Dignagas Criticism Of Samkhya Theory Of Perception

Author(s): Massaki Hattori
Publisher: Massaki Hattori
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269374/1

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SANKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION MASAAKI HATTORI FOREWORD In the first chapter of the Pramanasamuccaya, Dignaga, after elucidating his own theory of direct knowledge (pratyaksa), criticizes theories of perception formulated in the Vadavidhi and by the Naiyayikas, the Vaisesikas, the Samkhyas and the Mimamsakas. This paper is intended for providing readers with critical edition of Tibetan texts along with an annotated translation of the portion of the Pramanasamuccaya-vitti, Chapter I, wherein the Samkhya theory of perception is criticized. In preparing this edition, the following have been collated :K: Tshad-ma kun-las btus-pahi hgrel-pa, Tr. by Kanakavarman and Dad-pa ses-rab, Peking Ed., TTRI", Vol. 130, No. 5702. V: ditto, Tr. by Vasudhararaksita and Sen-rgyal, Peking Ed., TTRI, Vol. 130, No. 5701, Sde-dge Ed., Tohoku No. 4204. Kk: Tshad-ma kun-las btus-pa, Tr. by Kanakavarman and Dad-pahi ses-rab, Peking Ed., TTRI, Vol. 130, No. 5700. Vk: ditto, Tr. by Vasudhararaksita and Sa-ma sen-rgyal, Sde-dge Ed., Tohoku No. 4203. The verses of the Pramanasamuccaya have been printed in italics and numbered in order. The whole text has been divided for convenience sake into paragraphs A......K, and some of them have been subdivided. In taranslating the text, K has been followed in principle, and constant reference has been made to V. Passages where the present writer has adopted V have been marked with (V... ...V). As Dignaga's exposition is very condensed in most cases, the writer has inserted between lines many explanatory words, which have 1) Some portions have been translated and studied in M. Hattori, Dignaga's Theory of Direct Knowledge, Bulletin of the Univ. of Osaka Prefecture, Ser. C, Vol. 7, do., "Ronki" no Chikaku-setsu ni taisuru Dignaga no Hihan (Dignaga's Criticism of the Vadavidhi's Theory of Perception). Syukyo Kenkyu (yet unpublished) and, H. Kitagawa, Shori-gakuha no Genro-setsu ni taisuru Jinna no Hihan (Dignaga's Criticism of the Nyaya Theory of Perception), Nagoya-Dai gaku Bungaku-bu Kenkyu-Ronshu, Tetsugaku, Vol. XXI. 2) The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, reprinted and published by the Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, Tokyo-Kyoto.

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2 MASAAKI HATTORI These explanatory words have been supple been placed in brackets []. mented mostly on the basis of the following:J: Jinedrabuddhi, Visalamalavati-nama Pramanasamuccaya-tika, Tibetan Version, Sde-dge Ed., Tohoku No. 4268, Peking Ed., TTRI, Vol. 139, No. 5766. TIBETAN TEXTS D: Sde-dge Edition. P: Peking Edition. As K and Kk are not available in D, P alone has been used. However, some words have been corrected at the discretion of the editor. In these cases, the original readings have been given in the footnote. As regards V, D and P have been collated, and the editor has not made any further correction, although some wrong readings are noticeable. K Peking Ed., TTRI Vol. 130, No. 5702. A. [102b, 7] // ser skya pa [8] rnams kyi yan rna ba la sogs pa hjug pa ni mnon sum du hdod de / rna ba dan pags pa dan Ice dan / sna rnams yid kyi byin gyis brlabs nas / sgra dan reg bya dan gzugs dan ro dan/ [103a, 1] dri rnams la go rim ji Ita ba bsin du hdzin pa la hjug pa ni mnon sum gyi tshad maho ses zer ba/ Ba. de rnams kyi Itar na yan dban po 1) (1... rnams // thug med (k. la,1) / de dag gis ni dban po gsan gyi [2] gzun bya yul ma yin pa nid kyis dban po rnams ran gi yul la hjug par hdod pa yin no // yon tan gsum hphel ba dan hgrib pa tsam gyi khyad par las sgra la sogs pahi rigs tha dad pahi phyir // [3] sgra gcig kho nahi yon tan hphel ba dan hgrib pa tsam gyis mthah yas pahi phyir / hdzin pa po dban po mthah yas par khas blan bar bya dgos so/ 1) Kk. thug pa med pa(ham) (1... 1) Bb. /yan na dban po gcig (k. la,2)/ ci ste der yon tan [4] gsum tha mi V Peking Ed., TTRI Vol. 130, No. 5701. (Sde-dge Ed., Tohoku No. 4204) [D. 21b, 6] [21b, 5] ser skya pa rnams kyis ni rna ba la sogs pahi hjug pa mnon sum du hdod do // rna ba dan pags pa dan mig dan lce dan sna rnams yid kyis byin gyis brlabs nas yul la hjug pa ste /sgra dan [6] reg bya dan gzugs dan ro dan dri da Itar ba rnams la go rim bsin du hdzin pa ni mnon sum gyi tshad maho ses so / /de dag gi Itar na yan dban po rnams kyi / thug pa med paham / de dag gis ni dban po gsan gyi gzun bya yul ma [7] yin pa nid kyis ran gi yul la hjug pahi dban po hdod pa yin la yon tan gsum gyi hphel ba dan [D.22a) hgrib pa tsam gyis tha dad las sgra la sogs pahi rigs tha dad ces hdod de / sgra gcig pu yan yon tan gyi hphel hgrib [8] kyi tha dad kyis thug pa med pahi phyir dban po dpag tu med pas hdzin par khas blan bar byaho / 1) D. om. sad 2) P. pohi /yan na dban gcig hgyur / ci ste der yon tan gsum tha mi dad pas rigs gcig

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 3 dad pahi phyir rigs tha mi dad pa de nid yin na ni de Itar na sgra tha dad lta yin na sgrahi khyad par hdzin pa hdzin 224 17 pa bsin reg pa la sogs bsin du reg bya la sogs pahan hdzin pahan" udzin par thal bar hgyur bahi par thal bahi phyir dban po gcig nid phyir dban po gcig nid du hgyur te / thob pa ste / khyad par thams cad la thams cad du yon tan gsum po tha yon tan (5) gsum khyad par med pahi mi dad pahia phyir ro // yon tan phyir ro // gan gi phyir gan sgra kho gsum dan bral bahi sgrahi rigs (2] ni na la hgyur gyi reg bya la sogs pa yod pa ma yin no // gan sgra nid du rnams la ni ma yin no ses bya ba yon gyur ba de ni reg bya la sogs pa la tan gsum las gsan pahi sgrahi rigs med ma yin no / pas thams cad la yon tan gsum las gsan 1) P. inserts a sad after pahan. 2) P. om. pahi rigs med pas thams cad la yon tan (6) gsumokhyad par med pahi phyir ro/ . 1) Kk. (pa) ham dban gcig hgyur 2) P. de 3) P. par Ca. / ci ltar med de 1) gan gi tshe / gan gi tshe snin stobs la sogs soin stobs la sogs pahi dbyibs kyis pahi dbyibs kyis gnas skabs kyis tha khyad par gyis sgra la sogs pa la ni dad kyi sgra la sogs pa tha dad pa ji tha dad pa yin te / sgrahi rigs la ni tar med / sgrahi (3) rigs tha mi dad tha mi dad pahi dbyibs yod (7) pa yin par mtshuns pahi dbyibs kyi gnas la reg bya la sogs pa rnams las) ni skabs ni yod pa yin la / reg pa la sogs tha dad paho // rigs de yan rnam pa rnams las tha dad pa ste / rigs mthun hjug pahi gzun bar bya ba yin la / de pahi gzun bar bya bahi yul la rna ba bsin .du reg bya la sogs pa rnams la hjug pa yin no // de bsin du reg pa la (4) yan yin no // dehi phyir ji skad bsad sogs pa la yan no // deni phyir ji skad pahi (8] nes par thal bar mi hgyur du brjod pahi skyon du thal bar hgyur ro se na / de Ita na") yan mig dan reg se na / de lta na yan reg bya ni mig pa dag yul mtshun pa thob ste / gangis mthun pahi yul du hgyur te / gi phyir dbyibs ni / gnis gzun (k. 1b, 1) gan phyir dbyibs ni gnis kyi gzun bya") / rin po la sogs pahi dbyibs la mig ) rin po la sogs pahi dbyibs la mig dan / reg pahi ses pa (103b, 1) dag [6] dan reg bya dag gi ses pa mthon mthon bahi phyir de dag ran ran gi bahi phyir ran gi yul de kho nar hjug yul la hjug par ni hgal lo / go ses pa ni rnam par gsal to / 1) P. om. sad 2 P. la 3) P. om. 1) D. gi 2) D. byar 3) P. D. om. sad 1) P. om. 4) P. D. ri, cf. K. b) D. te Cb. / sgra la sogs pa rnams kyan rna ba la sogs pa rnams kyis gzun / dbyibs kyis byas pahi rigs kyi bye brag hdod pahi Itar na ni sgra la sogs

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MASAAKI HATTORI ...2) bar bya ba ma yin par hgyur te gan pa ni rna ba la sogs pa la mi hdzin gi phyir dbyibs ni / gsum gyi [2] spyod par [6] hgyur te/ gan gi phyir se na yul min (k. 1b, ) / dbyibs ni rna ba / dbyibs ni gsum gyi spyod yul min // dan sna dan Ice rnams kyis gzun bardbyibs ni rna ba dan sna dan Ice bya bar ma mthon bahi phyir sgra dan rnams kyis gzun bar bya ba ma yin dri dan ro rnams mnon sum ma yin pas / mthon bsin pahi sgra dan dri par hgyur ro / dan ro rnams mnon sum ma yin par hgyur ro / 1) D. om. sad 2) Vk. 1b, 2: gsum gyi yul ma yin 3) P, om. sad ...1) Cc. / dbyibs kyis byas pahi rigs kyi khyad par hdod pa ni (3) dbyibs man po rnams / yul gcig tu thob (k. 1c, 1) ste / gan gi phyir dban po gcig gi yul gyi rigs las ma hdas pa kho nar dehi khyad par gyi rigs du ma yin pahi phyir dbyibs du ma yul mtshuns pa thob bo / 1) Kk. nid (7) yul gcig la dbyibs man po hthob par yan hgyur te / dban po gcig gi yul gyi doye ba yod na ni dehi bye brag gi rigs du ma yod pahi phyir yul gcig tu dbyibs du ma mthon bar hgyur ro / 1) Vk. 1c, 1: yul goig nid thob.. Cd. / (4) gser la sogs pahi skyogs dan rgyan la sogs pahi dbyibs mtshuns pa rnams la yan / tha mi dad (k. 1c, 2) gser la sogs pa dan sgra la sogs pa yan rigs rnams gcig nid thob ste /dbyibs mtshuns (5) pahi phyir ro // de Ita na yan ran gi" yul hjug pa med do / 1) Kk. tha dad med P. om. ran gi / dbyibs rnams la (8) khyad par med par mtshuns pahi phyir gser la sogs pahi skyogs rnams dan rgyan rnams (D. 22b) kyi tha dad kyan med par hgyur ro il dbyibs mtshun par yod pahi phyir gser dan snin stobs dan rdzas la sogs pa (22b, 1) rnams kyan mtshuns par hgyur ro // de bsin du ran ran gi yul la hjug pa yan mi hgyur / 1) Vk. 1c, 1: dbyer med hgyur. >> D. om. D. / dban po hjug pa yan rigs) tsam / ci dban poui hjug pas rigs ran hjug par hdzin par byed par hgyurtsam hdzin par byed dam/ bde ba la ram / rigs kyi khyad par can gyi bde sogs pani" khyad par du byas pahi ba la sogs pa hdzin par byed par rigs hdzin (2) par byed / hgyur / 1) P. pas 1) P. rig Daa. (6) gal te re sig rigs tsam gal te rigs ran tsam hdzin na ni don (V...

