Jainism from the View Point of Vedantic Acaryas

Author(s): Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: B J Institute
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/001366/1

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Sheth Shri Popatlal Hemchand Adhyatma Vyakhyanamala, No. 8 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas (with special reference to Nimbarka, Sankara and Ramanuja) by Prof. Dr. Yajneshwar S. Shastri BASE B. J. Institute of Learning & Research H. K. Arts College Compound, Ashram Road, Ahmedabad-380 009

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Sheth Shri Popatlal Hemchand Adhyatma Vyakhyanamala, No. 8 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas (with special reference to Nimbarka, Sankara and Ramanuja) by Prof. Dr. Yajneshwar S. Shastri Professor and Head, Department of Philosophy, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad. B. J. Institute of Learning & Research H. K. Arts College Compound, Ashram Road, Ahmedabad-380009

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas (c) Prof. Dr. Yajneshwar S. Shastri Published by Dr. Bharati Shelat Director, B.J. Institute of Learning & Research Ashram Road, Ahmedabad-380009, Gujarat (India) First Edition : 2003 Copies : 500 Price : Rs. 45-00 Printed by : Krishna Griphics 966, Naranpura Old Village, Ahmedabad-380013 Ph. : (079) 7494393

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zeThazrI popaTalAla hemacaMda janma saM. 1928, zrAvaNa suda 5 ne zanivAra tA. 22-7-1871 - svargavAsa saM. 2001 Aso vada 5 ne guruvAra tA. 25-10-1945

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Publisher's Note Under the terms of the donation made by Shri Chimanlal Popatlal Shah in 1946 in the name of his father Shah Popatlal Hemchand, it was decided to organize series of lectures on the subject of Atman-Paramatman with special reference to Jain Philosophy under the auspices of B.J.Institute of Learning and Research, Ahmedabad. It was decided to name the series 'Sheth Shri Popatlal Hemchand Adhyatma Vyakhyanamala'. Under this lecture-Series, Dr. R.D. Ranade delivered inaugural three lectures on 'Spiritual life in Mahatma Gandhi and Hindi Saints, Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi on 'Adhyatmavicarana', Dr. Padmanabh Jaini on 'Liberation, Incarnation and Rebirth in Jainism', Dr. Bhogilal Sandesara on 'Yoga, Anuyoga and Mantrayoga', Dr. R.N. Mehta on Jainism and Archaeology', Muni Sumermalji on 'Importance of Character and Meditation in Indian Culture and healthy life and Preksadhyana', Svami Shri Atmanandaji on 'Inspiring sources of Gandhiji's Ahimsa, Shrimad Rajachandra and Jain Religion and Mahavira-darsana in modern context', Dr. N.J.Shah on 'concept of Shraddha (Samyak-darshan), Matijnana and Kevalajnana in Jain Philosophy and Dr. Jitendra Shah on 'Naya in Jain Philosophy with special reference to Acarya Devasena and Upa. Yasovijaya' respectively. Most of these lectures have been published in the book-form by the Institute. Dr. Yajneshvar Shastri is an eminent scholar of Indian Philosophy and Sanskrit studies. He has contributed to the field of Hindu, Jain and Mahayana Buddhist philosophy. His scholarly works include Mahayanasatralarikara of Asanga, Traverses on less Trodden path of Indian Philosophy and Religion, Foundations of Hinduism and the Salient Features of Hinduism. He has also edited with studied introduction Prasamarati-prakarana of Umasvati Vacaka, Atmabodha of Padma-nandi and has been the general editor of Munisuvratasvamicarita and Nyayamanjari (IV-Vth Ahnika). iii

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Dr. Shastri has organized several national and international seminars and he is the visiting professor of Philosophy in the Loyola Merymount University at Los Angeles and Cleveland State University at Cleveland, Ohio. Thus he has contributed immensely to the fields of teaching and research. I have a great pleasure in publishing the three lectures delivered by Dr. Yajneshvar Shastri on 'Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas' in the book form and I hope the publication will prove to be interesting and illuminative not only to the students of Indian Philosophy, but also to those who are interested in the subject. Ahmedabad 22nd Jan., 2003 1. 3. Publisher's Note Preface Jainism from the View point of Sri Nimbarkacarya Date of Nimbarka Works of Nimbarka - 2. Sri Sankaracarya's views on Jainism Presentation of Jainism Criticism of Syadvada Refutation of Dehaparimanavada CONTENTS - - Sri Ramanujacarya and Jainism Presentation of Janism - Refutation of Syadvada, grace of Siddhas and Dehaparimanavada of Jainism. Criticism of Syadvada and Dehaparimanavada In defence of Anekantavada or Syadvada iv Bharati Shelat Director iii V 1 4 11 15 26 26 27 33 41 41 43 52

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Preface This book is a collection of my three lectures delivered under the auspices of Sheth Shri Popatlal Hemachanda Adhyatma Vyakhyanamala, at B.J. Institute of Learning and Research, Ahmedabad, in September 2002. These lectures are based on Brahmasutrabhasyas of respective Vedantic Acaryas. Jainism is one of the three major religio-philosophical systems of India, which made manifold contributions to Indian society through its literature, religion and philosophy. Anekantavada is a special contribution of Jainism to Indian thought. This Anekantavada is an expansion of principle of non violence (ahimsa) at intellectual level. The principle of respect for the life of others was transformed by the Jaina philosophers at the intellectual level. The attitude of tolerance, which is hallmark of this system, inspired Jaina thinkers to make a unique attempt to harmonise, reconcile, all conflicting view points in the field of philosophy. Learned Jaina thinkers thought that various systems of philosophy being dogmatic in their assertions created bitterness among the followers of different philosophical schools. The age-old philosophical disputes and controversies between the various philosophical schools are on account of their conditional assertion in regard to philosophical propositions. On account of this rigid attitude, each school asserts its view to be true and thus, philosophers of these schools do not really try to understand the view points of others, which gave rise to hatred an rivalry towards other systems of thought. This is also a kind of intellectual intolerance and violence in the realm of thought. To avoid such kind of intellectual violence Jaina thinkers evolved a unique, synthetic, philosophical methodology, which is technically known as Anekantavada i.e. Doctrine of Many-sidedness of reality, consisting of dual doctrine viz. Nayavada (the doctrine of different partial view points) and Syadvada or Saptabhanginaya V

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(sevenfold predication). Anekanta denotes that reality is manifold, each entity consists of may forms and modes of innumerable aspects. We are all imperfect human beings. We cannot comprehend an object or reality in its totality and our view of it is limited. We are wrong when we emphasize and say that our view is perfect and final. Our view towards reality is always partial. Anekantavada or Syadvada allows all different viewpoints in it and reveals complete picture of reality. Thus, this Anekantavada is accepted to co-ordinate, unify and harmonize the divergent, seemingly disagreeing philosophical viewpoints into a practical whole. When an object which is possessing many characteristics (anekantatmaka) is expressed in a particular form of judgment the expression is known as Syadvada. We can express the characteristics of an object from different points of view and those points of view are expressed by the word Syat. Thus the judgment. about an object possessing many characteristics is called Syadvada. Syadvada is neither a doctrine of doubt nor a doctrine of probability. This Jaina's Anekantavada or Syadvada as a philosophical method is criticized by the Buddhists as well as by all the Vedantic Acaryas. The superficial understanding of Syadvada seems to be the main reason behind their criticisms. The word 'Syat in Syadvada is taken in the sense of probability (sambhavana) or may be (not in the sense of certain point of view or in certain respect) by all these non-Jaina Philosophers. So, this kind of understanding led them to criticize Syadvada as a doctrine of doubt or probability. Another principle of Jainism which is a subject of severe criticism of Vedantic Acaryas is Dehaparimanavada (the doctrine according which size of the soul is body size). Their criticism is centered round on these two principles of Jainism. While criticizing these two doctrines of Jainism, Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Madhva and Vallabha followed Sanskaracarya (borrowing almost same arguments) except pointing out some minor defects.

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It is a general misconception that, Sankaracarya and other Vedantic Acaryas have misrepresented Jainism in their writings. But this is far from the truth. Vedantic Acaryas following the Indian philosophical tradition have presented Jainism as Parvapaksa (prior view). They have presented Jaina doctrines very authentically. While presenting Jainism, Vedantic Acaryas have not done any injustice to it. Their criticism of Syadvada is on account of superficial understanding of it. Special study has not been done so far to give complete picture of Vedantic Acaryas' views on Jainism. In these lectures, an attempt is made to fill up this gap, giving detailed arguments given by all these three Vedantic Acaryas. In the first lecture Sri Nimbarkacarya and his views on Jainism have been discussed in detail.. Nimbarka is very neglected philosopher in the history of Indian Philosophy. Antiquity of his school is concerned, lots of injustice has been done to this great thinker. Proper attention has not been given by the historians of Philosophy, even to date and works of Nimbarka. On the basis of recent research I felt it necessary to throw some light on Nimbarka's date and works, before presenting his views on Jainism, in this lecture. Nimbarka's commentary is very brief. So, we do not find detailed account of Jainism in his commentary. His immediate follower, Srinivasa in his commentary on Vedantaparijatasaurabha (Brahmasutra-bhasya of Nimbarka) presents Jaina doctrines in detail and justifies Nimbarka's criticism of Syadvada and Dehaparimana-vada, giving detailed arguments. I have covered Srinivasa's views also in this lecture. The second lecture is devoted to Sarkaracarya's presentation of Jainism, refutation of Syadvada and Dehaparimanavada. Sri Sankaracarya has presented Jaina doctrines as a prior view (purvapaksa) very authentically. He, as a great philosopher criticizes both Syadvada and Dehaparimanavada with logical rigour. Like Dharmakirti and Santaraksita, he took the word 'Syat in the sense of probability or may be and criticizes it. It seems that Sankara was not familiar vii

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with the meaning of the word 'Syat' taken by the Jainas in the sense of 'in certain respect' or in certain point of view.' There was not much literature in defense of Syadvada prior to Sankara. Whatever literature developed in defence of Syadvada is postSankara development. Jaina philosophers who came after Sankara, gave proper answers to objections raised against Syadvada. Surprisingly, these Jaina philosophers did not give any reply to criticism of Dehaparimanavada made by Sankara. In the third lecture Ramanuja's views on Jainism are discussed. In conclusion, in defence of Syadvada, meaning of Syat, purpose of Syadvada and possible answers given by Jaina thinkers against criticism of Anekantavada are discussed in detail. In appendix, views of Sri Bhaskaracarya, Madhvacarya and Vallabhacarya are given quoting from their respective bhasyas. B.J. Institute of Learning and Research is doing yeoman service to the field of Indology through its research, teaching, editing and publishing and arranging learned lecture series. I am very much grateful to Dr. Bharatiben Shelat, Director, B.J. Institute of Learning and Research, for inviting me to deliver these three lectures under the prestigious Vyakhyanamala. I am also thankful to all those who helped to bring out these lectures in book form. Ahmedabad 23rd January, 2003 viii Dr. Yajneshwar S. Shastri

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas (with special reference to Nimbarka, Sankara and Ramanuja). Intoduction Jainism is one of the oldest religio-philosophical systems of India. Jainas emphasize on principle of Ahimsa (non-violence) and their Anekantavada or Syadvada is expansion of this principle at intellectual level. But unfortunately, this Anekantavada (doctrine of many-sidedness of reality) or Syadvada (theory of seven-fold judgement) has become subject of severe criticism of the Buddhists as well as Vedantic Teachers. The superficial understanding of this principle, seems to be main reason behind this criticism. It is also important to note that, almost all these critics of Jainism, mention only Digambara Jainas by name. Probably, they were not familiar with Svetambara sect. Prior to Vedantic Acaryas, Buddhist logicians like Dharmakirti and Santaraksita, bitterly criticise the Anekantavada or Syadvada. Dharmakirti states that, the shameless and naked Jainas make such non-sensical and contradictory remarks that reality is both existence and non-exist

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2 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas ence, unity and plurality, inclusion and exclusion. If it is so, then, curd is curd as well as a camel. Then, when a person is asked to eat curd, he should run to eat a camel : etenaiva yadahIkAH kimapyayuktamazlIlamAkulam / pralapanti pratikSiptaM tadapyekAntasambhavAt // sarvasyobhayarUpatve tadvizeSanirAkRteH codito dadhi khAdeti kimuSTaM nAbhidhAvati // * Pramanavartika, III. 180-182 santaraksita says that Syadvada which combines the real and the unreal, the existent and non-existent, the one and the many, the identity and the difference, and the universal and the particular, is like a mad man's cry and suffers from fault of Sarkara i.e. intermixture (parasparasvabhAvatve syAt sAmAnyavizeSayoH / sAya~ tattvato nedaM dvairUpyamupapadyate / / Tattvasangraha, Part II. 1721.) Saikara and other Vedantic Acaryas, point out that, you cannot blow hot and cold in the same breath. Unity and plurality, permanence and momentariness, reality and unreality, cannot remain at the same time and in the same thing, like light and darkness. The Buddhists and the Vedantins, taking the world Syat in its popular sense of probabil * In reply to this kind of harsh utterances of Dharmakirti. against Jainas, Jainacarya Akalanka calls Dharmakirti as a fool, mad and unbalanced minded who shamelessly talks non-sensically-[jJAtvA vijJaptimAtraM paramapi ca bahirbhAsi bhAvapravAdaM, cakre lokAnurodhAt punarapi sakalaM neti tattvaM prapede / na jJAtA tasya tasmin na ca phalamaparaM jJAyate nApi kiJcit ityazlIlaM pramattaH pralapati jaDadhIrAkulaM vyAkulAptaH / / nyAyavinizcaya, I.172 ]

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas ity, criticised the Syadvada as a self-contradictory doctrine. They criticise this doctrine on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing. The Vedantic Acaryas present Jainism as Purvapaksa (prior view) in their Brahmasutrabhasya and refute it. They have presented Jaina principles in authentic way. They have not done any injustice to Jainism while presenting it as Purvapaksa. But they took the world Syad either in the sense of probability or 'may be' or 'somewhat' and criticise it. There are total four sutras in second Adhyaya of second pada of Brahmasutras of Badarayana, which Vedantic Acaryas consider as a refutation of Jainism. In the versions of Brahmasutras, accepted by Sankara and Nimbarka, The Sutras are numbered as thirty-three to thirty-six (Brahmasutra, II.II. 33-36), while in Ramanuja's version of Brahmasutra, they are numbered as thirty-one to thirty-four (B.S. II.II. 31-34). The Brahmasutra of Badarayana takes note of only two Jaina doctrines, viz., Anekantavada or Syadvada and the Dehapramanavada (the doctrine according to which size of the soul is, body size) of the Jiva. Among these four Sutras, only one Sutra is concerned with criticism of Syadvada and remaining three are devoted to refutation of the concept of size of the soul of Jaina. Thus, these Vedantic Acaryas' criticism is centered round on refutation of Syadvada and the concept of the size of the soul of Jainism. Now, let us see, how Nimbarka, Sarikara and Ramanuja refute these doctrines of Jainism.

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas Jainism from the View point of Sri Nimbarkacarya : Sri Nimbarkacarya (cir. 600 A.D.) is one of the important Vedantic teachers in the history of Indian Philosophy. He is considered as the founder of Svabhavika-bhedabheda (the doctrine of natural difference and non-difference) school of Vedanta. He has written a commentary on Brahmasutras of Badarayana which is known as Vedantaparijatasaurabha (=VPS), in which he has expounded his doctrine of Svabhavikabhedabheda. Nimbarka is most neglected philospher in the history of Indian thought. Lots of works have been done on Advaita, Visistadvaita and Dvaita, but very little attention has been paid to Nimbarka School. Proper attention has not been given, even to date and works of Nimbarka. Recent research tells that antiquity of this school is concerned lot of injustice has been done to this great thinker. I feel it necessary here to throw some light on Nimbarka's date and works, before I start the subject. Date of Nimbarka : There is uncertainty about the date of Nimbarka, because he has not left any historical evidence about his date. Traditional works which provide account of life and activities of Nimbarka are full of legends and myths. There are lots of controversies an disputes among the modern scholars about his date. In such circumstances it is very difficult to say with certainty of his date.

