Implications Of Buddhist Jaina Dispute Over Fallacious Example In Nyaya Bindu And Nyayavatara Vivrti

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269215/1

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE OVER THE FALLACIOUS EXAMPLE IN NYAYA-BINDU AND NYAYAVATARA-VIVRTI* Piotr Balcerowicz From the times of Aristotle, to whom the idea seemed so obvious and natural that he eventually failed to spare anywhere in his voluminous oeuvre even a single word of explanation on it, and of Alexander, his commentator, who was the first to point out its significance explicitly, the benefits of symbolic expressions in logic, or formal logic to be more precise, have not been questioned seriously by any sane student ever since. It has been unanimously determined that the predominant idea underlying the usage of symbols in logic lies in the desire, first, to make the student 'aware, that the validity of the processes of analysis does not depend upon the interpretation of the symbols which are employed, but solely upon the laws of their combination',' and, secondly, to render "every logical proposition, whether categorical or hypothetical, capable of exact and rigorous expression', not to mention a certain amount of intellectual gratification derived from the symmetry of their analytical expression, harmony and consistency notwithstanding the simple fact that 'in the beginning the use of letters is a mystery, which seems to have no purpose except mystification. The distinct advantage of the first two requirements, that is the recognition of class and general notion as a universal point of reference and univocality in the use of names, that jointly enable us to arrive autonomously at specific universally applicable, contents and context-independent elementary laws of thought and draw valid conclusions autonomously with reference to the contents of premises, was recognised relatively early by Alexander In the discipline (of logic), letters are used in order to make us aware, that conclusion does not depend on contents, but on (syllogistic] figures, on relation of premisses and on (syllogistic) modes, because it is not the 117

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE very contents that is important for syllogistic inference, but the arrangement itself. Accordingly, letters are employed [to represent) general notions and to show, that conclusion will always follow and from any assumption." indeed seems rather trivial. A good example of a reasoning of universal denotation is the one provided by Dharmakirti: 'Thus is the formulation of the logical reason based on (essential] identity: whatever is existent, is without exception impermanent, for instance the pot - this is the simple (unqualified) formulation of the logical reason based on (essential] identity, with the thesis and the logical reason having most broadly conceivable universal reference: sarvam anityam, sattat (everything is impermanent, because it is existent')." But we have countless instances when Dharmakirti, and Indian logicians in general, draws inference with regard to a very particular situation ('here, on this particular spot') following a general rule of invariable concomitance, for example: 'The formulation of the logical reason based on effect is as follows): wherever there is smoke, there is fire, for instance in the kitchen, etc. And there is smoke here, (hence there is fire here)," where the implied thesis (or conclusion)*astihagnih ("there is fire bere') pertains to an individual case." But even then, in both earlier cases these formulations instantiate only some ideal patterns, or semi-symbolic formulas, even though no symbolic expressions occur in the formulations. That is clear from Dharmakirti's commentary itself, when the general rule is first stated and than instantiated, or applied to a particular case, for example: If x-s are observed, y-characterised by (i.e. dependent on these (r-s) (previously) unobserved - is observed and [y] is not observed, even if one of xs is absent, (then) y is the effect of x; and (in this case) this [effect) is smoke. 18 Two additional considerations that are taken for granted and speak in favour of the method resting upon the employment of symbols in formal logic were added in one breath at the moment of formulating the first theory to represent formal logic with the help of symbolic means that remain at the disposal of algebra, the result of which is symbolic logic, or mathematical logic or logistic: the need for a necessary instrument, or methods, or 'aids' (or, to intimate the name of the symbolic culprit' mnew, TO o pyavov) to facilitate the progress of scientific discovery, on the one hand, and, on the other, the demand of the discipline of the intellect. Our list of benefits can be further extended with two more features, that is, that of concision and manageability as well as amenability to and capability of expressing abstract concepts absent from natural language. Every student of philosophic Sanskrit knows how indefinite or imprecise - and logically unsatisfactory-the conjunctions ca or va (especially in negated sentences) in the natural language can be, how their meaning in certain contexts may overlap and how much intuitive their interpretation sometimes is. Conspicuous examples are furnisbed, for instance, by the problem of catus-koti, wherein the first bemstitch of one of its formulations naiva svatah prasiddhir na parasparatah para-pramanair val could theoretically be represented in a number of ways (p stands for svarah prasiddhir,g for parasparatah prasiddhir, and r for para-pramanair prasiddhir): (1) p ovr, (2) p-qur, (3) -p/-qvar, (4) apvqvaer, (5) -p/-(qur) or (6) p (qv) etc., but it is the reader who intensionally interprets it not as an alternative (the usual meaning of va) but as a disjunction (7) -p-q/-r. The inadequacy of, say, such ambiguous words as 'and' or 'or', or its equivalents, to express certain abstract relations, that are not present in the natural language but are casily definable with the help of truth tables (1110, 0111 and 0110) in the two-vakue logic and can be represented with symbols (pla, pvq. p.4), is well-known. Having said that, could such a symbolic and formalised language have any drawback? Apart from the earlier-quoted remark uttered jokingly by Bertrand Russell, two crucial disadvantages can be seen in the way any formalised language, alongside symbols as its corollaries, operates at the expense, where necessary, of brevity and facility of communication'. But there is one more to be mentioned of extralogical consequence and of sociological import. However, before I come to speak of it, let us consider what actually happens when, say, Dharmakirti avails himself of examples of proof formulas or of the fallacies of proof formula? Notoriously, Indian logicians did not use symbols in the proper sense. In which sense does be then use sentences that stand for proof formulas? While formulating an inference for others, does he refer to a panicular situation or does he articulate general rules? The question Clearly, Dharmakirti - and Indian logicians in general - does not use symbols; however, particular terms such as ghata, akasa, paramanu, Sabda, etc., stand for certain classes of objects, for example the class of material perceptible things (murta - pratyaksady-anupalabdha), the class of imperceptible things (amirta), the class of produced things (otaka), etc. His formulations are 'replaceable', namely they stand for general symbols, and the actual contents of a proposition is rather secondary; being of exemplary, illustrative character, its meaning is hardly of any relevance. However, their meaning is not entirely irrelevant such semi-variables, for example ghata, that occur in proof formulas denote a particular class, for example either the class of material perceptible things (marta) or the class of produced things (kytaka), and its particular denotation range is determined by the context. Thus, intensional logic possesses some indistinct aspects of extensionality. A good exemplification of this is furnished by a comparison of two varieties of the fallacious example found in Sankarasvamin's Nyaya-pravesa (NP) and in Dharmakirti's Nyaya-bindu (NB). The former avails himself of one and the same sentence word for word (nityah Sabdo martatvat paramanuvar) to exemplify two different kinds of drstantabhasa, namely of sadhana-dharmasiddha (of the sadharmya type) and sadhyavydvetta (of the vaidharmya type), the only difference being in stating the invariable concomitance (vapti) either in the positive 118 119

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE manner (yad amurtari fan nityam drstam - 'whatever is imperceptible is experienced to be permanent') or negative manner (yad anityani tan murtam drstar-'Whatever is impermanent is experienced to be perceptible')." However, Dharmakirti, in explicating two divisions of the fallacious example, namely sadhya-vikala and sadhyavyatirekin, that correspond to Sankarasvamin's sadhana-dharmasiddha and sadhyavyavrtta respectively, employs partly the same sentence, but changes the essential element in the reasoning: the statement of the object that serves as an example. The result is that we have two diff examples that can be interchanged ((SI) karmavar and (V1) paramanuvar). I have expressed earlier the conviction that the actual contents of a proposition is rather secondary instead of saying it is of no relevance, inasmuch as the contents of a proposition is indeed entirely irrelevant structurally to the way a proof formula is formulated its role is to exemplify certain ontological and logical relations), but, on the other hand, it does play a certain role, since it conveys some ideas, being formulated with verbal means. I agree, all these remarks are perhaps not particularly original and are, at least intuitively, taken for granted by every student of Indian epistemology. Why, then, am I saying all this? 10 vious question: is there, thus, any advantage in using no symbols? Apparently there is, though it is not of logical nature, and I shall try to demonstrate this on the following pages. As it is well-known to the student of Buddhist thought, in the third chapter of Nyaya-bindu we come across Dharmakirti's expos example based on similarity (sadharmya-drstantabhasa) as well as the complementary ninefold division of the fallacy of the example based on dissimilarity (vaidharmya-dystantabhasa). Further, within both ninefold divisions of fallacious examples we can observe that each of them can be naturally divided into three sub-classes of three structurally similar elements. Accordingly, the complete enumeration runs as follows: [SC] with positive concomitance characterised by X: 1871 the fallacious example without positive concomitance (ananvaya), * (58) the fallacious example with unindicated positive concomitance (apradarsitanvaya). [59] the fallacious example with inverted positive concomitance (viparttanvaya); [V] fallacious examples based on dissimilarity (waidharmya-drstantabhasa): [VA] lacking negative concomitance with r: (VI) the fallacious example lacking negative concomitance with the probandum (sadhyavyatirekin), [V2] the fallacious example lacking negative concomitance with the probans (sadhana vyatirekin), [V3) the fallacious example lacking negative concomitance with the probandum and the probans (sadhya-sadhanavyatirekin), (VB) in which negative concomitance with x is doubtful: [V4) the fallacious example in which negative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful (sandigdha-sadhya-vyatireka), (VS) the fallacious example in which negative concomitance with the probans is doubtful (sandigdha-sadhana-vyatireka), (V6] the fallacious example in which negative concomitance both with the probandum and with the probans is doubtful (sandigdha-sadhya-sadhana-vyatireka), [VC] with negative concomitance characterised by : [V7) the fallacious example without negative concomitance (avy atireka) [V8] the fallacious example with unindicated negative concomitance (apradarsita-vyatireka). [V9) the fallacious example with inverted negative concomitance (vipartta-vyatireka).21 [] fallacious examples based on similarity (sadharmya-drstantabhasa): [SA] lacking r: [Sl] the fallacious example lacking the probandum (sadhya-vikala), [S2] the fallacious example lacking the probans (sadhana-vikala), (53) the fallacious example lacking both the probandum and the probans (sadhya-sadhana-vikala), (SB) in which the property of x is doubtful: (54) the fallacious example in which the property of the probandum is doubtful (sandigdha-sadhya-dharma), [S5] the fallacious example in which the property of the probans is doubtful (sandigdha-sadhana-dharma), [86] the fallacious example in which the property of the probandum and the probans is doubtful (sandigdha-sadhya-sadhana-dharma), Noteworthy is the fact that Dharmakirti's typology, along with illustrations for each of the entries, is followed in each and every detail - with a few exceptions - in the classification found in Siddharsigani's Myayavatdra-vipti (NAV)-a Jaina epistemic treatise, the significance of which exceeds perhaps even the philosophic import of the Nyayavatara aphorisms, despite the subservient function it was predestined to perform, being a commentary thereupon. The juxtaposition presented in the following two tables (Tables 6.1 and 6.2) will clearly show such a dependence. I have single-underlined phrases found in NB that are basically identical with NAV. I have double-underlined the portions that can be either reconstructed on the basis of NB or NBT or supplied from cortesponding sections of NAV. I use a broken underliec to mark synonymous (but not identical) expressions in NB and NAV. 120 121