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION (V... ...V) hdzin par byed pa yin na don / de las ran bsin hdzin ma yin (k. 1d) // sgra la sogs pa rnams kyi dbyibs tsam hdzin par byed pa nid yin na ni bde. ba la sogs pa rnams kyi ran bsin [7] nes par ma gzun bar thal bar hgyur tegan gi phyir sin tu gsal bar ma yin par dbyibs tsam dmigs na yul gyi ran bsin ma dmigs pa mthon no / (V... ...V) Dab.dbyibs tsam hdzin par byed. pa nid yin [8] na tha dad don mi hdzin (k. 2a, 1) sgra la sogs pahi khyad par hdzin pa med par hgyur ro // de ltar na pi wan gi sgra dan rnahi sgra ses bya ba de lta bu la rogs pa de lta buhi khyad par mi hdzin par hgyur te [104a, 1] de la dbyibs gsan med pahi phyir ro/ Dac. / don la // yid bsin rnam par rtog pa can (k. 2a, 2-2b) / ran gi don rigs khyad par can nam dehi khyad par hdzin pahi phyir ran gi yul la yid kyi hjug pa bsin du rnam [2] par rtog pa can du hgyur ro/ 1) P. om. double sad Dba. ci ste dbyibs kyi khyad par can gyi bde ba la sogs pa hdzin par byed pa de lta na yan gnas skabs der hgyur (k. 2c, 1) / yid kyi hjug pa bsin rnam par rtog pa can nid do ses bya bahi [3] don to / 5 (1... ...V).1) gyi ran bsin hdzin par mi hgyur te des ni dbyibs tsam hdzin pa yin pas na sgra la sogs pa rnams kyi bde ba la sogs pahi ran bsin ma nes par thal bar hgyur [3] ro / 1) Vk. 1d de las ran bsin hdzin ma yin. V) /dbyibs tsam hdzin pa nid yin no don gyi bye brag hdzin par mi hgyur te // gan gi phyir" dbyibs tsam gyi snan ba cun zad la dmigs kyi don yul gyi ran gi no bo la mi dmigs pas so // sgra la sogs pahi bye brag [4] kyan mi hdzin par hgyur ro // de bsin du pi wan gi sgra dan rahi sgra ses bya ba la sogs pahi bye brag kyan mi hdzin par hgyur te // der) dbyibs gsan mi srid pahi phyir ro / 1) D. om. 2) D. de (1... ...1) /don hdzin no se na yan yid bsin rnam par [5] rtog pa yin ran gi don khyad par can du byed na yan khyad par de hdzin pa na yid kyi hjug pa bsin du ran gi yul la rtog pa dan bcas par hgyur ro/ 1) Vk. 2a: hdzin nahan yid bsin rnam rtog hgyur. / ci ste bde ba la sogs pas khyad par du byas pahi dbyibs [6] hdzin na1 (2... ...2) ni de Ita na yan gnas skabs dehi / yid kyi hjug pa bsin du rnam par rtog pa nid do ses bya bahi don to3 / 1 D. om. 2) Vk. 2c, 1 gnas skabs der hgyur. 3) P. no

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MASAAKI HATTORI Dbb. bde ba la sogs pa hdzin pa na so so bar ham bsdus pa hdzin par byed / Dbb-al. de la re sig so so ba ndzin pa ma yin te / gan gi phyir ran gi yul la mnon du phyogs pa las dban po hjug pahi phyir sgra la sogs (4) pa gzun bar bya ba yin gyi / soin stobs sogs min (k. 2c, 2) / soin stobs la sogs pa so so ba ni sgra la sogs pahi ran bsin ma yin pa deni phyir de dag ni rna ba la sogs pani hjug pahi gzun bya ma yin no / 1) Kk.... shin stobs sogs (2c) // ma yin (2d), cf. p. 26, note 34). / bde ba la sogs pa yan so sor hdzin par byed dam / sdom pa yan hdzin par hgyur gran / de la re sig (7) so sor ni mi hdzin te / ran gi yul la hdzin pa la sogs pani dban poui hjug pa ni' sgra la sogs pahi gzun bar bya ba la yin gyi / soin stobs la sogs pala ni ma yin no // soin stobs la sogs pa dan sgra (8) la sogs pahi ran bsin so so ni ma yin no // deni phyir de dag rnams rna ba la sogs pahi hjug pahi gzun bar bya tha ma yin no / 1) Vk. 2c, 2-2, 1: soin stobs sogs // ma yin. (1... ++1) (V... (D.23a) (V. Dbb-a2./ (5) ma yin gsan ma yin / gsan min se na / soin stobs la pahi phyir (k. 2d) / gan gi phyir sgra sogs pa las gsan nid ni (23a, 1) ma la sogs pa rnams las soin stobs la yin te / de yan gzun bar bya yin nol) sogs pa gsan ma yin pa deni phyir sena / hbras min paham / gal te sgra la sogs pa bsin du de yan gzun snin stobs la sogs pa sgra las ggan ma bar bya ba yin te / gsan min se na yin na ni tha mi dad kyi lus kyi sgra hbras min (6) paham (k. 3a) / gal te la sogs pa hbras bu ma yin la / snin snin stobs la sogs pa rnams las sgra stobs (2) la sogs pa yan sgra la sogs la sogs pani nbras bu gsan ma yin pa paui rgyu ma yin par ugyur ro // soin des na tha dad pa med do // yan na stobs sgrahi ran bsin du rnam par soin stobs la sogs pa sgra la sogs pahi bsag par byas nas ni ses bya ba la rgyu ma yin par hgyur ro // (7) snin sogs pa gan brjod pa de yan hgal bar stobs!) nbras bu sgrar snan nas sgrahi hgyur ro // snin stobs la sogs pa (3) bdag nid du rnam par gnas pa na ses phan tshun tha mi dad de sgra la sogs bya ba la sogs pa gan smras pa de pa dan gcig pa nid du hgyur na ni dan hgal bar hgyur ro // rgyu dan tha mi dad kyi ran bsin yin pas rgyu hbras bu dag tha mi dad ran bsin yin dan hbras bu dag tu hdod pa la gnod pahi phyir snin stobs la [8] sogs pa do ses bya ba la sogs pa ni ham ses rnams ni phan tshun tha mi dad pa brtag pahi sgrahi don yin no / nid dam/ sgra du ma nid dam ses 1) P. om. D. inserts la after pa. rnam par brtags pahi don la ham gyi sgra yin no /

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 7 1) P. thams cad instead of snin stobs. Perhaps sattva was misread as sarva. 2) P. sgra Dbb-a3. / gsan yan / gsan min na yan gzun bya min (k. 3b) // gal te yan bdel ba la (104b, 1) sogs pa sgra la sogs pa las / gsan ma yin pa de Ita na yan deni rdul phra rab rnams kyan gzun bar bya bar ma gyur cig snam (2 .2) nas so so ba gzun bya ma yin no // de srid de tsam la sogs pahi tshig gi don gsan ma yin de [2] thams cad dban pohi don ma yin te hbras bu nid la sogs pa hdzin pa spyini yul can nid du thal bahi phyir te / de Itar re sig so so bar gzun ba ma yin no / 1) P. bde twice 2) P. so ba gsan yan / gsan nid (4) min na gzun bya min // gal te yan bde ba la sogs pa sgra la sogs pa las) gsan ma yin pa de Ita na ni so sor gzun bar bya bar mi hgyur la/ rdul phra rab kyan gzun bar bya mi ugyur la / rdul phra rab kyan gzun bar bya bar mi (5) hgyur sin de tsam la sogs pa yan no // gan don gsan ma yin pahi dban pohi yul de thams cad dban poni yul ma yin par hgyur ro // nbras bu nid la sogs par hdzin pa ni spyini yul can nid du thal bar hgyur bahi (6) phyir ro // de Itar na re sig so sor" mi hdzin to / 1) P. om. sad >> P. one sad 3) P. om. 4) D. inserts ni after sor. (1... -1) Dbb-bl. / ji ste bsdus pa hdzin to / ci ste sdoms pa la hdzin na ni de se na / de Ita na yan dban poui (3) Ita na yan dban po thams cad hjug hjug pa thams cad / sna tshogs rnam par hgyur te sna tshogs rnam par ro par hgyur (k. 3c, 1) te gzun bya tha // sna tshogs kyi rnam pahi gzun bya dad pa la tha mi dad pani ndzin pahi la tha mi dad pahi rnam par hdzin pa rnam pa ni ithad pa ma yin te deni ma yin te / deni dban gis gzun bar dban gis gzun bya yons su ma bcad bya ba yons su bcad pahi phyir ro // pahi phyir ro // sgra la sogs pa rnams sgra la sogs pa la tha mi dad par la [4] tha mi dad pa mthon ba yin hdzin pa yan mthon no / no / 1 Vk. 3c, 1: sna tshogs rnam hgyur. 1) Dbb-b2. / bde ba la sogs pahi yul / bde ba la sogs pahi yul nid kyan nid la dban po rnams / don mtshuns mtshuns par hgyur / dban po rnams nid (k. 3c, 1) / hgyur te dban po (8) kyi yul nid" mtshuns par hgyur ro rnams!) yul mtshuns par hgyur gyi / // dban po rnams ran gi yul la hjug ran gi yul la hjug pa nid du mi hgyur par mi hgyur te bde ba la sogs pa yul gyi / de yul gsan (5) la bde ba la gsan la rigs kyi bye brag yod pahi sogs pahi rigs tha mi dad pahi phyir phyir ro // de Ita na yan dban po

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MASAAKI HATTORI ro // des na dban po gcig nid du thal ba de nid du hgyur ro / 1) P. rnam gcig nid du thal bar (23b, 1) hgyur ro / 1) Vk. 3c, 2: don mthuns hgyur. 2) P. inserts du after nid. (V ... V ) ...V V .. 1) ) Dbb-b3. hon te dbyibs kyi khyad par can hdzin par byed do ses brjod pa ma yin nam se na / hdi smra ba yin nam (6) rigs par smras pa ma yin te / gan gi phyir / rjes hjug mi hdzin phyir (k. 3d, 1) / gan gi phyir gzugs kyi rigs gcig la dbyibs kyi khyad par du mas hdzin pa na dbyibs gcig rjes su hjug pa ni ma mthon no / 1 P. om. /" ma yin te ran ran gi dbyibs kyis khyad par du byas pa hdzin no? ses brjod do se na / de skad du ni brjod na rigs par ni mi brjod de/ gan gi phyir du mar hdzin phyir gzugs kyi rigs gcig la yan dbyibs tha (2) dad kyi sgo nas du mar hdzin par byed pa (D.23) yin gyi dbyibs gcig gi rjes su sugs nas hdzin pa ni ma mthon no / . 1) P. om. sad 2 P. to 3) P. ma 2) 4... ...4) Ea., de la dbyibs tha (7) dad pas / der dbyibs kyi tha dad las rigs rigs tha dad par hdod na dban po kyi tha dad hdod na ni de nid dban mthah yas par thal ba de nid yin no po thug pa med par thal bar hgyur ba // hdir yan / hgah sig / grans can (3) yin no // hdi la ni grans can gyi tha dad par hdod na (k. 3d,, -4a) / / bye brag la las mi hdod do 1/ snon grans can hjig par byed pahi mdo ni gyi) ser skya pahi lugs la hdas par smra snar gyi grans can gyi mnon par hdod ba grans can phun bar byed pahi ma (8) pas smras pa sgrahi mtshan nid rdum pa na re sgrahi mtshan nid gsum po rnams las reg bya la sogs pa gsum" las tha mi dad pa ma yin te. / gsum poui rigs can tha mi dad pahi rigs (4) gsan nid las ni ma yin pas reg mtshan nid can ma yin te / tha mi bya la sogs pahi mtshan nid gsum po dad pa rnams la dban po gsan gyis dban po tha dad gsan gyis gzun bar hdzin pa ni hthad pa ma yin no // hthad pa ma yin no //(r)) deni phyir dehi phyir bde ba la (105a, 1) sogs pa bde ba la sogs pa rnams la tha dad yod dban pohi yul rnams la rigs tha dad pas dban po rnams ran (5) ran gi yul pa yod pa yin te / gan gi dban du dban byed par brjod do // ran gi byas nas ran gi yul la hjug pa nid ni yul la hjug pahi dban po rnams la tha dban po rnams so ses brjod pa yin no mi dad paui ran gi bye brag yod pa // des ran gi khyad par rnams la tha yin pas dban po rnams thug pa med dad pa med pahi phyir dban po mthah par thal bar hgyur" ses zer ro / yas par thal bar yod pa (2) "yin no / 1) P. om. sad >> D. om. 3) D. om. sad 4) Vk. kha cig. D. om. la ) P. om. 1) P. om. double sad 2 P. inserts a sad 6) P. om. 7 D. inserts pa after gsum. after can. 3) P. ma yin no (V... (V...

