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## Devagam-Aapta-Mimamsa
The relationship of *samyoga* etc. is not in the form of a relationship, but rather in the form of an inseparable relationship (identity). No dharma of a substance is completely different from its other dharmas, nor is it completely inseparable. All dharmas are present in the substance with a sense of friendship, and they are all the soul (nature) of the substance. This kind of co-existent relationship is called *avishvagbhav sambandh*. A substance, while being one in relation to *satsamanya*, is also multi-faceted due to the distinction between dharma and dharmi. Or, to put it another way, it is neither completely one nor completely many, but rather a *jatyantara* form of one-many.
In *karika* 108, a solution is presented to the doubt that in Jain philosophy, the group of *ekantas* is called *anekanta*, and *ekanta* is considered *mithya* (false). Therefore, their group (*anekanta*) will also be called *mithya*. Many falsehoods cannot come together to form one truth. Therefore, the *anekanta* in the form of the above-mentioned group of *ekantas*, which has been called a substance, is not *samyak*? While resolving this doubt, the author says that if the group of absolute *ekantas* is called *mithya*, then it is acceptable to us; because in the view of the *syadvadis*, there is no absolute *ekanta* in a substance. The *syadvadis* accept relative *ekantas* and consider their group to be *anekanta*, not the group of absolute *ekantas*. They have clearly called absolute *nayas* (*ekantas*) *mithya* (false) and relative ones *vastu* (*samyak* - true), because they are the ones that are meaningful.
In *karika* 109, the nature of the speaker is also arranged from the perspective of *syadvad*. While reviewing those who consider a *vidhivakya* to be only a *vidhi* and a *nishedhavakya* to be only a *nishedha*, it is said that whether it is a *vidhivakya* or a *nishedhavakya*, both convey the knowledge of the *anekanta* nature of the substance in the form of *vidhi* and *nishedha*. When a *vidhivakya* is spoken, it not only conveys the knowledge of its intended *vidhi* dharma, but also acknowledges the silent existence of the *pratisedha* dharma - it does not convey only the knowledge of *vidhi* by negating or eliminating it. Similarly, ...