Disclaimer: This translation does not guarantee complete accuracy, please confirm with the original page text.
## 386/Go. Sa. Jivakanda
**Verse 307-30**
**Doubt:** Iha and other such प्रत्यय (impressions) cannot be considered as matijnana (knowledge of perception), because they are not produced by the senses like श्रुतज्ञान (knowledge of scripture).
**Solution:** This is not true, because Iha and other such प्रत्यय, which are produced from the अवग्रह ज्ञान (knowledge of perception), are accepted as being produced by the senses through उपचार (conventional usage).
**Doubt:** Should this conventional sense-produced nature be accepted in श्रुतज्ञान as well?
**Solution:** No, because just as there is a tendency towards the object grasped by अवग्रह, there is no such tendency in श्रुतज्ञान. Therefore, due to the absence of this tendency, there is no possibility of श्रुतज्ञान being contradicted. For this reason, श्रुतज्ञान cannot be considered as conventionally sense-produced. Therefore, matijnana (knowledge of perception) is not possible in श्रुतज्ञान.
**Explanation:** Iha is the desire to know the specific characteristics of an object grasped by अवग्रह. This arises from the doubt that arises from the अवग्रह, which is the nature of प्राणध्यावसाय (the state of being alive). For example, a being who has doubt about whether a white object is a बलाका (a type of bird) or a पताका (a flag) will experience Iha. It is not a fixed rule that Iha only arises from an unclear अवग्रह. Even when an object is clearly grasped, like "this man," a person can still experience Iha if they have doubt about whether the man is a दाक्षिणात्य (from the south) or an उदीच्य (from the north).
**Doubt:** In which type of knowledge does the संशय प्रत्यय (doubtful impression) belong?
**Solution:** In Iha, because it is the cause of Iha.
**Doubt:** Why is this so?
**Solution:** Because the effect is conventionally present in the cause. In reality, the संशय प्रत्यय is the अवग्रह.
**Doubt:** What is the nature of Iha?
**Solution:** Iha is the type of impression that exists between संशय (doubt) and अवाय (certainty), and is produced by the reliance on a हेतु (reason).
**Iha is not अनुमानज्ञान (inferential knowledge) because अनुमानज्ञान deals with an object that is not grasped by अवग्रह. It is not correct to consider Iha, which deals with a grasped object, and अनुमानज्ञान, which deals with an ungrasped object, as the same. This is because they have different अधिकरण (spheres of application), and considering them as the same would lead to contradiction. Another reason why they are not the same is that Iha is produced from a रूपलिंग (sign) that is inseparable from its object, while अनुमानज्ञान is produced from a रूपलिंग that is different from its object. Therefore, considering them as the same would lead to contradiction. Iha is not a परिच्छेदक (determiner) of the object like संशयज्ञान (doubtful knowledge).**
**1. Ghavla Pu. 6, p. 146-148.**