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas * We get traditional account of his date in Acaryacaritam (=A.C.) which is written in 17th or 18th century A.D. Tradition on the basis of Pauranic reference believes that he lived in the 15th year of Kali age i.e. 3100 B.C. (A.C. pp. 34-35, 42-48; Kathiyababa, pp. 93-143), which does not seem to be reasonable. If this view is true then we have to accept that Nimbarka flourished prior to Badarayana. Historians tell that, Badarayana composed Brahmasutra not earlier to 200 B.C. Nimbarka who wrote commentary on Brahmasutra of Badarayana cannot be earlier to him. Another traditional source for date of Nimbarka is Guruparampara of this tradition, which is prepared in the 15th or the 16th century A.D. Work of such late date, can not be considered as authentic to decide his date. This list is unable to provide any chronological or historical data concerning all the Acaryas of the tradition. Many of the Acaryas listed in Guruparampara have left no evidence about their existence nor their names have been mentioned in the works of their immediate followers. Modern scholars, due to uncertainty of any historical evidence, are very much confused in deciding the date of Nimbarka. Several views are expressed by modern scholars in this respect. Some scholars think that Nimbarka lived after Ramanuja and prior to Madhva. Some other scholars consider him to be postMadhva and still some place him even after Vallabha. Another group of scholars places him after Bhaskara. Some scholars considered him to be pre-Bhaskara. Some other scholars belonging to Nimbarka tradition believe

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas that he is prior to Sankara and even earlier to Gaudapada. R. G. Bhandarkar thinks that Nimbarka lived shortly after Ramanuja. Even scholars like Radhakrishnan, R. Ghosh, P. Chaturvedi, P. Bhattacarya also consider him to be post-Ramanuja commentator (Kathiyababa, p. 47-55). S.N.Dasgupta, dates him roughly about the middle of the 14th century A.D. (H.I.Philo., Vol. III, pp. 399-402). Some scholars think that Nimbarka refers to the Srisampradaya and Brahmasampradaya of Ramanuja and Madhva, respectively in his Brahmasutrabhasya, so, he must have lived after Ramanuja and Madhva. (H.I.Phil., Vol. II. J. Sinha, p. 70; C.D.Sharma, Critical Survey of Indian Philo., p. 375). It seems, on the basis of several works attributed to Nimbarka of which their authenticity is in question in which there are references to Srisampradaya of Ramanuja and Brahmasampradaya of Madhva, concept of prapatti and Gurupasatti, and cult of Radhakrsna worship, several scholars are forced to assign Nimbarka to post-Ramanuja and post-Madhva period. Scholars who think that Nimbarka is post-Madhva Vedantin, argue that, the work Madhvamukhamardana (Ms of which is not available at present) is attributed to Nimbarka. He might have refuted Madhva in this work, so, he flourished after Madhva. Secondly, Madhavacarya (14th A.D.) in his sarvadarsana-sangraha does not mention Nimbarka school, though he deals with all the then existing important schools of Vedanta

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas (S.N. Dasgupta, H.I.Phil., Vol. III, pp. 399-402). Again, Nimbarka refers to Brahmasampradaya of Madhva in his Brahmasutrabhasya. On account of these reasons, he can be placed somewhere in the middle or later half of the fourteenth century A.D. (S.N.Dasgupta, H.I.Phil., Vol. III, pp. 399-402; J.Sinha, H.I.Phil., Vol. II, p. 702). These reasons given by scholars do not conclusively prove that Nimbarka flourished after Madhva. First of all, manuscript of Madhvamukhamardana which is attributed to Nimbarka is not available till-to-day, so, in such circumstances, it is very difficult to say whether Nimbarka refuted Madhva of the Dvaita school of Vedanta or Madhva of the Sankhya Philosophy, who flourished in 6th century A.D. (E. Frauwallner. H.I.Philo. pp. 320-321). Nimbarka has refuted Sankhya school in his Brahmasutrabhasya, so, in all probability, he might have criticised Madhya of Sankhya School. We will be able to decide only after discovery of this manuscript. Secondly, Nimbarka does not refute Dvaita school of Vedanta in his Brahmasutrabhasya. Certainly, he could have refuted Madhva, to establish his view, if he is after Madhva. It is also possible that, Nimbarka school was not popular or prominent school at the time of Madhavacarya of Sarvadarsana-sangraha, to be mentioned. The writer of Sarvadarsana-sangraha has not included many prominent schools, such as Ajativada of Gaudapada and Aupadhikabhedabheda of Bhaskara. It does not mean that they were not in existence prior to Madhavacarya.

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas Nimbarka is not certainly post Ramanuja also, because, there is no reference in Vedantaparijatasaurabha (V.P.S.) of Nimbarka (=Brahmasutrabhasya), of Visistadvaita doctrine of Ramanuja nor reference to Srisampradaya. There is no influence of lengthy, logical and polemical style of Ramanuja on Nimbarkabhasya. His commentary on Brahmasutra is very brief, free from all dialectical controversies. It does not refute any other Vedantic School. Another important thing is that, Ramanuja in his Sribhasya as well as in Vedarthasangraha refutes the doctrine of difference and non-difference (bhedabheda), which is certainly refutation of view of Nimbarka not aupadhikabhedabheda of Bhaskara (Sribhasya, I.I.1). Again, though Nimbarka recognises grace of God (bhagavatprasada) and importance of guru, the doctrine of prapatti (selfsurrender to God) and gurupasatti (self-surrender to spiritual teacher), which are found in Ramanuja and post-Ramanuja Vaisnava Vedantins, are not found in Brahmasutrabhasya of Nimbarka. Nimbarka is not follower of Pancaratra Agamas like Ramanuja and Madhva. Nimbarka does not make any defence of Pancaratra like Ramanuja has done against the attacks of Advaitins nor defend Pancaratra Agamas as authoritative texts as Madhva has done (Madhvabhasya, I.I.3). There is neither mention of Vyuhavada nor Narayana cult of Pancaratra in Nimbarkabhasya. For Ramanuja, Narayana. is the ultimate reality. Nimbarka avoids even the reference of Narayana while quoting from Mahabharata (V.P.S., II. III. 46). It seems, Nimbarka is a follower of

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas 9 Bhagavata tradition (V.P.S., I.1.4), of early phase of Vaisnavism, i.e. prior to merging of the Pancaratra into the Bhagavata tradition. Terminologies and concepts of Vaisnavism used by Nimbarka are more primitive one (V.P.S., III. III. 30, 40-41). In Vedantaparijatasaurabha we find less developed form of Vaisnavism compared to works of Ramanuja and others. We do not find any sectarian element in Brahmasutrabhasya of Nimbarka. He nowhere in this text mentions later developed Vaisnava concept such as Vaikuntha or Goloka, instead he speaks of Brahmaloka (V.P.S., III.III.31; IV.III.1). There is no reference to Srisampradaya of Ramanuja or Brahmasampradaya of Madhva in entire Vedantaparijata-saurabha as mentioned by some scholars (J. Sinha., H.I.P., Vol. II, p. 702, C.D. Sharma, pp. 375376). On the basis of these reasons, we can definitely draw a conclusion that Nimbarka is not post-Ramanuja. Nimbarka was not even worshipper of Radhakrsna. It is surprising to note that there is no reference or trace of Radhaklsna cult and philosophy in Vedantaparijatasaurabha though present day Nimbarka followers are worshippers of Radhakrsna. This worship seems to be later development in Nimbarka school. Even Srinivasa, the first commentator on the V.P.S. does not mention Radha although he mentions Krsna in several places while in his comentary Vedantakaustubha. Nimbarka seems to be even pre-Bhaskara Vedantin on the basis of internal evidences. Bhaskara was aware of the position of Nimbarka expounded in

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10 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas Vedantaparijatasaurabha on several issues. He was also well aware of the doctrine of Svabhavikabhedabheda (natural difference and non-difference) of Nimbarka [Brahmasutrabhasya of Bhaskara, I.I.15, 31, 32; II. III. 29, 32). Again, Bhaskara while commenting on sutras I.1.31-32, clearly mentions that 'Others read'. This reading is actually found in Nimbarka's Brahmasutrabhasya. Vacaspati Misra, who is earlier or contemporary to Bhaskara refutes bhinnabhinnavada or bhedabhedavada (doctrine of difference and non-difference) in number of places in Bhamati. His criticism is certainly Nimbarka's view not of Bhaskara. (Bhamati, I.1.4; I.IV.22; II.III. 43-46; III.II. 27-30). Influence of Vaisnava Vedantins such as Bhaskara, Ramanuja and others are not found in Brahmasutrabhasya of Nimbarka. On the contrary, Bhaskara and Ramanuja are familiar with views of Nimbarka established in his bhasya. These internal evidences, suffice to prove that Nimbarka flourished prior to Ramanuja and Bhaskara. Some scholars believe that Nimbarka is preSankara Vedantin. According to these scholars Vedantaparijatasaurabha is the only genuine work of Nimbarka and other works attributed to him are not works of Nimbarka, because, doctrines found in these works either differ from his view expounded in Brahmasutrabhasya or go against its teachings. If we accept this view then there is all possibility, that Nimbarka might have flourished before Sankara, be

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas cause Nimbarka does not refute Advaita Vedantic doctrines of Mayavada, Jivabrahmaikyavada, and non-dual nature of Brahman. If he is aware of Sankara's view, he might have refuted it as other Vaisnava Vedantins like Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Madhva and Vallabha have done in their bhasyas. It seems that Nimbarka was aware of only Sankhya, Jaina, Bauddha, Saiva and Sakta views and refuted them, but unaware of views of other Vedantic Acaryas including Sankara. Sankara in several places in his Brahmasutrabhasya, puts forth opponent's view (as Purvapaksa) and refutes without naming the opponent, which certainly seems to be Nimbarka's view, (Brahmasutrasamkarabhasya, II. III. 1931, 50; and Vedantaparijatasaurabha, II. III. 19-31, 50). Even some scholars think that Gaudapadacarya refers to Dvaitadvaita view in his Advaita-prakarana of Mandukyakarika (Karika. 18), which is none other than Nimbarka's view. From all these references, we can draw rough conclusion that, if Nimbarka is pre-Sankara Vedantin, then he might have flourished in the 6th century A.D., because he refutes highly developed form the Saiva and Sakta Schools which were very powerful and popular in the Gupta and post-Gupta period. Works of Nimbarka : Nimbarka's commentary on Brahmsutras of Badarayana is known as Vedantaparijatasaurabha (=V.P.S.). This is the basic work in which he expounded his philosophy of Svabhavikabhedabheda. Thorough study of other works attributed to Nimbarka makes us 11

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12 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas to believe that, this is the only genuine work of Nimbarka. In addition to this, tradition ascribes several works to Nimbarka viz., Dasasloki (also known as Vedantakamadhenu and Siddhantaratna), Prapannakalpavalli; Mantrarahasya-sodasi, Savisesanirvisesasrikrsnastavaraja, Radhastaka, Krsnastaka and Pratahsmaranastotra. (N.D. Sharma, p. 22; Kathiyababa, p. 44). But all these works are not accepted as works of Nimbarka, even by his own followers. Some scholars on the basis of doctrinal difference between his Brahmasutrabhasya and these works, believe that, Vedantaparijatasaurabha is the only undisputed work of Nimbarka. This is the basic work of Nimbarka and whatever view he expressed or doctrine he expounded as a Vedantin in it should be accepted as touch-stone for judging the authenticity of any other works ascribed to him. There seems to be truth in it. Several works attributed to Nimbarka, either contradict the doctrines established in Vedantaparijatasaurabha or in no way in confirmity with his general teachings. These works may not be authentic works of Nimbarka. These works are attributed to the founder of the school in order to claim authenticity and acceptability, and consequently make them popular among the followers of this tradition. Judging from this point of view, it seems that except Vedantaparijatasaurabha (i.e. Brahmasutrabhasya), all other works attributed to him belong to later stage in the development of Vaisnava Bhakti movement, be

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas cause, these works contain those doctrines which are not found or referred to in Vedantaparijatasaurabha, such as doctrines of prapatti, gurupasatti, Radhakrsna worship, premalaksanabhakti etc. Works like Radhastaka, Krsnastaka, Pratahsmaranastotra are certainly not of Nimbarka because, the content of these works is the Radhakrsna worship, while Nimbarka is worshipper of Ramakanta Purusottama or Bhagavan Vasudeva and he nowhere mentions Radhakrsna in Vedantaparijatasaurabha. Secondly, none of the earliest Acaryas or commentators of Nimbarka school have mentioned them or commented upon them. Thirdly, all the sects developed within the Nimbarka tradition are not unanimously accept them as the works of Nimbarka. Even the works which are held in high esteem in the Nimbarka tradition such as Dasasloki, Prapannakalpavalli, Mantrarahasyasodasi and Savisesanirvisesasrikrsnastavaraja seem to be works of later writers of this school. Dasasloki (=D.S.) also known as Vedantakamadhenu or Siddhantaratna attributed to Nimbarka occupies prominent place in the Nimbarka tradition. It propagates Radhakrsna worship, considers Srikrsna attended by Radha as the highest Brahman, advocates, special kind of love for Lord Krsna, (Premavisesalaksanabhakti) and grace of Lord Krsna as a chief means of liberation (=D.S. 4-5, 8-9). Again, it refutes (D.S. 7) Advaita of Sankaracarya. Nimbarka, nowhere mentions Radhakrsna by name in entire Vedanta 13

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14 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas parijatasaurabha. His loved God is Sri Ramakanta Purusottama, who is also called Bhagavan Vasudeva, not Lord Krsna. For Nimbarka, Brahmopasana (meditation on Brahman) is the chief means of liberation not grace of Lord Krsna. Nimbarka nowhere refutes Advaita of Sankara in his Brahmasutrabhasya. If Nimbarka was well aware of the Advaita of Sankara he could have refuted it in his Brahmasutrabhasya itself as he refuted the Sankhya, Bauddha, Jaina, Pasupata and Sakta. Even some of the scholars of Nimbarka sect believe that Harivyasadeva is the real author of Dasasloki (L.K. Goswami, p. 51). Thus, this work which advocates Radhaklsna cult is the work of later period. Prapannakalpavalli (P.K.) propagates the doctrine of self-surrender to God. i.e. Prapatti and Mantrarahasyasodasi (M.R.S.) advocates, self-surrender to spiritual preceptor i.e. gurupasatti, as chief means of liberation. Nimbarka, does not mention these doctrines in his Brahmansutrabhasya. According to Nimbarka knowledge (Vidya) obtained through meditation on Brahman (dhyana) is the unique means of liberation (V.P.S., III. II. 24-25; III.IV.1). Mantrarahasyasodasi prescribes most secret gurumantra viz. eighteen syllabled Gopalmantra, (M.R.S., 3-5, 17) of which no reference is made by Nimbarka in his Brahmasutrabhasya. If it is secret mantra and essence of Nimbarka Vedanta, he could have mentioned it in his major work (i.e. in V.P.S.) without fail. Another work attributed to Nimbarka viz. Savisesanirvisesasrikrynastavaraja (S.N.K.S.) can

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas 15 not be the work of Nimbarka, because, it contains refutation of Advaitic Nirgunabrahmavada, Drstisrstivada, doctrine of Avidya and so on, which Nimbarka does not deal with in his Brahmasutrabhasya. Secondly, it contains polemics and sectarian controversies. Nimbarka's Vedantaparijatasaurabha is completely free from polemics and sectarianism. Thirdly, several followers of Nimbarka, consider it as spurious work. (J. Satyananda, pp. 45-46). Judging from the contents of D.S., P.K., M.R.S., S.N.K.S., we can safely say that these works are of later period in the tradition and attributed to Nimbarka- the founder Acarya for the sake of gaining acceptance and authority for the doctrines contained therein. Refutation of Syadvada : Nimbarka, in his Brahmasutrabhasya (i.e. Vedantaparijatasaurabha, II. II. 33-36), refutes, Syadvada and Dehaparimanavada of Jainism. Taking the word 'Syat' in the sense of somewhat (Kincidasti), he criticises Syadvada, by stating that, Jainas apply both existence and non-existence to one and the same thing. Contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot belong to same thing just as light and darkness cannot remain together. (stat: 49sfintranAstitvAdinA viruddhadharmadvayaM yojayanti, tannopapadyate / ekasmin vastuni Hall : falhas note ratsa4a6 41746 3791979 I (V.P.S., II. II.33). Nimbarka's commentary is very brief and he does not give principles of Jainism in detail. He, does not, even eleborate the doctrine of Syadvada except point

