Sutrakritang Sutra

SR No.: 032440
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Sudarshanlal Acharya, Priyadarshan Muni, Chhaganlal Shastri
Publisher: Shwetambar Sthanakvasi Jain Swadhyayi Sangh
Publication Year: 1999
Total Pages: 658
Language: Hindi
Classification: Book_Devnagari & agam_sutrakritang
File Size: 21 MB

Page 556

श्री सूत्रकृताङ्ग सूत्रम् (नेनो) पात्त एव । सर्वविषयमन्त:करणं युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिलिङ्गं मनः, तदपि द्रव्यमनः पौगलिकमजीवग्रहणेन गृहीतं, भावमनस्त्वात्मगुणत्वाज्जीवग्रहणेनेति ।आत्मनःसुखदुःखसंवेदनानां निर्वर्तनकारणं प्रवृत्तिः,सापि पृथक्पदार्थतया नाभ्युपगन्तुं युक्ता, तथाहि-प्रवृत्तिरित्यात्मेच्छा, सा चात्मगुण एव, आत्माऽभिप्रायतया ज्ञानविशेषत्वाद्, आत्मानं दूषयतीति दोषः, तद्यथा-अस्यात्मनो नेदंशरीरमपूर्वम्,अनादित्वादस्य, नाप्यनुत्तरम्, अनन्तत्वात्सन्ततेरिति, (शरीरेऽपूर्वतया सान्ततया वा) योऽयमात्मनोऽध्यवसायः स दोषो, रागद्वेषमोहादिको वा दोषः, अयमपि दोषो जीवाभिप्रायतया तदन्तर्भावीति न पृथग्वाच्यः । प्रेत्यभावः-परलोकसद्भावोऽयमपि ससाधनो जीवाजीवग्रहणेनोपात्तः, फलमपिसुखदुःखोपभोगात्मकं, तदपि जीवगुण एवान्तर्भवतीति न पृथगुपदेष्टव्यमिति, दुःखमित्येतदपि विविधबाधन योगरूपमिति न फलादतिरिच्यते, जन्ममरणप्रबन्धोच्छेदरूपतया सर्वदुःखप्रहाणलक्षणो मोक्षः, स चास्माभिरूपात्त एवेति । किमित्यनवधारणात्मकः प्रत्ययः संशयः, असावपि निर्णयज्ञानवदात्मगुण एवेति, येन प्रयुक्तः, प्रवर्तत्ते तत्प्रयोजनं, तदपीच्छाविशेष त्वादात्मगुण एव,अविप्रतिपत्तिविषयापन्नोऽर्थो दृष्टान्तः,असावपिजीवाजीवयोरन्यतरःन चैतावताऽस्य पृथक्पदार्थता युक्ता, अतिप्रसंगाद्, अवयवग्रहणेन च तस्योत्तरत्र ग्रहणादिति । सिद्धान्तश्चतुर्विधः तद्यथा -
सर्वतन्त्राविरुद्धस्तन्त्रेऽधिकतोऽर्थः सर्वतंत्रसिद्धान्तः ! यथा स्पर्शनादीनीन्द्रियाणि स्पर्शादय इन्द्रियार्थाः प्रमाणैः प्रमेयस्य ग्रहणमिति !, समानतन्त्रसिद्धः परत-त्रा सिद्धः प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्तो यथा साङ्खयानां नासत आत्मलाभो न च सतः सर्वथा विनाश इति, तथा चोक्तम्-"नासतो जायते भावो, नाभावो जायते सतः" इति२, यत्सिद्धावन्यस्यार्थस्यानुषङ्गेण सिद्धिःसोऽधिकरणसिद्धान्तः३, यथेन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तो ज्ञाताऽऽत्माऽस्ति दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थ ग्रहणादिति,तत्रानुषङ्गिणोऽर्था १, इन्द्रियनानात्वं २ नियतविषयाणीन्द्रियाणि ३ स्वविषयग्रहणलिङ्गानि च ४ ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानसाधनानि ५ स्पर्शादिगुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यं ६ गुणाधिकरण ७ मनियत विषयाश्चेतनाः ८ इति, पूर्वार्थ सिद्धावेतेऽर्थाः सिध्यन्ति, नैतैर्विना पूर्वार्थः संभवतीति ३, अपरीक्षितार्थाभ्युपगमात्तद्विशेषपरीक्षणमभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः ४, तद्यथा, किं शब्द इति विचारे कश्चिदाह-अस्तु द्रव्यं शब्दः, स तु किं नित्योऽथानित्यः ?, इत्येवं विचारः स चायं चतुर्विधोऽपि सिद्धान्तो न ज्ञानविशेषादतिरिच्यते, ज्ञान विशेषस्यात्मगुणत्वाद्गुणस्य च गुणिग्रहणेन ग्रहणाद् न पृथगुपादानमिति ४ । अथावयवाः-प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि, तत्र साध्यनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञा, यथा नित्यः शब्दोऽनित्यो वेति, हिनोतिगमयति प्रतिज्ञातमर्थमिति हेतुः, तद्यथा-उत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वात्, साध्यसाधर्म्यवैधर्म्यभावी दृष्टान्तः उदाहरणं, यथा घट इति, वैधयॊदाहरणं यदनित्यं न भवति तदुत्पत्तिमदपि न भवति यथाऽऽकाशमिति, तथा न तथेति वा पक्षधर्मोपसंहार उपनयः, तद्यथा-अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद् घटवत्तथा चायं, अनित्यत्वाभावे कृतकत्वमपि न भवत्याकाशवत् न तथाऽममिति, प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोः पुनर्वचनं निगमनं, तस्मादनित्य इति, ते चामी पञ्चाप्यवयवा यदि शब्दमात्रं ततः शब्दस्य पौद्गिलकत्वात्पुद्गलानां चाजीवग्रहणेन ग्रहणान्न पृथगुपादानं न्याय्यम्, अथ तज्जं ज्ञानं ततो जीवगुणत्वात् जीवग्रहणेनैवोपादानमिति, ज्ञान विशेषपदार्थताऽभ्युपगमे च पदार्थ बहुत्वंस्याद्, अनेकप्रकारत्वाज्ज्ञान विशेषाणामिति । संशयादूर्ध्वं भवितव्यताप्रत्ययः सदर्थपर्यालोचनात्मकस्तर्कः यथा भवितव्यमत्र स्थाणुना पुरुषेण वेत, अयमपि झन विशेष एव, न च ज्ञानविशेषाणा ज्ञातुरभिन्नानां पृथक् पदार्थपरिकल्पनं समनुजानतेविद्वांसः । संशयतर्काभ्यामुत्तरकालभावी निश्चयात्मक प्रत्ययो निर्णयः, अयमपि प्राग्वन्न ज्ञानादतिरिच्यते, किञ्च-अस्य निश्चयात्मकतया प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणान्तर्भावान्न पृथग् निर्देशोन्याय्य इति । तिस्रः कथा:-वादो जल्पो वितण्डा चेति, तत्र प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भः सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः पञ्चावयवोपपन्नः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो वादः, स च तत्वज्ञानार्थं शिष्याचार्ययोर्भवति, स एव विजिगीषुणा सार्धं छलजाति निग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भो जल्पः, स एव प्रतिपक्षस्थापना हीनो वितण्डेति, तत्रासां तिसृणामपि कथानां भेद एव नोपपद्यते, यतस्तत्त्वचिन्तायां तत्त्वनिर्णयार्थं वादो विधेयो,
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Translation AI Generated

