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## Gatha 312-314
## Jnanmargaga/393
"Just as one, two, many. In abundance, just as much rice, much lentil."
**Doubt:** The effect of many **avagraha** (grasping) and other types of knowledge is there, because knowledge is different for each object.
**Solution:** No, because if we accept this, then the question of the origin of knowledge of one object always arises.
**Doubt:** Is this the case?
**Solution:** No, because if we accept this, then the question of the origin of knowledge of one object will arise in the city, forest, and camp as well.
**Doubt:** Since there is one city, one forest, and one camp in the city, forest, and camp, respectively, and the use of the singular form cannot be otherwise, it is evident that these are not many?
**Solution:** No, because without **bahutva** (plurality), there is a contradiction in the origin of those three **pratyaya** (perceptions). Secondly, the singular form is a proof of oneness. There is no such thing. Because oneness is not seen in the **dhavādi** (trees, etc.) situated in the forest. To say that analogy is the cause of oneness is also not correct, because there is a contradiction there.
Secondly, in the opinion of one who believes that knowledge grasps only one meaning, does the origin of subsequent knowledge occur after the cessation of previous knowledge, or does the origin of subsequent knowledge occur without the cessation of previous knowledge? Without the cessation of previous knowledge, the origin of subsequent knowledge cannot occur, because there is a contradiction with the statement "Knowledge, being one-minded, knows one meaning," and if this happens, then the behavior of "this is different from that" is lost. Thirdly, in the opinion of one who believes that one knowledge does not have many objects as its subject, then the simultaneous grasping of the middle and index fingers will not lead to the relative behavior of long and short in relation to them. Fourthly, if we consider each knowledge to be fixed towards one meaning, then there will be the effect of doubt-knowledge arising from the fact that 'that' knowledge cannot be both-touching in the case of a pillar and a man. Fifthly, the origin of the knowledge of the action and the pot of the painter who paints a full pot and is skilled in painting cannot occur, because the origin of two, three knowledges simultaneously is not possible, because there is a contradiction in accepting this. Sixthly, the knowledge of the five fingers located in the **yogya-pradesh** (suitable place) cannot occur because the knowledge of many cannot occur simultaneously. To say that there is a difference in knowledge because there is a difference in the meaning that is known is also not correct, because one **trikoti** (three-cornered) **parinat** (transformed) knowledge with diverse nature is available. To say that the difference in power is the cause of the difference in objects is also not correct. Because they cannot be considered as objects because they do not have different meaning-actions.
Thus, grasping many objects simultaneously is **bahu-avagraha**. This **bahu-avagraha**...
**3. Dhavala**
**1. G.P. 13 p. 235; V.D.P. 6 p. 344.**
**2. G.P. 13 p. 235-236; B.C.P. 6 p. 346.**
**3. G.P. 13 p. 236; V. Dhavala P. p. 146, 150, 151.**