans (hetu) and the sub-cause is regarded as antarvyāpti. In the PNT the term "bahirvyāpti" appears for the first time. [It is worth to note the next points. In the later Nyāya school the karana of inferential knowledge has undergone change in the following order: hetu → vyāpti → vyāpti-jñāna → parāmarśa.]
When, on the basis of antarvyāpti, the probans (hetu) can or cannot establish the probandum (sādhya), it is useless to mention the bahrvyāpti. (antarvyāptyā hetuh sādhya-pratyāyane saktāśaktāu ca bahirvyāpter udbhāvanam vyartham iti //111.371/)

If the probans establishes the probandum, based on antarvyāpti exclusively, bahirvyāpti is useless. (It mentions three examples.)
(I)

"Here is fire.” (asty atrāgnih)

"Where there is fire, there only exists (is intelligible). (saty-evāgnau dhūmopapattih)
(II)
"That my son is speaking outdoors" (mat-putro 'yam bahir-avasthito vakti) "Otherwise such voice is unintelligible." (anyathaivam bhūta-svarāupapattih]

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When by only using such either (positive vyäpti) or (negative vyāpti), sharp-minded (vyutpanna-mati) opponent can establish probandum (inference).
(III)

“This woman's unborn baby is a boy." (etasyāḥ strio garbhātyarn pumān) "because of being her baby." (etad-apatyatvāt) "Like other babies who are known as boys." (prasiddha-pumstvetatarāpatyavat)
For in these examples, even if in the presence of bahirvyāpti antarvyāpti is not obtainable, probans (hetu) is not considered to be the main cause (gamaka) of the probandum (inferential knowledge).
In the third example, "saty-eva pumstve etat-apatyatvāt" should be valid probans (hetu). So, such valid antarvyāpti is doubted. Bahirvyāpti produced from such doubt, though determined, cannot produce anything (useless).
(Comment] I would like to test three examples one by one. Syllogisms mentioned in the first two examples are right. In the first example, hetu "smoke" is here omitted. The vyāpti being reducible to the form chetu sādhya> is antarvyāpti, residing in the paksa (here; mountain?). Here antarvyāpti being taken as principal, instructor (vādin) didn't dare to mention drstānta. Since the hetu (probans) is gamaka of inference, bahirvyāpti is useless so far as the form is concerned. It is a good example to show how antarvyāpti or bahirvyāpti functions in accordance with the absence of the presence of drstānta, in relation to two syllogisms having two members in common.
In the second example, vyāpti being shown in the form <-sādhya > -hetu> is (negative vyāpti). <-hetu> is "otherwise unintelligibility of such voice" (anyathā evambhūta-svarānupaparti), and <-sādhya> is "if he is not speaking outdoors" (bahir-vacanābhāva). Here any heterogeneous example is purposely neglected, and accordingly bahirvyāpti is not mentioned. Thus antarvyāpti existing in the paksa is functioning, the hetu is gamaka of inference.
In the third example, the hetu is apparently “asiddha-hetu" as well as "sopädhika-hetu”, and this hetu is not the cause (ghataka) of inference.

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If one is forced to say, the valid hetu should be "being boy" and "being her baby." Thus bahirvyāpti is useless.

(in the beginning of the RaA is mentioned a verse, which is a compromise between the NyA (20) and the PNT (111.37). The main. cause of inferential knowledge is considered to be antarvyāpti, and the term "bahya-vyapti" is mentioned instead of "bahirvyāpti.)
antarvyāptih săddhya-saktau bāhyavyāpter varnar vandhyam eva antarvyāptih sāddhya-āśaktau bāhyavyāpter varnam vandhyam eva |!
When on the basis of antarvyāpti the establishment of probandum is possible, the mention of bāhyavyāpti is useless. When on the basis of antarvyāpti the establishment of probandum is impossible, the mention of bāhyavyāpti is useless.
(Like the SyR, the RaA mentions two examples.)
(1)
"That my son is speaking outdoors” (mat-putro 'yam
bahir avasthito vakti)
"Otherwise such voice is unintelligible." (anyathaivam
bhūta-svarāupapattih] In this case though bahirvyāpti does not exist, antarvyāpti is accepted as gamaka of inferential knowledge. (II) "He (the unborn boy) is black.” (sa śyāmah)
"Because of being her baby." (tad-putrarvat)
"Like her other boys." (itara-tat-putratvat)
In this case, however, even though bahirvyāpti exists, it is not regarded as the main cause (ghataka) of inferential knowledge. (Comment] The first example is the same as the second one of the Syr. The second example is almost the same as the third one of the SyR. In the first example, the description seems misleading. Bahirvyāpti (vyatireka-vyäpti) and heterogeneous example do exist, though they are not described obviously.
PNT further describes two kinds of vyāpti (111.38, 39).