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas ing out the inherent improbability of opposite attributes staying together. But, Srinivasa, a commentator on Vedantaparijatasaurabha, presents almost all philosophical principles of Jainism in an authentic manner and then eleborates and justifies Nimbarka's refutation of Syadvada. He states that, 'Jainas accept two fundamental categories viz., Soul and non-soul. They do not accept existence of God and believe that atoms are the cause of the world. te hi jIvA'jIvAtmakaM nirIzvaraM jagadAhuH / paramANUnAM jagatkAraNatvaJcAhuH / (V.K., II. II.33). 16 - They apply contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence, etc., to all things. faf fagfgei yarefy acupuf | (V.K., II.II.33). They also admit seven categories viz., the soul (Jiva), nonsoul (ajiva), inflow of Karma (asrava), stoppage of Karma (Samvara), annihilation of accumulated Karma (nirjara), bondage of Karma (bandha) and liberation (moksa). There are eight kinds of Karma of which four are destructive karmas (ghatiya) and four are aghatiya (non-destructive). When all karmas are destroyed, atman (soul) shines in its own purity by the grace of Siddhas and Arhat. It is Moksa or liberation. ( saMvaranirjarabandhamokSA iti teSAM zAstrasaGgrahabhUtAH sapta padArthA: / (V.K., II.II.33). They also accept five kinds of astikaya (which occupy space); such as Jivastikaya, pudgalastikaya, dharmastikaya, adharmastikaya and akasastikaya. (aPP aparaH prapaJcaH paJcAstikAyo nAma / tathAhi jIvAstikAya: pudgalAstikAyaH dharmAstikAyaH adharmAstikAyaH AkAzAstikAyazceti / ( V. K., II.II. 33)

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas The Jainas admit that all things have infinite characters and reality is one and many. Everything as a substance, is one eternal and existent and as a modifications (such as pot, cloth etc.) is many, non-eternal and non-existent. (sarvaM vastujAtaM dravyaparyAyAtmakamanaikAntikaM dravyarUpasya caikatvAtsthiratvAtsadbuddhibodhyatvAttadAtmanA sattvaikatvanityatvAdupapadyeta / paryAyAzca dravyasyAvasthAvizeSAH ghaTatvapaTatvAdirUpAsteSAM cAnekatvAdasthiratvAdasadbuddhibodhyatvAttadAtmanA hi asattvAnityatvAdikamupapadyateti / (V. K., II. II. 33). These Jainas apply sevenfold judgement everywhere and to everything, such as: (1) somewhat a thing is existent (Syadasti) (2) Somewhat a thing is non-existent (Syannasti) (3) Somewhat a thing is existent, as well non-existent (Syadasti syannasti ca). 17 (4) Somewhat a thing is indescribable (Syadavaktvyam). (5) Somewhat, a thing is existent and indescribable (Syadasti avaktavyasca). (6) Somewhat a thing is non-existent and indescribable (Syannasti avaktavyasca). (7) Somewhat, a thing is existent, non-existent and indescribable (Syadasti, Syannasti, ca avaktavyasca) (imaJca saptabhaGgInayaM sarvatra yojayanti - syAdasti, syAnnAsti, syAdasti ca nAsti ca syAdavaktavyaH syAdasti cAvaktavyazca, syAnnAsti cAvaktavyazca, (V.K., II.II. 33). Srinivasa fifa

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas takes the word 'Syad' in the sense of somewhat or somehow (kiJcidasti kiJcinnAstItyevaM yojanIyam / V. K., II.II.33). 18 He criticises this view by saying that, seven-fold judgement is impossible fact, because contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence, real and unreal are not possible in one and the same thing. Existence of light and darkness is neither seen nor heard by any one in same place. Application of such dual contradictory attributes to same thing is unreasonable (ekasminpadArthe kiJcidasti kiJcinnAstItyAdisaptabhaGgayukterasaMbhavAt / na hi tamaH prakAzayoryugapadekatropalambho dRSTaH zruto vA evamekatrAstitvanAstitvAdiviruddhadharmadvayasyAsambhava eva / V. K., II. II. 33 ). Vedantakaustubha also refutes the view of the Jainas that atoms are the cause of the world by saying that, atoms are being unconscious, cannot function without the guidance of an intelligent cause. Therefore, the Brahman the intelligent principle alone is to be accepted as the cause of the world. Again, it is faulty (gauravadosa) or improper to accept many unconscious atoms as cause of the universe, when there is one single intelligent cause the Brahman which is proved by valid means of knowledge. (ekasmin jagatkAraNe pramANaprApte bahUnAM paramANUnAM kAraNatvaM nopapadyate, gauravAtteSAM jaDatvena kAraNatvAsaMbhavAt / Criticism of Grace of Siddhas : Srinivasa in his Vedantakaustubha, surprisingly criticises the concept of grace of Siddhas and Arhats in attaining liberation. He says that we believe in one Godthe Brahman, knwon through Vedas, whose grace is es

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas 19 sential to attain liberation. But by the grace of Siddhas, liberation is not possible, because Jainas accept, existence of countless Siddhas which cannot be proved by any valid means of knowledge. Suppose, this is accepted that grace of Siddhas is possible, then the question naturally arises is : whether this grace of Siddhas is possible through worship (aradhana) or not? If it is possible through worship, then by merely worshipping one single Siddha, liberation may not be possible, because there are many Siddhas having same nature, and one has to worship all Siddhas which is practically impossible. If you do not worship all, then there is a fault of showing disrespect to other Siddhas. If Jainas accept that there is only one supreme Siddha, then, they are admiting one supreme God like followers of Vedanta, which is not acceptable to Jainas. If it is said that obtaining grace of Siddhas, no worship is required, then every one will be entitled to get grace of Siddhas and consequently, all will be liberated without worship (ekasminvedavedye mokSaprade sati siddhAnugrahAnmokSo durghaTaH, asambhavAt / siddhAnugrahaH ArAdhanasApekSaH na vA ? Adye, siddhAnAM samAnasvabhAvAnAmekatamasyArAdhanena mokSo na bhavet, bahUnAM siddhAnAmupekSAdoSAt sarveSAmArAdhane gauravaM syAt, asti 26 HER ARE Are ufael val i fanita, 19946: IV.K., II.II.33). The Jainas generally do not talk about the grace of Siddhas to obtain liberation. Liberation is attained through destruction of all karmas, which is mainly dependent on individual's efforts. The concept of grace is, specially a Vaisnava concept. Srinivasa, might have

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20 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas come across with certain Jainas who believed in the grace of Siddhas and Arhats. Criticism of Debaparimanavada : Nimbarka and his followers reject the Jaina doctrine of dehaparimanavada. The most important and noteworthy feature of Jaina doctrine of soul is that the size of the soul changes, according to the size of the body which it occupies. If the body that it occupies is big, the soul becomes even big as an elephant, and if the same enters the body of an ant, it compresses itself and assumes the smallest size of the ant. Thus, sizes of the souls are variable and they depend upon the sizes of the bodies which they occupy. The same soul, thus, becomes small or great as the case may be. The soul is of the size of the body. The soul substance is regarded as so much subtle that it is infinitely compressible and infinitely expansible, so that it can fill any body that it happens to occupy as a result of its deeds. It is neither atomic (anu) nor all-pervasive (Vibhu). The soul (Jiva) is called Jivastikaya, which means that occupies space. It occupies innumerable space-points. It has a capacity to expand and contract itself according to the dimension of the body which it occupies at any time. It occupies the whole of the body in which it lives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the feet, whenever there may be cause of sensations, it can at once feel it. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often explained as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines the whole room (Tattvarthasutra, V. 16-MariErfahrfezi 14aal)

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas 21 Nimbarka rejects this view because he believes in atomic size of the soul. According to him accepting the view that soul is of the size of the body, involves incompleteness on the part of Jiva (evaM zarIraparimANatvena 315lane 31164A: TEETH 374UCI BUCL I V.P.S., II.II.34). If we accept this view, then the size of the soul of an elephant will be as huge as the body of the elephant and the size of the soul of an ant will be as small as the body of an ant. The difficulty is, when the soul of an elephant will obtain the body of an ant or when the soul of an ant will obtain the body of an elephant due to its own deeds (Karmas), it will be rather impossible for both of them to enter into the body of one another. (ga 7 EYRAUT gasfy alas I. 219: ? Tu ! dehaparimANa AtmA karmavazAtpipIlikAzarIraM vihAya gajazarIraM yadA''pnoti tadA tasyA'kAtsyaM syAt / gajazarIrAnurUpaM paripUrNatvaM na syAt / gajAkAradehAnirgatasya cAtmanaH sUkSmazarIre praviSTasya tadanurUpaM sUkSmatvaJca na Pufgref: 1 V.K., II.II.34). To avoid this difficulty Jainas maintain that atman (soul) is possessed of attributes of contraction and expansion. The soul has infinite number of parts (avayava). So, in the body of an elephant, its parts increase and in an ant body, its parts are decreased. Nimbarka says that the soul (atman) cannot be said to possess parts (avayavas), which are subject to increase and decrease, because of the resulting fault of change, etc., on its parts. (34EUR41452e4091 37475T 7 fantas, sfat a 7 aj prakty, fachfraifaci994: 1 V.P.S., II.II. 35). Increase and decrease of parts of soul (jiva)

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22 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas means, it becomes subject to change. Whatever is changing, is subject to destruction. So, the Jiva will become non-eternal, like a body (7 a ajaj Hidual fe Grae4164, tasyAvayavAnAM gajazarIre upacayaH sUkSmazarIre apacayazcetyevaM paryAyAdavirodha sfat i pa: ? "falorfaz21: \" faolufcala HFTO i afa 4a4d 311641 Arayaafe Telfcafert PICTANT PITT I V.K., II.II.35). Intended meaning of Nimbarka is that, in case a body loses some of its parts or in case it gets deformed, it will result in a damage to the soul also, because, the soul is co-terminus with the body. Just as the body is subject to birth and death and various modifications (vikara), the soul also will be subject to these alternations and may share many deformities along with the bodily alternations and may share many deformities along with the bodily substance (pudgala). Again, the Jainas hold that the size of the soul at the time of release is permanent (nitya). It is little less than size of the body which it occupies. If we accept the constancy of the final size of the soul, then there must be the eternality (nityatva) of the initial and intervening size of the soul on account of the non-distinction (avisesa), everywhere (37pte Are Ferraga aGgIkRtyAdimadhyayorapi nityatvamastIti cettarhi sarvatrAvizeSaH syAdvinaSTo defimara: 1 V.P.S., II. II.36). What is the dimension of the soul in the state of liberation is the natural dimension of the soul and permanent, because, no more taking of body afterwards. In other words when liberation is attained, the possibility

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas 23. of rebirth is completely brought to an end. There would be non-difference of the size of the soul in gross body, in subtle body, in bondage and liberation. If we accept this view, then, the doctrine of the size of the soul is of body size, is completely demolished (carama-dehavinAzAnantaraM yanmokSadazAyAM parimANaM svarUpaJca taddhi nityambhavati / tadA sUkSmasthUlazarIraparigrahAbhAvAttasya saMkocavikAsAbhAvo bhavati / evambhUtasyAntasya parimANasya svarUpasya cAvasthiterubhayorAdyamadhyayoravasthayorapi nityatvam iSyate ArhataistasmAcca sarvatrAvizeSaH syAdityarthaH / sthUlazarIre sUkSmazarIre baddhAvasthAyAM mokSAvasthAyAM ca nityaniyataparimANa AtmA syAt, zarIraparimANapratijJA bAlabhASitA syAt / V.K., II.II.36). Nimbarka rejects Jaina's view of the size of the soul on these above mentioned ground and upholds the atomic size of the soul. The jiva (soul) is atomic in size (jIvo'NuH- V.P.S., II.III. 19). The knowledge is both essence and the attribute of the soul. The Jiva is extremely minute and is a minute as the hundredth part of the extremity of a hair, when divided into hundred parts (eSo'NurAtmA, "bAlAgrazatabhAgasya zatadhA kalpitasya ca, bhAgo jIva" iti svazabdonmAnAbhyAM jIvo'NuH / (V.P.S., II.III.22). The individual soul is atomic in size because of its action of going to another world (V.P.S., II.II.19-22). It is atomic in size in bondage as well as in the state of liberation (V.K., IV.IV.15). Its seat is in the heart. Although, this atomic Jiva occupies only a small point in the body, it spreads all over the body by means of its knowledge or consciousness, which is its attribute, just as the light of a lamp placed in the interior of a

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas room spreads in all the corners of the room ( jIvaguNAdeva, koSThe dIpAlokAdivat / V.P.S., II. III. 25). It experiences the various sensations of pleasure and pain of the entire body through its all pervasive quality of consciousness, just as the sandal-paste gives delight to the whole body though applied to one part of the body (dehaikadezastho'pi kRtsnaM dehaM candanabinduryathA''lhAdayati tathA jIvo'pi prakAzayati, ataH kRtsnazarIre sukhAdyanubhavo na virudhyate / V.P.S., II. III. 23). 24 Nimbarka also criticises the view of all-pervasive (Vibhu) nature of the soul. He seems to be unaware of the view of Sankara. He says that the doctrine of all-pervasive size of the soul is upheld by the Kapila and others which is delusory (abhasa) and is to be rejected. (pareSAM kapilAdInAM vyatikaraprasaGgAtsarvagatAtmavAdAzca AbhAsA ga | V.P.S., II.III.49). Srinivasa while commenting on this sutra, states that it is a view of Kapila an Kanada (kapilakaNAdAdInAM sarvagatAtmavAdAstu AbhAsA eva / V. K., II. III.49). According to Nimbarka, the view of the all-pervasive nature of the soul, contradicts Sruti (Scripture) which talks about the soul going out of the body (utkranti), its travelling to the higher world like world of moon etc. (gati). Such kind of movement is not at all possible in all-pervading Jiva. Again, if jiva is all-pervasive, then there will be either eternal contact with all objects. In the first case, there will be eternal perception of all objects and the later case, there will be eternal non-perception of all objects. Since there is no third principle outside of all-pervasive soul to bring about the contact. As a result, there will be the consequence

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas 25 of either eternal release or eternal bondage of the souls (V.P.S., II.III. 19-28, 31, 48-49). Again, if the souls are all-pervasive, they will be in contact with all the deeds of the souls, so, there, will be confusion of Karmas. (V.P.S., II.III.50-52). So, in this way Nimbarka criticises both the view of all-pervasive nature of the soul and the doctrine which holds that the size of the soul is of body size.

