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Jain Terms Preserved:
(342)
Yāgadṛṣṭisamuccaya
Someone may say that this fallacious argument (kutarka) is obstructed by the grandeur of imagination (kalpanāgaurava) and so on. For example, imagining the nature of water to be burning in the proximity of fire is a monstrous imagination (kalpanāgaurava), it is a very heavy imagination, it does not go down the throat; therefore, it is an obstruction. Someone may say this, the answer to that is that the grandeur of imagination and the like is not capable of establishing the nature (svabhāva) proved by reasoning, because it is not possible to imagine the nature otherwise even with thousands of imaginations. Therefore, it should be understood that it is not possible to imagine the alteration of nature even with the lightness of imagination - a small imagination. The grandeur, although it may be, is its defect; and if it is authoritative, it is faultless even through the grandeur and the like. The meaning is that whether there is the grandeur of imagination or the lightness of imagination, it does not obstruct the fallacious argument at all; therefore, this example-based fallacious argument should certainly be abandoned.
Kalpanāgauravādi is not an obstruction
Here the example says:
द्विचन्द्रस्वप्नविज्ञान निदर्शन बलोत्थितः ।
निरालम्बनतां सर्वज्ञानानां साधयन्यथा ॥ ९६ ॥
The example of the knowledge of the two moons and the dream, arising from strength, establishes the non-dependence of all knowledge in another way. 96
Meaning: Just as the fallacious argument arising from the example of the knowledge of the two moons and the dream, while establishing the non-dependence of all knowledge, is not obstructed by anything.
Explanation:
Above, the predominance of the fallacious argument through examples was said, and it was said that such example-based fallacious arguments cannot be obstructed. To clarify this, the example is presented here: The moon is one, yet it appears double to the squinting eye; the dream is false, yet its knowledge occurs. Similarly, the knowledge of the moon, as well as the knowledge of the dream, is actually false, but