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The Study of Samvasarana. Truth cannot be understood through deceit, trickery, etc., because deceit, etc., is used to deceive others, and it does not lead to the understanding of truth. Even though there is a difference, these things are not meaningful, because whatever truly exists in reality is what should be accepted as true. Arguments, however, are based on the will of the individual and are therefore inconsistent. Therefore, they are not meaningful. Moreover, arguments that follow the will of the individual can also be found in things like cockfighting and gambling, where there is a taking of sides and opposing sides. Therefore, they would also lead to the attainment of truth, which is not desirable.
Invalid, absolute, and contradictory fallacies are called fallacies because they appear to be arguments. In this case, even valid arguments do not establish truth, let alone fallacies. For example, whatever is definite and real deserves to be considered truth. Arguments, however, are not definite, as they are sometimes valid and sometimes invalid in relation to the object of the argument.
Now, deceit is the distortion of meaning or the possibility of alternative meanings. In this case, when a specific meaning is intended and stated, the speaker's intention is to create an alternative meaning, which is verbal deceit. For example, "This new blanket is Devadatta's." Here, the speaker's intention is that the blanket is new, and there is a difference in the meaning of the compound word and the expanded form. In this case, the deceiver would say, "You said that this is a new blanket." And the other person would deny it, saying, "No, I did not." In this case, the statement is meaningless. If it is not deceit, then it is truth. And if it is not truth, then it is deceit, because truth is the form of reality. Therefore, the statement "deceit is truth" is an unnecessary use of language.
Fallacious criticisms are types of criticisms. In this case, even valid criticism does not establish truth, because it is not definite. The indefiniteness is that what is valid criticism in one case is a fallacious criticism in another case. And because criticism is based on the ability of the individual, the indefiniteness of the establishment of criticism and counter-criticism is why there are types of fallacious criticisms. This is because they are not real.
During an argument, the point at which the arguer or the opponent is refuted is called the point of refutation. This is the statement of the arguer's weakness, and the opponent's refutation of it. Anything else that is said by the logicians is mere chatter. This includes the denial of the proposition, the substitution of a different proposition, the contradiction of the proposition, etc. When examined, these things do not deserve to be considered points of refutation. You are also capable of making a mistake, but this does not deserve to be considered truth. The speaker's virtues and faults are considered in relation to the object, inference, and the subject matter, but not in relation to truth. Therefore, what the logicians say should not be considered truth. Their statements are flawed.
Nor is the truth as stated by the Vaisheshikas. For example, substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence are considered truth. In this case, there are nine substances: earth, water, fire, air, space, time, direction, soul, and mind. In this case, the distinct substantiality of earth, water, and fire is not established. For example, the same atoms, through experimentation and observation, transform into earth, etc., but they do not abandon their own substantiality. And the difference in state does not justify the difference in substance, because it leads to an absurd conclusion. We also accept the substantiality of space and time. However, the substantiality of directions as parts of space is not established, because it leads to an absurd conclusion. The substantiality of the soul is also accepted, as it is characterized by its use in relation to the body alone. And the mind is included in the substance of matter, as a particular type of matter (like an atom). And the mind and its states are included in the soul, because they are qualities of the soul.
Even though they say that earth is earth because of the quality of earthness, this is just their own process. For there is no separate earthness from earth, so that earth would be earth because of its connection to earthness. Rather, everything that exists is characterized by generality and particularity, and has the nature of both Narasimha and the lion. As it is said:
"There is no connection, because of difference, nor is there difference, because of connection. A pot is different from clay, because of the connection of two types of clay." (1)
And:
"A man is not a lion because of lionhood, nor is a lion a man because of manhood. Because of difference, there is a difference in kind between the objects of sound and knowledge." (1)
And so on.
Now, the qualities of form, taste, smell, and touch are qualities that are particular to substances. And number, quantity, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, otherness, and non-otherness are general qualities, because they apply to all substances. And intellect, happiness, sorrow, desire, aversion, effort, virtue, vice, and impressions are qualities of the soul. Heaviness is a quality of earth and water. Wetness is a quality of earth, water, and fire. The quality of oiliness is a quality of water, like the quality of speed. The quality of sound is a quality of space, and it is embodied in the impressions of substances.