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Chapter 1 - Sutra 34-35: By harmonizing the opposing statements of the theory of Nayayat, it establishes non-contradiction - a singularity of meaning. Similarly, the disagreements regarding the eternal and non-eternal nature of the soul, as well as the creator and the created, also contribute to the theory of Nayayat through non-contradiction. The root of such non-contradiction lies in the perspective of the thinker, which is contained in the essence of the argument. This perspective is referred to as "Apeksha" in the presented scripture, thus Nayayat is also called Apekshavad.
Why is there a separate discourse on Nayayat in Jain philosophy while it appears to contradict the interpretation of Shrut? In the initial explanation of knowledge, there is a discussion on Shrut. Shrut is conceptual knowledge, and Nayayat is also a type of conceptual knowledge. Therefore, Nayayat is included within Shrut knowledge. Hence, the first question arises; after explaining Shrut, why is Nayayat treated distinctly in this separate discourse on Nayayat? One specificity of Jaina Tattvajnana is attributed to Nayayat; however, Nayayat means it is Shrut, and Shrut denotes Agama Pramana. Other philosophical systems also discuss the validity, and indeed include the explanation of Agama Pramana. Therefore, a second question naturally arises: when other philosophies hold a place for Agama Pramana, how can Nayayat, which is included within Agama Pramana, be regarded as a distinct aspect of Jaina Tattvajnana merely because of its separate discourse? Or, to put it another way, in Jain philosophy...