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 9 8) P. one sad after ro o P. inserts double sad -V) Eb. / gal te yan bde ba la sogs pa dban poui rigs yul rnams rigs tha dad pa yan bsgrub par bya bahi phyir snar gyi grub mthah las hdah par byed pa des na / sin tu gsal bahi rigs pas kho bos (3) bsad par byaho // kun las rdul phran tha dad pa / re rehi no bo gtso bo yin (k. 4c-d) / bde ba dan sdug bsnal dan gti mug dan / sgra dan reg bya la sogs pa rigs kyi khyad par gyis tha dad pa thams cad du son bahi rdul [4] phra rab rnams gtso bo ses brjod par bya ste / yan dag sbyor bahi khyad par las // hbras buhi no bo mtshon par byed (k. 5a-b) // de Ita na ni sbyor bahi khyad par las ran gi rigs las ma hdas par nbras buhi ran bsin dban (5) po rnams kyi yul nid du rtogs par hgyur ro / ? gal te rigs kyi tha dad (6) las kyan bde ba la sogs pahi yul dban po nus par dan ldan par byaho ces snon ma rnams las khyad par du byed pa Ita na ni de bas kyan ches lhag par du kho bos smra bar bya ba nid de / re rehi no bo thams cad nis) // gtso [7] bord) rdul phran so sor yod // bde ba dan sdug bsnal dan gti mug dan sgra dan reg bya dan bya ba dag gis tha dad kyi rigs las tha dad pahi gtso bo rdul phra rab thams cad du son ba yod do ses brjod par byaho // rab tu (8) sbyor bahi bye brag las // nbras bu hi5) no bor mtshon par byed // de hdi Itar yan dag par rab tu sbyor bahi bye brag las ran gi rigs las ma hdas par nbras buhi no bor(r)) grub pa ni dban po rnams kyi yul du hgyur ro / 1) P. om. sad 2 D. Vk. bor 3) Vk. na 4) Vk. bo ) Vk. bu 6) bohi Ec. / rdul rnams no bo gsum nid na // hbras tha dad med ga la rtogs (k. 5c-d) // gan sgra las ges bde ba la sogs pa las ldog pahi tha mi dad pahi blo skye ba gan yin pa de tha dad pa du (6) maui ran bsin la ni mi rigs te | cihi phyir se na / sbyor yan rigs mi mthun pa dag // yons su hgyur bar mi hdod do (k. 6a-b) // gsum yan dag par sbyor bas gcig tu hgyur ba ni ma yin te / grans can (7) rnams kyi rigs tha dad pahi phyir gcig gi sgrahi brjod byar hgyur gyi ran bsin gcig ni ma yin no / (24a, 1) rdul phran gsum pohi ran bsin du 11 gcig deni no bora) gan gis hgro // gal te sgra la sgraho ses bde ba la sogs pa dan bral bahi tha mi dad kyi blo de don du mahi ran bsin tha mi dad pa yin par ni mi rigs te / cihi phyir (2) se na / rigs mi mthun las gyur pa yi // rab tu sbyor bar hdod ma yin // gsum po sbyors) ba las gcig tu gyur pa ni yod pa ma yin te / grans can rnams kyi rigs tha dad du hgyur pahi phyir ro // sgra gcig brjod pa ni (3) yod pa la rag las na dnos po gcig pa ni yod pa ma yin no/

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10 MASAAKI HATTORI (V... ...V) Ed. / ci ste yan sgra ran bsin gsum pa can la bde ba la sogs pa gan phyal ...V) baham hdzin par hdod pa de dban [8] pohi yul du hgyur te no bo gnis nid hdod med na // hbras la no bo gcig nid thob (k. 6c-d) // gal te rna bas sgra hdzin pa la bltos pa med par bde ba la sogs pa gan yan run ba la hdir blo (V... hjug pa yin na de nid ran (1056,1] bsin cig ses bya ba hthob bo // cihi phyir se na ran bsin man pohi dnos rnams lahan/ dban pohi don ni khyad par can (k. 7a-b) // du mahi ran bsin gyi sgra la sogs pa la yan dban pohi don gan kho na la blo hjug pa de nid (2) dban pohi blo yul yin la de yan gcig nid do // reg bya la sogs pa rnams la mtshuns pa ses bya ba de mi rigs so/ ...V) 1) Kk. la (V... Ee. dehi phyir grans can hdod spans nas // re rehi no bo nid mchog yin (k. 7c-d) // snon grags" pahi [3] grans can gyi Ita ba spans pa na hbras bu la rigs kyi khyad par re rehi ran bsin mchog yin te rgyu kho na ...V) brtag par bya ba ma yin no // de ltar na rigs mi mthun pa hbras bu mi 1) Vk. 5c-d: rdul phran ran bsin gsum nid na // hbras bu gcig par gan gis rtogs 2 P. bohi 3 P. om. double sad. 4) Vk. 6a-b: rigs mi mthun par sbyar na yan // yons su hgyur bar mi hdod do / 5) D. sbyar 6) P. la (V... /ci ste gsum pohi ran bsin du hgyur [D.24a) bahi sgra dan bde ba la sogs par gan brjod pa ses par hdod pahi ran bsin de dban pohi yul du hbyun bar hgyur ro V) 1) (2... 2) se na [4] tshul gnis ses par mi hdod na // hbras bu gcig gi na bor hgyur // gal te rna bas gsra nan pa la sogs pahi blo ni bde ba la sogs pa la mi Itos par gsan las khyad par du gyur (V... pa hdi la hjug par byed de" de [5] nid ...V) kho nas gcig gi ran bsin du hgyur ro // cihi phyir se na / don gyi ran bsin du ma ste" // dban pohi yul ni khyad par can // sgra la sogs pahi don gyis ran bsin du ma yod pa las ran bsin gan la blo hjug pa de [6] dban pohi don te/ de nid dban pohi yul yin no // de yan gcig kho na ste reg bya la sogs pa rnams la yan mtshuns pa") yin no // dehi phyir rigs pa ma yin no / (V... 1) D. te 2) Vk. 6c-d: no bo gnis nid mi hdod na // hbras bu no bo gcig nid thob / 3) P. pa yin no // 4) Vk. la 5) D. inserts ma before yin no. (1... 1) (V... /dehi phyir re rehi dnos po la //2 grans can lugs las khyad par hphags // [7] snon grags pahi grans can gyi lta ba las khyad par du hphags sin mchog tu gyur pa ni bden pa kho na ste rigs kyi bye brag gcig gi ran bsin can" gyi rgyu las hbras bu skye ...V) bar brtags pa ste de lta na ni rigs

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 11 rtsol ba hthad pa dan bcas (4) par hgyur ro // gsum po rnams gcig gi no bo nid la ni ma yin no / 1) P. grans mi mthun gyi hbras bu mi rtsom (8) mo ses mdzes par hgyur gyi/gsum gyi ran bsin gcig pa nid las ni ma yin no/ 1) Vk. 7c-d : deni phyir grans can lugs dor te // re rehi no bo nid mchog yin/ 2) P. one sad 3) P. one sad - D. tsam (10****.1) . F. /gal te yan sgra la sogs pa hdzin / gal te yan da ltar bahi sgra tsam pa tsam la dban pohi nes pa thjug pa ldzin par byed pahi dban poni hjug pa mnon sum yin pa de Ita na gsal bya thams mnon sum du hdod pa de Ita na ni!) cad kyi yul can gyi tshad ma ma (5) bstan yul gcig ma yin / gcal bar bya (24b, 1) ba par hgyur te / gan las se na / ma lus yul thams cad kyan yul ma yin pas3) tshad ma yin pa bsal bar hgyur ro // hjug la hjug pa yi // tshad ma mnon par ma pa de" (5) tshad mar brjod pa ma yin no brjod phyir // dban poui hjug pa yid // dban pohi thjug pa yan dag par myon kyis rig pa rtags?) la sogs pa med pas) bar byed pahi yid kyi dban po la ni yid kyi dban po de ni tshad mar ma rtags la sogs pa med pas) tshad (2) brjod pahi (6) phyir nun ba nid do // mar ma brjod pahi phyir nams pa nid dehi hjug pahi rig" pa ni tshad ma du hgyur ro // der hjug pahi yan dag gan yan run bar hdu ba ma yin no / par myon ba tshad ma gsan gyi khons 1) P. pahi, cf. Kk. 2 P. brtags 3) P. pa su hdu bar ni mi hgyur ro / 1) P. rigs. 1) D. om. sad 2) P. om. sad 3) D. pa 4) Vk. ste 5) D. om. sad 6) D. inserts a sad between pas and tshad. G./ nes pa de ni med de deni / nes pa de!) ni med de/ der sugs hjug pa rig" pa ni hdod pa la sogs pa pahi nams su myon ba ni dran pa ste bsin du' dran pa yin te / maon sum / hdod pa la (3) sogs pa bsin no // gyi? nes pahi khyad (7) par gyi dran gan ji skad du dran pa ni maon sum pa ni you pa yin no ses ji skad bsad gyi" hjug pahi bye brag go ses brjod pa Ita buho 11 deni phyir dban po do // dehi phyir dban pohi ses pa ni rnams ni phyi rol gyi don la mnon phyi rol gyi don la mnon sum ste / sum gyi ses pa yin la/ dban pohi - / dban pohi hjug pa dan bar du ma (D. 24b) hjug pa la ni de ma thag pahi yid chod pa yin no // dran (4) paho se na kyi dran pa 'yin no se na / dran dran min nams su mas) myon phyir // (8) pa ma yin ma myon phyir (k. 8c) bar ma chod) pahi yid ni dban pohi // dban poui hjug pani nes pa la de hjug pa hdzin par byed pahi dran par ma thag pahi yid kyi dran pa mi rigs rigs pa ma yin te?) / snar nams su te snar nams su ma myon bahi phyir ma myon bahi phyir ro / ro / 1) P. om. 2 P. gyis 3) P. phyir 4) Vk. 1 P. rigs 2 P. gyis 8c : dran pa ma yin ma myon phyir. b) P. mi 6) P. chad ) D. no // (3 . ...4

