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* பாடட்டா
57 NBT 3.126 (pp. 242.6-243.2); atomapartho drstántas tad-arthas cánena nápapanah
sadharmyarthai cópapantoninupayoga iti vaker dosadayandrsanta-dosah vaktrahy atra para pratipadayilavyah. tato yadinama na dustan vastu lathapi vakara dustan
daricam ini dusam eva 58 NBT 3.127 (p. 244.3-4): tasmad viparttánvayo 'pi waktur aparadhat na vastutah.
pararthanumane ca vaktur api dosas cintyata iti 59 NBT 3.134 (p. 250.3-5): lha pararthanumane parasmad artha pratipattavah, sa
fuddho 'pi svato yadi parenäsuddhah thapyale sa lavad yatha prakaitas fatha na yukta yatha yuktas tatha na prakasitah. prakasitas ca heruh, ato waktur aparadhad
api pararthanumane heter des ponto va dustahsyad ini. 60 NBT 3.135 (p. 252.9-10): fata ca vipartta-varirako plaktur aparadhad dustam. 61 NB 3.121 (p. 234.1-2): tri-rapo heturuktah, taward cárthoprattorini na prthag drsinto
nama sadhanavayavah kascit tena ndisya laksanam prthagwydte ga drzhavat. 62 See NB 3.122 (p. 235). 63 NB 3.122 (p. 73): Na hy ebhir drstantábhasair hetoh samya-laksanam sapaksa
va sativat vipakse ca sarvatrásarvam ca niscayena saya dariayihe video
lakranant ca. tad arthaparişant iraso drastavah. 64 NBT 3.8 (p. 188.2-3): Wapti-sadhanasyc pramanasya visayo drsintah. Sam eva
darayum aha-yatharya ini, sadhya-dharminowo drsanta lty arthah. 65 NA 18:
sadhya-sadhanayor waptir yatra nišclyate-taram!
sadharmeņa sa drsräntah sambandha-smaranan matah 66 See NAV 18.1 (p. 398):
ayam cavismsla-pratibandhe prativadini na prayokavya ity aha: sambandha-smaranad iti, lyab-lope panicami, prag-grhita-vismalasambandha-smaranam adhiktya...grhite ca pratibandhe smaryamane krvalan helur darsantyah, lavatdi va bubhutsidrtha-siddher dratanto na vacya, valyarthyat yada iu grhtto "pi vismatah karharicit sambandhas, tada fat-smaranártham drsantah kathyate. Subsequently, having in mind that this example) does not have to be proBounced for the disputant who has not forgotten the invariable connection, the author) says: "because of the recollection of the relation' (wherein the ablative is used in the place of the gerund, i.e..) having taken account of the recol lection of the relation, which has been grasped previously and have been afterwards) forgotten; this example] 'is known as', (ie.) intended by logicians, not in any other case. For when a person to be taught does not know the relation characterised by the property (on the part of the probans) of being insepe rably connected with the probandum even now, then he sbould be made grasp the relation by means of a cognitive criterion, bot merely by an emple, for just by seeing (two things together in some cases it is not proved that one of them) does not occur without the other one in all cases, because that would have] too far-reaching consequences. And if the invariable connection, which has been grasped [before), is being recollected, then simply the logical reason has to be shown since an object which one wants to cognise is proved by that much only, an example does not have to be stated, because it is purposeless. But when the relation - even though it has been grasped (before) has somehow been forgotten, then an oumple is mentioned with the purpose of its recollection, i.e..
In order to remind the opponent of the invariable concomitance) The same remark applies to both kinds (positive and negative) of the example, cf. NAV 19.1 (p. 400): yatra kvacid drstante sa waldharmena bhavatel-sabdend sambandha-smaragdiri.
67 NAV 20.1 (p. 401):
fat-siddhau tata eva sadhya-siddher akaficit-kart drunodartir iti nyayo-wide nyayo vid variuso vidur avabudhyanta ini lha ca prakarane sedvayavanam spanaya-Rigamana-fuddhi-pacaka-laksanand santkipta-ruci sattunugraha paralad arya, yady api sakal laksanan noktam, lachdipy ata eva pratipaditavayava-trayad buddhimadbhir wineyan, yato Vayadpekaya jaghand-madhyamdkrstas tisrah katha bhavanti. tatra het pratipadangmarami jaghanyd. dwyddy-avayavd-nivedanam madhyamd samplrd. da dayava-karhanam sta tatréha madhyamayah saya kathanand jaghanyókste arthatak sacayati tad-sadbhavasya pramanesididharvadi. 'Experts in logie, [i.e.specialists in logie, 'have recognised" [i...) they know, that when this invariable connection) has been proved, an exemplification by adducing) an example is ineffective, inasmuch as the probandum is (already proved by this invariable concomitance). And even though the definition of the remaining members (of a proof formula) characterised by application, conclusion and the five clearances have not been taught directly here in this treatise, inasmuch as this treatise) aims at the advantage of shuman beings who delight in concise (form), nevertheless (respective def inition) can be deduced by the learned from this very triad of the members of the proof formula demonstrated (above), because there are seventually) three kinds of discourse as regards the number of members of the proof formula, viz. lower, intermediate and superior. Out of them, the lower coe is a mere demonstration of the logical reason; the intermediate one is a procla mation of two or more [but not all) members of the proof formula, the supe rior (discourse is the mention of complete ten members of the proof formula. Regarding these varieties of the discourse), by the direct mention of the intermediate (discourse) bere in this treatise the author] indicates both the lower and the superior (varieties of the discourse) by implication,
because their presence can be proved by cognitive criterion. 68 NAV 24.4 (p. 412):
yadi Al dryanta-balena vaptih sadhya-sadhanayoh pratipadyet, ata sydd anavayo drsantábhasah, sya-karyakaranad, yada ta para presto sambandha.grahi.pramina.gocara-marana-sampadandrthat drutdandálytirishnan, addramaatvo-laktano na drsantasyadona un Larhi hetor eve pratibandharyadyapi promånenápratishinandt, prarandhábhawe cámayasiddheh. na ca hehu dopo pldrande vaca, hiprasanged in. For if the invariable concomitance between the probandum and the probans could be demonstrated by the force of an example, then the example) without positive concomitance would be indeed) a fallacy of the example, because it would not produce its effect, namely it would not demonstrate the invariable concomitance between the probandum and the probans). But when it is established that an exemplification by adducing) an example serves the purpose of producing a recollection, whose domain is a cognitive criterion grasping the relation that has occurred before, then the characteristic of being without positive concomitance is not the defect of example, but of the logical reason itself, because the invariable connection has not been determined by cognitive criterion until now, and if there is no invariable connection, then positive concomitance is not proved (either]. And the defect of the logical reason should not be taught in the case on (sc. should not be blamed on the example, because that would have too far-reaching consequences
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| SR No. | 269215 |
| Book Title | Implications Of Buddhist Jaina Dispute Over Fallacious Example In Nyaya Bindu And Nyayavatara Vivrti |
| Original Sutra Author | N/A |
| Author | Piotr Balcerowicz |
| Publisher | Piotr Balcerowicz |
| Publication Year | |
| Total Pages | 18 |
| Language | English |
| Classification | Article |
| File Size | 3 MB |