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Table 6.7 Sadharmya-dratantabhasa Variety of the fallacious example Nyaya-bindu of Dharmakirti Nyaya valora-vival (on NA 24) of Siddharsigani [SI] sadhya-vikala lacking the probandum [S2] sadhana-wikala lacking the probans niyah Sabdo mrtavat, karmaval (NB 3.124). Speech element is impermanent, because it is imperceptible, like action. nityah sabdo marta var. paramanwal (NB 3.124). Speech element is impermanent, because it is imperceptible, like infinitesimal atom. nityah Sabdo marta vad, ghafuval (NB 3.124). Speech element is impermanent, because it is imperceptible, like pot. (S3) Sudhya-sadhana-vikala lacking both the probandum and the probans bhrantam anumanani, pramanavat. pratyakpaval. Inference is erroneous, because it is a cognitive criterion, like perception. jagral-savedanam bhrantan pramanaval. swapna-santwedanavar. The sensation of a person in the waking state is erroneous, because it is a cognitive criterion, like the sensation in dream. nasil sarva rah. prawakady anupalabdharvad, ghafavar There is no omniscient person (sc. omniscient person is non-existent), because he is not comprehended through perception, etc., like a pot. vita-rago yan, marana-dharmavad, rathyd-purusavat. This particular person) is dispassionate, because he is mortal, like a person in the street. marana-dharmayant puruso, ragddimatrad. rathya-purusavat. This particular person is mortal, because he is passionate, like a person in the street. (S4) sandigdha-sadhya-dharma in which the property of the probandum is doubtful (SS) sandigdha-sadhana-dharma in which the property of the probans is doubtful ragadiman ayam wacanad rathwa-purugaval (NB 3.125). This (particular person is endowed with passion, because he speaks, like a person in the street. marana-dharmayant puruso rigadimallvad, rathya-purusaval (NB 3.125). This particular person is mortal, because he is endowed with passion, like a person in the street. asarva-ino 'yan, ragadimaltvad, rathya-purusaval. This particular person is not omniscient, because he is passionate, like a person in the street.. (56) sondigdha-sadhya-sadhana- dharma in which the property of the probandum and the probans is doubtful (S7) anamaya without positive concomitance ragadiman vivaksitah puruso, vakurtvad ista-purujaval. A particular person in question is dispassionate, because he is a speaker (sc, talks), like any selected person. asarva-jho yan ragadimallvad, rathya-pursavar (NB 3.125). This particular person) is not omniscient, because he is endowed with passion, like a person in the street. (ragadiman avar, vaktrivad.) yatha yo vakia sa ragadiman, ista-purusavar (NB 3.126). [This particular person is endowed with passion, because he is a speaker (sc, talks).) for instance whoever is a speaker is endowed with passion, like any selected person. anitvah sabdah krtakarvad ghafavar (NB 3.126). Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced, like pot. [ Anitvah fahdah. krtakarvad yad anityam tat kytakam ("ghafavat ) (NB 3.127). [Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced:) whatever is impermanent is produced, slike pot]. [58] uprudarslarvaya with unindicated positive concomitance viparitanvaya with inverted positive concomitance (59) anitvah sabdah. krtakarvad, ghatavat. Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced, like pot. anitvah fabdah, krtakatvad, yad anityam tar krtakam ghatavat (Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced; whatever is impermanent is produced, like pot.

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Table 6.2 Valdharmya-dranabhasa [VI] [V2] [V3] [V4] [VS] [V6] Variety adkyvyttrekin lacking negative concomitance with the probandum sadhandvyatirekin lacking negative concomitance with the probans sadhya-sadhanavyatirekin lacking negative concomitance with the probandum and the probans sandigdha-sadhya-vyatireka sandigdha-sadhanavyatireka in which negative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful sandigdha-sadhyasadhana-vyatireka in which negative concomitance both with the probandum and with the probans is doubtful Nyaya-bindu ("nia abdom@arvar paramanuver (NB 3.129) [Speech element is impermanent, because it is imperceptible,] like infinitesimal atom [*nityah sabdo 'martarvar,25 karmavar (NB 3.129). Speech element is impermanent, because it is imperceptible, like action ["nityah sabdo 'murtatvat, akasavar (NB 3.129). Speech element is permanent, because it is imperceptible, like space asarva-jaah kapiladayo 'nata va, avidyamana-sarva-jnataptatalinga-bhata-pramandisaya-sasanatvar yah sarva-Jna apto va sa jyotir-jaadikam upadistavan, yarha-rsabha-vardhamanadir in (NB 3.130). Kapila and others are neither omniscient nor authoritative persons, because [their] teaching is the best cognitivecriterion as the proof that they have no omniscience or authority, whoever is an omniscient or an authoritative person, he teaches astrology, etc., like Rsabha, Vardhamana and other [Jinas] na traytida brahmanena grohya-vacanah kascit vivaksitah puruso ragddimartvar y grahya:acanak na te rigadimantah tad yatha goutemadayo dharma-dastrana pranetarah (NB 3.131) A particular person in question is not such whose statements could be trusted by a Brahmin learned in the three Vedas, because he is endowed with passion, etc... those whose statements can be trusted are not endowed with passion, etc., like Gautama and others, who are promulgators of Dharma-iastra avita-ravah kaniladayah. Darigrahdgrahayogat: yo vila-rigo na tasya parigrah@grahah. yatharsabhadeh (NB 3.132). Kapila and others are not dispassionate, because they are endowed with covetousness and greed, whoever is dispassionate, he does not have covetousness and greed, like Reabha. Nyayavatara-vivrti (on NA 25) of Siddharsigani bhraniam anumanam, pramanarva: yar punar bhranta na bhavati na tat pramanam, tad yatha svapna-janam Inference is erroneous, because it is a cognitive criterion, whatever is not erroneous, however, is not a cognitive criterion, like cognition in dream nirvikalpakam pratyaksam, pramanarvar; yat punah savikalpakam na tat pramanam, tad yathanumanam Perception is non-conceptual, because it is a cognitive criterion, whatever is accompanied by a conceptualisation, however, is not a cognitive criterion, like inference nityanityah labdah, sattvat; yah punar na nityanityah sa na san, tad yatha ghatah The speech element is [both) permanent and impermanent, because it is existent, whatever is not [both] permanent and impermanent, however, is not existent, like a pot asarva toa anh po va kaplladayo arya-satya-catustayapratipadakatvat; yah punah sarva -jna opto va son Arya-satya-catustayam protxaripadat. tad yatha sauddhodanih. Kapila and others are neither omniscient nor authoritative persons, because they do not teach the four noble truths, whoever is an omniscient and an authoritative person, however, he teaches the four noble truths, like the Buddha. anadeya-vakyah kabeld vivaksitah puruso ragadimattvat; yah punar adeya-vakyo, na saragadinams, tad yatha sugatah A particular person in question is untrustworthy. because he is endowed with passion, etc., whoever is trustworthy, however, is not endowed with passion, etc., like the Buddha. na vita-ragah kapilddayah, karundspadev apy akarunapartia-cittatayddatta-nijakamamsa-sakalatvar; ye punar vila-ragas te karundspadesu karuno-partia-cillataya datta nija-mama-sakalas, tad yatha bodhisattvak. Kapila and others are not dispassionate, because - inasmuch as [their] consciousness is not filled with compassionthey have not offered any bits of their own flesh even to the abodes of compassion (sc. to hungry beings who deserved compassion), those, however, who are dispassionate, inasmuch as their consciousness (Continued) W

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE Nyawi vatra-vivrti (on NA 25) is filled with compassion, offered bits of their own Nesh to the abodes of compassion compassion), like Bodhisattvas. (sc. to hungry beings who deserved vakiwa yah punar Vila-ragona 20 wakia, Avitardah kaloid vivaksilah purus (sc, talks), whoever is dispassionate, however, dispassionate, because he is a speaker A particular person in question is not of Siddharsigani is not a speaker (sc. does not talk). yarhopala-khandah Speech element is impermanent, because like a bit of stong. anityah fabdah kakavad, akalavar randoyah fahdah. Irakatd. wad akrakant fan it is produced, like space. Speech clement is impermanent, because it is alovat bhavari. whakatom. produced, whatever is not produced is permanent, like space. in whom there is avtla-ragu yam waktrat: vairavifa-ragar vam ndalen vakia, yarpala-khandayani (NB 3.133) This person) is not dispassionate, because he is & speaker (sc. talks). [a person no dispassionateoss, is a speaker (se, talks). like a hit of stone. vad akrakam fan anitvah sahdah krtakahvind akalavar (NB 3.734), Speech element is impermanent, because it is nityant bhavadi. 1 akatawa ') (NB 3.135). landiyah Labdah. Irakarvad produced, like space Speech element is impermanent, because it is produced whatever is not produced is permanent, flike space.) As far similarities in wording in both texts are concerned, the exceptions, that is, passages where Siddharsigani does not follow in his illustrations those of Dharinakirti at all, can easily be seen in the tables: (SI) sadhya-vikala-drstantabhasa, (S2) sadhana-vikala-drstantabhasa, (VI) sadhyavyatireld-drsfantabhasa and (V2) sadhanavyatireki-drstantabhasa. In some other cases Siddharsigani's classification follows Dharmakirti's typology in general, but varies in wording so insignificantly that the differences can be altogether discarded. Thus (S7) in the ananvaya type of fallacious example and in Siddharsigani's expression vivaksitah purasah is tantamount to Dharmakirti's ayam. That is also the case in (V7] the avyatireka type of fallacious example (ayam kascid vivaksitah purusah), whereas the invariable concomitance is expressed in quite a similar way, barring different position of the negative clause (yatravita-ragatvami nasti sa vakia, yah punar vita-rago, na sa vakta). In [V4) sandigdha-sadhya-vyatireka-drstantabhasa the second predicate anapta va is interchanged with the subject kapiladayah; the verb forms upadistavan (Dharmakirti) and pratyapipadat (Siddharsigani) are identical in meaning, likewise the pronouns sa (Dharmakirti) and asau (Siddharsigani); the significant difference being the logical reason, that is the realm of superatural teaching in the invariable concomitance and the example respectively: avidyamanasarva-jataptald-linga-bhuta-pramanatisaya-sasanalvdeyotir. Aanadikam, vardhamanadih (Dharmakirti) and arya-satya-carustaydpratyaptpadakarvar, sauddhodanih (Siddharsigani). In (VS) sandigdha-sadhana-Vyatire hasa the negation in the statement of the thesis is expressed either by the particle na (Dharmakirti) or by the alpha-privativum a. (Siddharsigani), while the compounds grahya-vacanah (Dharmakirti) and -adeya-vakyah (Siddharsigani) are identical in meaning, the only difference in the expression of the invariable concomitance is the number, namely plural ye...te (Dharmakirti) and singular yah...sa (Siddharsigani); Siddharsigani does omit the phrase traylvida brahmanena; the only significant difference being the example gautamadayo dharma-sastrana pranetarah (Dharmakirti) and sugatah (Siddharsigani). In [V9] the viparita-vyarireka type the example is indicated either by the suffix-war (Dharmakirti) or by relative indeclinable yatha (Siddharsigani). In two instances the similarities in Dharmakirti's and Siddharsigani's formulations are partial, thus in (S3) sadhya-sodhana-vikala-drstantabhasa and in [54] sandigdha-sadhya-dharma-drstantabhasa only the example is identical, namely ghatavat and rathya-purusavar, respectively, and the compound clement-raga. and pronoun ayam in (S4). In (V3) sadhya-sadhanavyatireki-drstantabhasa the subject of the thesis fabdah is the same, whereas the predicate nitya (or nitya) partly overlaps. In (V6) sandigdha-sadhya-sadhana-vyatireka-drstantabhasa only the theses of Dharmakirti and Siddharsigani are identical, the negations being expressed either by the alpha-privativum a-(Dharmakirti) or by the particle na (Siddharsigani). The large number of similarities or identical formulations alone is so ample that it leaves no doubt as regards the indebtedness of Siddharsigani to Dharmakirti in this respect. That is the first point I wished to make: Dharmakirti's Naya-hindi without negative concomitance Dyanac apradarita-vyotireka with unindicated negative concomitance vipartia-vyatireka with inverted negative concomitance Variety Table 6.2 Continued [17] [V] ton) 127