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12 MASAAKI HATTORI H. gni ga cig car hbyun se na (k. 8d) / dban pohi nes pa dan de1 nams su myon bahi [106a, 1] yid cig car mnon par gsal bar hgyur ro se na de Ita (V... na yan yul rgyu mtshan med pahi yul ...V) can du hgyur ro // de yan tshad min (k. 9a, 1) dban po myon bahi yid de yan tshad mar ma bsad pahi phyir [2] (V... hjug pa la tshad ma ma bsgrubs pas ...V) nun bahi gnas skabs de nid do // ran rig pa yin pahi phyir hdod pa la sogs. pa rnams la dran pa ges bya ba nes pa (V... ..V) med do // mnon sum gyi nes pahi dran pa la khyad par hdi yod [3] do ses bya ba hdi ni lon bahi spyod pa nid yin no / 1) P. des I. de lta na ni dban pohi don la yan de ma thag pahi dran pa mi srid deyid kyis nams su ma myon bahi phyir ro // yid kyis" phyi rol gyi don snar nams su myon ba ni med do // [4] gsan Ita la nams paham yan na dran pa yid (k. 9a, 2-9b) // dban pohi hjug pa nams su ma" myon bahi phyir dran pa nams su myon ba ham nams pa ses bya bahi ham gyi sgra ni rnam par brtag pahi don laho // ci ltar nams ses na [5] gal te phyi rol gyi don la dban po hjug pa dan lhan cig skyes pahi yid nams su myon bar hdod na / don gcig byed pahi dban po dag rtog pa la nus pa ma yin no ses gan bad pa de nams pa yin no / 1) P. kyi 2) P. om. (1... 1) / cig car gnis ka hbyun bar hgyur // [5] cig car ba yin na yan dban po ses pa dan de nams su myon bar bsal byed pahi yid gnis ka bar khas blans par hgyur ro // de lta (V... na ni yul gyi rgyu mtshan yul can la V) yod par hgyur ro // de ni tshad mahi3) dban [6] po nams su myon bahi yid de ni tshad mar ma brjod de des ni 4) (V... ...V) dehi gnas skabs la gugs pa po yan tshad mar ma brjod pahi phyir nams"> par rgyur ro // ran rig tu dod pa la sogs pa la nes pa med de" dran pa ses bya ba [7] ni lon bahi gom pa nid. de de yod pahi Ita na ni dran pa hdi mnon sum hdzin pahi bye brag go ses bya bar hgyur ro/ (V... ...V) 1) Vk. 8d: gnis ka cig car hbyun se na 3) Vk. min 4) P. des de 2) D. pos 6) D. inserts ni after la. 5) D. myans 7) D. do // 8) D. pa (3 3) / de Ita na yan bar ma chod pahi dban pohi yul hdzin na ni dran par mi hgyur teyid kyis nams su [8] myon bahi phyir ro // snar yid kyis phyi rol gyi don nams su myon ba ni2) med do // dran pa nams paham / dran pa yin nahan gsan mthon hgyur // dban pohi hjug pa tsam sig myon bahi phyir nams su ma myon ba ham dran pa [25a, 1] nams paham5) ses bya bahi ham" ses pahi sgra rnams rnam par brtag pahi don to // ji ltar nams par hgyur te phyi rol gyi don la dban pohi hjug pa dan lhan cig tu skyes pa yid kyis nams su myon ba hdod pa [2] (D. 24b) yin no se na gan ji skad du don gcig gis dban po gnis bskyed pahi nus pa ni brtag par mi nus so ses brjod

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 13 pahi phyir de ni nams pa nid do / 1) P. om. P. om. 3) Vk. 9a,2-9b: gsan Ita la // nams paham yan na dran pa yin / P. om. 5) D. pa 6) P. inserts a sad after ham. J. / gal te (6) nes pa hdi yod pa ma / nes pa de dag ni yod pa ma yin yin / dran pa lhag pani nes pa bstantel) / dran pahi yid lhaga) tu hdzin pahi don du lhan cig pa ses bya ba pani (3) ched du lhan cig kho nar skye bkag pa yin no // lhan cig pa grub pa ba bkag pa yin no%) // lhan cig par nid la ci phyi rol gyi don rnams la grub pa nid la ci phyi rol gyi don la dban po dan yid dag lhan cig nes par dban po dan yid dag gis lhan cig tu byed dam (7) ses nes pa la hdri ba ndzin byed dam ses hdzin lugs la brgal yin no // da Itar) bahi dus su dban te / gan gi tshe la lar dus gcig tu dban po hgah sig dan Idan pa gan gi tshe (4) dan Idan pahi yid hbyun no ses snar yid yin no ses tshig sna ma yod pahi brjod pahi phyir roce na / de Ita phyir ro se na / de Itar yan / don la na yan / dran pa lhag par brjod phyir dran pa lhag bsgrub na (k. 9c) / gal na // rnam bsal ) gal te dran pa te dran pa lhag pa sgrub (8) pahi don Thag par brjod par bya bahi phyir du phyi rol gyi don gyi yul la yid kyi phyi rol gyi don la yid dan lhan cig Ihan cig pa bkag pa yin pa de Ita na bkag pa yin na ni (5) de Ita na yan / ci ltar yan dban pohi ses pa la yid gan ji skad du hdi Itar dban pos gzun sen par byed pa ma yin la de bsin girjes la yid kyis hdzin par byed de / du yid kyi nes pas dban pohi don rig de Itar yid kyis gzun nas dban po ji Ita pa ma yin no ses bya (106b, 1) ba la ba bsin du rig par byed do ses bya ba sogs pa de dan hgal ba) (k. 9d, 1) yin la sogs pa brjod pa de rnam par bsal" no / ba yin no // (6) deni phyir phyi rol 1 P. Ita 2) Kk. te gyi don la dran pa hdi(r) yod pa ma yin no / 1) D. no // 2 D. rtag 3) P. te/ P. one sad 5) P. om. sad 6) D. inserts a sad after gi. 7 P. gsal 8 D. ni (D. 25a) K. / gal te yan yid" phyi rol gyi don la dnos su hjug pa de Ita" yin na / dban gsan mthon don med (k. 9d, 2) // phyi rol gyi don la dban (2) po gsan dag don med par hgyur te / yid kyis skyes bu la don ne bar bsdus pahi phyir ro / /gal te yid phyi rol gyi don la dros su hjug pa de Ita) na yan / dban gsan don med hgyur / dban po gsan rnams phyi rol gyi don la hjug pa don med par hgyur te / (7) skyes buhi don yid kyis sgrub pahi phyir ro /

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14 MASAAKI HATTORI de Itar yul gyi ran bsin nes par ma gzun bahi phyir grans can gyi mnon sum ni tshad ma ma yin no // deni phyir de Itar yul gyi ran bsin nes par gzun bar mi nus pahi phyir grans can gyi mnon sum tshad ma ma yin no // 1 P. Itar " P. inserts 1 P. inserts kyi after yid. na after lta. TRANSLATION WITH ANNOTATION A.1 The Samkhyas maintain that the operation (vrtti) of (senses, such as) auditory sense etc. is the perception (pratyaksa)" They say, "When auditory sense (srotra), tactual sense (tvac), visual sense (aksa), gustatory serise (jihva) and olfactory sense (ghrana), being controlled by the mind (manas), are operative respectively upon sound (sabda), tangible object (sparsa), shape (rupa), taste (rasa) and odour (gandha) in order to apprehend them, the operation (of each sense) is the perception as means of valid cognition (pratyaksapramana).") 1) Cf. J. 616,2-62b,3 (692,6 - 706,2). Folio number of Sde-dge edition is indicated first, and then that of Peking edition is given in brackets. Henceforth the same principle will be followed. 2) srotr'adi-vrttih pratyaksam, cf. Yuktidi pika, ed. by P. Chakravarti, p. 4.10, 39,18 SK (=Samkhya-karika) defines the perception differently as: prativisayadhyavasayo drstam (k. 5a). The definition referred to by Dignaga is ascribed by Vacaspatimisra to Varsaganya, a predecessor of Isvarakrsna, cf. NV, ad. I, i, 4 (p. 43,10): ... tatha srotr'adi-vrttir iti. NVTT, p. 155,20-23 Varsa ganyasya pi laksanam ayuktam ity aha-srotr'adi-vrttir iti. pancanam khalv indriyanam arth'akarena parimatanam alocana-matram vrttir isyate. Dr. E. Frauwallner, in his elaborative article "Die Erkenntnislehre des Klassischen Samkhyasystems," WZKSO, Bd. II, made a thoroughgoing examination of passages obviously quoted by Dignaga and Jinendrabuddhi from a certain Samkhya text, and proved that Dignaga's criticism was directed toward the Sastitantra of Varsaganya. By putting those passages in order, he reconstructed the portion of the Sastitantra where epistemological and logical problems are dealt with. 3) Cf. Simhasuri, Nyayagamanusarini, p. 107.44f (cf. Frauwallner, op. cit., S. 17): srotra-tvak-caksur.jihva-ghrananan manasa'dhisthita vrttih sabda-s parsa-rasa-rupa-gandh. esu yatha-kramam grahane vartamana pramanam pratyaksam. Jinendrabuddhi introduces Samkhya interpretations of this definition of perception. 'Manasa'dhisthita' is interpreted in two different ways. (a) It is expressive of that the mind, together with the sense (adhisthita=saha), operates upon the external object (manasmano-vrtti). (b) It means that the operation of the sense upon the external object is intellectualized through the operation of the mind. The operation (urtti) of the sense is either intellectual (sapratyaya) or unintellectual (a-pratyaya) according as it is accompanied by buddhi (intellect) or not. It is with a view to removing a pratyaya-vrtti that urtti is characterized as 'grahane var tamana'. Sabda ... gandhesu yatha-kramam' is indicative of that each sense operates upon its proper object, cf. J. 616,4 (666,1) ff. cf. also Frauwallner, op. cit., S. 21 ff.

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 15 Ba.) If their (theory of perception should be accepted,) there must be infinite number of sense-organs. They are of the opinion that each sense-organ operates upon its proper object, for the object to be apprehended by other sense does not come within its range. (In sofar as all objects are equally composed of three gunas, as is held by the Samkhyas, they are essentially not distinguished from each other. Accordingly,) the distinction between (five) classes (jati) of (object, i. e.,) sound etc. is, (accoding to the Samkhyas,) solely due to the increase (upacaya) and decrease (apacaya) of three gunas. (This theory, however, is not without involving difficulties. Although) the sound, (for instance,) is thought to be a single existence (as the object of the auditory sense), there must be, according as (three) gunas increase and decrease, infinite (varieties of sound, such as seven musical notes and the like, inasmuch as these all are recognized as being composed of three gunas.) Hence, one who apprehends the object (through his senses) must necessarily be in possession of infinite number of sense organs, (each of which apprehending its proper object.) Bb.Or, only one sense-organ (would be sufficient to apprehend all kinds of object). (The Samkhyas may assert as follows:-) "In that case, (i. e., in case of apprehending various sounds, such as seven musical notes and the like, all sounds) being equally (composed of) three gunas, are grouped under one and the same (sound-) class, (thus being apprehended alike through the auditory sense)." On this assumption, however, not only various sounds but also tangibles and other objects would be apprehended (through one sense-organ, because these also are similarly composed of three gunas). Consequently, only one senseorgan (would apprehend all sorts of object, and other sense-organs would be useless). Despite that there are various objects, three gunas, of which they are composed, remain the same. (In vidication of their theory, the Samkhyas may state the following :-"We need not presume that the number of sense-organ is limited according as the number of object is definitely 4) Cf. J. 62b,3 - 63a,1 (706,2-8). 5) Jinendrabuddhi makes reference to the following Samkhya reasoning: The deaf person, whose auditory sense-organ is defective, is unable to hear sound, although he keeps other nine organs (four buddhindriyas and five karmendriyas) in good condition. This fact proves that the sound is apprehended only through the auditory sense-organ and not through any other, cf. J. 62b, 4 (70b, 2-3): ji skad du bsad pa "hon pas dban po dgu rnams yod pa na / sgra mi thos te / dehi phyir rna ba kho na sgrahi yul can te / hdis pags pa la sogs pa rnams ran gi yul hjug par rtogs par byaho" ses so / 6) Both triguna and visaya are predicated, along with other attributes, to vyakta in SK, k. 11. Cf. Yogabhasya, ad. IV, 13: sarvam idam gunanam sannivesa-visesamatram iti paramarthato gun'atmanah. 7) Cf. J, 63a, 1-7 (70b, 8--71a, 7).