The **Sri Sutra Kritanga Sutra (Neno)** states that the mind is the internal organ of all objects, and it is the sign of the simultaneous arising of knowledge. The mind is also a substance, and it is grasped by the non-living substance (pudgala) through its own grasping. The mind as a state is a quality of the soul, and it is grasped by the soul through its own grasping.

The cause of the soul's experience of pleasure and pain is **pravritti** (activity). It is not appropriate to consider it as a separate entity, because **pravritti** is the desire of the soul, and it is a quality of the soul. The soul, through its own intention, is a special kind of knowledge. The soul's defilement is called **dosha** (fault). For example, the soul's belief that this body is not eternal, because it is not without beginning, and it is not without end, because its lineage is infinite, is a **dosha**. This belief, whether it is about the body being without beginning or without end, is a **dosha**. **Raga** (attachment), **dvesha** (aversion), **moha** (delusion), etc., are also **doshas**. These **doshas** are also included in the soul's intention, and therefore they are not to be spoken of separately.

The state of non-existence after death, or the existence of the afterlife, is also grasped by the soul through its own grasping of the living and non-living substances. The fruit of this grasping is the experience of pleasure and pain. This experience is also included in the qualities of the soul, and therefore it is not to be spoken of separately. The word "suffering" also refers to various types of obstacles, and therefore it does not go beyond the fruit. **Moksha** (liberation) is the cessation of the cycle of birth and death, and it is characterized by the elimination of all suffering. We have grasped this **moksha** through our own understanding.

**Sanskaya** (doubt) is a perception that is not definitive. It is also a quality of the soul, like definitive knowledge. The **prayojana** (purpose) is that which is used to motivate action. It is also a quality of the soul, because it is a special kind of desire. **Drishtanta** (example) is a statement that is free from contradiction. It is either a living or non-living substance. However, it is not appropriate to consider it as a separate entity, because it would lead to an infinite regress, and it would be grasped again in the future through the grasping of its parts.

There are four types of **siddhantas** (principles):

1. **Sarvatantra Siddhanta** (principle that is not contradicted by any other principle and has the most meaning): For example, the sense organs, such as touch, etc., grasp the objects of the senses, such as touch, etc., through the means of knowledge.
2. **Samanatantra Siddha** (principle that is established by the same principle): For example, the Sankhyas believe that the soul is not born, and it is not destroyed. As it is said, "From non-existence, existence does not arise, and from existence, non-existence does not arise."
3. **Adhikarana Siddhanta** (principle that is established by the dependence on another principle): For example, the soul, which is different from the sense organs, exists, because it grasps the same object through sight and touch. The dependent principles are: 1) the existence of the object, 2) the diversity of the sense organs, 3) the sense organs having fixed objects, 4) the signs of grasping their objects, 5) the sense organs being the means of knowledge for the knower, 6) the substance that is different from the qualities of touch, etc., 7) the locus of the qualities, 8) the conscious beings having fixed objects. These principles are established by the establishment of the previous principle. The previous principle cannot exist without these principles.
4. **Abhyupagam Siddhanta** (principle that is established by the assumption of an unexamined object): For example, when someone asks, "What is sound?", someone might say, "Sound is a substance." Then they might ask, "Is it eternal or non-eternal?" This is an example of this type of principle. All four types of principles do not go beyond special knowledge. Special knowledge is a quality of the soul, and qualities are grasped through the grasping of their locus. Therefore, they are not to be considered separately.

The **avayavas** (parts) of an argument are: **pratijna** (statement), **hetu** (reason), **udaharana** (example), **upanaya** (application), and **nigamana** (conclusion). The **pratijna** is the statement of the proposition, such as "Sound is eternal or non-eternal." The **hetu** is the reason that supports the proposition, such as "Because it is the nature of sound to be produced." The **udaharana** is the example that illustrates the proposition, such as "A pot." The **upanaya** is the application of the reason to the proposition, such as "Sound is non-eternal because it is created, just like a pot." The **nigamana** is the conclusion that restates the proposition and the reason, such as "Therefore, sound is non-eternal."

If these five parts are only words, then they are grasped by the non-living substance (pudgala) through its own grasping, because the words are made of pudgalas. If they are knowledge, then they are grasped by the soul through its own grasping, because knowledge is a quality of the soul. If we assume that special knowledge is a separate entity, then there would be an infinite number of entities, because there are many types of special knowledge.

**Tarka** (reasoning) is a perception that is based on the possibility of something happening, and it is characterized by a critical examination of the meaning. For example, "It is possible that a man will stand here." This is also a special kind of knowledge. Scholars do not accept the idea that special knowledge is a separate entity from the knower, because they are not different.

**Nirnaya** (decision) is a perception that is definitive, and it arises after doubt and reasoning. It is also not different from knowledge. Furthermore, it is not appropriate to consider it separately, because it is included in the means of knowledge, such as perception, etc., because it is definitive.

There are three types of **katha** (discourse): **vada** (debate), **jalpa** (wrangling), and **vitanda** (sophistry). **Vada** is a debate that is based on the means of knowledge, reasoning, and the use of arguments. It is not contradictory to the principles, and it is supported by the five parts of an argument. It involves the