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE status of a separate fallacious example of the six types, attempting to prove them to be misconceived and faulty solely either due to the defects of the logical reason (hetu) or due to the incompetence of the speaker, but not because of their deficient nature being a separate and independent category of the fallacy of the example. The appropriate sections of NAV are introduced respectively as follows: And now (a doubt is raised): "Some (thinkers) have taught an additional triad of fallacies of the example, as well, namely (S7) (the fallacious example) without positive concomitance, (58) (the fallacious example) with unindicated positive concomitance and (89) (the fallacious example) with inverted positive concomitance." and Other (thinkers), inasmuch as they are (such kind of people who speak without deliberation, have demonstrated three additional fallacies of the example, as well, namely: (V7] [the fallacious example) without negative concomitance, (V8] (the fallacious example) with unindicated negative concomitance and [V9) [the fallacious example) with inverted negative concomitance." typology has been practically accepted by NAV en bloc. A solitary case of parallelism in choosing illustrations of fallacious examples might be claimed to be nothing but coincidental, but the situation when Siddharsigani's choice of expressions in most cases coincides with that of Dharmakirti and the eighteenfold division of drzantabhasa is identical in both cases, it can by no means be a matter of coincidence. Further, my thesis is corroborated additionally by the way Siddharsigani makes the selection of three proof formulas that are not mentioned by Dharmakirti in extenso but in a terse, incomplete form to be supplemented from the context of preceding sutras, namely (S7). [S9) and (V9). When we reconstruct the proof formulas to complete formulations (for details see respective notes 22, 23, 27), as intended by Dharmakirti - that is, (S7) (ragddiman ayar, vaktstvad.) yatha yo vakta sa ragadiman, ista-punasavat, (59] [*anityah Sabdah, kytakarvat.) yad anityam tat krtakam [*ghatavar], [V9] [*anityah sabdah, kptakanvar] yad akatakan tan nityam bhavati, ["akasavat] - it turns out that they correspond virtually in every detail to the examples given by Siddharsigani. There is at least one more reason to believe that Siddharsigani follows Dharmakirti in his typology. Commenting upon (V4) he classifies the sandigdhasadhya-vyanireka type as reducible, on extra-logical grounds, to be exact, to [VI] the sadhyavyatirekin variety. The only reason for singling it out as a separate variety is the need to take into consideration the opinion of some people 'lacking the recognition of certain substantial facts, to whom a particular case of a fallacious example lacking negative concomitance with the probandum 'appears to be the fallacious example in which negative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful'. As a commentator, he was obviously restrained by the contents of Siddhasena Mahamati's Myayavatara. However NA 250 may be similarly taken to enforce the acceptance of the whole (VA) class (namely (VI), (V2), [V3]) as well as only some types of the (VB) class (namely one or more out of [V4), (5), [V6]), but not necessarily all of them." As the text stands, NA 25 does not urge one to distinguish separately the sandigdha-sadhya-vyatireka type. Having examined the varieties of fallacious examples as illustrated by Dharmakirti and Siddharsigani, we can easily notice a couple of regularities. What is conspicuous is the almost complete absence of any similarity in the [A] sub-category of (S) and (V), namely in (SA) (i.c. [Sl], [S2], [S3]) and in [VA] (i.c. [VI]. (V2), [V3D). There is a lot of correspondence in the [B] sub-categorynamely (SB) (i.e. (S4). [S5]. [56]) and (VB) (i.c. (V4). [15], [V6]) - in the exposition of both authors, although the comparison betrays certain differences, whereas the [C] sub-category - namely (SC) (.e. (S7), (S8], [99]) and (VC] (i.c. (V7],[18], [19- is altogether identical in NB and in NAV. The question what factors could account for this evident incongruity in treating Dharmakirtis sub-categories by Siddharsigani, if there is any, arises. Why does Siddharsigani quote certain Dharmakirti's reasonings in extenso, whereas he diverges from the Dharmakirti's formulations in other cases? Examining the varieties (S7)[S8], [99]. (17), [V8] and [V9), Siddharsigani enters into a polemical discussion with an opponent, nay, he openly disputes the In the light of what has been said on the foregoing pages there can be no doubt regarding the identity of the opponent, referred to by Siddharsigani as 'others' (paraih). To dispute the antagonistic standpoint, in this case Dharmakirti's tradition, the easiest way would be simply to cite either the rival thesis and the name of its advocate. General practice of philosophic discourse in India, however, has it that it was enough to hear even the incipit alone to identify Dharmakirti as the adversary. On the other hand, to interpolate or alter in any other way the opponent's statements was not advisable methodologically for a variety of reasons. A modified quotation might no longer be an unambiguous indication of its source and author. Moreover, in case of an interpolated excerpt the opponent could easily ward off possible criticism pointing out that what is actually being refuted is not his own thesis and the criticism is misdirected. These seem to be Siddharsigani's motives to leave Dharmakirti's six faulty illustrations ((S7), (S8), (59), [V7), [V8). [V9D) in an unmodified form. Having thus pointed out the target of his criticism, this decision did not compel Siddharsigani to preserve all the remaining original illustrations of Dharmakirti intact. Still, he did refrain from introducing any changes to the illustrations taken over from NB in a few other cases, namely in the [B] sub-category of the sadharmya-drstantabhasa (i.e. (S4), (SS), (S6]). These unmodified categories seem to be of considerably less interest for my purposes, whereas most of the remaining cases when Siddharsigani interpolates or modifies Dharmakirti's illustrations form a kind of a puzzle, bringing up the question what purpose he had in mind while taking liberties with the original instances of fallacious examples formulated by Dharmakarti. A closer 128 129

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE look at all remaining illustrations in question, namely the (A) sub-category of [S] and [V] (ie. (S1), (S2). [53]. [VI). [V2]. [V3D as well as the (B) sub-category of [V] (i.e. (V4). [VS]. [V6]), reveals that Siddarsigani's selection of locutions was deliberate, and his decision was motivated by his sectarian bias, in most part against the Buddhist, the only case of his other than anti-Buddhist prejudice being (V3). Altogether, one may group illustrations of fallacious example, the original reading of which was modified by Siddharsigani, under three headings: 1 2 Anti-Buddhist illustrations provoked by Dharmakirti's own sectarian anti-Jinistic bias ((V4), (V6]). Anti-Buddhist illustrations not provoked by Dharmakirti (Si), (S2), (VI). (V2), [VSD and Doctrinal illustratioa without anti-Buddhist bias, cadorsing a particular Jaina tenet 83 3 Startling as it is, there is not even a single case when Siddharsigani modified Dharmakirtis original illustration irrelevantly. There are no doctrinally neutral changes: all alterations are prompted directly by Siddharsigani's sectarian partiality or doctrinal conviction My main concern now will be rather to examine the doctrinal, motivational or sociological background of each of such illustrations, not so much their logical relevance or formal structure. and authoritative (Rsabha, Vardhamana and other (Jinas)') - is in his opinion fallacious, being doubtful. In this clandestine way Dharmakirti discredits spiritual or/and intellectual accomplishments of Jaina Tirtharkaras. In retaliation, Siddharsigani employs the same procedure and questions the Buddha's omniscience and authority, explaining that nothing bars the possibility that a charlatan may likewise teach the Four Noble Truths and deliberately deceive people at the same time, without being omniscient or authoritative." Siddharsiganis formulation of the doubt indicates that the Buddha was indeed Deither omniscient nor authoritative. [V6) sandigdha sadhya-sadhana-watireka. Kapila and the Sarkhya school remain the scapegoat of the thesis also in this variety of the fallacious example both in NB and NAV. As in the preceding case, Dharmakirti chooses the Jainas as the whipping boy in his example. His unpronounced assumption, at least something which is liable to doubt, is whether the Tirtharkaras are dispassionate and free of covetousness and greed. Since in this proof formula both probandum and probans are doubtful, Tirtharkiras' moral status is questioned in two ways. Not only their dispassionateness is disputed by the doubtful probandum' (in the correct vyatireka example this should be vita-raga), but also the logical reason imputes that the Tirthakaras are 'endowed with covetousness and greed (parigrahagraha-yoga). This is particularly offensive to Jainas, or to Digambaras as Dharmottara specifies, who would refrain even from wearing clothes in order to curb all desire for possessions and to manifest total lack of covetousness and greed'. Siddharsigani is quick to repay him tit for tat, and follows Dharmakirti's method in every detail. He chooses two doctrinal points regarding Bodhisattvas - a Buddhist parallel of Jaina Tirthankaras - that are as sensitive to the Buddhists as Tirthankaras' dispassionateness and lack of possessions for the Jainas. To discredit the Buddhist ideal, he cites Bodhisattvas' compassion as an instance of doubtful probans. As if it were not enough, Siddharsigani adds a second logical reason (benevolence, dana), which seems doubtful to him. "Bodhisattvas have offered bits of their own flesh to hungry people who deserved compassion'. Siddharsigami's charge is repeated explicitly in the concluding part of his argument, where he expresses his doubt through the doubtful probans ('[it is not known whether the [Bodhisattvas) have offered bits of their own flesh to those deserving sympathy or not), which follows the repetition of the doubtful probandum (it is not known whether those [Bodhisattvas) are endowed with passion, etc., or whether they are dispassionate'). 1 Anti-Buddhist illustrations provoked by Dharmakirti's own sectarian anti-Jinistic bias. As in the case of Dharmakirtis original illustrations, these are of insolent nature and do not aspire to establish any doctrinal thesis. [V4) sandigdha-sadhya-vyatireka. Dharmakirtis illustration of fallacious reasoning based on the fallacious example implicitly puts to doubt the omniscience and authority of Jaina Tirtharkaras. In his illustration science of astropomy-astrology represents the distinguishing quality of cognition that should serve as the mark of possessing the status of an omniscient or an authoritative person, (which) is not present' (avidyamana-sarva-fiataptatliriga-9. Accordingly, Kapila and many other thinkers did not teach astro logy, as Jaina Tirthankiras did, hence they could not aspire to possess omniscience or authority. The doubtful element in this fallacious reasoning is whether teaching astrology necessarily entails omniscies one may be an expert in astrology without being omniscient or authorita tive. Even though both the Buddhist and the Jainas would take the thesis ("Kapila and others are neither omniscient nor authoritative persons') to be true, the whole reasoning is claimed by Dharmakirti to be fallacious, because the proof formula is faulty, insofar as the negative example - which should adduce a contrary example, that is of someone who is both omniscient Therefore the two virtues of Bodhisattvas put to doubt are therefore compassion (kanan), the foundation of Buddhist ethics, and benevolence or charity (dana), the first of the Perfections (paramita). Siddharsigani is accurate to link karun to dana, 130