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16 MASAAKI HATTORI limited. A certain number of sense-organs are produced so that purusa may achieve its own purpose therewith.8) If one sense-organ were sufficient for the purpose of purusa, then only one sense-organ would have evolved from prakrti. That the number of sense-organ is limited to five is solely due to that purusa accomplishes its purpose with five sense-organs. Each of senseorgans, thus evolving from prakrti, is endowed with a definite character, and operates upon its proper object alone. Hence the auditory sense operates upon the sound only and not upon other objects, and other senses act in like wise.") This theory, however, does not hold good.] There is no sound-class which is different from three gunas and which is indwelling in all sounds but not in tangibles and other objects. As all objects are equally pervaded by three gunas, [there is no radical discrimination between sounds and tangibles. Accordingly, it is impossible that a sense operates upon the sound alone and not upon other objects.] Ca.10) [The Samkhyas may argue :-) "Why [is it asserted that three gunas do] not [vary with objects]? [Objects are] discriminated from each other according as sattva etc., [of which they are composed,] are differently arranged. [On the other hand, various sounds included in] the same sound-class are of similar shape, [that is to say, three gunas composing them are shaped alike, and this shape of sound] is distinguished from [those of] tangibles and other objects.12 We thus maintain that the sound-class inclusive of all] homogenous [sounds] is the object upon which the auditory sense operates. So with tangibles and other objects. Accordingly, no such fault as pointed out by you above is to be found with us." Granted that their argument is plausible in a way, there arises, in consequence of this argument, another difficulty that] both the visual sense and the tactual sense would have the object in common, (V... ...V) 8) SK, k. 31c-d: purusartha eva hetur na kenacit karyate karanam. ibid., k. 21: purusasya darsanartham kaivalyatham tatha pradhanasya pangv-andha-vad ubhayor api samyogas tat-krtah sargah // 9) Cf. J. 63a,3-6 (71a,3-6). 10) Cf. ibid., 63a, 7-63b,5 (71a,7-71b,6). 11) dbyibs samsthana, akara, rupa. 12) Jinendrabuddhi quotes the following passages from a Samkhya treatise: smras te "dbyibs kyi bdag nid can gyi rigs ni yod pa kho na ste/ yon tan gsum tha mi dad na yan yon tan gsum gyi gnas skabs tsam tha dad pa las sgra la sogs pahi rigs rnams tha dad do"// de skad du yan bsad pa "sgra dan reg bya dan gzugs dan ro dan dri ste Ina rnams ni / bde ba dan sdug bsnal dan gti mug gsum po rnams kyi nes par bkod pahi bye brag rnams so" ses paho cf. J. 63a,7--63b.1 (71a,7-71b,1). Briefly speaking, three gunas are variously arranged into shapes, so that sound-class etc. are distinguished from each other by their shapes. However, objects included in the same class are of the same shape, because three gunas composing them are equally arranged.

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 17 (16 ...16) because the shape is apprehended through two (senses). It is commonly known that we apprehend the shape, such as long and the like, through tactual sense as well as visual sense. Hence, (the Samkhya argument that a certain shape of object is apprehended through the sense is) incompatible with their theory) that each sense-organ operates upon its proper object.13) Cb.14) Further, (if the above argument should be accepted, the sound etc., would not be apprehended through the auditory sense etc., because a shape is not in the range of three (sorts of sense-organ). A shape is apprehensible only through two senses, visual and tactual, and) is not found to be apprehended through (three other senses,) auditory, olfactory and gustatory. Accordingly, (objects of these three, i. e.,) sound, odour and taste would not be recognized as being direct to the sense (pratyaksa). Cc.15) If classes (of object) should be distinguised from each other by their shapes, then various shapes, (such as "long', 'short' and the like,) would be regarded as one and the same object. (According to the above argument put forward by the Samkhyas, the sound of vina, of tambour and all other sounds would be equally apprehended through the same auditory sense, as they alike are within the extent of sound-class.17) It, therefore, follows that) there are various specified existences (of different shape), each being not beyond the extent of the class of a certain object. The consequence of this argument will be that various shapes, (such as long', 'short' and so on) should, (irrespective of their specific features,) be treated as the same object. (This conclusion, however, will not be approved of even by the Samkhyas themselves. Hence, the above argument of the Samkhyas is deemed to be violative of the thought assented by them (abhyupagama-virodha)]. Cd.18) (Again, if classes of object should be distinguished from each other by their shapes, then) spoons, ornaments etc. of the same shape, whether they are made of gold, silver or any other material,]19) would be without distinction. 13) Cf. above note 3) and Ba. . 14) Cf J. 63b, 5-7 (71b, 6-8). 15) Cf. ibid., 63b,7-64a, 1 (716,8-72a,2). 16) V puts this passage at the beginning of Cb. However, K has been adopted here, as J is in accord with it, cf. J, 635,7 (716,8). 17) J. 63b,7 (716,8-72a,1): pi wan dan rna pa na wa la sogs pahi sgraui rigs phan tshun tha dad pa rnams ni sgrahi rigs las ma hdas par gnas pa nid kyi phyir yul mtshuns pa nid du hgyur ro.. 18) Cf. J, 64a,1-5 (72a, 2-7). 19) K: gser la sogs pahi skyogs dan rgyan la sogs pahi .. is liable to be taken as meaning the identity of golden spoon and golden ornament. If this interpretation should be accepted, the point of argument would be identical with Cc. V: gser la sogs pahi sk yogs rnams dan rgyan rnams kyi ... has been adopted.

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MASAAKI HATTORI (In answer to this criticism, the Samkhyas argue :-"It may not be erring to say that all things are of the same shape in their states of tanmatra (subtle element of object). However, when gross objects, such as golden ornament and the like, evolve from tanmatras, there must be clear distinction between these objects."20) This statement does not constitute a proper answer. According to the Samkhya theory, the effect (karya) is immanent in the cause (karana) prior to the evolution (parinama), both effect and cause being thus essentially indiscriminate from each other. Hence, gross objects, such as golden ornament and the like, must be of the same shape as they were in the state of tanmatras, from which they evolved. Further,) gold etc. would be recognized as being identical with sound etc., because they are indiscriminately shaped (before evolving from tanmatras.21) If the distinction between objects should be neglected) in this way, then the conclusion would be that (each senseorgan) does not operate upon its proper object. (Needless to say, this conclusion is inconsistent with what has been stated by the Samkhyas.) D.22) (Inasmuch as it is maintained that classes of object are distinguished from each other according as three gunas are differently arranged, we may well regard gunas as distinguishing qualifiers (vise sana) of the class of object, which as opposed to the former is deemed to be the qualified (visesya). Therefore, two alternatives are thinkable as regards the apprehension of object through the sense. That is to say,) when a sense operates (upon its object), it grasps23) either a mere (appearance of) the class of object or its distinguishing qualifiers, i. e., sukha (pleasure), (duhkha (pain) and moha (delusion) as natures of three gunas). 24) Daa.25) If, anyhow, the sense should be thought to operate upon the class 20) Cf. J, 64a,3-4 (72a,4-5). SK, k. 38: tanmatrany avisesah tebhyo bhutani ... ete smrta visesah ... Those which come within the range of sense-organ are gross elements (maha-bhuta) resulted from elements (bhuta), which again are produced according to varying combinations of tanmatras, cf. STK (=Samkhya-tattvakaumdi). ad. k. 22Gross elements are characterized as visesah, as they are distinguishable as pleasurable, painful or delusive objects according as sattva, rajas or tamas is predominant in them. On the other hand, tanmatras are avisesah, because we cannot notice distinction between them. 21) The implication of V: gser dan snin stobs dan rdzas la sogs pa rnams kyan mtshuns par hgyur ro' is not quite clear. 22) Cf. J, 64a,5-6 (72a, 7-726,1). 23) K: hjug par hdzin par..., but hjug par seems to be unnecessary, because we read 'dban po hjug na' preceding these words. Both V and I read simply * dzin par...' 24) SK, k. 12: prity-a priti-visad'atmakah ..... gunah. STK, ad. k. 12: pritih sukham prity-atmakah sattva-gunah, a pritir duhkham aprity-atmako rajo-gunah. visado mohah visadatmakas tamo-guna iti. 25) Cf. J. 64a, 6-646,2 (72b,1-4).

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 19 as such (of an object), then it would not apprehend the characteristic feature (svarupa) of that object. In case merely the appearance (akara) of the sound (-class) etc. should be apprehended (through the operation of the auditory sense etc.), the specific features of qualifiers, i. e.,) sukha etc., (by dint of which a class of object is distinguished from others), would not be distinctly apprehended, and the erroneous conclusion that the perceptual apprehension is no other than the mere indistinctive cognition) would follow. (To give an instance, when we perceive merely a cow-like appearance in the twilight and do not perceive marks distinguishing a cow from other things, we are not able to get the determinate knowledge that the object seen is a cow.28) Similarly,) it is found that when we apprehend indistinctly the appearance of an object and do not apprehend its distinguishing qualifiers,) we are unable to apprehend the characteristic feature of the object. Dab.27) (Again,) if the sense) should grasp the appearance of the class of object) alone, it would not apprehend the difference between objects (included in the same class). Different (sounds etc., which are equally included in) the sound (-class) etc. would not be apprehended through the operation of the sense). In such a case, the sense would not be subservient to apprehend the difference between, for example, the sound of vina and that of tambour (dindima), because no difference of appearance is to be found between them, inasmuch as all sounds are apprehended merely in their common appearance. Dac.28) (The following might be stated by the Samkhyas :-"Simultaneously with the operation of the sense upon the sound-class, each specified sound is also apprehended as one qualified (visista) by the class. Accordingly, the criticism that the sense, which grasps the class only, would be inapprehensive of different objects included in the same class is not deemed to be apposite to the case. The statement that merely the class of object is apprehended through the sense was made solely with a view to rejecting the theory that sukha etc. are apprehended through the sense. It was not meant for denying the fact that various things qualified by a class are apprehensible." This vindication again is not exempted from our criticism. If this theory should be approved of, then the sense) would, like the mind (manas), be possessed of the faculty of thought-construction (vikalpa) when operating upon its object. The sense, apprehending its own object qualified by the class29) and its difference (from 26) Cf. ibid., 645.1 (72b,3). 27) Cf. ibid., 64b,2-3 (72b,4-5). 28) Cf. ibid., 64b,3-7 (72,6-73a,3). 29) Both K and V are not quite readable. The translation is based upon J. 64b, 5 (726,8): rigs kyis (P. kyi) khyad par du byas pa dan ...