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Sri Sankaracarya's views on Jainism Presentation of Jainism Sri Sankaracarya (788-820 A.D.) is one the outstanding philosophical personalities in the history of Indian thought. He is the chief exponent of Advaita Philosophy (non-dualism). He was familiar with main principles of Jainism. His presentation of Jainism as Purvapaksa (prior view) in Brahmasutrabhasya is very authentic. His criticism of Syadvada may not be acceptable to many. He presents Jainism in the following way : The Jainas admit seven categories viz., the soul (jiva); non-soul (ajiva); inflow of Karma (asrava), stoppage of inflow of Karma (samvara); annihilation of accumulated Karma (nirjara), bondage of Karma (bandha) and liberation (moksa). In brief, they believe that, these can be broadly divided into two groups, the soul and the non-soul. Other categories can be included in these two only (FH a Tai Taterf: Hal: 312-37510AsravasaMvaranirjara-bandha-mokSA nAma / saMkSepatastu dvau eva padArthoM jIva-ajIva310, 741 cura sarafara sfa plast Brahmasutra Sarkarabhasya = B.S.B., II.II.33). They describe these two categories (Soul and non-soul) in another way also. They call this division of categories by the word astikaya (i.e. a category which occupies space). There are five astikayas (categories) viz., the category of soul (jivastikaya), the category of Pudgala (body)- combination of atoms, (pudgalastikaya), the category of principle of motion (dharmastikaya), the category of prin

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Sri Sankaracarya's views on Jainism 27 ciple of rest (adharmastikaya), and the category of space (akasastikaya). All these varities are subdivided into various ways, according to the assumption of their own doctrine (cent: $44 37424 4454 3798d Toffoli 779, jIvAstikAyaH, pudgalAstikAyaH dharmAstikAyo'dharmAstikAya AkAzAstikAyazceti / sarveSAmapi eSAm avAntara prabhedAn bahuvidhAn svasamayaparikalpitAn varNayanti / B.S.B., II.II.33). : The speciality of the Jainas is, application of reasoning known as seven-fold-judgement to all things, such as : (1) may be it exists, (2) may be it does not exist, (3) may be it exists and may be it does not exist, (4) may be it indescribable, (5) may be it exists and indescribable, (6) may be it does not exist and indescribable and (7) may be it exists, does not exist and is indescribable. In this way they predicate seven different views as regards the reality of everything. They apply this logic even to such concepts as unity, and eternality as well. Everything according to them, may be real, unreal, both real and real, one and many, indescribable and so on. (Ha a SH 45 R 14 7244 avatArayanti-syAd asti, syAnnAsti, syAdasti ca nAsti ca, syAdavaktavyaH, syAdasti cAvaktavyaH, syAnnAsti ca avaktavyaH syAdasti ca nAsti ca avaktavyaH afa, Taha Tahrafricaifay Bufu SH 9451784 of B.S.B., II.II.33). Criticism of Syadvada : We have already pointed out that Sankara took the word 'Syat in the sense of probability or 'may be' and criticises Syadvada. It seems that Sankara was not

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28 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas very familiar with the meaning of the word 'Syat taken by the Jainas in the sense of 'in certain respect or in certain point of view. There was no much literature in defence of Syadvada prior to Sarkara. Whatever literature developed in defence of Syadvada, is, post-Sankara development. Sankara, while criticising Syadvada, states that, this reasoning of application of sevenfold judgement to everything is faulty and unjustifiable. Sanksara, like Buddhists logicians, bitterly criticises this view by stating that contradictory attributes, like existence and nonexistence, unity and plurality, eternality and momentariness, cannot belong to the same thing, just as light and darkness cannot remain at the same place, or just as the same thing cannot be hot and cold at the same time. (Franqu14 : cfa i gra: | Bohf 1991 i afe ekasmin dharmiNi yugapat sadasattvAdiviruddhadharmasamAvezaH saMbhavati, shiitossnnvt| B.S.B., II.II.33). This view about things cannot be accepted as it is absord to think of the same thing of endowed with these contradictory attributes of reality, unreality etc. Sankara levels another charge against Syadvada by saying that no theory can be sustained by mere probability. If everything is probable, then Syadvada, by its own assertion, becomes only probable. If all truth is partial, then Syadvada itself is only partially true and, therefore, partially false. The seven categories (Soul, non-soul etc.) are definitely ascertained and said that they are seven in they are seen in

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Sri Sankaracarya's views on Jainism number, and have specific in character. Then, when we apply seven-fold judgement (Syadvada) to these, there will be confusion about them. Such as, they may be just as they are described or they may not be. These categories described in Jainism, in reality, may not be so, or may be, as it is described. So, this kind of knowledge about the objects will be uncertain. All assertion about them will end in doubt and cannot give definite knowledge. It will certainly be unauthoritative like doubt. (ye ete sapta padArthA nirdhAritAH, etAvanta evaMrUpAzceti, te tathaiva vA syuH, naiva vA tathA syuH, itarathA hi tathA vA syuH, atathA veti anirdhAritarUpaM SLI ARPsinaq Sy | B.S.B., II.I.33). Jainas may say that, reality has many aspects is a definite knowledge, it cannot be invalid like doubt (nanu anekAtmakaM vastu iti nirdhAritarUpameva jJAnamutpadyamAnaM saMzayajJAnavat na apramANaM bhavitumarhati / B.S.B., II.II.33). Sankara argues that, to say like this, that cognition of a thing can assume manyness or more than one nature and is a definite piece of knowledge, is itself untrue, for applying same reasoning, this socalled definite knowledge, may or may not be definite. In other words, if you apply Syadvada unrestrictedly for every object without exception, the definiteness of knowledge itself being equally an object of knowledge, would come under the application of such alternations as 'may be it exists', 'may be it does not exist' and so on and hence, this knowledge would have an indifinite nature all the same (niraGkuzaM hi anekAntatvaM sarvavastuSu pratijAnAnasya, nirdhAraNasyApi vastutvAvizeSAt, syAdasti, syAnnAsti ityAdi vikalpopanipAtAt anirdhAraNAtmakatA eva syAt / (B.S.B., II.II.33) 29

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30 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas Similarly, the ascertainer, as also the knowledge that result from ascertainment would somehow partially existent and somehow partially non-existent. In short, if this indefiniteness belongs to all things, without exception, that is, if it belongs to knowledge and the means of knowledge, as also to the knowing subject and the objects of knowledge, how can it be said that, Tirtharikara (Spiritual teacher of Jainism) teaches anything which is undoubtable or definite ? In this circumstances, how can you consider, the teacher of the Jainism as an authority, who imparts instruction, when the means of knowledge, objects of knowledge, the knower and knowledge remain indefinite in nature ? Also, how can those who rely on his views act upon his instruction about things which remain indefinite in their nature ? This Jaina view, being thoroughly indefinite, appear to be uttered by a madman or a drunken person (evaM nirdhArayituH nirdhAraNaphalasya ca syAt pakSe astitA, syAt ca pakSe nAstitA iti / evaM sati kathaM pramANabhUtaH san tIrthaMkaraH pramANaprameyapramAtRpramitiSu anirdhAritAsu upadeSTuM zaknuyAt ? kathaM vA tadabhiprAyAnusAriNaH tadupadiSTe arthe anirdhAritarUpe pravarteran / ekAntikaphalatvanirdhAraNe hi sati tatsAdhanAnuSThAnAya sarvo loko'nAkulaH pravartate, nAnyathA / atazca anirdhAritArthaM giliai yupne HT48199 349444927: PIT I B.S.B., II.II.33). Again, if we extend the application of the same reasoning (Saptabhanginaya) to the five astikayas, then the difficulty is that they may be seen to be more or less than five i.e. they may be five or more than five or less then five, they may not be five, hence these things can be greater or less in number. (tathA paJcAnAm astikAyAnAM

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31 Sri Sarkaracarya's views on Jainism paJcatvasaMkhyA asti vA nAsti veti vikalpyamAnA, syAt tAvat ekasmin pakSe, pakSAntare tu na syAt, ityato nyUnasaMkhyAtvam adhikasaMkhyAtvam vA 91974 I B.S.B., II.II.33). Again, Jainas say, when the intention is to speak of existence and non-existence-simultaneously, the two states being inexpressible at the same time, it is called indescribable(avaktavya). Sankara points out that these categories cannot be indescribable, for if they be indescribable, they cannot be expressed in words. To call them indescribable and yet to describe them in words is to contradict oneself. Even when they are expressed in words, they may either be understood as such or may not be understood. (7 a Pai Ygref14a Tourai Syafa! avaktavyAH cet na ucyeran / ucyante ca avaktavyAH ca iti vipratiSiddham / 32447418 geta 3taaring maarfat sfat a 1 B.S.B., II.II.33). Similarly, the perfect knowledge arising from the comprehension of all this, may exist or may not. So also its opposite false knowledge, may or may not exist. To go on saying that they can be known or not-known, that their knowledge is perfect or imperfect, inspite of its being imperfect or not, is certainly to talk like a mad person. (721 HG ER07460 HRYGGHET AT 71 ai, vai tadviparItam asamyagdarzanamapi asti vA nAsti vA, iti pralapan mattonmattapakSasya Ta FITCL 7 T AGET I B.S.B., II.II.33). Nobody will ever to act or no-body will be inspired to follow or achieve his relase or to attain heaven, if these things mean nothing definite, so far as their existence or duration are concerned. Similarly that they

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32 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas are eternal from one point of view and impermanent from another. Even the nature of the Arhats, whose nature have been determined, in Jaina scriptures, will tend to have an indefinite nature. (Fauftaufit: a cat a:, pakSe ca abhAvaH, tathA pakSe nityatA, pakSe ca anityateti anavadhAraNAyAM pravRtti-anupapattiH / anAdisiddhajIvaprabhRtInAM ca svazAsrAvadhRtasvabhAvAnAmayaTayata taraya: B.S.B., II.II.33). Thus, Jaina doctrine is illogical, for it is not possible for any of the categories, starting from the souls, to have such contradictory attributes as existence and non-existence. In the presence of the attribute of existence, there can be no possibility of the presence of the other attribute of non-existence, just as much as existence is not possible in the presence of non-existence. As a matter of fact, being excludes nonbeing, and non-being excludes being, but nothing definite can be said, regarding soul, real or unreal, separate or non-separate. To say, the very same thing is one and many, permanent and impermanent, different and nondifferent at the same time is to ascert indeterminateness and which is certainly illogical. So, this kind of doctrine is not acceptable. (evaM jIvAdiSu padArtheSu ekasmin dharmiNi sattvAsattvayoH viruddhayoH dharmayoH asaMbhavAt, sattve ca ekasmin dharme asattvasya dharmAntarasya asaMbhavAt, asatve ca evaM sattvasya asaMbhavAt, asaGgatamidaM 37eri Ha4 | B.S.B., II.II.33). According to Sankara the Jaina doctrine of Syadvada, in the ultimate analysis is useless even for practical purposes, being but uncertain or, indefinite

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33 Sri Sankaracarya's views on Jainism knowledge. He tried to show that, entire spectrum of Jaina principles can be subjected to the Syadvada idea and no definite guidance can be had from it. Refutation Dehaparimanavada : Sankara critically considers the various possible size of the soul and then came to the conclusion that the soul cannot have any particular finite size. The soul is according to him, infinite, all-pervasive and omnipresent. He criticises the both view of atomic size of the soul and the Jaina view which considers the size of the soul is of body size. He states that, if the soul is of the size of an atom, if it emits knowledge out of it as its quality, the quality (knowledge) will remain restricted only to the space of the atom; it cannot spread outside of it, as the quality and the substance remain in the same place. Similarly, if the soul were of atomic size, it could not experience the various sensations extending over the whole body, for, the soul would then be localised in some part of the body, due to its atomicity. If again, intelliegence of the soul pervades the whole body, the soul cannot be atomic, since intelligence constitutes the proper nature of it, just as heat and light constitute the essential nature of fire. The qualities cannot be separated from the objects whose qualities they are. For the above mentioned difficulties the soul cannot be atomic (B.S.B., II.III.29). Sankara further points out that, now this is appropriate only in the case of the atomicity of the soul being mataphysical while its infinity is real; for both statements cannot be taken

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34 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas in their primary sense, at the same time. Hence, the statement of anutva (subtle, atomic) mentioned in the Sruti (scriptures) has to be understood as referring either to the difficulty of knowing the soul or else to its limiting adjuncts (B.S.B., II.III.29). Similarly, Sankara points out the defects in the view of Jaina doctrine of size of the soul. He gives ten arguments to prove that size of the soul cannot be body size. If soul is of body size, it would be limited in extension, non-permanent and so like the pot, and other material things, it will be subject to destruction. If it becomes non-eternal then the question is who is bound and who is got liberated, because destruction of the body will be end of everything (zarIraparimANatAyAM ca satyAma akRtsnaH asarvagataH paricchinna AtmA ityataH ghaTAdivat anityatvamAtmanaH ARI B.S.B., II.II.34). Again, another difficulty would be, all bodies, in the world (i.e. human, animals, insect. etc.) have no fixed dimensions. The soul born as a man will asume the size of a human body. If the soul of a man is born as an elephant, as a consequence of its previous deeds, it will not pervade the whole of the elephant body, and when it is born as an ant or small insect, it will not be wholly contained in the body of the ant. (PruMTN a 3779fceraftiMaTa oitat Home parimANo bhUtvA punaH kenacit karmavipAkena hastijanma prApnuvan na kRtsnaM hastizarIraM prApnuyAt / puttikAjanma ca prApnuvan, na kRtsnaH puttikAzarIre F AI B.S.B., II.II.34). Similar will be the difficulty if we take into consideration the bodies of one and the same person, in his childhood, youth and old age. (417

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Sri Sankaracarya's views on Jainism eSa ekasminnapi janmani kaumArayauvanasthavireSu doSaH / B.S.B., II.II.34). The Jainas may explain away this difficulty by saying that the soul has infinite parts which are capable of being compressed in a small body and of being expanded to fill the space in a large body like a light of a lamp, which is kept in a small pot, comprises itself and kept in a big hall is expanded ( syAdetat / anantAvayavo jIvaH / tasya te eva avayavA alpe zarIre saMkuceyuH, mahati ca vikaseyuH fa B.S.B., II.II.34). Sankara argues that the Jainas have to explain, whether there is any obstruction to the different parts of the soul becoming concentrated at the same place or not. Should there be any impediment, the infinite parts will not be contained in the same limited place, and even if there is no obstruction, then all the parts can very well be accommodated in the place occupied by a single part, so that there will be no possibility of increase in magnitude. As a result, the predicament will arise of the embodied soul becoming atomic in dimension. In other words, if the infinite particles of the soul occupy different places, they cannot be contained in a small body, and if they occupy the same place, that is the place occupied by one particle only, the size of the soul will always in all cases, be very minute or atomic (teSAM punaH anantAnAM jIvAvayavAnAM samAnadezatvaM pratihanyate vA na vA iti vaktavyam / pratighAte tAvat na anantAvayavAH paricchinne deze saMmIyeran / apratighAte'pi ekAvayavadezatvopapatteH sarveSAmavayavAnAM prathimAnupapatteH jIvasya YES: B.S.B., II.II.34). Besides, there is no reason why should one believe in the particles being 35

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas infinite in number, when the soul has a limited extent of the body. It cannot be even imagined that the soul that is limited by the size of the body should have infinite parts. ( api ca zarIramAtraparicchinnAnAM jIvAvayavAnAmAnantyaM na 36 fg4f | B.S.B., II.II.34). The Jainas may say in reply that the particles join or fall away as the occasion for the soul is to enter into a large or a small body. (atha paryAyeNa bRhat zarIrapratipattau kecit jIvAvayavA upagacchanti tanuzarIrapratipattau ca kecit apagacchanti iti ucyeta / B. S.B., II. II. 34 ) . Sankara argues that, even by admitting the increase and descrease of parts of the soul in succession, it is not possible to establish beyond contradiction the fact that the soul confirms to the size of the body. This view implies that soul is capable of undergoing change. In the first instance, mutability becomes unavoidable for the soul that increases and decreases for ever through the accession and deplation of parts. And if it be mutable like a piece of leather (or skin), it will be subject to impermanence. If it is non-eternal, impermanent, subject to destruction, everchanging, then bondage and liberation cannot be predicated of it. This view would go against the Jaina doctrine of bondage and liberation of the soul. Jainas believe that the soul surrounded by eight kinds of Karma (astavidha karma) remains sunk in the sea of this world (Samsara) like a bottle ground and it floats upward when that bond is snapped (na ca paryAyeNApi avayavopagamApagamAbhyAmetad dehaparimANatvaM jIvasya avirodhena upapAdayituM zakyate / kuta: ? vikArAdidoSaprasaGgAt / avayavopagamApagamAbhyAM hi anizamApUryamANasya apakSIyamANasya ca jIvasya