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE following Buddhist tradition: The sons of the Buddha have always renounced even their own life (sacrificing it] for the sake of anyone who wishes for what is beneficial. And there is no higher disposition than compassion. There is no fruit (more) welcome (than the one) desired. And precisely thanks to this benevolence (they] have elevated the whole humankind to the triple understanding, and furthermore, by acquiring knowledge, they) establisbed benevolence in the world, which has not known [it previously]." Clearly, not only is compassion (karuna) the prime motive for benevolence (dana), but also the proper practice of benevolence connotes absolute lack of passion or attachment (raga): "That because of which (something) is given [is] benevolence." Verily (that) is (benevolence). [However, something can also be given with passion etc., but this is not meant here." A noble person, who is dispassionate, as well as an ordinary man, who is passionate, can give offering in the temple. If a noble person, who is dispassionate, gives offering to other beings - with the exception of (the case when its results are to be experienced in the present life in that case the gift is for the sake of others, because this (offering brings them benefit. (SI) sadhya-vikala. In view of Jaina theory of multiplexity of reality (anekanta-vada), sound could be said to be both permanent and impermanent, depending on the specific point of reference. However, from this perspective practically every assertoric statement could be problematic for the Jainas, therefore it would be difficult to take Dharmakirtis instance of the faulty proof formula as something provocative. Nevertheless, in his own illustration of the faulty example, Siddharsigani indirectly disavows the Buddhist well-known doctrine of crroneousness of inference. It is the thesis (bhrantam anumanant) which conveys the criticism, whereas the example (perception as erroneous knowledge) was as unacceptable to the Buddhist as it was to the Jainas. The background for this faulty proof formula is apparently the discussion (NAV 5) of the idea of cognitive validity (pramanya), which by definition entails non-erroncousness of our cognition; hence perception and inference have to be non-erroneous, if they are both cognitive criteria. In fact, the thesis of the defective proof formula in question (NAV 24.2 (p. 409): bhrantam anumanai, pramanavat, pratyaksaval) is antithetical to NA Scd: 'This (inference) is nonerroneous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception' (tad abhrantar pramanarvat samaksavat). (S2) sadhana vikala. Dharmakirtis reasoning is almost identical to (SI). with the only exception of the 'infinitesimal atom (paramanu) that replaces 'action' (karman) in (S1). Similarly, there is nothing explicitly anti-Jinistic in Dharmakirti's proof formula. Nevertheless, Siddharsigani takes this opportunity to criticise another Buddhist theory: the doctrine of illusory character of worldly appearance as the contents of consciousness (vijiana-vada). What we have here - except for the use of pramana in place of the usual pratyaya - is one of many formulations of the so-called Dreaming Argument: 'The sensation in the waking state is erroneous, because it is a cognitive criterion, like the sensation in a dream fagrar-samvedanam bhrantani, pramanatdi, svapna-samvedanavar). This argument is commonly ascribed to the Buddhist and we find references to it also in a number of non-Jinistic sources. In its typical formulation (with 'pratyaya' or 'khyadi as the logical reason), the Dreaming Argument is refuted, for instance, by Kumarila," Uddyotakara, " Sankara and by Siddharsigani himself later on." It is important to note that, as it has been shown by Taber (1994: esp. 28-31), the so-called Dreaming Argument has never been expressed by the Buddhist thinkers in the form as it appears in antiBuddhist works. In subsequent lines Siddharsigani employs a series of expressions that describe cognitive states (namely santvedana, pramana, pratyaya) in the context of Dreaming Argument. It is an open question whether one may be justified to conclude that he saw do qualitative difference between these three expressions in this particular The three virtues-dispassionateness (Vita-ragarva) as the probandum (sadhya), as well as compassion (karuna) and benevolence (dana, the offering of bits of one's own flesh being the proof of, and motivated by, one's compassion) as the probans (sadhana) - are therefore related doctrinally and ethically. However, there is nothing that would compel one to enlist all of them together in an instance of a faulty reasoning. The use of double logical reason (karund and dana) is not enforced by the logical structure of the argument itself. On the contrary, it is rather surprising to find such an elaborate, compounded logical reason in the exposition of the fallacies of the example. Why did then Siddharsigani avail himself of two logical reasons, both of which express doubts about two virtues of Bodhisattvas A possible answer would be to match the double logical reason (sadhana) employed by Dharmakirti (parigraha and agraha). Astounding as it may be, the fallacious example of the sandigdha-sadhya-sadhana-vyatireka type is the only case when Dharmakirti avails himself of a double logical reason, without any structural or logical need, and similarly the only case when Siddharsigani's classification has a double logical reason! 2 Anti-Buddhist illustrations not provoked by Dharmakarti. In this category of sectarian-biased and doctrinally-bound illustrations, Siddharsigani attempts to indirectly refute a particular Buddhist thesis. 132

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE to passions. The proof formula has the following structure: 1 2 context and therefore used them interchangeably as synonyms. In this particular case be seems to employ the term 'pramana' in the place of the logical reason) basically in the sense of pratyaya. In any standard formulation of the Dreaming Argument (*mithya stambhadi-pratyayah pratyayatvar, yatha swapnadi-pratyayah) the term pratyaya is used in the sense of a cognition the contents of which corresponds to the object represented in the cognition. In this manner, being factual and reliable, its meaning comes close to Siddharsigan *pramana'. Accordingly, Siddharsigani's illustration is a criticism, be it indirect, of the Buddhist idealist standpoint expressed in the Dreaming Argument ragadiman (H) kascit vivaksitah puresah (P): PCH na traylvida brahmanena grahya-vacanah (S) ragddiman (H): HCS ergo: na traylvida brahmanena grahya-vacanah (s) kascit vivaksitah purush (P): PCS (VI) sadhyavyatirekin. The case is rather analogous, doctrinally speaking, to [S1) in the formulation of Siddharsigani, apart from 'svapna.jana' used as the negative example. [V2] sadhandvyatirekin. This illustration of fallacious example immediately invokes the famous Yogacara-Sautrantika thesis: 'perception is free from conceptual construction. Inference (anumana), mentioned as the drstanta of a conceptual mental event which is not a cognitive criterion does not fulfil the def inition of the proper negative example, being a pramana itself, namely lacks neg. ative concomitance with the probans. This particular illustration corroborates the Jaina claim that perception that is free from any conceptual construction could eventually be never experienced by any cogniser. That this illustration is not accidental can be seen from the fact Siddharsigani refutes the Buddhist thesis at length in NAV 4, cf, for example NAV 4.5 (p. 364): tan na kadacana kalpanapodhatvani pratyaksasya pramatur api prani-gocara-caritam anubhavati. -"So, (to express it metaphorically), freedom from conceptual construction [in the case) of perception never experiences the phenomenon of itself turning into the domain of awareness of the cogniser whatsoever.' [V5) sandigdha-sadhana-vyatireka. The contents of this particular instantia. tion in Dharmakdrti's formulation is of much interest in itself. In the reasoning. the instantiation of the fallacious example are philosophers or law-makers of the Brahmanic tradition, like Gautama, Manu. etc. The doubtful element in this reasoning is whether these Brahmanic thinkers are reliable teachers: The correct negative example (D) should be excluded from the probanslogical reason (sadhana-watireka: DCH') as well as excluded from the probandum/the property to be proved (sadhya-vyatireka: DCS), namely (D CH') n(DCS). One more condition is that in the negative formulation of the example (D exemplifying P) occurs is the contraposition of P CHCS, viz S CH CP. Thus, DCS would be the condition for DCH: 'ifa particular person d of the D-range (d E D) is trustworthy (S), then this person is dispassionate (H)'. In other words, to distrust the dispassionateness of Gautama, Manu and other Brahmanic law-givers undermines one's trust in their trustworthiness, and ipso facto the veracity and authority of the Brahmanic lore is undermined. This unspoken conclusion is openly expressed by Dharmottara in his commentary it is unreasonable to rely on words of teachers of Brahmanical tradition, like Gautama, Manu, etc. At the same time, Dharmakirti is claimed by Dharmottara to question the veracity of statements of other Brahmanic philosophers like Kapila, etc. This criticism has also its social dimension: such is the behaviour of most people who rely on the teaching contained in the works on dharma by Gautama, Manu, etc. Dharmakirti's thesis refers to 'a Brahmin leared in the three Vedas' (traytvida brahmanena), who is a follower and/or promulgator of the Brahmanic philosopbical and religious tradition in everyday life and a local authority. The Brahmin's scepticism regarding his own Brahmanic tradition, as expressed in Gautamadharma-sutra, Manu smrti etc., could undermine the tradition itself. The overall picture of the Brahmanical society relying on tradition would be, therefore, that neither proponents of the social-religious tradition (Gautama, Manu, etc.) por preceptors of philosophical schools (e.g. Kapila) are a suitable source of reliable teaching for a true Brahmin. Dharmakirti's approach in the argument is therefore clearly anti-Brahmanical and could be a reflection of Buddhist-Brahmanic strife. Last but not the least, that the opponents' tradition, which one criticises, was at some point not too well-known is attested by Durveka Misra, who erroneously identifies the Gautama in Dharmakirti's example with Gautama Aksapada: "Gautama's other name is Aksapada, and he is the thinker who is the author of the Nyaya-sutra." Dharmakirti himself was clear enough when he mentioned that Gautama is one of promulgators/authors of Law textbooks (gautamadayo dharma-sastraan pranetarah), and this could by no means be Aksapada! On his part, Siddharsigani leaves the basic structure of Dharmakirti's argument intact and replaces Dharmakirti's original example gautamadayo dharma-fastra nant pranetarah with sugatah, the Buddha. Mutatis mutandis the Buddha's dispassionateness becomes subject to doubt, and subsequently the whole Buddhist Here the exemplification based on dissimilarity can be formulated in the following manner): "Those whose statements can be trusted, are not endowed with passion etc., like Gautama and others, who are promulgators of Dharma-fastra.' It is doubtful [here) whether the property of the probans, namely 'being endowed with passion etc.', does not occur in (is excluded from) Gautama and others. In this manner, Dharmakarti casts doubt on their dispassionateness and thereby, intimates that Brahmanical philosophers or law-makers may be subject 134 135

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE Similarly on (59): Therefore also [59] (the category] with inverted positive concomitance is defective) because of the speaker's mistake, not because of circumstances. And in case of) inference for others one has to consider also the defect of the speaker, teaching. What is missing from Siddharsigani's formulation is the Brahmin learned in the three Vedas' (traytvida brahmanena). This could have been a cooscious decision to leave this phrase out: the implication would be that any teacher who is not dispassionate should not be trusted, be be a Hindu or Buddhist; and the truly dispassionate are the Jinas. Moreover, the main opponent for the Buddhist was Brahmatic tradition, whereas the Jainas had to protect their identity and distinctiveness not only against Brahmanic conversions but also against Buddhist influence. To confront this wider picture of the society from Jaina perspective, Siddharsigapparently extended it by embracing the proponents of Buddhism and including them into the comprehensive framework of unreliable teachers whose dispassionateness was doubtful. 3 Theses prompted by certain other doctrines that stand in opposition to Jaina tenets on [V8]: [53] sadhye-sadhana-vikala. In case of Dharmakirti, the reasoning is a mere repetition of (SI) and (S2], with a new example ('pot' excluded from both the probans 'imperceptible' and the probandum 'impermanent'). Unlike Dharukirti, Siddharsigani takes this opportunity to corroborate indirectly a crucial dogma of the Jainas, namely the omniscience of the Jinas and the Arhants. From Siddharsigani's contention that " (this example is fallacious) because, [firstly), a pot is existent and secondly), it is comprehended through perception, etc. one could even venture to infer its antithesis, namely asti sarva.jrah. An elaborate discussion of all implications of this reasoning, however, would not be relevant to the subject of the present chapter and would exceed its limits. In this case (of inference for others the meaning should be understood [directly from the opponent's words). Even if the argument is correct in itself, but is formulated incorrectly by the opponent, it becomes] such (sc. defective); as far as it is expressed it is not correct, (and) as far as it is correct, it is not expressed. And what is expressed is the logical Teason. Hence either the logical reason or the example (can be defective because of the speaker's mistake, and on (V9): And accordingly, also the category] with inverted negative con comitance is [is defective) because of the speaker's mistake. His proof that such varieties as (58), ($9), (V8) and (V9) are varieties of the fallacious example was rather conversational: although there is a deficiency solely on the part of the speaker, nevertheless, they become fallacies of the example in case of inference for others (pararthanumana). As an ardent commentator, however, Dharmottar accepted Dharmakirti's typology en bloc. Perbaps, it was his candid assertion that all these sub-types are due to various defects of the speaker that inspired Siddharsigani. A separate question is whether Dharmakirti himself was aware of the fact that some of his fallacious examples could rather be cases of the speaker's incompetence alone? What role was actually assigned to the example in the proof formula by both parties? Dharmakirti admits that drstanta is not an independent member of the proof formula: As it has been pointed out earlier, Siddharsigani rejects Dharmakirti's six subvarieties of the fallacious examples (namely (S7). [S8], [S9), [V7), [V8] and [V91) as irrelevant and wrongly classified due to two reasons: they are either due to the defects of the logical reason (hetu) or due to the incompetence of the speaker." Dharmottan whose influence on Siddharsigani is clear,was well aware that some falladies of the example are in fact due to the ineptness of the speaker to communicate his thoughts properly. Commenting on the (S8) apradarsitanvaya category, in which positive concomitance is unindicated, he says: Hence, the example has as its objective (the demonstration of the positive Concomitance; its object is not explicated by this example). And the example that is explicated [here as having as its objective (the demonstration of similarity (alone) is of no use, therefore this (alleged example) is - inasmuch as it is due to the defect of the speaker-the defect of the example, for the speaker has to demonstrate [his thesis) to the opponent in this example). Therefore, even though the circumstances are not defective, nevertheless, they are shown in a defective manna. Hence, (this example) in nothing but defective (sc. fallacious).*** The triple-formed logical reason has been discussed. This alone (can produce) the cognition of an object. Hence there is no separate member of the proof formula called example. That is why no separate definition of this example) is given, because its meaning is implied [by definition of the logical reason). Accordingly, the role of drstanta is to additionally corroborate what the logical reason expresses. Fallacious examples 'fail to demonstrate with certainty the general characteristic of the logical reason, viz. its presence in the homologue only, and its complete absence in the heterologue, and its individual characteristic'. 136 137