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MASAAKI HATTORI other objects), would be capable of apprehending its own object through the conceptual construction, as is the case with the operation of the mind.30) Dba.31 (Now the second alternative as regards the sensory apprehension of the object should be examined.) If, (unlike the above theory,) it should be maintained that sukha etc. as distinguishing qualifiers of the appearance of the class of object) are apprehensible through the operation of the sense, then again that circumstance would follow. That is to say, (the operation of the sense) would be thought-constructive like the operation of the mind. Dbb.32) In sofar as the sense is thought to be subservient to apprehend natures of sukha etc., it must apprehend them either separately or in unity. Dbb-a1.33) Among (two) cases (just mentioned above, the first one does not appear probable.) The sense is not, at any rate, effective to apprehend each (of three gunas). It, operating upon its object, certainly is capable of apprehending sound etc., but no one of sattva, (rajas and tamas) is possible to be grasped by it.34) (As the sound is composed of three gunas, i. e.,) sattva etc., (each of these three) is not to be regarded as the sound itself. So with the tangible and other object. Hence, each of three gunas is not the object to be grasped through the operation of the auditory sense etc. Dbb-a2,35) (The Samkhyas assert as follows :-"The above argument) is not (persuasive), because we hold that three gunas) do not differ (from the sound etc.)" Sattva etc., they opine, being not different from sound etc., are possible to be apprehended (through the operation of the sense) in the same way as sound etc. (are apprehended therethrough. However, this opinion also is subject to our criticism.) Should it be maintained that three gunas do not essentially differ from sound etc.), the conclusion would possibly be that (sound etc. are not 30) If the sense itself has the faculty of thought-construction, it need not be accompanied by the mind (manasa'dhisthita). Hence, the above interpretation is inconsistent with the Samkhya definition of perception, cf. above note 3). 31) Cf. J, 646,7 (73a,3). 32) Cf. ibid., 65a,1 (73a,3-4). 33) Cf. ibid., 65a, 1-4 (73a,4-8). 34) According to Kk and Vk, k. 2c-d is : ... soin stobs sogs // ma yin gsan ma yin pahi phyir/ K interprets 'ma yin' once as the negation of the apprehensibility of sattva etc. (soin stobs sogs min) and again as the word of dissent from the side of the Samkhyas (ma yin, gsan ..., cf. Dbb-a2). V interprets 'ma yin' only in the first sense, and puts the first half of k. 3a in place of k. 2d at the beginning of Dbb-a2. Jinendrabuddhi seems to be in support of K, cf. J. 65a, 3 (73a, 6-7): 'ma yin' ses pa la sogs pa ste / Ina rnams gsum gyi bkod pahi khyad par inams ses khas blans pahi phyir hdi yod pa ma yin no / and ibid., 65a, 4-5 (732,8) :'ma yin ste / gsan ma yin pa nid kyi phyir' ses pas ... 35) Cf. J. 65a, 4-65b,5 (73a,8-74a,2).

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 21 recognized as effects of three gunas. According to the Samkhya doctrine, sensible objects, such as sound etc., are to be reckoned as effects (karya) of three gunas, which in their original forms are very subtle and imperceptible.36) Now,) if (three gunas, i. e.,) sattva etc. should be considered to be no other than sound etc., these latter, being effects indistinguishable (from three gunas), 37) would not be regarded as effects, while sattva etc. would not deserve to be called causes. This consequence, however, is inconsistent with the following statement of the Samkhyas, which they put forth with a view to proving that sattva etc. are considered as causes of sound etc. :-) "With the explanation that sattva manifests itself as the effect apprehensible as the sound, it is established that sattva is) the essence of sound, (or that the sound is sattvic,) "38) and so on. Further, inasuch as cause and effect are of indistinguishable nature, (the sound is as well identical with rajas or tamas according as it is rajasic or tamasic. The conclusion, therefore, will be) either that sattva, (rajas and tamas) are identical with each other or that the sound itself is differentiated into many (in accordance with sattva etc. being discriminated from each other.) It was in view of taking, on this wise, (some alternatives) into consideration that we used the term possibly' in the above passage: " the conclusion would possibly be that sound etc. are not recognized as effects (of three gunas)." 36) SK, k. 34 states that five sense-organs have both subtle elements and gross elements for their objects, buddhindriyani tesam panca visesavisesa-visayani, STK, ad. k. 34: visesah sthulah sabd'adayah santa-ghor a-mudhah prthivy-adi-rupah, avisesas tanmatrani suksmah sabd'adayah. Subtle elements are perceived only by the sage, and are imperceptible to normal senses. In gross elements which comes within the range of normal senses, natures of three gunas are distinctly manifested. For example, the wind (vayu) is pleasurable (sukha) or sattvic for the man suffering from heat, painful (duhkha) or rajasic for the man suffering from cold and stupefying (moha) or tamasic when it raises heavy dust, cf. Gauda pada-bhasya and Mathar a-vrtti, ad. k. 38. As sound etc. are of the nature of gross elements, they are recognized as manifestations of three gunas, and in this respect we may regard three gunas as causes (karana) and sound etc. as their effects (karya). 37) V: tha mi dad pasi lus kyi sgra. Perhaps karya was misread as kaya. The word corresponding to it is found neither in K nor in J. 38) Jinendrabuddhi quotes the following passage from a Samkhya text: 'gan brjod pa' ses pa la sogs pas ni rgyu nid du khas blans pa gsuns te / "snin stobs sgrahi hbras bur bsad nas sgrahi bdag nid du gnas pas ni / rdul dan mun pa dag sgra las byun bahi ched du hjug par thchad par byed do // rdul sgrahi hbras bur bsad nas ses pa la sogs pa thams cad sna ma bsin no // hdi ni khyad par te / rdul gyis snin stobs dan mun pa dag sgrahi dnos pohi ched du hjug par byed do // mun pa ni snin stobs dan rdul dag sgra la yod pahi ched du rnam par hjog par byed do" ses paho / cf. J. 65a, 7-65b,1 (73b, 3-5). K: thams cad hbras bu sgra snan nas... 'thams cad' (=sarva) is obviously the misrendering of sattva (=snin stobs).

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22 MASAAKI HATTORI Dbb-a3.39 Moreover, if [three gunas] were not different [from sound etc., then each guna] would not be apprehended [through the operation of the sense). In case [the Samkhyas stick to their theory of the effect being immanent in the cause and still maintain that] sukha etc. do not essentially differ from sound etc., [then they shall be charged with another difficulty.] As the atom of sound,40 [which, like gunas, do not essentially differ from the hearable sound evolved thereform], is considered [by the Samkhyas] to be insensible, each guna also would not be apprehended [through the operation of the sense). In the meanwhile, [sound-]tanmatra,41) [ahamkara, mahat, prakrti, etc.,42) which, inasmuch as appearing in the process of evolution,] are not different entities from the sound, do not come within the range of the [auditory-] sense, [despite that the sound itself is heard through the sense.] If it is maintained that [the sound] is recognized [through the sense] as the effect of these entities, then would follow [the absurd conclusion] that the sense has the universal (samanya) for its object,43) [because, in that case, the sense is thought to be capable of] apprehending [the relation of cause and] effect [or that of qualifier and qualified]. In this way, [it has,] anyhow, [been proved] that each [of three gunas] is not apprehended [through the operation of the sense). Dbb-b1.44) If, on the other hand, it should be maintained that [three gunas] are apprehended in unity [through the sense), then every [apprehension resulted from] the operation of the sense would be with various phases (nana. akara). Inasmuch as the object is [composed of sukha, duhkha and moha possessing] their respective [phases,] the apprehension cannot be of a single phase. Because, the apprehension [with a single phase] is impossible to determine the object [with various phases). It, [however,] is found that the [sensory) apprehension of sound etc. is of a single phase. [Accordingly, the 39) Cf. J, 65b,5-7 (74a,2-4). 40) ibid, 65b,6 (74a,2): dehi rdul phra rab' ces pa sgrahi rdul phra rab bo. Five kinds of tanmatra are thought to be composed of their respective atoms, cf. Yogabhasya, ad. IV. 14: prthivi-paramanus tanmatravayavah. 41) J, 65b,5-6 (74a,2-3): de tsam la sogs paham' ses pa sgra de tsam la sogs paho. 42) ibid., 65b,6 (74a,3): sogs pa' hi sgras na rgyal dan chen po dan gtso bo gzun bar byaho. All of these are composed of three gunas and stand in vyakta-avyakta (or karya-karana) relation one after another. 43) According to Dignaga, the universal is apprehended by means of inference only, and the sense-perception is never concerned with the universal, cf. PSV, ad. I, k. 2. M. Hattori, Dignaga's Theory of Direct Knowledge, Bulletin of the University of Osaka Prefecture, Ser. C, Vol. 7 pp. 6-7. 44) Cf. J, 65b,7-66a,2 (74a,4-7).

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 23 (V... object must not be composed of many phases, and the theory that three gunas are apprehended in unity through the sense should be discarded.]45) Dbb-b2.46) (Again,) should sukha etc. in unity be the object, the object would be common to different senses. That is to say, different senses would operate upon a common object, and the Samkhya doctrine that) every sense operates upon its proper object would be violated; for sukha etc. in different objects are of the same kind. Consequently would follow the same wrong conclusion as said before that only one sense-organ (would be sufficient to apprehend all kinds of object).17) Dbb-b3.48) (The Samkhyas may state :--"Our doctrine is) free from such fault. (We do not maintain that three gunas in every object are of the same kind). We said (that classes of object, such as sound-class and the like, which are) distinguisued from each other in accordance with the difference of the shape (made of gunas), were to be apprehended (through the operation of senses),49) wasn't it?" Indeed, you said like that, but what you said does not prove rightful. Because, (in that case,) the conformity (anuvidhana) (of the sense to the shape of the object]50) would not be comprehended. If (the visual sense, for instance, operating upon) one and the same colour-class, should apprehend it variously in accordance with the difference of shape (between blue, yellow and so on), then it would be impossible to find the conformity Cof the sense) to the shape of a certain class of object. Ea.51) Now, if it should be maintained that the distinction between classes of object, such as sound-class etc.), is due to the difference of the shape of triguna), then would follow the same consequence (as stated at the beginning that there must be infinite number of senses.52) A certain Samkhya teacher holds the view that (shapes of triguna) differ according to classes of object. In the treatise . ) 45) Jinendrabuddhi summarizes the above argument in the follwing syllogism: (pratijna): The apprehension of sound etc. is not related to the object with various phases. Chetu): Because it is of a single phase. (drstanta): Whatsoever is of a single phase is not related to the object with various phases. This is a vya paka-viruddho palabdhi (affirmation of something incompatible with a fact of greater extension). 46) Cf. J, 66,2 (74a,7). 47) Cf. above Ba. 48) Cf. J. 66a, 2-4 (74a, 7--74b,2). 49) Cf. above Ca. 50) Some Samkhya teachers are of the opinon that the sense-organs are modified into the shape of that object from which they receive the particular impression, cf. Yuktidi pika, p. 108,9: indriyani samskara-visesa-yogat parigrhita-rupaniti kecit. 51) Cf. J, 66a, 4-67a, 1 (74b, 2-75a, 8). 52) Cf. above Ba.

