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## Knowledge Path / 387
It is not correct to say that *Iha* knowledge is unreliable; because *Iha* knowledge arises by grasping the object and it has knowledge of the linga (sign) related to the Dakshinatya and Udicya (south and north) regions. Therefore, since unreliability is not possible in it, there is a contradiction in considering it unreliable.
It is also not correct to say that *Iha* knowledge, which occurs after the initial grasping, is unreliable; because it is the cause of the definition of a particular object, and it has knowledge of one aspect of the object. It is also different from doubt and wrong knowledge. Therefore, there is a contradiction in considering it unreliable.
It is also not correct to say that it is unreliable because it is in the form of non-conclusive knowledge; because its nature is to eliminate doubt. It knows the specific object like white, etc., in a general way, and it is eager to grasp whiteness from the objects in the three worlds and establish it in one object. Therefore, there is a contradiction in considering it unreliable.
**Verse 306**
The desire to know the object grasped by the grasping knowledge through specific characteristics like knowledge, age, proof, region, and language, etc., is *Iha* knowledge. The thoughtful knowledge that occurs after grasping knowledge and before *Pravaya* knowledge, whose nature is to remove the doubt that arises in grasping knowledge, is *Iha* knowledge.
**Pravaya and Dharana Knowledge**
When certainty is achieved through *Iha* knowledge, that certainty about the object is *Pravaya* knowledge. The fourth, *Dharana* knowledge, is the cause of remembering the decided object in the future.
**Explanation:**
The certain knowledge of the object known through *Iha* is *Pravaya* knowledge. The knowledge that produces the impression of not forgetting in the future is *Dharana* knowledge.
After *Iha*, the knowledge that arises as a result of *Iha*-like thought is *Pravaya* knowledge. That is, the knowledge that arises from the decision of the thought that is in the form of a desire to know specifically in *Iha* knowledge is called *Pravaya*. The decisive knowledge that arises from the elimination of doubt due to the proper knowledge of the inherent linga (sign) is *Pravaya*. For example, knowing through signs like flying above, flapping wings, calling, etc., that this is a flock of birds and not a flag, or knowing from hearing words that this man is from the south and not the north, is *Pravaya* knowledge.
**Question:**
Since there is no difference in the decisiveness of both grasping and *Pravaya* knowledge, why is there no unity?
**Solution:**
Even though there may be unity due to no difference in decisiveness,
1. Jayadhaval Pu. 1, p. 336
2. Ghadal Pu. 1, Sutra 115, Commentary
3. Jayadhaval Pu. 1, p. 563
4. Dhaval Pu. 13, p. 218