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE (27) 'wherever if there were no fire, there would be no smoke": VES(x) HI) This decrease of necessary members of the proof formula was in fact possible, thanks to the new way of defining the characteristic of the logical reason, namely 'inexplicability otherwise' (anyathanupapannatva, anyathinupapart), which can be either formulated in the positive way (tarhopapatti) or (anyathanupaparti)." To recapitulate, there can be hardly any doubt that Dharmakarti immensely contributed to Jaina typology of fallacies of the example (drstantabhasa), at least in case of Siddhasena Mahamati and his commentator, Siddharsigani. A closer look at the instances of fallacious examples offered by Dharmakirti and Siddharsigani reveals that Dharmakirti inspired his rivals not only in the realm of strictly logical analysis (in our case: classification of fallacies), but also method ologically: how to attack one's own opponents with arguments clad in harmless illustrations of faulty proof formulas, and to express doubts with regard to fundamental doctrines upheld by rival schools. Neither Dharmakirti nor Siddharsigani were negligent when it came to the selection of exemplifications of the fallacious example. On the contrary, their most careful choice reveals considerable amount of prejudice against their rivals. In case of Siddharsigani, his biased position was provoked to a some degree by Dharmakirti, whose method was discrediting the antagonist he conscientiously follows. Furthermore, minor differences in Buddhist and Jaina classification of drstantabhasas, especially (S7). [58]. [S9). [V7), (V8] and [V9), testifies to a different role assigned to the example and the invariable concomitance in the proof formula. This uncovers also an important tendency among Jaina logicians to simplify the structure of the proof formula and to free it from the need of empirical exemplification. What is also important, the discussion shows that even such eminent thinkers as Dharmalarti or Siddharsigani were not above sectarian prejudice and provocation. Being Human, they did not abstain from expressing such not entirely elevated emotions in a concealed way at every available opportunity. Having said all this, let me come to my initial question is there any other disadvantage, apart from occasional expense of brevity and facility of communication' mentioned already (p. 118), in having a symbolic and formalised language to describe the way we reason and draw inferences? Obviously, had Indian logicians used symbols and a applied formalised language of logic, decidedly less sources would have been left at our disposal to follow the development of certain ideas or to track down historical dependencies and intellectual influences among philosophers. And Dharmakirti and Siddharsigani would not have had an additional tool, of extralogical nature, to censure their opponents. Notes * An abridged version of this paper first appeared in Balcerowicz (1999), from which Table 6.1 (p. 122) and Table 6.2 (p. 124) are reproduced with variations. 1 Lukasiewicz (1957: $ 4). 2 Aristotle employed symbols only in the form of letters as variables that substituted proper names in a broader sense. The first to employ symbolic expressions - follow. ing the method of algebra - that represent logical constants, such as connectives, improper symbols (eg parentheses, brackets) etc., was Boole (1847). 3 The opening lines of the "Introduction in Boole (1847:3). 4 Boole (1847:6). 5 Boole (1847:7) 6 Russell (1917: 51). 7 Boole (1847:6). 8 Alex 53.28: en royco Tibexde soires in ip robbelfasta , ono para ten ulen ginetai ta sumperasmata alla para to skhema kai ten toiauten ton protaseon sumplokes kai ton tropon ou gar oti ede e ule, sunagetai sullogistikos toxo, alla oti e suzugia toiaute, ta oun stoikheia tou katholou kai aei epi pantos tou lephthentos toiouton esesthai to sumperasma deiktika estin. 9 Boole (1847: 9-10). 10 Most of these advantageous characteristics enumerated in the text are concurrent with the recapitulation of Bochenska (1954: 50): "Der Gebrauch von kunstlichen Symbolen ist indessen zugleich mit dem Formalismus aufgekommen. Whitehead und Russell rechtfertigen ihn folgendermassen (1) In dem Wissenschaften allgemein, besonders aber in der Logik, braucht man Begriffe, die so abstrakt sind, dass man in der Umgangssprache keine entsprechenden Worte dafur findet. Man ist also zu Symbolbildungen genotigt. (2) Die Syntax der Umgangssprache ist zu wenig exakt, ihre Regeln lassen zu viele Ausnahmen zu, als dass man auf dem Gebiet der strengen Wissenschaft gut damit zu operieren vermochte. Man konnte sich wohl zu belfen suchen, indem man die Worte der Umgangssprache beibehielte und nur die Regeln Anderte, aber dann wurden doch die Worte durch Assoziationen immer wieder die lockeren Regeln der Alltagssprache nahebringen, und es entstunde Verwirrung. Deshalb ist es besser, eine kunstliche Sprache mit eigenen, streng syntaktischen Regeln aufzustellen. (3) Entscheidet man sich fur den Gebrauch einer kunstlichen Sprache, dann kann man ganz kurze Symbole withlen, etwa einzelne Buchstaben statt ganzer Worte; so werden die Satze bedeutend kurzer als in der Umgangssprache und wesentlich leichter verstandlich. (4) Schlieblich sind die meisten Worte der Umgangssprache schr vieldeutig: so hat z. B. das Wort wist wenigstens ein Duzend verschiedene Bedeutungen, die in der Analyse scharf auseinander gehalten werden mussen. Es ist also Zweckmdissig, statt solcher Worte kunstliche, aber eindeutige Symbole zu brauchen. 11 VIVy 51: "The establishing (of a particular cognitive criterion cas) by no means [be accomplished by the cognitive criterion) itself or by (cognitive criteria) mutually or by other cognitive criteria)." 12 Bochenski (1980: $3 (1)). 13 Church (1956:2-3). 14 NB 3.9. tatha svabhava-hetoh prayogah-yal sattar sarvam aniyam, yarha ghaddir Idi fuddhasya sabhava hetoh prayogah. 15 Cf. NBT ad loc: yor sad iti sattvam anudya at sarvam anityam iti antyalvari vidhtyate. sarvam-grahanart ca niyamartham sarvam anityam, na karcin Raaltyam. After existence has been called to mind as something well known by (words] 'whatever is existent, impermanence (of everything) is taught as something yet unknown (sc. to be proved) with (words) that everything is 140 141

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ impermanent. And the use of [the word] 'everything' has the purpose of circumcription (reference): 'everything is impermanent', [viz.] 'there is nothing that is not impermanent". Cf. PVSV 3.28: tatha hi yat krtakam tad anityam ity ukte 'anarthantara-bhave vyaktam ay asya svabhavas... 16 NB 3.22:arya-heloh prayogah - yatra dhumas tatragnih, yatha mahanasadau. asti ceha dham. 17 Cf. NB 2.1 karyam yathagnir atra dhamad iti; see also PVSV 3.28: tatha yatra dhumas tarignir iti ukte karyam dhamo dahanasya. 18 PVSV 334 yesam upalambhe tal-laksanam anupalabdham yad upalabhyate. tatraikabb 'pi nopalabhyate. tat tasya karyam tac ca dhamo 'sti. 19 NP 3.3.1 (-NP (1) 5.19-6.14): tatra sadhayena tavad drstantabhasah panca-prakarah, tad yatha: [1] sadhanadharmasidah, [2] sadhya-dharmasiddhah, [3] ubhaya-dharmasiddhah, [4] ananayak [5] viparitanvayas ceti // tatra [1] sadhana-dharmasiddho yatha: nityah Sabdo miravat paramanuvat, yad amartam tan nityam drstam yatha paramanuh. paramana sadhyam nityarvam asti sadhana-dharmo 'murtatvam nasti murtatvat paraman iti ..., NP 3.3.2: vaidharmyenapi drstantabhasah panca-prakarah, tad yatha: [1] sadhyavyavrttah, [2] sadhanavyavrtah, [3] ubhayavyavrttah, [4] avy atirekah, [5] viparita-vyatirekas ceti Il tatra [1] sadkyavyavrtto yatha: nityah sabdo martatva paramanuvat, yad anityam tan martam drstam yatha paramanuh. paramanor ki sadhana-dharmo 'murtatvam vyavrttam murtatvat paramanunam iti. sadhya-dharmo nityarvam na vyavrttam nityarvat paramananamiti // 20 NB 3.124 [S1] sadhya-vikala - nityah sabdo 'martatvat, karmavat, and NB 3.129: [VI] sadryatirekin nityah sabdo 'martatvat, paramanuvat. For details see the tables below and the respective note 24. 21 Another way of looking at the typology of fallacious example could be the following table, where x is a variable (sadhya, sadhana, and the relation between them both, that is, anvaya sad vyatireka) and is a function of x. x-vikala x-avyatirel sadhya- sadhana- sadhyasadhana-4 [S3] [V3] [S6] [V6] [SI] [S2] [VI] [V2] sandigdha-s-dharma [S4] [SS] sandigdhos-vyatireka [V4] [VS] a-x apradaritie-x viparita-x -anvaya -vyatireka 142 [S7] [S8] [59] [V7] [V8] [V9] 22 This (ragaman ayam vakrrtvad) is how the thesis and the logical reason should be reconstructed, first, in view of the explication of the positive concomitance in NB 3.126 itself (vatha yo vakta sa ragadiman), and secondly in view of the NBT ad loc yo vaktes waktrivam anadya sa ragadiman iti ragadimattvam vihitam, wherein the gerund andya of anuvad is used in its conventional meaning of 'having called something to mind (as well known]' and the past passive participle vihita, a derivative of the verb virda, occurs in its well attested meaning "introduced as something new; taught as something yet unknown (sc. to be proved). Also DhPr ad loc. (vaktrtvasya heto ragadimate sadhye pratiniyamah pratiniyatatvam uktam iti sesah) expresses plainly the logical reason (hetu: vaktrtva) and the probandum (sadhya: ragadimattva). The significance of the corresponding section of NAV that offers the formulation of the proof formula in extenso and tallies with our reconstructed version, should not be underestimated. IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE 23 The formulation of the thesis and the logical reason (anityah sabdah, krtakatvat...) alongside with the example (... ghatavar) are, obviously, to be supplied from the preceding aphorism NB 3.126. The statement yad anityam tat krtakam is the formulation of the invariable concomitance (anvaya) referring to the proof formula in NB 3.126, which is incomplete, inasmuch as it lacks its explicit statement, being the fallacy of anavayava type. Cf. also NBT ad loc: yad anityam ity anityatvam anadya tat krtakam iti krtakatvam vihitam. This proof formula bears resemblance (barring the lack of nega tion in the thesis of sadhana-dharmasiddha type of fallacious example, which is to be supplied further on in the viparitanvaya type) to the one found in NP 3.3.1 (-NP (1) 5.19-6.14): tatra sadharmyena tavad distantabhasah panca-prakarah, tad yatha:...[1] sadhana-dharmasiddho yatha: nityah sabdo 'martatvat paramanvat.... [5] vipartianvayo yatha: yat krtakam tad anityam drstam iti vaktavye yad anityah tad krtakam drstam iti braviti // (cf. n. 19). The reconstruction is independently confirmed by the reading found in the corresponding section of NAT. 24 The thesis and the logical reason (nityah sabdo 'murtatvat) here as well as in the two following cases are to be supplied from the parallel aphorism of NB 3.124. Besides, the reconstruction is directly confirmed by NBT: nityatve sabdasya sadhye heav amartatve paramanu-vaidharmya-drstantah sadhyavyatirekt. 25 Cf. n. 24. 26 Cf. D. 24. 27 The formulation of the thesis and the logical reason (anityah sabdah, krtakarvar...) alongside with the example (...akasavar) are, beyond doubt, to be supplied from the preceding aphorism: NB 3.134 states incomplete reasoning lacking the explicit formulation of the negative concomitance which NB 3.135 supplies, though in the reversed order. The proof formula formed correctly would run as follows: anityah sabdah, krtakatvat, yad akytakam tan nityam bhavati, akasavat. This proof formula - with the correct formulation of the negative concomitance-occurs in NP 2.2 (=NP (2) 2.2=NP (1) 1.11 13): tad yatha: anitye sabde sadhye ghatadir anityah sapaksah Il vipakso yatra sadhyam nasti. yan nityam tad aktakan drstam yathakajam iti. The reconstruction is independently confirmed by the reading found in the corresponding section of NAT. Similarly to [S9]. also this proof formula bears certain resemblance (barring the lack of negation in the predicate anitya) to the one found in NP 3.3.2 (=NP (1) 6.14 7.8): vaidharmyenapi dryantabhasah panca-prakarah, tad yatha: ...[1] sadhyavyavyo yatha: nityah labda 'miratuar paramanuvat...[5] viparita-vyatireko yatha: yad anityam tan mitam dratam iti vaktavye yan murtam tad anityam drstam iti braviti // (cf. n. 19). 28 NAV 25.2 (p. 414), vide infra n. 35. 29 On the authorship of NA see Balcerowicz (2001b). 30 NA 25: vaidharmyenatra drstanta-dosa nyaya-vid-Irish/ sadhya-sadhana-yugmanam anivrties ca samsayat // Defects of the example, here based on dissimilarity, have been proclaimed by the experts in logic [to arise] from non-exclusion of the probandum, of the probans and of their combination and from the [liability to] suspicion [regarding their presence]. 31 One would naturally read anivriteh and samsayat as dependent on the compound sadhya-sadhana-yugmanam. Theoretically speaking, however, the latter could be taken separately. NA 25 is not the only aphorism that is not conclusive. For instance NA 8: drstestavyahatad vakya paramarthabhidhayinah tattva-grahitayotpannam manam sabdam praktrtitam // The cognitive criterion - arisen as grasping reality due to a [momentous] sentence, which is accepted as what is experienced, and which is not 143

