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The Sutra of the Sri Sutra Kritanga, in which numbers and other general qualities are not qualities because they are dependent on the nature of substances like form, etc., and are not qualities because they are dependent on the nature of substances like form, etc. Even if they were, there would still be no separate arrangement of qualities, because the destruction of the nature of the substance would result in the absence of separate existence. Therefore, it is appropriate to grasp the substance by grasping the substance, as it is said, "The substance is the synonym of the quality" (Tattvartha. A. 5 Sutra). Therefore, there is no separate existence. Moreover, its existence is called its essence, and the perception of existence is that of the quality, because the insertion of the word in the substance due to the existence of the quality is done by the word "tvatala". For example, a pot is red, the water is its food, and it is called a pot by all these qualities. Here, the existence of the pot is potness, the existence of red is redness, the existence of the food is foodness, and the existence of the water is waterness. Therefore, due to the existence of the qualities of the pot, the general red quality, action, and substance, the word "kutaka", which is a large, round, water-holding, etc., is inserted in the substance, and that is the "tvatala". But what is the quality called "red"? What is its existence? And what is the substance in which the word is inserted, so that there is a perception of existence? Now, should the existence of red be redness? It should be, by convention. For example, the word "red" is conventionally used as a substance, and its general existence is redness. But convention is not used in the consideration of essence, because it is fulfilled in the establishment of the word. And the word is not a quality of space, because it is material, and space is immaterial. The rest is just a process, not a part of the defect of the means. And action is also inseparable from the substance, and it is not appropriate to consider it as a separate quality with a different support. Now, what about the general? It is of two kinds: the ultimate and the penultimate. The ultimate is called "maha-satta", which pervades substances like the earth, etc. And it is said, "Because of the word 'sat', there is that existence in substances, qualities, and actions." The penultimate is the essence of substance, quality, and action. Now, the separate existence of "maha-satta" is not appropriate, because the perception of "sat" in it, is it dependent on another existence or is it self-existent? If it is dependent on another existence, then there is the same dilemma, and therefore, there is no end. If it is self-existent, then there will be a self-existent perception of "sat" in substances, etc., and what about the existence of another existence, like the horn of a rabbit? Is it hypothetical? Moreover, is the perception of "sat" in substances, etc., due to their existence or due to their being existent? If the perception of "sat" is self-existent in the existent, then what about it? But in the case of the non-existent, there would be a perception of "sat" in the existence of the horn of a rabbit, etc., because of the existence of "sat" in them. And it is said,
"Things are self-existent, but what about the existence of the existent?
It would not be so in the non-existent, because it would be a universal implication."
And so on. This same defect is applicable to the penultimate general, because the conditions and results are the same. Moreover, we also accept that the object is of the form of the general and the particular, and because it is inseparable from it in some way, it is grasped by grasping the substance. Now, what about the particulars? They are dependent on others because they are the cause of the perception of complete difference. Here, it is to be considered that the perception of particularity in them is not caused by another particularity, because of the fear of endlessness. And if it is self-dependent, then there would be a perception of particularity in substances, etc., as well, because of the particularities that are different from substances, etc.? But the particularities that are not different from substances are also dependent on us, because everything is of the nature of the general and the particular. This is just a process, just as the ultimate particulars are the eternal substances, and the eternal substances are of four kinds: atoms, liberated souls, liberated minds, and liberated bodies. Because of their being appointed, they should be discarded. Now, what about "samavaya"? It is called "samavaya" which is the perception of the support and the supported, which are not self-existent. It is also eternal and one, and it is dependent on others. Because of its eternality, the "samavaya" is also eternal, and if it is non-eternal, then it would also be non-eternal, because it is the support. And because of its oneness, there would be oneness of all the "samavaya"s, but it is not one. Moreover, this "samavaya" is a relation, and because it is two-fold, it is self-existent. Just as the stick and the stick-holder, and the destruction of the form of the "chakra" in the birth of the "chakra" and the birth of the form of the "chakra" in the destruction of the "chakra", and the arrangement of the form of the "chakra" in the form of the "chakra", just as the milk and the curd, and so on. Even in the Vaisheshika view, the arrangement of the objects is not correct. Now, the exposition of the essence in the Samkhya view is being undertaken. There, creation arises from the union of nature and the self. And nature is the state of the three qualities: sattva, rajas, and tamas. From that, arises the great, from the great arises the ego, from the ego arises the eleven senses, from the senses arise the five subtle elements, and from the subtle elements arise the five gross elements. Consciousness is the nature of the self, and it is the doer, without qualities, and the enjoyer. Now, the qualities like sattva, etc., which are mutually contradictory, cannot exist together in nature and the self without a controller and a possessor, just as the qualities like black and white, etc. And it is not
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