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Sri Sarkaracarya's views on Jainism 37 vikriyAvattvaM tAvadaparihAryam, vikriyAvatve ca carmAdivat anityatvaM prasajyeta / tatazca bandhamokSa-abhyupagamo bAdhyeta, karmASTakapariveSTitasya jIvasya alAbuvat saMsArasAgare nimagnasya bandhanocchedAt UrdhvagAmitvaM bhavati iti / B.S.B.II.II.35). Besides the parts that come and go (while increasing and decreasing) will be other than the soul, precisely, because they are adventitious like the bodies etc. 'In other words, like the body which comes into being and is destroyed, similarly, these particles too have got origin and destruction and therefore cannot be said to be of the nature of the soul. In that case, some part that is everlasting will be the soul. But that cannot be pin-pointed to be so and so. If some one permanent part is to be said as the soul, we do not know, which one is meant. Nor do we know whence the particles come, when they join the soul and wither they go, when they fall away. It will be not possible to know from where these incoming, parts emerge, and where the outgoing ones submerge. It cannot be that they come out of the elements and merge into elements, for the soul is not material. The soul being immaterial, these parts cannot be said to have sprung from the material elements, so that they can return back into them. There is no way to know their common or uncommon source of the parts of the individual soul. Further more, the incoming and outgoing parts will have no definite measurement. In such case, the nature of the soul will remain indeterminate. Thus, due to such defects, it is not possible to accept a successive increase and de

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38 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas crease in the parts of the soul. (kiMcAnyat / AgacchatAm apagacchatAm cAvayavAnAm-Agama-apAyadharmatvAdeva anAtmatvaM zarIrAdivat / tatazca avasthitaH kizcad avayava AtmA iti syAt / na ca sa nirUpayituM zakyate ayamasau iti / kiJcAnyat / AgacchantaH ca ete jIvAvayavA: kuta: prAdurbhavanti, apagacchantaH ca kutra lIyante iti vaktavyam / na hi bhUtebhyaH prAdurbhaveyuH bhUteSu ca nilIyeran, abhautikatvAt jIvasya / nApi kazcidanyaH sAdhAraNo'sAdharaNo vA jIvAnAm avayavAdhAro nirUpyate, pramANAbhAvAt / kiMcAnyat / anavadhRtasvarUpazca evaM sati AtmA syAt / AgacchatAmapagacchatAM cAvayavAnAm aniyataparimANatvAt / ata evamAdidoSaprasaGgAt na paryAyeNApi avayava-upagama-apagamau AtmanaH AzrayituM zakyete / B. S.B. IIII.35). Sankara says that the Jainas may say like some Buddhists that, the soul may be considered as permanent inspite of its changes, just as a stream of water is said to be permanent inspite of the changing water. But the difficulty is, if the stream is not real, there will be the theory of non-existence of the soul, which is not acceptable to Jainas. If the stream is real, the soul will be subject to such defects as mutability. Hence, this view is unjustifiable (punaH paryAyeNa parimANa - avasthAne'pi srota - saMtAnanityatAnyAyena Atmano nityatA syAt / yathA raktapaTAnAM vijJAnaanavasthAne'pi tatsaMtAnanityatA tadvat visicAmapi iti AzaGkaya anena sUtreNa uttaramucyate / saMtAnasya tAvad avastutve nairAtmyavAdaprasaGgaH, vastutve'pi AtmanaH vikArAdidoSaprasaGgAt asya pakSasya anupapattiH iti / B.S.B., II.II.35). Again, the Jainas believe that the final size of the soul is permanent during its state of release. Now, if this final size is permanent, it cannot have been created, for nothing created is eternal or permanent. If it is not created, it must have existed in the beginning

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Sri Sankaracarya's views on Jainism and middle as well. If the size of the soul in the condition of release is permanent, it logically follows that the initial and the intervening (before release) sizes also must be permanent, otherwise, there will be three different conditions of one and the same soul. Thus, the soul will have the size of one single body only, and it will not acquire any other inflated or deflated body. In other words, that the different bodies of the soul will have one and the same size and that the soul will not be required to enter into bigger and smaller bodies. The dimensions of the soul being the same in its three conditions, it must be either atomic (anu) or large (mahan) and must not very according to the size of the body. In this way, the Jaina doctrine is inadequate and therefore, deserves to be rejected (api ca antyasya mokSAvasthAbhAvino jIvaparimANasya nityatvamiSyate jainaiH / tadvat pUrvayoH api AdyamadhyamayoH jIvaparimANayoH nityatvaprasaGgAt avizeSaprasaGgaH syAt / ekazarIraparimANatA eva syAt na upacita- apacita- zarIrAntaraprAptiH / athavA antyasya jIvaparimANasya avasthitatvAt pUrvayoH api avasthayoH avasthitaparimANaH eva jIvaH syAt; tatazca avizeSeNa sarvadaiva aNurmahAn vA jIvo'bhyupagantavyo na zarIraparimANaH / ataH saugatavat Arhatamapi matamasaMgatamiti B.S.B., II.II.36). In this way, by disapproving the possibility of the souls having the atomic size or the size of the body, Sankara is naturally driven further to the last alternative which states that the soul is all-pervading and infinite. It being all-pervading, it can both be atomic and infinite at the same time without any contradiction. The same supreme self appears to assume various forms of 39

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40 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas varying magnitudes due to the adjuncts with which it is associated. Sankara states as light, either, the Sun and so on appear differentiated as it were through their objects such as fingeres, vassels, water and so on which constitute limiting adjuncts, while in reality they preserve their essential non-differentiatedness, so the distinction of different selves is due to limiting adjuncts only, while the unity of selves is natural and original (yathA prakAzAkAzasavitRprabhRtayo'GgalikarakodakaprabhRtiSu karmasUpAdhibhUteSu savizeSA ivAvabhAsante, na ca svAbhAvikImavizeSAtmatAM jahAti, evaM upAdhinimitta qarTurcia: Partita I (B.S.B., II.II.25).

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Sri Ramanujacarya and Jainism Presentation of Janism Sri Ramanujacarya (1017-1137 A.D.) is the chief exponent of Vaisnava school of Philosophy. His philosophical system is known as the Visistadvaita (qualified Monism). He was familiar with almost all principles of Jainism. He gives detailed account of Jainism. His presentation is very similar to that of Sankaracarya. He says, 'According to Jainas, there is no God, the world consists of Jiva (Soul) and ajiva (non-soul). The world is made up of six substances, viz., the soul, which has knowledge, faith happiness and valour, and all other five substances are unconscious. Pudgala (matter) is that substance which possesses colour, smell, flavour and touch. It is of two kinds, of the nature of atoms and of the nature their aggregate i.e. the elements and the things elemental-air, fire, water, earth, body, world etc. The Kala (time) is again, a special kind of substance, atomic, the cause of practical dealing in the form of, was, is, would be etc. Akasa (Space) is also one and infinite in extension. They also accept another division among these substances viz., five astikayas known as jivastikaya, dharmastikaya, adharmastikaya, pudgalastikaya and akasastikaya. The word astikaya refers to a substance residing in many regions. These Jains also accept another divisions, which is useful for liberation of Jivas viz., Jiva (soul), ajiva (non-soul), asrava (inflow of karmas), bandha (bondage), samvara (stoppage of inflow of Karma), nirjara (annihilation of

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42 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas accumulated Karma) and moksa (liberation). Moksa is the appearance of one's own natural form, annihilating all kind of passions and Karmas. (jIvAjIvAtmakaM jagadetannirIzvaram / tacca SadravyAtmakam / tAni ca dravyANi jIvadharmAdharma-padagalAkAzAkhyAni / tatra jIvA baddhA yogAsiddhA muktAzceti trividhAH / dharmo nAma gatimatAM gatihetubhUto dravyavizeSo jagadvyApI / adharmazca sthitihetubhUto vyaapii| pudgalo nAma varNagandharasasparzavadravyam / tacca dvividhaM, paramANurUpaM tatsaMghAtarUpaM ca pavanajvalanasaliladharaNItanubhuvanAdikam / kAlastvabhUdasti-bhaviSyatIti vyavahArahetuNurUpo dravyavizeSaH / AkAzo'pyeko'nantapradezazca / teSu cANuvyatiriktadravyANi paJcAstikAya iti ca saMgRhyante, jIvAstikAyo dharmAstikAyo'dharmAstikAyaH pudgalastikAya AkAzAstikAya iti / anekadezavartini dravye'stikAyazabdaH / jIvAnAM mokSopayoginamaparamapi saMgrahaM / kurvanti jIvAjIvAsravabandhanirjarasaMvaramokSA iti / mokSasaMgraheNa mokSopAyazca gRhItaH / (Sribhasyam, II. II. 31). They uphold the Anekantavada. According to them all things have many characteristics. Everything in the universe is existent as well non-existent, eternal as well non-eternal, difference and non-difference. As a substance a thing is existent or real, but from the point of view of modification same thing is non-existent or unreal. In this respect, they apply seven- fold judgement everywhere and to everything, such as (1) May be is, (2) may be is not, (3) may be is and is not, (4) may be, indescribable, (5) may be is and indescribable (6) may be is not and indescribable and (7) may be, is, is not, and indescribable (sarvaM ca vastujAtaM sattvAsattvanityatvAnityatvAbhinnatvAbhinnatvAdibhiranaikAntikamicchanti - 1. syAdasti 2. syAnnAsti 3. syAdasti ca nAsti ca 4. syAdavaktavyam 5.

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43 Sri Ramanujacarya and Jainism syAdasti ca avaktavyam 6. syAnnAsti cAvaktavyam 7. syAdasti ca nAsti 7 3tamaj a, cfa Ho 999t adia I (Sribhasya, II. II.31). Criticism of Syadvada : Ramanuja does not deal in detail with Syadvada doctrine except pointing out to the inherent improbability of opposite attributes staying together. He states that, Syadvada is not proper reasoning, because of on account of the impossibility of simultaneous existence of contradictory things like existence and non-existence in the entity like shadow and light (ekasmin vastuni 37fFramfetarafa base et OP 1149 G H9ata Sribhasya, II. II.31). Substance and its modifications (paryayas) are two different things. Paryayas are objectives being particular state of substance. They are (substance and its modifications) different like clay and pot. So, contradictory attributes in one and the same thing, at the same time not possible. Same clarified butter (Ghrta) cannot be solid as well as liquid form at the same time. There is no possibility of the inclusion of two different things (like pot and clay), though they are substance and paryayas of the same thing. Water is a substance, but it cannot be solid as ice and flowing liquid at the same time and at same place. When the particular thing is described as existent it cannot be described as nonexistent at the same time, which is quite opposite of existence. Non-eternality (anityatva) of particular substance is, its being the resort of particular modifications called origination and destruction. If it is the case,

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44 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas then how can the permanency or permanent nature opposed to that come in there ? Being different is being the locus of opposite attributes or qualities, then how can its opposite non-difference come in there. In other words, how can quite opposite attributes such as difference and non-difference can exist in one and the same thing, just as it is not possible for the nature of -aboon nf , huffalo to exist simultaa horse ana ine naime vo v neously in one entity. (dravyasya tadvizeSaNabhUtaparyAyazabdAbhidheyAvasthAvizeSasya ca pRthakpadArthatvAt, maikasminviruddhadharmasamAvezaH saMbhavati / tathAhiekenAstitvA-dinAvasthAvizeSeNa viziSTasya tadAnImeva na tadviparItanAstitvAdiviziSTatvaM saMbhavati / utpattivinAzAkhyapariNAmavizeSAspadatvaM ca dravyasyAnityatvaM tadviparItaM ca nityatvaM tasminkathaM samavaiti ? virodhIdharmAzrayatvaM ca bhinnatvaM tadviparItaM cAbhinnatvaM kathaM vA tasminsamavaiti ? yathAzvatvamahiSatvayoryugapadekasmin 37449: 1 (Sribhasya, II.II.31). Ramanuja points out that Kala (time) is considered as one of the substances by the Jainas. But in case of Kala, it being apprehended as only a qualifying attribute (visesana) of objects (dravya), its separate existence and non-existence, etc., are neither capable of being described, nor capable of being-refuted. Ideas like existence and non-existence referring to time are always associated with a object and can be hardly thought of independently. In this case, how can you apply saptabhanginaya ? (folcthy padArthavizeSaNatayaiva pratItestasya pRthagastitvanAstitvAdayo na vaktavyA na ca parihartavyA / kAlo'sti nAstIti vyavahAro vyavahartRNAM jAtyAdhastitvanAstitvavyavahAratulyaH / jAtyAdayo hi dravyavizeSaNatayaiva pratIyante / Sribhasya, II.II.31).

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Sri Ramanujacarya and Jainism 45 Jaina may argue that learned Brahmins say that Brahman is one and is alone, atman of all. He is one and many. It is said like that, Ramanuja argues, because, Brahman is one. He is omniscient, omnipresent, all-powerful with all desired fulfilled and sentient (cit) and non-sentient (acit) constitute His body. We accept only one Brahman as the ultimate truth. But, the Jainas accept six different substances as the real entities and hence, they cannot properly account for oneness (ekatva) as well as manyness (anekatva) etc., in one place, because substance lack identity with one another. (kathaM punarekameva brahma sarvAtmakamiti zrotriyairucyate ? sarvacetanAcetanazarIratvAtsarvajJasya sarvazakteH satyasaMkalpasya puruSottamasya, ityuktam / preterefiunt: Massfori alimentariu 404664 I (Sribhasya, II.II.31). Moreover six substances such as Jiva and ajiva are not modifications of one single substance. It is very difficult to propound in their case being one or being many etc., owing to the substance being one and owing to its being constituted of modes. (kiJca jIvAdInAM SaNNAM dravyANAmekadravyaparyAyatvAbhAvAtteSu dravyaikatvena paryAyAtmanA caikatvAnekatvAdayo 54994141: 1 (Sribhasya, II.II.31). If it is argued that, these six substances would become like that i.e. one and many, by their own modes and by their respective natures, the reply is, even thus there would be contradiction with Anekantavada, i.e. everything is many-sided, on account of the absence of mutual identity. (378113ia asal Golfo 50014: pra: svena cAtmanA tathA bhavanti, iti / evamapi sarvamanaikAntikam iti 3724 TARTET:, 3RTRAGIKAAaa I (Sribhasya, II.II.31).