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE is our poble truth ob omniscient and Sumply (the above alle ow: even thoughcomitance with the pears as the finitive Dyl possible dating out of that kind ets with whitative, con un caracterised by the dans son contradicted (as well as) which communicates the ultimate truth is declared to be the verbal knowledge, is differently construed by the commentators, for example. (1) NAV 8.1 (p.380): dritena pruandvalokitenestah pratipodayisito vyahato 'niraktah samarthyad artho yasmin wakyetar-tarha (in which (momentous sentence the meaning - due to its efficacy is accepted" fi.c.,) desired to be demonstrated, as "what is experienced" (i.c.,) as what is seen by means of a cognitive criterion, (and which is not contradicted" [ie..) which is not revoked that momentous sentence] is such."), and (2) NA ad loc. (n. 340, p. 222): drsteneryddi. ayant bhinnddhikaranas tri-pado bahu vrtih yadi visto 'wahatotho yata ad avahatam vakyam, tadanu drstena pramana nimitenestavydhatam in tal-purah ("This is either a bahw-vrti compound consisting of three words, which has a substance different from its constituent elements) "such a statement in which the meaning is accepted and not contradicted", or it may be understood as] a tal-pura compount "what is accepted (and) not contradicted by what is experienced (viz..) by what is determined through a cognitive criterion".") 32 NAV 243(p. 411): nanu ca parairanyad epi drsansabhasa-trayamuktam, tad yasha nav pradaridayo vipartamvayas cet. 33 NAV 253 (pp. 415 416): parair apare 'pi drstand bhasas trayo Vimya-bhasilayd darth ind yasha-ayatieka, pradariita-watirko, vipartio-vatiekal calle Imabhir guttavan na darsayilavah. 34 NBT ad loc.: atra pramane waidharmyodaharanam. yah sarvaja apto vd sa jyotir janadikan sarva-jataptata-linga-bhutami wpadisavdayatha rabho vandhamanat ca avadhi yasya sa sabha vardhamanddi-digambaran dard sarvajal ca aptas ceti, tad iha vaidharnryodaharanad rabhader asarwolatvasydnaplatayas ca varireko vydvitih sandigdha, yalo jyotir. janan copaduted asarva-jrias ca bhaved anapta va ko tra virodhah? nalitikametajana vyabhicari na sarvajavam arumapayer. 35 NAV 25.2 (p. 414): atra waidharma-dranto: yah punah sarva-fia Aplo va sav Arya saya cauayan pratyaptpadar, tad yatha-sauddhadanir ini. ayant ca sadhylvantrekt dryo-salya-cahustayarya dukkha-samudaya-mdryo-nirodho laborary promo-badhiavena tad-Shasakarydsorganapapapatah. kavalat tan-nirakaraka-pramina-samarthya paryolocand-vikaland sondigdhe-sadhya-varietala pratibhari dahopanyastahtasha Wiyalty py Bryo-satya-cahay saddhodnih pratadiuvams, tadpisarvo adplate laye N siddhyarah, sabhyat saharya-saya-cahayapratipadanasydnyathanupapatty-asiddher, asarva-Jidnaplenapi paro-protranabhipraya-pravatta-nipuna-buddhasha.purusena fatha vidho pratipadanarya kartant sakyahat. tasmde chauddhodaneh sakajad asarva-Jatnaplata-laksanasya sadhyasya vyavstrih sandigdheti sandigdha-sadhya-vyatirekitamin. Hero the example based on dissimilarity (can be formulated in the following manner): "Whoever were either an omniscient or an authoritative person, however, he would teach the four boble truths, for instance: Suddhodanas son (sc. the Buddha).'Or else, one could say as well that this is (the first variety of fallacious example) lacking negative concomitance with the probandum, becauseinasmuch as the four noble truths characterised by the suffering its origin, the path [leading to its cessation and its cessation are subverted by cognitive criteria - an advocate of these [four noble truths) is explicable (only) is a non-omniscient and a non-authoritative person. Simply, (the above fallacious example) has been specified as such (an exam ple in which negative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful] because to people) lacking the recognition of the efficacy of cognitive criteria that revoke these [four noble truths) it appears as the fallacious example) in which negative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful For it is as follows: even though Suddhodana's son (the Buddha) taught the four noble truths, nevertheless his omniscience and his authority are not proved, because there is no proof that teaching the four noble truths is otherwise inexplicable except together with these two, [i.c., omniscience and authority). inasmuch as it is (equallyl possible that a cunning person of an adroit mind, who acts with an intention of cheating others, although he is neither omniscient sor authoritative, can impart teaching of that kind. Therefore, non-occurrence of the probandum characterised by non-omniscience and by lack of authority is doubtful in the case of Suddhodana's son (the Buddha); bence this instance is called an example) in which segative concomitance with the probandum is doubtful It is worth mentioning that, strangely enough, the typical sequence of the four noble truths is bere disturbed: Siddharsigani interchanges the third and fourth noble truths. 36 NAV 25.2 (p. 415) na vila-ragah kapilddayah, kannaspadesv apy akarundpartta-citatayddattanijaka-masa-Sakalatvaditi.atra vaidharmyadranto: se punar vita ragas te karundspadesu karuna-parita-citataya datanja-masa-jakalas, -Iad yatha-bodhi-sativa i atrasadhya-sadhana-dharmayor bodhisattveblo Waytti sandigdha, tal-pratpadaka-pramana-vaikalyan na Mayate kim te ragadimanta wta vita-ragah: tathanukampyesu kisa-pidita-khandani dattavanto ned va, atah sandigdha-sadhya-sadhana varirekitvami. "Kapila and other (thinkers of his kind) are not dispassionate, because inasmuch as their consciousness is not filled with compassion - they have not offered any bits of their own flesh even to the abodes of compassion (s. to hungry beings who deserved compassion). Here the example based on dissimilarity can be formulated in the following manner): "Those, bowever, who are dispassionate, inasmuch as their conscioustess is filled with com passion, offered bits of their own flesh to the abodes of compassion (sc. to hungry beings who deserved compassion), for instance: Bodhisattvas.' Here the non-occurrence of the properties of both the probandum and the probens in the case of Bodhisattvas is doubtful. Because of lack of any cognitive criterion that could demonstrate that (sc. that passions, etc., are excluded in the case of Bodhisattvas), it is not known whether those [Bodhisattvas) are endowed with passion, etc., or whether they are dispassionate; similarly, it is not known) whether they have offered bits of their own flesh to those wor thy of sympathy, or not. Hence, (this is the fallacious example) in which nego ative concomitance with [both the probandum and the probans is doubtful. 37 MSA 16.36 (p. 105.24-27): yakran buddha-sutih svaj#vitam api prapyarthinam sarvada / karunat paramo na ca pratitir nestami phalani prarthitam danendiva catena sarva-janata bodhi-traye ropita / danam ana.parigrahena ca punar loke "rayam sthapitam // body propertieste) na ca prazikri bodhi-raytropil shapitam 144 145

