Implications Of Buddhist Jaina Dispute Over Fallacious Example In Nyaya Bindu And Nyayavatara Vivrti

SR No.: 269215
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz
Total Pages: 18
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 3 MB

Page 17

PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDDHIST-JAINA DISPUTE
Furthermore, yours is that view - namely: inasmuch as, in the time of the inference for oneself, one knows the probandum himself merely by seeing the logical reason, also at the point of the inference for others, only the demonstration of the logical reason should be carried out-on account of the following utterance: since for scholars simply the logical reason alone is to be stated" (pronounced by you) whose description of all fallacies of the example, as well - inasmuch as the probandum intended to be proved can be proved by specifying the logical reason alone in the form of nothing more than: "because it is produced' - demonstrates (your) aptitude for formulations in which antecedent and subsequent statements are contradicted (by each other). Let us leave therefore these two (fallacious examples (V8) and (V9]] alone, because the example is not accepted as a part of
the probans. 73 See Balcerowicz (2001a: xx-xx). 74 NAV 11.1: [sadharmyena:) agnir alra dhamopapanter, waidharmyera: agnir atra,
anyatha dhamanupapatren. 75 I discuss it at length in Balcerowicz (2003). 76 In Balcerowicz (2001a: esp. xii-xxx), I discuss Dharmakirti's influence on the NA at
leogth.
the
best of which is a certum, the proba
69 NAV 25.3 (p. 416):
ayuktak cayani vaktum, avyatirekitaya hetu-dosavat. yadi hi drsantabalenalva yasirekah pratipadyeta, tada tarha-vidha-samarthya-vikalarya tad-abhasata yujyeta, na caisad asti, prät-pravstta-sambandha-grahangproward-pramana-gocara-smarana-sampadan artham drstantópadanal na hy ekatra yo yad-abhave na drsiah, sa tad-abhave na bhavatiti pratibandha. grähi-pramana-vyatirekena sidhyary, ariprasarlgar. tasmad asiddhapratibandhasya hetor evayant doso, na drsantasyeti. It is improper to say so, because if there were no negative concomitance, then that would be the defect of the logical reason. For if negative concomitance could be demonstrated by the force of the example alone, then (an example) lacking the efficacy of this kind, (viz incapable of demonstrating negative CODcomitance), would be justified as the fallacy of this example), but that is not the case, because the example is mentioned in order to produce a recollection the domain of which is a cognitive criterion - disposed towards grasping the relation [between the probandum, the probans and the logical reason) - that occurred previously. For the example) is not established without a cognitive criterion that grasps the invariable connection in the forn): 'If (at least in one case, when y is absent, x is not seen, then x does not occur, when y is absent, because that would have too far-reaching consequences. Therefore, that is the defect of the logical reason, alone, whose invariable connection is not proved
Dot (the defect) of the example. 70 NBT 3.8 (p. 188.2): vyapti-sadhanasya pramanasya visayo drsintah-'The logical
reason is the province of cognitive criterion that establishes the invariable concomi
tance'. f. also NBT 3.126 (p. 242.6): ato 'vayortho drstànids. 71 Re. [58] and [59]. cf. NAV 24.4 (p. 412):
tarhapradaršitánvaya-viparltánvaya api na drstantábhasata svi-kuruto, 'mayapradarsanasya viparyastávaya-pradarsanasya ca vakts-dosatvar, tad-dosa-dvarenápi drstäntábhäsa-pratipadane tad-lyatia viftryeta, vakar dondnam anantyat. Similarly, both (the example) with unindicated positive concomitance and (the example) with inverted positive concomitance do not secure the status of the fallacy of the logical reason, because not indicating positive concomitance as well as indicating positive concomitance as inverted are the defects (on the part of the speaker. If the demonstration of fallacies of the logical reason [were carried out by taking into account the defects of this (speaker) as well, the limited number of those (fallacies) would be shattered, because
defects of the speaker (can be) infinite. Similarly, re. [78] and [V9), see NAV 25.4 (p. 417) wat rekapradarsanan vipartia vyatireka-pradarsanans ca na vastuno doşah, kinh tarhivacana-tusalato-vikalasydb.
hidhayatasya. 72 PVSV p. 186.19 (Gnoli: 18.11) on PV 3.27cd found in NAV 25.4 (p. 417):
kimi ca, yeşar bhavatam ado darśanani: yad uta svarthanumana kale saya hetu-darsana-matra! sadhya-pratteh pararthanumándvasare 'pi het pran padanam eva kartavyant "widusan waeyo hatur eva hi kevala" In-wacanat tega letakarvad" itiyata hetipanyasenalva sisadhayitosadhya-siddheh samasta-destántábhasa-varanam api parvapara-vahadvacana-racand-caluram avir-bhavayari, asata lavad elau, drsräntasya sadhanavayavatvenanabhyupagamál.
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