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Invariable concomitance of the hetu (M) with the sādhya (P) existent in the very object which is considered paksa (S) is antarvyāpti. On the other hand, invariable concomitance existent elsewhere is bahirvyāpti. (paksikrta eva visaye sādhanasya sādhyena vyāptir antarvyāptih; anyatra tu bahirvyāptih)
[Comment] Vyāpti being synonymous with vyāpyatā, it is a nature or a relation possessed by a pervaded (vyāpya). Therefore I translated "hetu's vyāpti with sādhya" etc.
For example : (1)
[
"Entity (vastu) is made up of many natures." (vastu anekāntātmakam) "Because it is sat.” (sattvāt) This is not expressed.] “Only when the entity is of many natures (sādhya), then sattva (hetu) is intelligible." (tathopapatti)
(II) "Because it has smoke." (dhūmavattvāt) "Whatever possesses smoke has fire." (sa evam sa evam) "Like a kitchen" (yathā pākasthānam)
[Comment] These two examples show antarvyāpti and bahirvyāpti respectively.
Syllogism (1) is lacking in drstänta, because entity (vastu) is highest connotation being synonymous with existent (sat) in Jainism. The sadhya is and the hetu is , and the vyāpti holding between such two notions is nothing but antarvyāpti, residing in the paksa (= vastu) only and not elsewhere.
Syllogism (2) is equipped with three members : pratijñā, hetu, drstānta, and positive-vyāpti existent in the outer example (bahirdrstānta), i.e., kitchen is bahirvyāpti.
Antarvyāpti has much to do with drstānta. Hemacandra in PrM first defined drstänta in three sūtras, discussed it in his own commentary and concluded that it is by no means indispensable to inference, and eventually referred to antaryāpti.

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"Drstānta is not the cause (anga) of inference" (1.1.18).
"Because inferential knowledge is established by the probans (sādhana) exclusively" (1.11.19). For inferential knowledge is produced from the cause (sādhana; hetu) which lacks drstānta and is inseparable from probandum (sådhya). So drstānta is by no means the cause of inference. For, drstānta is mentioned for the purpose of (1) getting the knowledge of the probandum, or (2) getting the knowledge of the vyāpti, or (3) making the opponent remember the vyāpti ? It is not the case (1), because the establishment of the probandum is secured by the above-mentioned probans (hetu) exclusively. And it is not the case (2), because the knowledge of the vyāpti is produced from the denial (exclusion) of the hetu in the heterogeneous example (vipaksa; vyatireka; what has not the probandum). And any drstānta is individual. How can individual drstānta totally communicate us the general vyāpti ? For other cases of vyāpti, another vyāpti is to be sought. Since that drstānta is also individual in nature, the decision of the whole is impossible, because drstānta being sought one by one may lead to regressus ad infinitum. And it is not the case (3). For those who are familiar with the vyāpti, the vyapti is to be remembered at the sight of the probans (hetu). For those who are ignorant with the vyāpti, the vyāpti cannot be remembered even at the sight of drstānta. For remembrance presupposes previous knowledge (fire) smoke : -fire )-smoke).
"Drstānta is the basis on which to show the opponent the vyāpti" (1.1.20)
[Question) If the drstānta is not the cause of the inferenial knowledge, why do you dare to give it a definiton ?
(Answer) For in order to satisfy the opponent's wish in the inference for others, exceptional drstānta will be allowed. And even in the field of inference for oneself, the definiton of drstänta is not entirely inappropriate in view of the fact that there may be a person who is helped to arrive at the knowledge of antarvyāpti from the observation of bahirvyāpti found in an example.
[Comment) it is the NS that showed the general definion of drstānta. However, the drtānta of later product in other schools being quite different in nature, is necessarily connected with the vyāpti. The definition of drstānta

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was hardly touched by Jaina and Buddhist texts, with an exception of Hemacandra and Devasūri. Frankly speaking, antarvyāpti is the vyāpti which is accepted directly in the paksa, not through the medium of any drstānta.
IV
The Naiyāyikas accept three lingas, upon which they put forth conventionally three kinds of inference. Among these is “kevalānvayi anumāna". It is explained in the Tarkasamgraha (* 48) as follows:
The linga which has vyāpti only positively (anvayenaiva) is called “kevalãnvayi linga”. For example, "A pot is nameable (abhidheya)”. “Because of knowableness (prameyatva)” “Like cloth (pațavat)", In this case, between the probandum (= abhidheyatva) and the probans (prameyatva) there is no negative vyāpti, because all things are nameable as well as knowable.
In the Naiyāyika's tradition, drstānta cannot be paksa, and when the paksa happens to be all things indicated by etc., any drstānta is not obtainable. In the above syllogism, the Naiyāyika might have purposely limited to “pot" etc. as the subject instead of or , in order to evade the difficulty of unavailability of drstānta. In the above-mentioned example (PNT 111.39) “sat is made up of many natures" will be considered to be a modified syllogism of the Naiyāyika's "kevalānvayi anumāna". Ratnākarśānti, a later Buddhist logician, holds antarvyāpti's doctrine for interpreting ksana-bhanga. That is, in the argument “Everything is momentary (Vastu kşaņikam)" he could not but seek for vyāpti in the paksa i.e., antarvyāpti. As has been explained, the establishment of probandum is eventually secured by confirmation of the vyāpti in the paksa. However, this problem being quite different in nature from the question whether antarvyāpti or bahirvyāpti, here will not be taken into consideration.
To sum up,
(1) When vyāpti is sought in the paksa, without accepting drstānta as a member, antarvyāpti functions.
(2) When vyāpti is sought in the drstānta, bahirvyāpti operates. (in order to make the opponent of slow understanding remember the vyāpti.)
(3) Even in two similar syllogisms (e.g. of smoke and fire), a) when it is furnished with drstānta bahirvyāti functions (PNT 111.39, the second

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'Antarvyapti' Interpreted in Jainism 323 example), b) when it lacks drstanta antarvyapti functions (SyR the second example). (4) Syllogism is lacking in drstanta, (i) because it is dependent on the prativadin's arbitrary (in accordance with the opponent's faculty), and not necessarily determined physically. (ii) when positive vyapti is unobtainable (SyR the second example, RaА the first example). (iii) when the paksa happens to be 'sarva', 'sat' etc., indicating the highest connotation (PNT 111 39, the first example; Buddhist's antarvapti-theory). 000