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ 38 AK 4.113a and AKBh ad loc. (p. 740.10 741.2): diyate yena tad danam, bhavati sma ragadibhir api diyate, na catra tad istam. 39 AKBh ad AK 4.113ab (p. 741.14 17):...avita-ragah aryah prthag-jano va vita-ragas caitye danam dadari yadaryo vita-ragah para-sativebhyo danam dadati sthapayitva dra-dharma-vedantyam tatra danam paresam arthaya, tena tesam anugrahai... 40 Cf. NBT 1.5: bhrantam hy anumanam sva-pratibhase 'narthe thadhyavasayena pravrttavat, and PV in II p. 24.67: de ma yin la der dzin phyir /khrul kyan "brel phyir ishad ma nid = (PVin II p. 25:) atasmims tad-graho bhrantir api sambandhatah prama!! [*Tib. tad-graha??] 41 MSV (Niralambana-vada) 23 (p. 159.7-8): stambhadi-pratyayo mithya pratyayatvar tatha hi yah pratyayah sa mrsa drstah svapnadipratyayo yatha !! The cognition of a column etc. is erroneous, because it is a cognitition, for it is as follows: whatever is a cognition it is false, like the cognition in a dream." 42 NV on NBh 4.2.34 (p. 489.89): ayam jagrad-avasthapalabdhanam visayanam cinta-vyatirekinam asative hetuh khyarih svapnavad iti na drantasya sadhya-samavat. This logical reason [to be provided] for [the thesis that] 'things perceived in the state of wakefulness do not exist as [something] different from consciousness do not exist' is 'cognition', like in a dream. - [This argument] is not [correct], because the example is in the same [predicament as] the probandum, which is the case of the fallacy of the logical reason (hervabhasa): the cited example is in need of proof as much as the thesis it is supposed to prove. 43 BSSBh 2.2.5.29 (p. 476.2 3): yad uktam bahyarthapalapina svapnadivaj jagarita-gocara api stambhadipratyaya vindiva bahyendrthena bhaveyuh pratyayarvavisesad iti tad prativaktavyam. What has been said by [the Buddhist idealist] who denies [the existence of] external objects: 'Like in a dream etc., also acts of cognition of a column etc. which have as their domain the waking state are possible solely without external thing, because there is no difference [as regards them being] acts of cognition."- this is [now] refuted. 44 The argument, in its typical wording, reoccurs later in NAV 29.8 (p. 437): niralambanah sarve pratyayah, pratyayatvat, svapna-pratyayavad. All acts of cognition are void of the objective substratum, because [they are] acts of cognition, like a cognition in dream. 45 For example NAV 24.2 (p. 410): svapna-sanvedanasya pramanata-vaikalyat tat-pratyanika-jagrat-pratyayopanipata-badhitatvaditi. [This example is fallacious] because the sensation in dream is subverted-inasmuch as it lacks the status of cognitive criterion - by the occurrence of the 146 IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST varVIL cognition of a person in the waking state, which is opposite to this [sensation in dream].' 46 Cf., for example NAV 29.1 (p. 425): iha yad yatra pratibhati, tad eva tad-gocarataydbkyupagantavyam. 47 As far as certain structural nuances are concerned, worth pointing out is the fact that Dharmakirti employs not more than two different instances of reasoning to represent altogether four types of fallacious reasoning, namely he interchanges them as follows: [S1]-[V2] and [S2] [VI]. Siddharsigani uses various intermingled illustrations, in which certain 'semi-variables' overlap as follows: the probandum iswith one exception the same (i.e. sadhya of [S1] sadhya of [S2] sadhya of [VI] 'bhraniam'), the logical reason remains unchanged (i.e. heru of [S1]-hetu of [S2]henu of [V1] hetu of [V2]='pramanarvar"), paksa of [SI]= paksa of [VI]: dratanta of [V2] (anumanam); paksa of [V2] drstanta of [S1] (pratyaksam); dritania of [S2] dritania of [V1] (svapna-samvedanam); sadhya of [V2] (= nirvikalpaka) has no match. 48 See for example PSV 1.k3c-d: pratyaksamm kalpanapodhamm nama-jary-ady-asamyuktam, and NB 4: tatra pratyaksam kalpanapodham abhraniam. Comp. also the definition found in NP 4.1 (= NP (1) 7.12-3), bearing striking similarity to the one of Dinnaga, which fact was initially one of the reasons responsible for the wrong attribution of Sankarasvamin's manual to Dinnaga: tatra pratyaksam kalpanapodham. yaj jnanam arthe rapadau nama-jary-adi-kalpana-rahitam tad. See also NBT 1.4 (p. 47.1): bhrantam hi anumanam svapratibhase 'narthe 'rthadhyavasayena pravrttatvar. 49 This is an addition to Dharmottara, cf. NBT ad loc.: gautama adir yesam te tathoki man-adayo dharma-sastrani smrtayas tesam kartarah... 50 NB 3.131: arra vaidharmyodaharanam: ye grahya-vacana na te ragadimantah, tad yatha gautamadayo dharma-sastranam pranetara iti gautamadibhyo ragadimativasya sadhana-dharmasya vyavrttih sandigdha. 51 NBT ad NB 3.131: gautamadibhyo ragadimattvasya sadhanasya nivrttih sandigdha. yady api te grahya-vacanas traytida tathapi kim saraga uta vita-raga iti sandehah Even though those [thinkers like Gautama and others] are [such people] whose statements should be trusted by a [Brahmin] learned in the three Vedas, nevertheless there is a doubt whether [they are) passionate or dispassionate? ["See the critical apparatus in Dalsukhbbai Malvania's edition and the editor's n. 7: 'vida tathapi A.P.H.E.N.'; the main text reads: vidas tathapi.] 52 NBT ad NB 3.131: vivaksita iti kapiladi dharm!. 53 DhPr. ad NB 3.131 (p. 247.20-21): gautamo 'ksapadapara-nama nyaya-satrasyapi praneta munih, manur iti smrti-karo munih. 54 NAV 24.2 (p. 410): ghatasya sattvat pratyaksidibhir upalabdhatvac ca. 55 [S7] and [V7] are "the defects of the logical reason alone' (NAV 24.4: tadananvayatvalaksano na drifantasya dosah, kim tarhi hetor eva, and NAV 25.3: tasmad asiddhapratibandhasya hetor evayam doso, na drstantasyeti). [S8]. [S9], [V8] and [V9] 'rise from the defects of the speaker' (NAV 24.4: vakt-dosarvai, and NAV 25.4: vakt-doga-samutthau). 56 Dharmottara (c.740-800, see Steinkellner-Much (1995: 67)) preceded Siddharsigani by at least a 100 years (c.900), cf. Shastri (1990: 27: ninth/tenth century). Siddharsigani finished his work on the Upamiti-bhava-prapanca-katha, on 1st May 906 CE. (Vikrama Sarivat 962) according to Vaidya (1928: xxi) and Chatterjee (1978: 287). 147

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* paattttttaa 57 NBT 3.126 (pp. 242.6-243.2); atomapartho drstantas tad-arthas canena napapanah sadharmyarthai copapantoninupayoga iti vaker dosadayandrsanta-dosah vaktrahy atra para pratipadayilavyah. tato yadinama na dustan vastu lathapi vakara dustan daricam ini dusam eva 58 NBT 3.127 (p. 244.3-4): tasmad viparttanvayo 'pi waktur aparadhat na vastutah. pararthanumane ca vaktur api dosas cintyata iti 59 NBT 3.134 (p. 250.3-5): lha pararthanumane parasmad artha pratipattavah, sa fuddho 'pi svato yadi parenasuddhah thapyale sa lavad yatha prakaitas fatha na yukta yatha yuktas tatha na prakasitah. prakasitas ca heruh, ato waktur aparadhad api pararthanumane heter des ponto va dustahsyad ini. 60 NBT 3.135 (p. 252.9-10): fata ca vipartta-varirako plaktur aparadhad dustam. 61 NB 3.121 (p. 234.1-2): tri-rapo heturuktah, taward carthoprattorini na prthag drsinto nama sadhanavayavah kascit tena ndisya laksanam prthagwydte ga drzhavat. 62 See NB 3.122 (p. 235). 63 NB 3.122 (p. 73): Na hy ebhir drstantabhasair hetoh samya-laksanam sapaksa va sativat vipakse ca sarvatrasarvam ca niscayena saya dariayihe video lakranant ca. tad arthaparisant iraso drastavah. 64 NBT 3.8 (p. 188.2-3): Wapti-sadhanasyc pramanasya visayo drsintah. Sam eva darayum aha-yatharya ini, sadhya-dharminowo drsanta lty arthah. 65 NA 18: sadhya-sadhanayor waptir yatra nisclyate-taram! sadharmena sa drsrantah sambandha-smaranan matah 66 See NAV 18.1 (p. 398): ayam cavismsla-pratibandhe prativadini na prayokavya ity aha: sambandha-smaranad iti, lyab-lope panicami, prag-grhita-vismalasambandha-smaranam adhiktya...grhite ca pratibandhe smaryamane krvalan helur darsantyah, lavatdi va bubhutsidrtha-siddher dratanto na vacya, valyarthyat yada iu grhtto "pi vismatah karharicit sambandhas, tada fat-smaranartham drsantah kathyate. Subsequently, having in mind that this example) does not have to be proBounced for the disputant who has not forgotten the invariable connection, the author) says: "because of the recollection of the relation' (wherein the ablative is used in the place of the gerund, i.e..) having taken account of the recol lection of the relation, which has been grasped previously and have been afterwards) forgotten; this example] 'is known as', (ie.) intended by logicians, not in any other case. For when a person to be taught does not know the relation characterised by the property (on the part of the probans) of being insepe rably connected with the probandum even now, then he sbould be made grasp the relation by means of a cognitive criterion, bot merely by an emple, for just by seeing (two things together in some cases it is not proved that one of them) does not occur without the other one in all cases, because that would have] too far-reaching consequences. And if the invariable connection, which has been grasped [before), is being recollected, then simply the logical reason has to be shown since an object which one wants to cognise is proved by that much only, an example does not have to be stated, because it is purposeless. But when the relation - even though it has been grasped (before) has somehow been forgotten, then an oumple is mentioned with the purpose of its recollection, i.e.. In order to remind the opponent of the invariable concomitance) The same remark applies to both kinds (positive and negative) of the example, cf. NAV 19.1 (p. 400): yatra kvacid drstante sa waldharmena bhavatel-sabdend sambandha-smaragdiri. 67 NAV 20.1 (p. 401): fat-siddhau tata eva sadhya-siddher akaficit-kart drunodartir iti nyayo-wide nyayo vid variuso vidur avabudhyanta ini lha ca prakarane sedvayavanam spanaya-Rigamana-fuddhi-pacaka-laksanand santkipta-ruci sattunugraha paralad arya, yady api sakal laksanan noktam, lachdipy ata eva pratipaditavayava-trayad buddhimadbhir wineyan, yato Vayadpekaya jaghand-madhyamdkrstas tisrah katha bhavanti. tatra het pratipadangmarami jaghanyd. dwyddy-avayavd-nivedanam madhyamd samplrd. da dayava-karhanam sta tatreha madhyamayah saya kathanand jaghanyokste arthatak sacayati tad-sadbhavasya pramanesididharvadi. 'Experts in logie, [i.e.specialists in logie, 'have recognised" [i...) they know, that when this invariable connection) has been proved, an exemplification by adducing) an example is ineffective, inasmuch as the probandum is (already proved by this invariable concomitance). And even though the definition of the remaining members (of a proof formula) characterised by application, conclusion and the five clearances have not been taught directly here in this treatise, inasmuch as this treatise) aims at the advantage of shuman beings who delight in concise (form), nevertheless (respective def inition) can be deduced by the learned from this very triad of the members of the proof formula demonstrated (above), because there are seventually) three kinds of discourse as regards the number of members of the proof formula, viz. lower, intermediate and superior. Out of them, the lower coe is a mere demonstration of the logical reason; the intermediate one is a procla mation of two or more [but not all) members of the proof formula, the supe rior (discourse is the mention of complete ten members of the proof formula. Regarding these varieties of the discourse), by the direct mention of the intermediate (discourse) bere in this treatise the author] indicates both the lower and the superior (varieties of the discourse) by implication, because their presence can be proved by cognitive criterion. 68 NAV 24.4 (p. 412): yadi Al dryanta-balena vaptih sadhya-sadhanayoh pratipadyet, ata sydd anavayo drsantabhasah, sya-karyakaranad, yada ta para presto sambandha.grahi.pramina.gocara-marana-sampadandrthat drutdandalytirishnan, addramaatvo-laktano na drsantasyadona un Larhi hetor eve pratibandharyadyapi promanenapratishinandt, prarandhabhawe camayasiddheh. na ca hehu dopo pldrande vaca, hiprasanged in. For if the invariable concomitance between the probandum and the probans could be demonstrated by the force of an example, then the example) without positive concomitance would be indeed) a fallacy of the example, because it would not produce its effect, namely it would not demonstrate the invariable concomitance between the probandum and the probans). But when it is established that an exemplification by adducing) an example serves the purpose of producing a recollection, whose domain is a cognitive criterion grasping the relation that has occurred before, then the characteristic of being without positive concomitance is not the defect of example, but of the logical reason itself, because the invariable connection has not been determined by cognitive criterion until now, and if there is no invariable connection, then positive concomitance is not proved (either]. And the defect of the logical reason should not be taught in the case on (sc. should not be blamed on the example, because that would have too far-reaching consequences 148 149

