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The Tattvartha Sutra commentator asks what is the purpose of distinguishing the concept of Nayavada (the theory of partial viewpoint) from the authority of absolute knowledge (pramana), apart from the dead proof. It acknowledges that both sruta (scriptural knowledge) and nay (partial viewpoint) involve intellectual knowledge, yet there is a difference between the two. The distinction is that a thought that attempts to grasp a subject in its entirety or seeks to connect with all aspects is deemed 'dead'; whereas, a thought that engages only with a partial aspect of the subject is called nay. For this reason, nay cannot be independently termed as proof; however, it is also not without proof. Just as the act of touching a finger cannot itself be called a finger, it cannot be said that it is not a finger; yet it is indeed a part of the finger. Similarly, nay is a part of the proof of sruta. The sequence of the emergence of thought and the resulting actions illustrate that the explanation of nay, from both perspectives, is separated from the proof of sruta. Thoughts arise in parts regarding any subject, ultimately culminating in vastness or completeness. It is believed that the description of this emergence should be made in the same order as the emergence of thought; thus, it naturally follows that the representation of nay is distinct from the proof of sruta. Moreover, even if there is complete knowledge of a subject, its application in practice happens in parts; therefore, a representation of partial viewpoint (nay) stands distinct from the complete intellectual proof (sruta). In the non-Jain philosophical discourse, there is debate regarding the validity of canonical proof (agama). Nevertheless, Jain philosophy has a different status for nayavada that is encapsulated within that proof, and the reason for this is as follows.