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The study of Samvāsaraṇa, which is the correct and true reason, is not accepted as a principle. Then, how can Hetvābhāsa be considered a principle? Only that which is fixed and certain can be a principle, but reasons are related to a particular object and become non-reasons in relation to another object. Therefore, they are uncertain.
Now, the topic of deception arises. When there is a possibility of an alternative meaning, or when there is a difference in meaning, to distort the meaning of the speaker's statement, to kill its meaning, to change its meaning, is deception. When a speaker uses a word with a particular meaning, with a particular intention, to imagine a different meaning from his intended meaning is verbal deception. For example, a speaker says, "Nava kumbalo'yam Devadattaḥ," meaning Devadatta has a new blanket. Here, according to the speaker's intention, the analysis is "Nava kumbalo'sya," meaning his blanket is new. In this context, the difference or peculiarity lies in the analysis, not in the compound word. "Navaḥ kumbalo'sya," meaning he has nine blankets, is what the deceiver imagines. He says that Devadatta has nine blankets. You said this, but he doesn't have nine blankets. Therefore, your statement is not logical.
In this regard, the Jain view is that to state what is not true is deception. If it is deception, then it is not a principle. If it is a principle, then it is not deception. Because a principle is the ultimate truth. Therefore, to call deception a principle is illogical.
Dūṣaṇābhāsa, the appearance of a fault, is called a category. The Jains say that what is truly a fault is not established as a principle, it is not considered a principle because it is uncertain. What is well established as a fault in one place becomes Dūṣaṇābhāsa in another place. The establishment of Dūṣaṇa and Dūṣaṇābhāsa depends on the power and ability of the person. Therefore, it is uncertain. It is not a principle. Then, how can a category, which takes the form of Dūṣaṇābhāsa, be a principle, because they are unreal, they do not exist.
During a debate, the point where the speaker or the opponent is captured is called the point of capture. For example, if the speaker uses a statement that does not prove his intended meaning and the opponent captures its fault, then the speaker is captured, he is caught, this is the point of capture. In addition, other things stated in the Nyāya Darshan are mere talk. For example, प्रतिज्ञा, हानि, प्रतिज्ञान्तर, and प्रतिज्ञा विरोध, etc. If we think about it, this cannot be the point of capture. Even if it is called the point of capture, it is a mistake, a fault of the person. It cannot be a principle. The qualities and faults of the speaker are authorized only in the experience of the object. They are not established as principles. Thus, the principles stated in the Nyāya Darshan are not worthy of being considered as principles.
The principles established by those who believe in the Vaisheshika Darshan are also not worthy of being considered as principles. According to them, substance, quality, action, genus, species, and inherence are the six principles. Among these, earth, water, fire, air, space, time, direction, soul, and mind are the nine substances. To accept earth, water, fire, and air separately is inappropriate because they themselves, through the use of atoms and natural combination, become earth, etc. Therefore, they do not abandon their substance-hood, they only change their states.