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE Furthermore, yours is that view - namely: inasmuch as, in the time of the inference for oneself, one knows the probandum himself merely by seeing the logical reason, also at the point of the inference for others, only the demonstration of the logical reason should be carried out-on account of the following utterance: since for scholars simply the logical reason alone is to be stated" (pronounced by you) whose description of all fallacies of the example, as well - inasmuch as the probandum intended to be proved can be proved by specifying the logical reason alone in the form of nothing more than: "because it is produced' - demonstrates (your) aptitude for formulations in which antecedent and subsequent statements are contradicted (by each other). Let us leave therefore these two (fallacious examples (V8) and (V9]] alone, because the example is not accepted as a part of the probans. 73 See Balcerowicz (2001a: xx-xx). 74 NAV 11.1: [sadharmyena:) agnir alra dhamopapanter, waidharmyera: agnir atra, anyatha dhamanupapatren. 75 I discuss it at length in Balcerowicz (2003). 76 In Balcerowicz (2001a: esp. xii-xxx), I discuss Dharmakirti's influence on the NA at leogth. the best of which is a certum, the proba 69 NAV 25.3 (p. 416): ayuktak cayani vaktum, avyatirekitaya hetu-dosavat. yadi hi drsantabalenalva yasirekah pratipadyeta, tada tarha-vidha-samarthya-vikalarya tad-abhasata yujyeta, na caisad asti, prat-pravstta-sambandha-grahangproward-pramana-gocara-smarana-sampadan artham drstantopadanal na hy ekatra yo yad-abhave na drsiah, sa tad-abhave na bhavatiti pratibandha. grahi-pramana-vyatirekena sidhyary, ariprasarlgar. tasmad asiddhapratibandhasya hetor evayant doso, na drsantasyeti. It is improper to say so, because if there were no negative concomitance, then that would be the defect of the logical reason. For if negative concomitance could be demonstrated by the force of the example alone, then (an example) lacking the efficacy of this kind, (viz incapable of demonstrating negative CODcomitance), would be justified as the fallacy of this example), but that is not the case, because the example is mentioned in order to produce a recollection the domain of which is a cognitive criterion - disposed towards grasping the relation [between the probandum, the probans and the logical reason) - that occurred previously. For the example) is not established without a cognitive criterion that grasps the invariable connection in the forn): 'If (at least in one case, when y is absent, x is not seen, then x does not occur, when y is absent, because that would have too far-reaching consequences. Therefore, that is the defect of the logical reason, alone, whose invariable connection is not proved Dot (the defect) of the example. 70 NBT 3.8 (p. 188.2): vyapti-sadhanasya pramanasya visayo drsintah-'The logical reason is the province of cognitive criterion that establishes the invariable concomi tance'. f. also NBT 3.126 (p. 242.6): ato 'vayortho drstanids. 71 Re. [58] and [59]. cf. NAV 24.4 (p. 412): tarhapradarsitanvaya-viparltanvaya api na drstantabhasata svi-kuruto, 'mayapradarsanasya viparyastavaya-pradarsanasya ca vakts-dosatvar, tad-dosa-dvarenapi drstantabhasa-pratipadane tad-lyatia viftryeta, vakar dondnam anantyat. Similarly, both (the example) with unindicated positive concomitance and (the example) with inverted positive concomitance do not secure the status of the fallacy of the logical reason, because not indicating positive concomitance as well as indicating positive concomitance as inverted are the defects (on the part of the speaker. If the demonstration of fallacies of the logical reason [were carried out by taking into account the defects of this (speaker) as well, the limited number of those (fallacies) would be shattered, because defects of the speaker (can be) infinite. Similarly, re. [78] and [V9), see NAV 25.4 (p. 417) wat rekapradarsanan vipartia vyatireka-pradarsanans ca na vastuno dosah, kinh tarhivacana-tusalato-vikalasydb. hidhayatasya. 72 PVSV p. 186.19 (Gnoli: 18.11) on PV 3.27cd found in NAV 25.4 (p. 417): kimi ca, yesar bhavatam ado darsanani: yad uta svarthanumana kale saya hetu-darsana-matra! sadhya-pratteh pararthanumandvasare 'pi het pran padanam eva kartavyant "widusan waeyo hatur eva hi kevala" In-wacanat tega letakarvad" itiyata hetipanyasenalva sisadhayitosadhya-siddheh samasta-destantabhasa-varanam api parvapara-vahadvacana-racand-caluram avir-bhavayari, asata lavad elau, drsrantasya sadhanavayavatvenanabhyupagamal. Bibliography AK - Vasubandhu: Abhidharma-kosa. Abhidharmakosa and Bhagya of acarya Varubandhu with Sphurartha Commentary of acarya Yafomitra. Critically edited by Svamt Dvarikadas Sastri. Bauddha Bharat Series 5, 6, 7, 9, Varanasi, 1970: Part 1 (1 and 2 Kodasthana); 1971: Part II (3 and 4 Kosasthana); 1972: Part III (5 apd 6 Kosasthana): 1973: Part IV (7 and 8 Kasasthana) (Reprinted: Varanast 1987). AKBh Vasubandhu: Abhidharma-koja-bhagya. See: AK Alex - Alexander: In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum Librum I Commentarium, M. Wallies, Berolini 1883. Balcerowicz, Piotr 1999 Taxonomic Approach to dostanabhasa in Myaya-bind and in SideharsiganiMyayavatara w al - Dharmakirti'Typology and the Jaina Criticism Thereof' InDharmaldri Thought and its impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy (Proceedings of the Third International Dharmakirti Conference - Hiroshima, November 4-6, 1997), ed. by Sboryu Katsur, Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften: Beitrage zur Kidhar und Geistesgeschichte Asiens Nr. 32, Wien 1999: 1-16. Balcerowicz, Piotr 2001a Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective A Critical Edition and an Annotated Translation of Siddhasena Divakara Nyayavaldre, Siddhartiganin Nyaydvarara-vivrti And Devabhadrasaris Nydydvatara-tippand. Volume I & II. Al- und Neu-Indische Studien 53, 1 and 53, 2. Franz Steiner Verlag. Stuttgart 2001. Balcerowicz, Piotr 2001b"Two Siddhasenas and the Authorship of the Nydavatdra and the Saunati-tarka-prakarana,' Journal of Indian Philosophy 29/3 (2001) 351-578. Balcerowicz, Piotr 2003 'Is "Inexplicability Otherwise" (artyathanupaparl) Otherwise Inexplicable?', Journal of Indian Philosophy 1-3 (2003) 343-380 (Proceedings of the International Seminar 'Argument and Reason in Indian Logic 20-24 June, 2001 - Kazimierz Dolny, Poland). Bochenski, I. M. 1954 Die Zeitgenossischen Denkmethoden, Zweite Auflage, Dalp Taschenbucher Band 304, Leboen Verlag Munchen, 1959 (First edition: Bern 1954]. 150 151

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE Bochenski LM. 1980 'The General Sense and Character of Modern Logic'in Modern Logic - A Surugs (ed.) by E. Agazzi, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht 1980: 3-14. Boole, Gaupe 1847 The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, Cambridge - London 1847. : BSSBb = Sankara: Brahma-sutra-sarkara-bhasya. Ed. with the commentaries: Bhasyaratna-prabha of Govindananda, Bhaman of Vacaspatimisra, Nyaya-nirnaya of Anandagiri; ed. by J. L. Shastri, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1980 (Reprinted: Delhi P88). Chatterjes, Asim Kumar 1978 A Comprehensive History of Jainism: Up to 1000 A.D., Firma KM Private Limited, Calcutta 1978. Church, Alonzo 1956 Introduction to Mathematical Logic; Vol. 1, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (1956). DhPr = Durveka Misra: Dharmottara-pradipa [being a sub-commentary on Dharruttara's Nyayabindurika, being a commentary on Dharmakirti's Nyayabindu), ed. by Pt Dalsukhbhai Malvania, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 2, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Rescared Institute, Patna 1971. Lukasiewicz, Jan 1957 Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic, Second Enlarged Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1957 (First edition: 1951). MSA = Asanga (Maitreyanatha?): Mahayana-sutralarkara. Mahayana-sutralarikara of Asarig Ed. by S. Bagchi, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 13, The Mithila Institute of Post-Gaduate Studies and Research in Sans MSV = Kumarila Bhatta: Mimassa-sloka-vartika, with the Commentary Nyaya-ratnakara, of Parthasarathi Misra, ed by. Ramasastri Tailanga, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 3, Benars 1889-1899. NA = Sinhasena Mahamati: Nyayavatara. See: Balcerowicz (2001a). NAV = Siddharsigani: Nyayavatara-vivrti. See: Balcerowicz (2001a). NB = Dharmakirti: Nyaya-bindu. See: DhPr. NBh = Witsyayana: Nyaya-bhasya. See: NV. NBT = Daarmottara: Nyaya-bindu-sika; See: DhPr. NP = Sakarasvamin: Nyaya-pravesa. Revised critical edition in: Piotr Balcerowicz: 'Sarkmasvamin: Nyaya-pravesa - "Introduction to Logic" ("Wprowadzenie w logike, Part One: 1. Polish Translation, II. Sanskrit Text, III. Notes $ I, Abbreviations and Patography, Studia Indologiczne 2 (1995) 39-87: 72-77. NP (1) Sankarasvamin: Nyaya-pravesa. Part One: The Nyaya-pravesa - Sanskrit Text with Commentaries, ed. by A. B. Dhruva, Gaekwad's Oriental Series 38, Baroda 1 NP (2) Sankarasvamin: Nyaya-pravesa. In: Musashi Tachikawa: 'A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic (A Translation of the Nyayapravesa)', Journal of Indian Philonphy 1 (1971) 11-45 (Dordrecht). NV = Akiradvaja Uddyotakara: Nyaya-varttika. Nyayabhasyavarttika of Bharadvaja Udaymakara. Ed by Anantal Thakur. Nyayacaturgranthika Vol. I, Indian Council of Philonphical Research, New Delhi 1997. PSV = Disnaga: Pramana-samuccaya-vrtti (Chapter I]. In: Masaaki Hattori: Dignaga, On Perception, being the Pratyaksapariccheda of Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya, from the Sanshit fragments and Tibetan versions. Harvard Oriental Series 47, Harvard Univity Press, Cambridge, MA 1968. PV = Dharmakirti: Pramana-varttika. (1) Ram Chandra Pandeya (ed.): The Pramana varttitam of Acarya Dharmakarti with Sub-commentaries: Svopajna-vrtti of the Author and Ramana-varttika-vrtti of Manorathanandin. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1989. (2) Tipitakacharya Rahula Sanksityayana (ed.): Pramanavarttikabhashyam or Vartikalankarah of Prajnakaragupta (being a commentary on Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika). Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1953. (3) Raniero Gnoli (ed.): The Pramanavarttikam of Dharmakarti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. Serie Orientale Roma XXIII, Roma 1960. PVin II = Dharmakirti's Pramanaviniscayah, 2. Kapitel: Svarthanumanam. Tib. Text und Sanskrittexte von E. Steinkellner. Veroffentlichungen der Kommission fur Sprachen und Kulturen Sud- und Ostasiens 12, Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Wien 1973. PVSV = Dharmakirti: Pramana-varttika-syopajna-vrtti. See: PV (1). Russell, Bertrand 1917 'The Study of Mathematics' in Mysticism and Logic and other Essays. Third impression, Unwin Books, London 1970: 48-58. (First edition: 1917). Shasti, Indra Chandra 1990 Jaina Epistemology. P. V. Research Series 50, Varanast 1990. Steinkellner, Erast; Much, Michael Torsten 1995 Texte der erkenntistheoretischen Schule des Buddhismus (Systematic Survey of Buddhist Sanskrit Literature) II, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Gottingen 1995. Taber, A. John 1994 'Kumarila's Refutation of the Dreaming Argument: The Niralambanavada-adhikarana', in Studies in Mimansa - Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume, ed. R. C. Dwivedi, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi 1994: 27-52. Vaidya, P. L. 1928 'Introduction' to Nyayavatara of Siddhasena Divakara with The Vivrti of Siddharsigani and with The Tippana of Devabhadra, ed. by, Shri Jain Shwetamber Conference, Bombay 1928: vii-xliii. Vivy = Nagarjuna: Vigraha-vyavartani. The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna (igraha-vyavartany), Skt. text ed. by E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst. Transl. by Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1978. (Second edition: 1986). 152 153 .