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46 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas Criticism of Dehaparimanavada : Similarly, Ramanuja rejects the Jaina view of Dehaparimanavada of the soul by stating that, this view is nothing but absurd. (Ffe 37457H 3A4CH 1 Sribhasya, II.II.34). Here, his criticism is very similar to that of Sankara. According to the Jainas, the size of the soul is of the size of the body having innumerable parts. (Gastenayah GEYRAT sfa fe yani feefa: 1 (Sribhasya, II. II.32). They also believe in rebirth. Their view about the size of the soul is unteneble, because, when a soul abiding in the body of an elephant is reborn in the next life as an ant, how can the huge dimension of an elephant find entrance into the tiny body of an ant ? The soul will not have sufficient space in an ant body. That means, only a fraction of the jiva can enter into the ant which is absurd ( Erfgent fee chatta 2446 HOT pipIlikAzarIre pravizato'lpadezavyApitvenAkAtsnyaM prasajyate / aparipUrNatA yhoed Sribhasya, II.II.32). The Jainas may say that, the soul is capable of contraction and expansion, according to the size of the body, so, there is no absurdity here. (3781 FicharactedharmatayAtmanaH paryAyazadvAbhidheyAvasthAntarApatyA virodhaH parihiyate, ityucyate / Sribhasya, II.II.32). Even if we admit that the soul assumes a different condition through expansion and contraction, yet they will not get over the inconsistency. For the soul, would then be subject to change with all its concomitant imperfections like impermanence, modifications etc., like pot. If there is a change, it will become non-eternal, and in no way superior to

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Sri Ramanujacarya and Jainism material things like pot, etc. ( na ca saMkocavikAsarUpAvasthAntarApatyApi virodhaH parihartuM zakyate, vikAratatprayuktAnityatvAdidoSaguacefalfagmuraiflqugia | Sribhasya, II.II.33). The Jainas believe that the size of the soul in the state of release is permanent, because, it has not to take another birth. Liberation is end of cycle of birth and death. The soul and its size on release are both eternal. It is its natural size. If we accept this view, then the size of the soul cannot be different in the state of bondage also. Then, the size of the soul may not be the size of the body. (jIvasya yadantyaM parimANaM mokSAvasthAyAM tasya pazcAddehAntaraparigrahAbhAvAdavasthitatvAdAtmanazca mokSAvasthasya tatparimANasya cobhayornityatvAt, tadevAtmanaH svAbhAvikaM parimANamiti pUrvamapi tasmAd avizeSa: syAt / ataH dehaparimANatvamAtmano na syAt / Sribhasya, II. II.34). Ramanuja, in this way rejects the Jaina view and maintains that, the jiva is atomic in size. It is also not all-pervasive, otherwise, it would experience simultaneously the various pains and pleasures of all persons. It is one and single for each person and extremely minute like a monad or atom in size and it dwells in the heart of each person (Sribhasya, II.III.25). Though the soul is very minute, and dwells in the heart, it extends through the whole body by means of its quality, viz., consciousness or knowledge. The soul spreads all over the body, not actually, but by the means of its quality, just as the light of things abiding in one place, such as gem, the Sun, and so on is seen to extend to many places, so the consciousness of the soul, dwelling in the heart pervades the entire body. Ramanuja, 47

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48 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas does not identify the soul with knowledge (Jnana) like Sankara who identifies soul with knowledge. Ramanuja, on the contrary, makes a distiction and maintains that the knowledge is a quality (guma) that belongs to the subject (soul-gunin). The soul is frequently designated as knowledge, simply for the reason that knowledge is its essential quality and it cannot appear without knowledge (Sribhasya, II.III.29). The soul is thus not consciousness itself but the knower (jnata), the knowing subject. He states that 'to be a knowing subject is the essential character of the soul and the soul is atomic size' (Sribhasya, II.III.31). The objection may be raised that, if soul is atomic and occupies an extremely minute portion of the body how can it remain in touch with all the parts of the body and can simultaneously experience, so many sensations ? Ramanuja, like Nimbarka, replies that, as a drop of sandal-ointment, although applied to one spot of the body only, produces a refreshing sensation extending over the whole body, similarly, the soul also, dwelling in one part of the body only, is conscious of sensations taking place in any part of the body (Sribhasya, II.III.24). Another famous Vaisnava Philosopher Sri Vallabhacarya and his followers have also criticised Syadvada and Dehaparimanavada of Jainas. Their criticism is more or less similar to earlier Vedantic Acaryas. They point out that application of contradoctary attributes to same thing is an impossibility (TFFT Fift avaktavyAnAM pratyekasamudAyAbhyAM syAt pUrvakaH sapta prakAro bhavati, tadekasmin

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Sri Ramanujacarya and Jainism het, afgehaara 3y757 1 (Anubhasya, II.II.33), and if we apply this method of seven-fold judgement to all things, we cannot have definite knowledge of a single substance. Everything will be subject to probability and Jainas own theory, Syadvada proves only that nothing is certain. (Hoz tereta HH991-fon 440 gach lif yererea 20954 7 piffa Marina oda: 7967: 1 II.II.33 Pradipatika). Vallabhaites point out that, accepting Dehaparimanavada is embressing materialistic view. If we accept that, the soul has nature of expansion and contraction, means, it is, subject to change. Change (vikara) or parts (avayava) of the souls means, nonpermanency of the soul. So, destruction of the body will be end of the soul. So, bondage, liberation, means of liberation etc., will become meaningless. To avoid this, Jainas have to admit the view that the soul is either atomic or great or vibhu. That means giving up the view of Dehaparimana. (1. vikArasAvayavatvAnityatvAnAM prApteH lokAyatamatAt avizeSaprasaGgAt / II.II.35, Pradipatika. 2. anafanteracrustanto itafanirati II.II.36, Pradipatika. 3. pUrvadoSaparihArAya cobhayanityatvam bhavedaNutvaM vA mahattvaM vA, ubhayathA'pi PriceRAUT 7 wafar far 7 Tareffufas: 1 Anubhasya, II.II.36.). This Jaina's Anekantavada or Syadvada, as a philosophical method has been criticised by many other philosophers of Indian Philosophy. Santaraksita (a Buddhist Philosopher) says that, Anekantavada suffers from

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50 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas intermixture or confusion (Sankara), which consists in the incidence of opposite attributes in the same substratum. The substance in which difference is posited will have difference and identity both as its traits and likewise, the aspect in which identity is asserted will have identity and difference as its predicate and this means intermixture or Sarkara (Tattvasangraha, verse1722). In Pramanavartikalankara it is mentioned that existence and non-existence cannot go together. Either thing must be existent or it must be non-existent, both positive and negative cannot be possible in same thing. (p.142). It is also said that, if we accept anekanta of all things, then nature of one element will have nature of another element, such as water, earth etc., will have the nature of fire and fire would have the nature of water and so on. In that case, one who is desireous of water, may go for fire and vice-versa, so whole practical life will be disrupted (HCICII 3770IfH641 Saddarsanasamuccayatika, pp. 557-8.). Vyomasiva has pointed out the defects of Anekantavada by stating that, if we accept Anekantavada, then liberated (mukta) will not be really liberated (Vyomavati, p. 20). For he will be considered from one point of view, both liberated and not liberated and from another point of view, simply not liberated. Besides, if the statement "the thing has anekanta nature" involves an unconditional predication, then it falsifies the anekanta doctrine, for according to the Anekantavada, no philosophical predication should be unconditional or unqualified. But if the above predication is conditionalised with the 'Syat operator fol

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Sri Ramanujacarya and Jainism 51 lowing the Jaina anekanta doctrine viz., "in a certain sense, the thing has anekanta nature "and" in a certain sense, it does not have anekanta nature and so on, then we will be led into a Paradoxical situation or circularity (The central Philosophy of Jainism, p.57). Another general objection against the Syadvada or Saptabhanginaya (Seven-fold Predication) is that, why should we accept only seven predicates, why not accept several altenatives ? Instead of accepting only seven alternative predicates, we can go upto a hundred or an unlimited number. Kumarila Bhatta has pointed out that 'even one hundred alternatives can be generated through generous use of the method used by the Jainas to generate only seven alternatives (A9F1YHIGH TT957 379 Gear Mimamsaslokavartika). Jaina philosophers, beginning from Akalanka and Vidyananda, were aware of these criticisms of Anekantavada and they have tried to answer them all in their writings. Akalanka in Pramanasangrah mentions seven demerits of the Anekantavada pointed out by the critics, such as doubt (Samsaya), contradiction (virodha), lack of conformity of bases (vaiyadhikaranya), joint fault (ubhayadosa), infinite regress (anavastha), intermixture (sankara) and absence (abhava). Vidyananda notes eight faults of Anekantavada shown by the critics. He omits 'joint fault' from the list of Akalanka but adds two more viz., cross-breading (vyatireka) and the lack of comprehension i.e. arthapatti (Astasahasri, p. 227). Prabhacandra, also mentions eight defects of anekanta pointed by the opponents (Prameyakamal

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas amartanda, p. 156). Vadidevasuri (Syadvadaratnakara, p.738) and Gunaratnasuri (Saddarsanasamuccayatika, p. 357-58) were also aware of these objections raised by the opponents. Most of these defects of anekantavada pointed out by the critics are only minor variations of three major defects viz., contradiction, doubt and intermixture. 52 In defence of Anekantavada or Syadvada : We have seen that Jaina's Anekantavada or Syadvada as a philosophical method has been the subject of criticism of all non-Jaina philosophers. But certainly, these are not fair criticisms of the Jaina method. These criticisms do not satisfactorily meet the contention of the Jainas. The Anekantavada or Syadvada of the Jainas, is neither a doctrine of doubt or even uncertainty, nor a doctrine of probability. These, criticisms are based on misunderstandig of the word 'Syad' used by the Jainas. To understand the Jaina position, it is important to know, in what sense, the word 'Syat' is used by the Jaina philosophers and how they present the doctrine of Syadvada or sevenfold predication (saptabhangi). The speciality of the Jainas lies in its use of the 'Syat' particle in the predication. That is why saptabhanginaya (Sevenfold predication) is called Syadvada. Generally, the word 'Syat' is used to mean 'perhaps' or 'may be' or 'somehow' or 'somewhat', in Sanskrit language. It is also used sometimes to express probability (sambhavana). In Indian philosophical text the

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Sri Ramanujacarya and Jainism word 'Syat' is often used in the sense of 'let it be so' (but-syadetad). Here it is used to show the speaker's provisional acceptance of the opponents view to raise different kind of objections against it and to refute it finally. But the word 'Syat' used by the Jaina thinkers, is different from all these meanings. In the Jaina philocophical tauts the word 'Syat' means a conditional yes. WIV VT VA W Prof. B.K. Matilal has rightly pointed out that 'It is like a saying', in a certain sense yes. It amounts to a condition approval. The particle 'Syat', in fact, acts a categorical 'A is B' into a conditional: 'if P then A is B'. (The central Philosophy of Jainism, p.52). The use of the particle 'Syat' is to show more concession to opponents' thesis and at the same time, it persuades the opponent to see another point of view or carefully consider the other side of the case (Ibid., p.52). 53 Jaina philosophers like Samantabhadra, Akalarka, Vidyananda, Amrtacandra and others have tried to show that the word "Syat' is used to remove, one sided view. Samantabhadra notes that the word 'Syat' is ordinarily equal to such expressions as somehow or sometimes. But even these terms do not have in this context, such vague meaning as somehow or sometimes (kadacit or kathancit). They mean in certain respect or under a certain condition or from a certain point of view (P sarvathaikAntatyAgAt kiMvRttacidvidhiH / saptabhaGganayApekSo heyAdeyavizeSatA // Aptamimamsa, 104). FROM

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54 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas Samantabhadra, while commenting on the word 'Syat says that "When the particle 'Syat is used by you (O Mahavira) as well as by a Srutakevalin (a realised one), in a sentence, it indicates in connection with other meanings, non-sidendness, it qualifies (since it is a partical nipata) the meaning of the sentence concerned" area of Icela TELI afa farqUFT Pirachsefalarci na wafan || Aptamimamsa, 103). Hemacandracarya says that 'in the term' 'Syadvada', the word 'Syat expresses many aspects of an object, hence, Syadvada is called Anekantavada (AdIpamAvyoma samasvabhAvaM syAdvAdamudrAnatibhedi vastu / tannityamevaikamanityamanyaditi tvadAjJAdviSatAM pralApAH // . Anyayogavyavacchedika, 5). Again, it is essential to understand the doctrine of Syadvada presented by the Jaina thinkers. The Jaina philosophers say that Anekanta is the name of the ontological nature of reality, according to which every object possesses indefinite aspects. When an object, which is anekantatmaka (possessing many characteristics) is expressed in a particular form of judgement, the expression is known as Syadvada. We can express the characteristics of an object from different points of view and these points of view are expressed by the word Syat.' Akalanka points out : 'The judgement about an object possessing many characteristics is called Syadvada (37 cm 64 chef2714 PIGTG: | Laghiyastraya, p.83). This doctrine of Syadvada is also called Anekantavada, because, the relativity of judgement is

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Sri Ramanujacarya and Jainism 55 nothing but a relative judgement about an object that possesses indefinite qualities or aspects. Hence, the judgment that stands for an object possessing many characteristics is also known as anekantavada. (Outline of Jaina Philosophy, p. 118). This doctrine of Anekantavada or Syadvada is explained by all the great Jaina philosophers in the following Sevenfold formula : 1. From a certain point of view or in a certain re spect, the pot exists. 2. From a certain point of veiw, the pot does not exist. From a certain point of veiw, the pot exists and from another point of view, it does not exist. 4. From a certain point of view, the pot is inexpress ible. 5. From a certain point of view, the pot both exists and is inexpressible. 6. From a certain point of view, the pot both does not exist and is inexpressible. 7. From a certain point of view, the pot exists, does not exist, and is also inexpressible. ((1) Aptamimamsa. 14-21; (2) Syadvadamanjari, pp. 209-212; (3) Pramananayatattvalokalarikara, IV). Jainas say that, each philosophical proposition is subjected to this sevenfold formulation in order to avoid the danger of one-sidedness (ekantavada). It consists of seven kinds of expression regarding one and the same thing with reference to its particular aspects, one by one, without any inconsistency, by means of affirmation and negation made either separately or together (Traverses on Less Trodden Path of Indian Phi

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56 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas losophy and Religion, pp. 232-234). This Syadvada or Anekantavada is said to be the foundation of Jaina philosophy. Jaina thinkers have given equal status to this doctrine with omniscience (Kevalajnana). Acarya Samantabhadra in his Aptamimamsa clearly says that "both Syidvada and Kevalajnana illuminate the whole reality. The difference between them is only this much that while the fouiner illuminates the objects indirectly, the latter illuminates them directly. (PIIGIG G5 HodoohTI I 96: HTAN-GHT Elafrar varai Aptamimamsa, 105) Vedantic Acaryas and others, criticise the Syadvada on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing. To attribute both existence and non-existence, permanency and change to one and the same thing involves law of contradiction. In defence of their doctrine of Syadvada, Jainas say that there is no contradiction involved and no violation of law of contradiction in applying opposite predicates to the same thing in different capacities, because, they are applied to its different aspects, such as matter, state, space and time (Faly-25-01T-91a: Ara 2698151016 d: 374774 1 - Syadvadamanjari, p. 130). It is seen that mutually contradictory elements can exist in one and the same thing in different capacity such as the same man is a father to his son, son to his father, husband to his wife, and so on. (1) 491 Taher care fail, FT, FILM, bhAgine yaH ityevamAdayaH sambandhAH janakatvajanyatvAdinimittAH na

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Sri Ramanujacarya and Jainism virudhyante'rpaNAbhedAt / putrApekSayA pitA, pitRpekSayA putraH ityevamAdiH / Sarvarthasiddhi. V.32). (2) arpaNAbhedAdavirodhaH pitAputrAdisaMbaMdhavat / -Tattvartharajavartika, p. 36). The so-called opposites such as existence and non-existence, permanence and change, oneness and maniness, etc., can be attributed to an object from various points of view. They can remain in the same object without contradicting each other. Samantabhadra gives beautiful anology to show that, opposite attributes, such as origination, destruction and permanence can exist in one and the same thing without contradicting each other. He says, 'if a golden pot is destroyed and a golden crown is made out of it, destruction, origination and permanence (as a gold) happen simultaneously and give rise to sorrow, joy and indifferent attitude respectively in the minds of three different kinds of people, those in favour of the pot, those in favour of the crown and those in favour of the gold itself (ghaTamaulIsuvarNArthInAzotpAdasthitiSvayam / zokapramodamAdhyasthyaM jano yAti sahetukam | Aptamimarsa, 59 ) . Jaina philosophers never say that contradictory attributes belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same sense. It is said that everything exists in its own individuality and does not exist in the individuality of another. Were it not so, everything would be alike existent and thus, there would possibly be no individuality. (sarvamastisvarUpeNa pararUpeNa nAsti ca / anyathA sarvasattvaM Tattvartharajavartika, p. 24). : A thing is regarded as a real from the point of view of its own matter (substance), form, space and time and it is regarded as unreal, not from the same 57

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58 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas stand point, but from the point of view of other matter, form, space and time. There is no room for contradiction (Syadvadamanjari, p. 176-177). When the Jainas say that from the standpoint of persisting substance, the person is eternal but from the stand point of model changes (paryayas), the person is non-eternal, they do not make any self-contradictory assertion. Again, there is no contradiction if we consider primary and secondary meanings of the speaker in each statement (37farfaffet: Tattvarthasutra, V.31). In the sevenfold predication (Saptabhanginaya), existence and non-existence, both existence and non-existence successively and indescribability are attributed to a thing from different points of view. In all these cases, we have to consider primary and secondary meanings of the speaker. When the intention is to speak of a thing as successively existing and non-existing, the third mood is to be used i.e. syadasti syannasti ca). But when the intention is to speak of existence and nonexistence simultaneously, the two states being inexpressible at the same time, then it becomes indescribable. Because, language lacks an expression which can adequately express the simultaneous and combined application of both of the positive and the negative characters of an object. Again, there is no place for contradiction in a thing which is cognised as such. One thing is supposed to be the opposite of another, when in the presence of one, the other is not perceived. But in a perceived thing, no question of contradiction arise, such as in the unitory