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MASAAKI HATTORI of (Madhava]") who stands against the traditional Samkhyas, the following is stated with an allusion to the old Samkhya theory :-("The old Samkhya theory that) three qualities composing the sound are not different from those composing the tangible and the rest is not deemed to be valid.54) Because it does not stand to reason that objects of the same constitution are grasped by different senses. (The old theory would thus be led to the conclusion that one sense-organ is possible to operate upon all sorts of object.) It, accordingly, is better to consider that the distinction between classes of object is due to (the difference of the shape of triguna. To give a full explanation, an atom contains) sukha etc., (and thus the aggregation of many atoms, which) becomes mani. fested as the object of sense, (is recognized as being composed of three gunas However, sukha etc. in the sound-atom and those in the tangible-atom and the rest are not similarly arranged, and, in consequence, the sound etc., though being equally composed of three gunas, are distinguished from each other because of the difference of the shape made of triguna. For this reason,) it is stated that the sense is operative upon its proper object." That which has been referred to above in the verse is this (Madhava's theory].55) Should his theory be accepted, various objects included in) the same (class) must be distinguished constitutionally from each other according to varying permu V V 53) K: grans can hjig par byed pa. V: grans can phun bar byed pahi ma rdum pa. 'ma rdum pa' (P. ma rdum) is possibly a wrong transliteration of Madhava. Jinendrabuddhi gives a full explanation of the Madhava's theory which differs from the elder Samkhya theory, and lastly says: Ma dha ba yis ni thams cad rnam pa gsan du khas blans so // de nid kyi phyir hdi ni grans can phun bar byed paho / cf. J, 666.6-7 (752,6). It is reported by Hiuen-tsang that Madhava was challenged by Gunamati for a debate and was defeated, cf. Ta-tang-hsi-yu-chi (P d). Taisho LI, p. 913c ff. As Madhava was very old when the debate was held, he must have been an elder contemporary of Gunamati, whose date can be assigned to ca. 460-520 A. D. Cf. Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, I Bd., S. 280, 407 ff. P. Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Samkhya System of Thought, p. 154-5. 54) Both K and V seem somewhat defective and give no clear idea with regard to the difference of opinion between elder Samkhyas and MadhavaThe translation is helped by the following explanation of Jinendrabuddhi: ser skya pa sna ma rnams ni thams cad du bde ba la sogs pa nams no bo gcig pa kho na ste / ma dhu (=dha) ba ni / thams cad du de rnams tha dad par hdod do / cf. J, 66,5-6 (746,4). 55) J. 66a,6-66b,4 (74b,4-75a 2) is probably a quotation from an unknow treatise of Madhava. On the basis of this source, we may interprete Madhava's theory as follows: -Every atom is composed of three gunas, but some atoms differ qualitatively from others because of the difference of the arrangement of three gunas. Thus the soundatom and the tangible-atom are heterogeneous, and the difference between the sound and the tangible is due to this heterogeneity of atoms. At the time of evolution, homogeneous atoms combine themselves together, and their varying combinations give rise to various things, which, however, are included in the same class so far as component atoms are homogeneous. Prior to evolution, atoms exist dispersedly and, in this state, they are called pradhana.

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 25 (58... ...58) (V... V tations of atoms,]36) and there must be infinite number of senses. Eb.57) (Indeed, Madhava's theory is considered to be) superior to the old (Samkhya) doctrine inasmuch as propounding that sukha etc. vary in kind with classes of sense and object, but we shall state (our interpretation of his theory) with much lucidity. Each atom is of a definite nature : (sukha-atom, duhkhaatom etc., sound-atom, tangible-atom etc., atom of auditory sense, that of tactual sense etc. are essentially different from each other in nature. At the time of evolution, homogeneous atoms aggregate and become manifested as objects and senses. However, prior to evolution) they exist dispersedly and, in this state,) they are called pradhana (primordial matter).59) Sukha, duhkha and moha or sound, tangible etc., (when evolving from atoms,) are distinguished from each other in accordance with the difference of class, and atoms which are capable of becoming all of these [by combining themselves together) are called pradhana80) (in the state prior to evolution. Various) effects are produced according as (atoms are differently combined (samprayoga-vicesa). Thus in accordance with varying combinations of atoms, various objects, which are not beyond the extent of a certain class, Care produced, and these effects are recognized as objects of senses). Ec.61) (However, Madhava is of the opinion that each atom is not of one nature but is composed of three gunas.62>) In case an atom should be possessed of three natures, how could we recognize the effect, (which is the aggregation of atoms,) as being of one (nature)? (For example,) when the sound is heard, the cognition produced is of a single phase as is expressed by words: 'this is sound' and it lacks (three different phases, such as) sukha etc. But the cognition of a single phase cannot be produced when the object is of various 56) J. 665.1 (746,7): sgra so so la gsum po gsan dan gsan yin cin / dehi phyir na gsum po rnams man po nid kyi phyir man poni tshig go / cf. n. 55). 57) Cf. ibid., 67a, 1-67b.2 (75a,8-76a,2). 58) Both K and V are unreadable, and I gives no explanation. The above translation has been given provisionally. 59) While Madhava maintains that each atom is composed of three gunas, cf. J, 66b, 2-4, herein the atom is said to have one definite nature. In other points, the above interpretation dose not essentially differ from Madhava's theory, cf. above n. 55) and below Ee. 60) Cf. J. 67a, 4-5 (75b,4-5): rdul phra rab kyi rdzas gcig kho na thams cad du son ba yod pa ma yin gyi/hon kyan rdul phra rab de rnams kho na grans med pa rnams thams cad du yod la/ rigs gcig pa can ni de rnams kyi gtso bo ses br jod par byed par hgyur ro ses ston to / 61) Cf. ibid., 675,2-682,3 (76a, 2-766,5). 62) Cf. ibid., 666,2 (746,8): sgrahi rdul phra rab gcig kho na gum po ste / rdzas gsum gyi bdag nid yin te / See above n. 55) and 59).

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26 MASAAKI HATTORI phases. Why? Because, heterogeneous Catoms], even if conjoining together, are not recognized as being able to transform themselves (parinama) [into an effect). Three (heterogeneous atoms] cannot be united, for, according to the Samkhyas, they essentially differ in kind. Even if they all are expressed by one and the same term 'atom' (paramanu), their natures are different, [as for instance sugar juice and water are different although they are equally called 'drink' (pana)]. Ed.63) [The following might be argued by Madhava:- "The above criticism is not in place at all. We do not hold that three atoms of different natures are united together. Atoms are equally composed of three gunas, but they are classified in accordance with different arrangements of three gunas. Then some homogeneous atoms are combined together and become manifested as the sound etc., and these latter possess three natures: Such being the case,] the manifested object which is composed of three gunas is defined as sound on the one hand, and as sukha etc. on the other. The object of sense is nothing else than the entity of such sort." [This thought also is not exempted from our criticism.] As [an effect) is not to be admitted as possessing two natures, only one nature is grasped [when a sense operates] upon it. In case the auditory sense were operative, in disregard of the sound, upon any one of sukha etc., then, under this very circumstance, [the object] might ...V) well be said to possess only one nature. For, although things are possessed of various natures, one which is deemed to be the object of the sense is discriminated from others. Although sound etc. are possessed of various natures, such as sabda-tva, guna-tva, sukha-tva and the like, the apprehension is concerned merely with that which becomes the object of the sense. This alone is deemed to be the real object of the sensory apprehension, and it is [of] one [nature]. [To cite an instance, when a little amount of barley flour is mixed up with much salt, the olfactory sense has only the taste of salt for its object.] The same is the case with tangibles and other objects. Accordingly, [the theory that an effect is defined as sound on the one hand and as sukha etc. on the ...V) other] does not stand to reason.64) (V... (V... 63) Cf. ibid., 68a,3-68b,4 (76b,5-77a,7). 64) K is liable to be interpreted as negating the theory that the object of the sense is of one nature. Besides the above-stated, Jinendrabuddhi points out the following defects found in Madhava's theory of each atom being composed of three gunas:-Although a guna appears variously according to circumstances in the state of vyakta, it essentially remains the same; for instance, sattva is always illuminative (prakas'atmaka), whether it appears as the sound or as any other object. Such being the case, there must not be a qualitative difference between sound-atom and tangible-atom. Thus the distinction. between the sound and the tangible will be neglected, and one sense will operate upon

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 27 Ee.65) Therefore, (the theory we have set forth) that each atom is of a definite nature66) is superior to the Samkhya theory. Surely it is better than the thought of reputed old Samkhyas and is excellent. Distinction between classes (in effects) is due to that they are produced from their respective causes, each of which is of one (definite) nature. On this theory is also well grounded the proposition that heterogeneous (atoms) cannot produce an effect (even if they conjoin together).67) Three (heterogeneous factors) do not exist in the single-natured (atom as the cause). F.68) (The Samkhyas hold the view that the sensory apprehension of the object is intellectualized through the operation of the mind, while the object mentally apprehended is actually arrived at by the sense89) On the other hand, they define the perception as the operation of senses upon objects, such as sound etc.70) If (their definition is taken as implying that) the perception is the operation of senses aiming solely at the grasp of sound etc., then it will be inadmissible to say that the mind), which is thought to have all cognizables for its object,"") is also is operative in perception. (That is to say, the mental process of intellectualizing sensory apprehension is not to be regarded as perception.) Whence (is this argued)? Because they, (after elucidating inference as the means of valid cognition, simply say, "The operation of auditory sense etc. also (is the means of valid cognition),"72) and do not all sorts of object. If, on the other hand, the emphasis should be laid upon the dis. tinction between the sound and the tangible in their states of vyakta, then the distinction between various sounds also must not be neglected and, consequently, infinite number of senses would be needed to apprehend them, cf. J, 69,1 (77a,2) ff. 65). Cf. J, 68,4-5 (77a, 7-8). 66) Cf. above Eb. 67) Cf. above Ec. 68) Cf. J. 68b, 5-70a, 1 (77a.8-78b.7). 69) ibid., 686,5-6 (77a,8-775,2): phyi rol gyi don rnams la dban pos sen par byed la / dban pos rtogs par byas pa de la ni / yid kyis rjes su sen par byed cin / ji Itar yan dban pos rtogs par byas pa la yid kyis rjes su sen par byed pa de bsin du / yid kyis sen pa dban pos yan dag rig par byed do / This is the second interpretation of the term 'manasa'dhisthita' in the Samkhya definition or perception, cf. J, 61b, 5-6 (69b, 2-3) and above n. 3). Cf. also J, 69,3 (77b, 6-7). 70a,3-4 (78a,8-78b,1). 70a, 7 (79a,6-7). The first interpretation of 'manasa'dhisthita' is refuted in J, 69,5 (78a, 1) ff. 70) Cf. above A. 71) J. 73b, 6 (83a, 4) : "dus gsum pahi yul can dan don thams cad pa ni yid do" ses bsad do / cf. SK, k.35: santahkarana buddhih sarvan visa yam avagahate. STK, ad. k. 35: tair (=indri yair) u panitan sarvam visayam sa-mano-'hankara buddhih yasmat avagahate ... 72) J, 616,2-4 (69a,6-7): "ci rjes su dpag pa gcig pu kho na tshad ma ham se na / ma yin ses br jod par bya ste / rna ba la sogs pahi hjug pa yan no (srotr'adi-vrttis ca) // mnon sum tshad ma ses pa lhag maho / Cf. Frauwallner, WZKSO, Bd. III, S. 43.

