Disclaimer: This translation does not guarantee complete accuracy, please confirm with the original page text.
## Verses 307-308
## Knowledge Seeking/185
**Iha knowledge** is the knowledge that arises from the desire to know the specific characteristics of an object that has been grasped through **avagraha**. **Avagraha** is the grasping of an object, and **Iha** is the desire to know its specific characteristics. In other words, **Iha** is the specific curiosity about an object that has been grasped through **avagraha**. For example, seeing a man, one might wonder, "Is he handsome?" or "Is he ugly?" This kind of specific examination is called **Iha knowledge**.
**Iha knowledge** is not doubt, because doubt is destroyed by the **Iha**-like thought-intellect. **Iha** is the thought-intellect that arises in the space between doubt and **avaya** knowledge, being superior to doubt and inferior to **avaya** knowledge.
**Doubt:** Is **Iha** **shruta** knowledge because it involves reasoning in a specific way?
**Solution:** This is not a fault, because **Iha** is the reasoning that relies on the object grasped through **avagraha**, while **shruta** knowledge is the reasoning that relies on a different object.
**Doubt:** When a person is grasped through **avagraha**, the effort that arises later to specifically inquire about whether he is from the south or the north, etc., without having specific knowledge, is called **Iha**. Therefore, because it involves grasping the object grasped through **avagraha** and being doubtful, is **Iha** knowledge not a valid means of knowledge?
**Solution:** Grasping the object grasped through **avagraha** is not the reason for its invalidity, because the reason for its invalidity is doubt, error, and indecision. Secondly, **Iha** knowledge is not entirely dependent on the object grasped through **avagraha**, because **Iha** knowledge, which grasps the sign that is the cause of the determination of that part of the object grasped through **avagraha** which was not grasped through **avagraha**, cannot be dependent on the object grasped through **avagraha**. It is also not the case that it only grasps the ungrasped, because if that were the case, it would contradict the grasping of the real object, as it would be unreal like a mirage. **Iha** knowledge is not doubt, because there is a contradiction in saying that the **vimarsha** knowledge, which removes doubt by grasping the sign that is the cause of the determination, is doubt. Because it is present in the living being that is the basis of doubt, **Iha** knowledge cannot be invalid. Because there is a contradiction in saying that the said knowledge, which is opposed to doubt and inherently different from doubt, is invalid. **Iha** knowledge cannot be invalid because it is indecisive, because there is a contradiction in saying that the said knowledge, which removes doubt by determining some specifics, is indecisive. Therefore, it is proven that **Iha** knowledge (examination knowledge) is valid. It is also said:
> "The examination that destroys the components of doubt and produces the components of **avaya**, and which leads to proper determination, is called **Iha** knowledge." (47)
1. Dhavla, Vol. 1, p. 354.
2. "Vitarakaḥ śrutam." (Tattvārthasūtra 6/33).
3. Dhavla, Vol. 6, p. 17.
4. Chanchal.