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Sri Ramanujacarya and Jainism 59 cognition of a varigated canvas, there is no contradiction. The very nature of reality is infinitely complex and it being an identity and difference, admits of contradictory attributes from different points of view, which are all partial and relative. Hemacandracarya remarks that, not understanding this and fearing imaginary contradictions and mistaking partial and relative views as absolute, fools fall from the right position. (upAdhibhedopahitaM viruddhaM nArtheSvasattvaM sadavAcyate ca / ityaprabudhyaiva virodhabhItA jaDAstadekAntahatAH patanti // Anyayogavyavacchedika, 24) There is no sankara (intermixture) in Syadvada. Sarikara means, that which consists in the incidence of opposite attributes in the same substratum (yugapadubhayaprAptiH H: 1). Our experience shows that, there is no sankara in the cognition of the multiform colour (90 ETHI Svaig a chilgaa i Nyayaviniscaya, p. 45). Syadvada is not samsayavada or doctrine of doubt. Doubt is a kind of cognition in which the mind of the perceiver wavers between two conflicting alternatives (Plu: ar 4sat afa 1). It is a kind of uncertain knowledge. But in the case of Syadvada, both existence and non-existence, are clearly cognised, (from different points of view). There is no question of doubt when the cognition is found to be certain. Really, speaking there is no justification for the emergence of doubt in a matter which has been definitely established. (375cyanat fe um: RICI 991 faceast sthANupuruSayoH sthANurvA puruSo veti / paramekasminneva vastuni sattvAsattvayoH Hoeka tur vafastanifa Freecha Hift | Anekantavadas

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60 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas varupam - Traverses on Less Trodden path of Indian Philosophy and Religion, p. 237). Jainas point out that, the conception of reality as a synthesis of mode and attribute is not incompatiable with the vardict of experience and the interest of truth. As against the Kumarila's criticism that we can generate even hundred alternatives applying doctrine of Saptabhangi, Vidyananda, says that only seven alternatives are possible not less than seven nor more than seven. He clarifies this idea by stating that according to anekanta, a thing or entity is supposed to possess infinite or innumerable aspects. But sevenfold formula i.e. the seven alternative formulations or predicates using the three principle modes (i.e. positive, negative and neutral) will be applicable to each attribution of a property i.e. to each individual predication. As long as we accept only three basic qualities of one individual predicate viz., positive, negative and neutral, we will get only seven possible combinations. (Astasahasri, p. 126; also see Central Philosophy of Jainism, p. 56). Vidyananda observes that some people say that let there be only four types of proposition. This is not tenable. For, there are three (further) possibilities by combining the possitive, the negative and both of them with the 'inexpressible'. Thus, we have sevenfold predication i.e. (1) affirmation, (2) negation, (3) both affirmation and negation, (4) the joint and simultaneous affirmation and negation (inexpressible), (5) affirmation and the simulteneous affirmation, (6) negation, and the joint and simulteneous affirmation and negation, and (7) affirmation, negation

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Sri Ramanujacarya and Jainism 61 and the joint simultaneous affirmation and negation (Astasahasri, p. 125). The speciality of Syadvada is that, it reconciles all the partial view points and gives clear picture of reality. It has woven together all the nayas (partial view points) in it (Ha: 7: act: Adhyatmasara). It is impartial and treats all the nayas equally like one's own children. According to Jaina thinkers, it is the best view of reality. It is important to note, according to Jainas, views of other systems of philosophy are relative and partial. They comit the fallacy of mistaking a relative truth to be the absolute truth and fight against one another, while Jainism alone is impartial, because it puts all the partial view points (nayas) together. Anekanta alone is real view and to be the only truth. (anyonyapakSapratipakSabhAvAd yathA pare matsariNaH pravAdAH / nayAnazeSAnavizeSamicchan na pakSapAtI samayastathA te // Anyayogavyavacchedika, 30). Further, Hemacandracarya proclaims that Vitaraga is the only God and that Anekanta is the only Philosophical system. (7 OTTICE THIC 264 7 elle cold Torrefa: 1 Anyayogavyavaccehedika, 28). Without anekanta we cannot explain reality, without it, it is impossible to explain, pain and pleasure, actions and fruits, bondage and liberation, good and evil, existence and non-existence, one and many, permanence and change, universal and particular. Hence, the opponents are out to destroy the world which is to be preserved only by the Jainas. (colia ToG:UT 7 queria 7 a THTHI

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62 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas griffaraigataifa- tai prah FIGURT04 11 - Anyayogavyavacchedika, 27). These and many other similar statements of Jaina philosophers, reveal that in practice, their doctrine of relativity of truth is often forgotten. Jainas often made an exception and claim absolute validity of their view. Teachings of other systems are considered as relatively real and the Jaina teaching is held to be absolutely real. This goes against the Jaina doctrine itself. If we take these statements literally, then Jainism by its own assertion becomes partially false. Upadhyaya Yasovijaya tried to answer this objection by saying that "anekanta' is a real method. We are not emphasizing Anekantavada in the form of anekanta, because, in this on the basis of context and intention of the speaker, particular view point becomes dominant and other view point becomes subordinate. Anekanta is not a single doctrine, it is combination of many nayas (view points) and does not uphold particular view point. Thus, it cannot be said that, it is also ekantavada : (anekAnte'pi anekAntAd aniSTaivamapAkRtA / nayasUkSmekSikAprAnte vizrAnteH sulabhatvataH // Adhyatmopanisadprakarana, 1.4). This is a doctrine of reconciliation and accept. able to almost all the systems of Indian philosophy, according to Yasovijaya. It harmonises all the conflicting views and sees unity in diversity (Adhyatmopanisadprakarana, 1.45-51). In defence of body-size of the soul, the Jaina

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Sri Ramanujacarya and Jainism philosophers say that the soul is included in the astikayadravyas, because its constituents possess extension in space. It has quality of expansion and contraction. But it does not extend in space like matter. It is like the light. Just as the light fills the space, when it is burning and just as many lights may remain in the same place, without coming into conflict with one another, siinilarly, the soul fills the space and many souls may remain together without any conflict. Though, the self itself formless, it takes the form of the body, which it illuminates. There is no harm in accepting the soul of an ant is as small as the body of it, and the soul of an elephant is as big as the elephant itself. Like a light of the lamp, it occupies entire body of the elephant, or contracts itself, according to the size of the body. The soul is co-extensive with the body. The Jaina view that the soul has the size of the body seems to be bases on practical significance. What is the point in believing the soul to be all-pervading, if the particular body alone is the centre of enjoyment (bhogayatana) and comes under his jurisdiction ? We have seen that, these Vedantic Acaryas have given several arguments against the Jaina conception of the size of the soul. It is surprising to note that the Jaina Philosophers who flourished after Nimbarka, Sankara and Ramanuja, did not give any attention to criticism of Dehaparimanavada made by these Vedantic Acaryas. Sarkaracarya, alone raised more than ten objections against it. We do not find any attempt made by the Jaina Philosophers to answer these objections. They remained unanswered by the Jainas.

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APPENDIX (I) Bhaskaracarya (c. 900 A.D.) on Jainism (Brahmasutra-Bhaskarabhasyam, II. II. 33-36) naikasminnasambhavAt // 2.2.33 // idAnImArhataM mataM parIkSyate / sapta caiSAM padArthAH zAstrasaGgrahabhUtAH jIvAjIvAsravasamvaranirjarabandhamokSA iti / teSAmaparaH prapaJcaH paJcAstikAyo nAmajIvAstikAya: pudgalAstikAyo dharmAstikAyo'dharmAstikAya AkAzAstikAyazceti / imaM ca saptabhaGgInayaM nAma nyAyaM sarvatrAvatArayanti / syAdasti syAnnAsti syAdasti ca nAsti cAvaktavyaH syAdasti cAvaktavyaH syAnnAsti cAvaktavyazca syAdasti ca nAsti cAvaktavyazceti / tatra jIvAjIvau prasiddhAvAzrAvayati puruSaM viSayeSvindriyavRttibhiriti Azrava ucyate / anye tvArhatA vyAcakSate kartAramabhivyApyAzravatyanugacchatItyAzravaM karmocyata iti / samvaraH sambandhaH / nirjarastapaH pUrvasaJcitaM kalmaSaM nirjarayatIti / azrAntamaunI vIrAsane tiSThati bhojanataptazilArohaNakezolluJcanAdilakSaNam / aSTavidho bndhH| darzanAvaraNIyaM jJAnAvaraNIyaM mohanIyamantarIyamiti catvAryyetAni ghAtikarmANyucyante / vedanIyaM nAmikaM gotrikamAyuSkamiti catvAryyaghAtikarmANi / bandhanivRttau nityasiddhArhadanugrahAnmokSo bhavatIti / pudagalAstikAya iti paramANavo 'bhidhIyante / dharmAstikAyaH pravRtyanumeyo 'dharmAstikAyaH sthitiheturamuktAnAm / AkAzAstikAyo dvidhA bhidyate lokAkAzo'lokAkAzazceti / uparyuparisthitAnAM lokAnAmantarvartI lokAkAzasteSAmuparimokSasthAnamalokAkAzastu parato yatra lokA na santi / jIvAstu tredhA bhidyante baddhAtmAno muktAtmAno nityasiddhAzceti / ye muktAtmAnaste sarvajJA niratizayasukhAzcAsata iti / tatredamucyate naikasmindharmiNyasambhavAt / nanu paTarUpeNa ghaTo nAsti svena rUpeNAstIti ko virodhaH / ucyate svarUpe'pi saptabhaGgInayasyAvizeSAt / svarUpamastItyapi syAnnAstItyapi tatrAnadhyavasAnameva syAt / kiJca ye sapta padArthAste tathaivAnyathA vA / nanu sarvamanaikAntikamityavadhAraNaM jJAnaM nizcitameva netyucyate / avadhAraNamapyanaikAntikameva syAt / avadhAraNaM syAt nAsti cAvadhAraNanamiti kvacinnizcayaH syAnmokSo'sti nAstItyavadhAraNAda pravRttireva syAttatraivaM zAstraM praNayannunmattatulyastIrthaMkaraH

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APPENDIX 65 syAt // 33 // evaJcAtmAkAya'm // 2-2-34 // evaJcAtmano'pi yadiSTaM zarIraparimANatvaM tadapi pakSe syAt pakSe netyakAtyaM aparipUrNatvaM tatra zarIraikadeze jIva ityekadezo jIvazUnyaH syAt / kiJca manuSyazarIraparimANo jIvaH kena citkarmavipAkena pipIlikAzarIraM pravizanna samIyate // 34 // na ca paryAyAdapyavirodho vikArAdibhyaH // 2.2.35 // manuSyazarIraparimANasya jIvasya hastizarIrAdAvakAtya' parihartuM zakyaM kathamanantAvayava AtmA hastizarIre teSAmavayavAnAmupacayo'rbhakazarIre'pacaya ityevam / paryAyAdavirodha iti cenna / vikAramUrtatvAdidoSaprasaGgAt / yadi sAvayavo jIva: syAt dehavadvinAzI syAt mUrtatvAt na copacayApacayau zakyau kalpayituM pramANAbhAvAt / ye'pagatAste'pagatA eva na teSAM punarAtmasambandho nirUpayituM zakyata ityasaGgatamArhataM matam // 35 // antyAvasthitezcobhayanityatvAdavizeSaH // 2-2-36 // caramadehe gatasya parimANasyAvasthitiriSyate digambaraibhinnadehe muktaH sarvagato'haM dehAntarAvacchedAbhAvAt tannityaM parimANaM tatazcAdyamadhyayorapyavasthayornityatvaM syAdato vizeSaH sarvadANurvA sarvagato vA na zarIraparimANatvamanavasthitamAzrayituM zakyamevaM copacayApacayapratijJAhAnirato digambarasiddhAnto vivasanasamayo'pyatyantamanAdaraNIya iti // 36 // (II) Madhyacarya (1199-1278 A.D.) on Jainism (Brahmasutra-Madhvabhasyam - II. II. 33-36 with Anuvyakhyanam) // naikasminnasambhavAt // 2.2.33 // sat syAdasat syAt sadasat syAt syAt tato'nyacca syAdityetanaikasmin yujyate / adRSTatvenAsambhavAt // //

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66 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas // evaJcA'tmAkAya'm // 2.2.34 / / jIvasya zarIraparimitatvAGgIkAre'NvAdizarIrasthasya hastyAdizarIre'kAtyaM syAt // na ca paryAyAdapyavirodho vikArAdibhyaH // 2.2.35 // tattaccharIrasthasya tattatparimANatvamiti na vAcyam / vikAritvAdanityatvaprasakteH // antyAvasthitezcobhayanityavAdavizeSAt // 2.2.36 // parimANAbhAve svarUpAbhAvaprAptyA'ntyaparimANasthitestadarthatvena zarIrasthiterubhayanityavAdavizeSeNa sarvazarIranityatvaM syAt // // anuvyAkhyAnam // Aha kSapaNako vizvaM sadasad dvayamadvayam / dvayAdvayamatatsarvaM saptabhaGgi sadAtanam // 235 // naitat padArtha ekasmin yuktaM dRSTivirodhataH / bhAvAbhAvatayA vizvaM yena rUpeNa mIyate / tadrUpameva taditi niyamaH kena vAryate // 236 // tattaddoSanivRttyarthaM svIkRtA tattadAtmatA / yadi tairakhilairdoSailipyate caladarzanaH // 237 // atihAya pramANApta niyamaM sadasattayA / azeSamAvirUddhaM ca nirmAnaM vyAhataM sadA // 238 // sarvaprakAraM vadato dRSTahAniramagrahaH / svavyAhatatvamityAdyA doSAH sarve bhavanti hi // 239 // vakti svaprabhamAtmAnaM dehamAnaM tadapyalam / duSTaM nAnAzarIreSu pravezAdanyathAbhavAt // 240 // anyathAbhAvi yad vastu tadanityamiti sthitiH / tanmate tadanityatvaM pudgalasyAnivAritam // 241 // nAnityatA'smatpakSe tu caitanyAdevizeSiNaH / lakSaNasya nivRttau tu syAnna taccetane kvacit // 242 / / otaprotAtmakatvaM tu paTe dehe'GgasaMsthitiH / ityAdilakSaNasyaiva nivRttau syAdanityatA // 243 // bhautikaM tveva rUpAdi vyAptaM nAzena no mate / naivaM tasyAnyathAbhAvo yasyAnityatvamIritam // 244 // rUpAdiyuktasya tathA jgnnaashitvsiddhye| vyAptyA tayA'nyathAbhAvAdAtmano'nityatA bhavet // 245 // nityordhvagatirapyeSA yA muktiriti kathyate / alokAkAzamAptasya kathaM na vikRtizca sA // 246 // kIdRzazcAnyathAbhAvo nAzahetutayeSyate / saMsthAnApagamazcet sa nahi bhUsAgarAdiSu // 247 // yaH kazcidanyathAbhAvo yadi muktizca tAdRzI / dehamAne vikAraH syAditi sthAsnUnanAtmanaH // 248 // Aha hastyAdideheSu hyapi syAdanyathAbhAvaH / aNudehasya jIvasya gajatve vikRtirhi yA /