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MASAAKI HATTORI mention that the mind, which is operative upon all sorts of object, is the means of valid cognition (pramana). As there is neither a mark nor a testimonial word with regard to the mental sense which intellectualizes the operation of the sense, the said mental process should not be spoken of as the means of valid cognition. (Accordingly, the Samkhya view referred to above will) be violative of their own theory). The intellectualization of the operation Cof senses through the mind) is not included in any means of valid cognition.73) G.71) (In defense of their view, the Samkhyas may argue as follows :-) "That defect is not (to be charged upon us. We do not hold that the intel. lectualization of the operation of senses through the mind is the means of valid cognition in the sense of the apprehension of that which is not yet apprehended. That mental process) is no else than the recollection (smrti), just as desire (raga)76) and the like are. As is established by us, the recol. lection is a particular kind of perceptual apprehension.76) Hence, while senses are the means of perceptual apprehension in relation to external objects, the mind recollects the sensory apprehension immediately after the operation of senses." (In opposition to this statement, we allege that the said mental activity) is not a recollection, for the mind) has not had direct awareness (anubhava) Cof the sensory apprehension beforehand). It is unreasonable that the apprehension of the external object) through the operation of the sense is immediately followed by the recollection of apprehension) through the mind, for the mind) has had no (direct awareness) previously with regard to the operation of the sense. What can be recollected by one must have been experienced before by him. The direct awareness of the object through the sense is impossible to be recollected by the mind, just as the experience of one person is impossible to be recollected by another.) H.77) Supposing that both the sense and the mind operate simultaneously, in case the Samkhyas admit, (in defense of their view,) that the sensory apprehension and the mind cogitating thereupon function simultaneously,even then (the difficulty is not explained away, because) the mark as an object (visaya) would, in that case, be found on the mind, which primarily is) the 73) Jinendrabuddhi makes reference to the far-fetched interpretation of the Samkhyas that the word 'ca' in 'srotr'adi-urttis ca' is meant for including mano-vrtti. This interpretation, Jinendrabuddhi argues, is inadissible, becuase 'ca' obviously means besides anumana, srotr'adi-vrtti also', cf. J, 69,1-5 (77b,5 - 78al). 74) Cf. J, 70a, 1-712,7 (786,7-80a,8). 75) Sar vadarsanasangraha, Patanjaladarsanam, Govt. Or. Ser. p. 362-3: sukhabhijnas ya sukhanusmrti-purvakah sukha-sadhanesu trsna-rupo gardho ragah 76) Cf. J, 70a, 6 (79a,5): 'khyad par' gyi sgra so sor mion par sbrel par byaho. 77) Cf. ibid., 710,7-72a,1 (80b,1-819,3).

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 29 subject (visayin).78) (Granting that this point is justifiable anyhow,7%) that (mind which recollects the direct awarenes of the sensory apprehension) cannot be the instrument of valid cognition. Now that the mind functioning as the direct awareness of sensory apprehension was not said to be the instrument of valid cognition, it still less is to be regarded so when it apprehends its (previous) situation (by reviving it). (The above theory, thus,) has been violative of (the Samkhya doctrine). (The following might be questioned by the Samkhyas :"Why are desire etc. possible to be recollected ? The feeling of desire and the like are caused with regard to the object which has been grasped by the sense. In this respect, the condition under which they are caused is the same with the case of the mind. If the mind is ineffective to recollect the sensory apprehension, desire etc. also must not be recollected!" We are quite ready to answer to this question. As we admit that the feeling of desire and the like are no else than the self-cognition,80) it is not faulty to say that they are possible to be recollected. (The recollection, according to our theory, is thus not without previous experience, because desire etc. were self-cognized before. On the other hand, the Samkhyas, who do not approve of the theory of self-cognition or who, even if approving it, do not state it distinctly, are unable to set forth a proper reason for the sensory apprehension being recollected by the mind. Accordingly,) the statement the recollection is a particular kind of perceptual apprehension',81) (which they made in view of proving that the mental process of intellectualizing sensory apprehension is a recollection) is expressive of (that the recollection is not preceded by any experience), just as the blind walks without having the previous sight of his route).82) 1.83) Under the (above-said) circumstance, even the object of the sense is not possible to be recollected immediately after (it is grasped through the sense), because it is not directly known through the mind. (The Samkhyas 78) If it should be held that the ideation of sensory apprehension through the mind and the actual grasp of the ideate through the sense are simultaneous, the mind, which is visayin in contrast to the sensory apprehension would, at the same time, be regarded as the object (visaya) upon which the sense operates. SK, k. 35 explains that the sense and the mind are respectively the gate (dvara) and the gate-keeper (dvarin.). On the above presumption, however, the mind would be recognized as the gate watched by the sense. Cf. J, 69,1 (78a,5) ff and 726,1 (816,4) ff. 79) J, 71b, 3 (80b, 5) : 'de yan' ses pa khas blans nas skyon gsan suns paho. 80) PS, I, k. 6a-b: manasam cartha-rag'adi-svasamvittir akal pika, cf. M. Hattori, op. cit., p. 13. 81) Cf. above G. 82) J. 715,6-7 (81a,1-2): ji Itar lon bahi gom (P. goms) pa ma mthon ba snon ma can rnam par hgod par de bsin du hdihi yan tshad mas yons su ma bcad par mnon par br jod par byed pahi phyir ro / 83) Cf. J. 72a, 1-73a,4 (812,3-82b,1)

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30 MASAAKI HATTORI try to justify their theory arguing as follows :-"The mind does not operate without previous experience. When a sense operates upon an object, the mind which accompanies the sense is also related to the same external object, and thus the mind recollects its previous awareness of the object."84) Against this we declare that) the mind is unable to have the direct awareness of the external object before (recollecting it). If the mind should be related to the external object, the Samkhya doctrine would be violated. Or, Con the supposition that the mental process of intellectualizing sensory apprehension is deemed to be the recollection, (the mind would) grasp something different (from that which is grasped by the sense.]88) The term 'or' (va) in the verse is significative of the following alternatives: either the recollection is caused inspite of the lack of previous experience86) concerning the operation of the sense or (the Samkhya doctrine) is violated. (In any case, it is no more reasonable that the mind recollects the operation of the sense without appre. hending it before than that Yajnadatta recollects what has been experienced by Devadatta.]87) Why, then, is the Samkhya doctrine) violated ? If the mind, which is produced simultaneously with the operation of the sense upon the external object, is thought to be apprehensive of the same object), then the Samkhya theory expressed in the following statement will be violated :"In case two senses are operative (simultaneously) for one and the same purpose, then the effectiveness (samarthyatva) of the sense will be lost."88) 84) ibid., 72a,1-2 (81a, 4) : "dban pohi sen pa de yod na / phyi rol gyi don kho na las (=la) yid kyis rjes su sen par byed do" // ses pa bstan bcos kyi don te / 85) K and V are not in accord with each other, while Vk coincides with K as well as with Kk. However, K (Kk, Vk) is quite unreadable. J, 72a2 (81a, 4-5: 'nams paham' ses pa la sogs pa ste ... gsan mthon ba' ni... appears to be in support of V. but the meaning of 'dran pa' placed before 'nams paham' in V is hardly made out. The translation is based upon V, 'dran pa' being omitted therefrom. 86) Both K and V (Pek. Ed.) read nams su myon ba' instead of 'nams su ma myon ba'. J, 722,4-5 (81a, 7-8): 'nams su ma myon ba la dran pa ham' ses pa / ci ste yid kho nas nams su myon ba dran par hdod na / de Itar yin na nams su ma myon bahi don la dran par bgyur te / de ni yid kyis snar nams su ma myon ba nid kyis (=kyi) phyir ro / 87) The repudiation of the first alternative is omitted in PSV, but Jinendrabuddhi states as follows: gsan mthon ba' ni dran pa ste / dban poni hjug pas nams su myon ba nid kyi phyir dan yid kyis kyan dran par bya ba nid kyis phyir ro // de yan mi rigs te / Thas byin gyis nams su myon ba mchod sbyin gyis dran pa ni ma yin pas so ... cf. ), 72a, 5-6). 88) J. 72a,6 (81b,1-2): bstan bcos su bsad pa "ci phyi rol gyi don rnams dban po dan yid dag gis Than cig sen nam se na ma yin ses brjod par byaho // cihi phyir se na / don goig byed pani dban po dag rtog pa na nus pa nid ma yin no" ses paho / This must have been stated by those who are in support of the second interpretation of manasa'dhisthita' (cf. above n. 3)) against those who uphold the first interpretation.

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DIGNAGA'S CRITICISM OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION 31 J.89) "The fault pointed out above is not to be laid upon us. (The theory concerning) the simultaneity of the sense with the mind) was expounded by us in explanation of that the recollection (through the mind) is a subsequent apprehension. The passage referred to by you above) is stated in answer to the question as to whether the sense and the mind work together to apprehend the external object (or separately). Preceding that passage, the following has been (distinctly) stated:-'In case the mind operates at the present time together with a certain sense, then the operation of the sense will become intel. lectual.'91) (Accordingly, the mind and the sense cooperate to get the intelctual understanding of the object, but the mind does not operate directly upon the external object in parallel with the sense.)" Even if the Samkhyas defend their theory) in this way, (they cannot succeed in avoiding our criti. cism.) If they tried to prove that the recollection of the (external) object (through the mind) is subsequent,-if they explained that the mind operates simultaneously (with the sense) with a view to proving that the recollection occurs subsequently (to the intellectual apprehension of the object, then that explanation will be incompatible with the following exposition given by them :-"The apprehension of the object through the sense is followed by the intellectual apprehension through the mind, while the object mentally appre. hended is actually arrived at by the sense."92) Consequently, it is impossible that the external object is recollected (through the mind). K.98) In the meanwhile, if the mind should operate directly upon the external object, then senses other (than the mind) would be useless : senses other than the mind would be unserviceable with regard to (the appre. (V. As regards samarthyatva of indriya, see the following etymological explanation: indantitindriyani, Abhidharmakosa-vyakhya, Ed. by Wogihara, p.93. 89) Cf. J, 73a,4-73b,5 (82b, 4-83a,4). 90) Cf. the quotation at the end of I. 91) J, 73b, 1-2 (82b, 6-8): bstan bcos su .... hdi skad bsad do // "de bsin du yid ni don thams cad la dus gsum pa nid du rab tu hjug te / phyi rol gyi don rnams la da Itar bahi dus su gan gi tshe dban po hgah sig dan Idan par yid gyur ba dehi tshe dban po dan ni rkyen dan Idan paui hjug par hgyur ro // hbah sig pa ni hdas pa dan ma hons pani (dus dag la hjug go cf. 700, 6 (795, 6))" ses pa la sogs pa snar brjod la/ phyis hdri ba hdi byas paho / Cf. Frauwallner, WZKSO, Bd. III, S. 29. 92) Cf. above n. 69). 93) Cf. J, 73b,5-7 (83a,4-6). The first interpretation of manasa'dhisthita' is referred to herein, and is repudiated through the same argument as set forward by those Samkhyas who adopt the second interpretation of the above words, cf. n. 88). Cf. also J, 69b, 1-2 (782,5-6): gal te yan yid phyi rol gyi don la dros su hjug na / de Itar gyur na dban po cig sos nams de la hjug pa don med par hthob ste / yid kho nas skyes buhi don phun sum tshogs pa nid kyi phyir ro /

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32 MASAAKI HATTORI (V... hension of) the external object, because the purpose of purusa would be accomplished through the mind only. The perception as explained by the Samkhyas, thus being incapable of determining the nature of object, is not (to be recognized as] the means of valid cognition. This work is one of the fruits of joint research in "Common Basis and Interrelations among Scientific Systems of Classical India" (supervised by Prof. G. Matuo, Kyoto University), which was subsidized, for the year 1959/60, by the Ministry of Education, Government of Japan.