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The faultiness of that which is not obstructed; therefore, the mistaken attachment that is a subtle feeling is, by itself, a fault. Its faultiness is independent, meaning its basis in aversion is not reliant on the destruction of gross living beings or any other edible objects. Even if there is no destruction of gross beings, or if no suffering is caused, but if the life of the object is intended to be extinguished or suffering is intended to be inflicted, then in principle, it is written as such. Even if happiness reaches the object, if the underlying feeling is impure, that is considered a singular fault. Thus, such feelings are termed as "bhāvahiṁsā" or "niśchayahitḥsā" in the classical definition. Bhāvahiṁsā and niśchayahitḥsā are applicable in such a way that their faultiness is independent, remaining unhindered across all three time periods. Even though mistaken attachment and mere annihilation of life can be termed as separate harms, once the difference in their faultiness is understood, these two types of harm fall under the category of harm caused by mistaken attachment that leads to the destruction of life; thus, the clarity regarding these issues is achieved. That is, even if the gross eye cannot perceive it, in reality, only mistaken attachment is harm that is the destruction of a living being generated by that attachment, and mere annihilation does not fall into that category of harm.
Q—If, as stated above, mistaken attachment is indeed the root cause of the fault of harm, then in the definition of harm, it suffices to state that mistaken attachment is harm. And if this argument is true, then a question naturally arises as