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APPENDIX 67 dehavyAptyai vizeSaH kastasyAH sthAnutanau ca nuH // 249 // gItAt puSpaphalAvAptiH sparzAt kAryaM rasAt sthitiH / api vRkSasya dRzyanta iti nAnAtmatA bhavet / evaJcA'tmAkAtyamiti tata evA'ha vedavit // (250) (IID Vallabhacarya (1473-1531 A.D.) on Jainism (Brahmasutrannubhasyam - II. II. 33-36 with the commentary Pradipa of Iccharama Bhatta) vivasanasamayo nirAkriyate, naikasminnasambhavAt // 2.2.33 // te hyantaniSThAH prapaJca udAsInAH sapta vibhaktIH parecchayA vadanti, syAcchabdobhISTavacanaH, astinAstyavaktavyAnAM pratyekasamudAyAbhyAM syAtpUrvakaH saptaprakAro bhavati, tadekasmin yojayanti, tad virodhenAsambhavAdayuktam // 33 // pradIpaH naikasminnasambhavAt // 33 // adhikaraNamavatArayanti vivesanetyAdi, eta eva kSapaNakA ArhatA jainAzcocyante, muktakacchAH pUrvaM dUSitAH, idAnIM vivasanA dUSyante, saugatavajjainA api jagati paramANukAraNatAM vadantIti tadanantaraM tannirUpaNaM, dUSyAMzamanuvadanti te hItyAdi, sapta vibhaktIH saptabhaGgInayaM nAma nyAyaM, parecchayA vadanti sveSAmantaniSThatvAt pareSAM vivakSAnusAreNa yathocitaM vadantItyarthaH, teSAM mataprakAra ucyate, tatra syAcchabdo'vyayo'bhISTavacanaH, ato'styAdibhedaisteSAM samayaH saptavidho bhavati syAcchabdayogAt so'gre vaktavyaH / te hyevaM manyante-jIvajaDAtmakaM bodhAbodhAtmakaM jagadetannirIzvaraM tena samAsataH padArthadvayameva, vistaratastu jagat SaDdravyAtmakaM teSAM mate, tAni ca dravyANi jIvadharmAdharmapudgalakAlAkAzAkhyAni / tatra jIvAstrividhA baddhA yogasiddhA muktAzca / dharmo nAma gatimatAM gatihetubhUto dravyavizeSo jagadvyApI, adharmazca sthitihetubhUto vyApakaH, pudgalo nAma varNagandharasasparzavadravyaM, tacca dvividhaM paramANurUpaM tatsaGghatAtmakapavanajvalanasaliladharaNItanubhavanAdikaJca, kAlastu abhUdastibhaviSyatItivyavahAraheturaNurUpo dravyavizepaH, aakaasho'pyeko'nntprdeshshc| SaDdravyeSu paramANuvyatiriktAH paJcAstikAyA iti vyavahriyante, tathA hi-jIvAstikAyo dharmAstikAyo'dharmAstikAyaH

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Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas I pudgalAstikAya AkAzAstikAyazceti / astikAyazabdo'nekadezavRttidravye rUDhaH / tatra jIvAstikAyastrividhajIvAtmako vyAkhyAtaH, dharmAstikAyaH pravRttyanumeyaH, adharmAstikAya: sthityanumeyaH, pudgalAstikAyastu paramANuvyatiriktAni catvAri bhUtAni sthAvarajaGgamarUpANi, paramANavastu nAstikAyapadavAcyAH, paramANavo'pi teSAM mata ekavidhA na caturvidhAH, pRthivyAdibhedastu paramANupariNAmakRtaH, AkAzAstikAyo dvividho lokAkAzo'lokAkAzazceti, tatroparyuparisthitAnAM lokAnAmantarvartI lokAkAzaH, teSAmupari mokSasthAnamalokAkAzastatra hi na lokAH santIti / evaM jIvAjIvapadArthoM paJcadhA prapaJcitau / jIvAnAM mokSopayoginamaparamapi saGgrahaM vadanti jIvAjIvAsravasaMvaranirjarabandhamokSA iti / jIvAjIvau prapaJcitau / tatra jIvastu jJAnavIryasukhaguNaH sAvayavo dehaparimANaH, ajIvastu jIvayogyaM vastujAtaM AsravasaMvaranirjarAstrayaH padArthAH pravRttirUpAH prapaJcayante, dvedhA pravRttiH samya mithyA ca tatra mithyApravRttirAsravaH, AsrAvayati puruSaM viSayeSvitIndriyapravRttirAsravaH, indriyadvArAdinA pauruSaM jyotirviSayAn spRzadrUpAdirUpeNa pariNamata iti / anye tvArhatA karmANyAsravamAhuH, tAni hi kartAramabhivyApyAsravanti kartAramanugacchantItyAsravaH, seyaM mithyApravRttiranarthahetutvAt, saMvaranirjarau tu samyakpravRttI / tatra zamadamAdirUpA pravRttiH saMvaraH, sA hi Asravat srautaso dvAraM saMvRNotIti saMvara ityucyate / nirjarastvanAdikAlapravRttikaSAyakaluSapuNyApuNyaprahANahetustaptazilArohaNAsnAna 68 maunavIrAsanatiSThatibhojanakezolluJcanAdilakSaNamarhadupadezAntargataM tapaH, taddhi sukhaduHkhopabhogena puNyApuNyaM niHzeSaM jarayatIti nirjara ucyate / bandhastvaSTavidhaM karma, tatra jJAnAvaraNIyaM darzanAvaraNIyaM mohanIyamantarAyamiti caturvidhaM ghAti karma / tatra samyagjJAnaM na mokSasAdhanaM nahi jJAnAdvastusiddharatiprasaGgAditiviparyayo jJAnAvaraNIyaM karmocyate / ArhatadarzanAnna mokSa iti jJAnaM darzanAvaraNIyaM karma / bahuSu vipratiSiddheSu mokSamArgeSu tIrthakarairupadiSTeSu vizeSAnavadhAraNaM mohanIyaM karma / sanmokSamArgapravRttAnAM tadvighnakaraM vijJAnamantarAyaM karma / taddhi jIvaguNAnAM jJAnadarzanavIryasukhAnAM ghAtakaramiti ghAti karmetyucyate / vedanIyaM nAmakaM gotrikamAyuSamiticaturvidhamaghAti karma, taddhi zarIrasaMsthAnatadabhimAnatatsthititatprayuktasukhaduHkhopekSAhetubhUtaM, tatra vedanIyaM nAma zuklapudgalavipAkahetu:, tadvibandho'pi na mokSaparipanthI tattvajJAnAvighAtakatvAt, zuklapudgalArambhakaM vedanIyakarmAnuguNaM nAmikaM karma, taddhi zuklapudgalasyAdyAvasthAM kalilabudbudAdirUpAmArabhate, gotrikaM tvavyAkRtaM tato'pyAdyaM zaktirUpeNAvasthitaM, AyuSkaM tUtpAdadvAreNAyuSkAyati kathayatIti, tAnyetAni zuklapudgalAzrayatvAdaghAtIni karmANi / tadetat karmASTakaM puruSabandhakatvAdbandha ityucyate / mokSastu vigalitasamastaklezatadvAsanasyAnAvaraNajJAnasya sukhaikatAnasya svasvarUpAvirbhAva

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APPENDIX 69 stAdRzasyoparidezAvasthAnaM vA, sa ca sambandhanivRttau nityasiddhArhadanugrahAdbhavatIti / evaM jIvAdayaH padArthA vyAkhyAtAH / etat sarvaM vastujAtaM sattvAsattvanityatvAnityatvabhinnatvAbhinna- tvAdibhiranaikAntikamicchantaH saptabhaGgInayaM nAma nyAyamavatArayanti - syAdasti, syAnnAsti, syAdasti ca nAstica, syAdavaktavyaH syAdasti cAvaktavyaH, syAnnAsti cAvaktavyaH, syAdasti ca syAnnAsti cAvaktavyazceti / syAcchabdo nipAta:, yathAhuH "vAkyeSvanekAntadyotI gamyamprati vizeSaNam / syAnnipAto'rthayogitvAt tiGantapratirUpaka" iti / tanmatamidaM dUSayanti tadvirodhenAsambhavAdayuktamiti, ayamarthaH, tanmatasiddhanikhilapadArthAnAM madhya ekaikaM padArthaM dhRtvA tasmin tasmin saptabhaGgInayAvatAraH kartavyaH, yathA hi jIvamupAdAya jIvaH syAdasti, jIvaH syAnnAsti, jIvaH syAdasti ca nAsti ca, jIvaH syAdavaktavyaH, jIvaH syAdasti cAvaktavyaH, jIvaH syAnnAsti cAvaktavyaH, jIvaH syAdasti ca syAnnAsti cAvaktavyazceti, iti rItyA sarvatra padArtheSu saptabhaGgAnvaye kriyamANe ekasyApi padArthasya vyavasthA na syAditi tanmatarItyaiva tanmatocchedaH sukara iti bhAvArtha: // 33 // nanu kathaM bahirudAsInasya taddUSaNamata Aha, evaJcAtmAkArtsyam // 2.2.34 // evamapi satyAtmano vastuparicchedAdakAtsaryaM na sarvatvam / athavA zarIraparimANa AtmA cettadA sarvazarIrANAmatulyatvAdAtmano na kArtsnye na kRtsnazarIratulyatvam // 34 // , pradIpaH evaJcAtmAkAtrmyam // 34|| sUtramavatArayanti nanvityAdi, vyAkurvanti evamityAdi, evaM AtmaniSThatayA bahirdUSaNAnaGgIkAre satyapi paramANubhya eva sRSTyaGgIkAreNAtmano vastuparicchedAGgIkArAdakAtsyaM na sarvatvaM syAt, tathA ca mokSadazAyAmalokAkAzavRttitvena tadAkAzAvaraNasambhavAnmokSadazAyAM nirAvaraNatvabhaGgaprasaGgaH / nanvAkAzAvaraNaM nAvaraNaM digambarAdau tathA prasiddherata AhuH athavetyAdi, tathA ca manuSya - zarIraparimANasya manuSyAtmanaH karmavizeSeNa gajazarIrapraveza ekadeza eva jIvastiSTheddezAntaraJca nairAtmyaM syAt, na kAtrmyaM na jIvasya gajazarIraparimANatvam ||34||

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70 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas na ca paryAyAdapyavirodho vikArAdibhyaH // 2.2.35 // zarIrANAmavayavopacayApacayAnusAreNAtmano'pi devatiryaDmanuSyeSvavayavopacayApacayAbhyAM tattulyatA syAt tathA sati paryAyeNAvirodha iti na vaktavyaM, tathA sati vikArApatteH saGkocavikAse'pi vikArasya duSpariharatvAt // 35 // pradIpaH na ca paryAyAdapyavirodho vikArAdibhyaH // 35 / / kiJcidAzaGkaya pariharatItyAzayena vyAkurvanti zarIrANAmityAdinA / ayamarthaH, jIvo hi nAnAvidhena pUrvoktakarmASTakena jJAnAvaraNIyAdinA tattaccharIreSu pravizati tato nirgacchati c| tAni ca zarIrANi nAnAparimANAni teSAmavayavopacayApacayAnAndRSTatvAt, evaM devAdizarIrapraviSTajIvasyApi parimANanAnAtvena nAnAtvaM vaktavyaM, evaJca krame'GgIkArye pratyekajIvasvarUpANAM bhedAdanavasthA, tatra kramikaparimANabhedamAdAya parimANAnAmparasparaM virodho jIvAnAmbhedAGgIkAreNa samAdheya iti sUtrAMzenAzaya pariharati na cetyAdinA / evaM na vaktavyaM, kutaH ? vikArAdibhyaH vikArasAvayavatvAnityatvAnAM prApterlokAyatamatAdavizeSaprasaGgAt, tathA sati tanmatatulyatvAGgIkAre sati, muSTisthApitapaTasya bahiHprasAraNena yathA saGkocavikAsazAlitvaM paTe tathA jIvAnAmapi sUkSmasthUlazarIrasambandhena saGkocavikAsayoreva tanmate'GgIkArAdastu tathaiveti cettatrAhuH vikArasyetyAdi / tathA ca jIvAnAM paTatulyatayA saGkocavikAsAGgIkAre tattulyatayA vikArAnityatvAdyApattau bandhamokSavyavasthaiva syAdanupapannA tatsAdhanAnAmAcaraNaJcetibhAvaH // 35 // antyAvasthitezcobhayanityatvAdavizeSaH // 2.2.36 // antyAvasthitirmuktisamayAvasthitistasmAddhetoH, pUrvadoSaparihArAya cobhayanityatvaM bhavedaNutvaM vA, ubhayathApi zarIraparimANo na bhavatIti na tavArthasiddhiH // 36 // 6 // iti dvitIyAdhyAye dvitIyapAde SaSThaM naikasminnasambhavAdityadhikaraNam // pradIpaH antyAvasthitezcobhayanityatvAdavizeSaH // 36 // dUSaNAntaraM vadatItyAzayenAhuH antyetyAdi / digambarairmokSAvasthAgato yo jIvastatparimANamavasthitamityucyate muktasya jIvasya dehAntarAbhAvAttatparimANasya nityatvaM, tasmAddhetoH muktAvasthajIva

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Bibliography parimANanityatAhetoH, pUrvadoSetyAdi cArvAkamatIyavikArAGgIkAreNa jIvAnityatvaM, kiM tajjIvaparimANaM phalitamityAhuH, mahattvaM paramamahattvamityarthaH, ubhayathApi avasthAdvaye'pi, tavArthasiddhiH jIvanityatvasiddhiH, eteSu SaTsvapyadhikaraNeSu brahma jagadupAdAnaM na vetisandehaH, tanmatameva sandehabIjaM, neti pUrvaH pakSaH, vedaviruddhasakalasamayAnAM vyAsapAdaireva dUSitatvAt brahmaivopAdAnamitirAddhAntaH / SaSThe tu brahmaiva viruddhadharmAdhAraM netaraditiniyamo yukto na veti sandehe syAdvAdibhiH sarvatraiva tathAGgIkArAnneti pUrvaH pakSaH, syAdvAdasyAsaGgatatvAdbrahmaiva tatheti niyamo yukta eva zrutyA bhaktapratyakSeNa cAvagatatvAditisiddhAntaH, etAvadadhikaM pUrvato jJeyam ||36|| 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Adhyatmopanisatprakarana Pub : Sanghavi N. K., Jamnagar, V.S. 1994 Bibliography Adhyatmasara - ed. Muni Nemicandra, Nirgrantha Sahitya Prakashan, Delhi, 1976 71 Anekantajayapataka - Vols. I-II. Ed. H.R. Kapadia, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1940, 1947. Aptamimamsa, Ed. Giridharlal Jain, Siddhanta Prakashini Samstha, Banaras, 1914 Astasahasri, Ed. : Vansidhar; Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1915 ed.) Brahmasutra Nimbarkabhasya, Ed. : Pt. Dhundiraja Shastri, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras, V.S. 1989 Brahmasutrasankarabhasya, Ed. Mahadeva Shastri Bakre, Nirnaysagar Press, Bombay, 1909. Brahmasutrasankarabhasya, English Translation. Swami Vireswarananda, Advaita Ashram, Calcutta, 1996. (7th - Brahmasutra Sribhasya (Ramanuja). Eng. Translation Swami Vireswarananda and Swami Adidevananda, Advaita Ashram, Calcutta, 1998. 10. Srimad Brahmasutranubhasya of Vallabhacarya - with

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72 Jainism from the view point of Vedantic Acaryas commentary Pradipa., Ed. M.G.Shastri, Shuddhadvaita Sansad, Ahmedabad, 1980. 11. Central Philosophy of Jainism. B.K.Motilal, L.D.Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1981. 12. Darshan aur Anekantavada : Hemsuraj G. Sharma - Atmananda Jain Pustak Pracharaka Mandal, Agra, 1928. 13. Foundations of Hinduism. Y.S.Shastri. Yogeshwar Prakashan, Ahmedabad, 1998 (2nd ed.). 14. History of Indian Philosophy, Vols. I-II. J.N.Sinha, Cen tral Book Agency, Calcutta, 1982. 15. History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. III. S.N.Dasgupta, Cambridge, 1952 16. Jaina Philosophy of non-absolutism. - Satkari Mookerjee, Bharati Mahavidyalaya, Calcutta, 1944. 17. Laghiyastraya. Singhi Jain Series, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. 18. Outlines of Jaina Philosophy, Mohan Lal Mehta, Jain Mission Seciety, Bangalore, 1954 19. Prasamaratiprakarana of Umasvativacaka. Ed. Y.S.Shastri, L.D.Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1989. Saddarasanasamuccayatika. Gunaratnasari. Ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain, Bharatiya Jnanapith, Kasi, 1969 21. Syadvadamanjari - Mallisena. Ed. A.B.Dhruva, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, Bombay University, Bombay, 1933 22. Tattvarthasatra with Sukhalalji Commentary. English Translation K. K. Dixit, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1974 23. Traverses on Less Trodden Path of Indian Philosophy and Religion. Y.S.Shastri, L.D.Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1991. 24. Vedanta Explained. Vol. I. V. H. Date, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1973, (2nd ed.).

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