YJA Convention 1996 07 San Francisco CA Second

Author(s): Young Jains of America (YJA)
Publisher: Young Jains of America YJA USA

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way that a naya can be used improperly. Nayabhasa is an actively misused naya. It is not only limited but contains a fallacy.
This has implications for the concept of anekantvada as intellectual ahimsa. As Kendall Folkert writes "Where nayas are capable of being fallacious as well as limited, matters would be very different. What causes the existence of various schools of thought is not only the fact that judgments tend to be partial, but also that there can be error in those judgments. Thus it is not merely wrong-headed insistence eon a particular viewpoint that lies behind the existence of various schools, it is also error itself." The implication is that nayavada is not always used to harmonize viewpoints, as is often claimed, but that it claims superiority for the Jain position.
So, does anekantvada promote tolerance? We can see illustrations of different positions in the following quotes: The proclamation of Kalikala sarvagnaya Shri Hemachandra Surishvaraji: "To all who argue of the opposite side, I proclaim with thunder that there is no god-hood superior to vitaragatva and no philosophy superior to anekantavada." Hemachandra (12th century A.D.): "I bow to all those who have overcome the attachment and hatred, which are the cause of worldly existence be they Brahma, Visnu, Siva or Jina."
I make several interpretations of these statements. It appears to me that there is acceptance, in a qualified way, of other views, on our terms. You could liken the vitarag to those who have overcome attachment and hatred and thus say that they are saying the same thing. I also think it is important to look at Jain writing as diverse. Maybe we cannot generalize whether anekantvada promotes tolerance because different writers have different interpretations, and there is certainly a long history which I have not explored, of the changes in meaning, and the philosophical climate that influenced these changes. Certainly, when one looks at the divisions within Jainism, for instance, the surprisingly strong opposition of Digambaras and Svetambaras, one wonders why anekantvada has not harmonized within Jainism.
Finally, I think this is the logical problem of self-referencing. How does a philosophical system which talks about truth see itself in relation to other philosophical systems? There has to be an assumption of anekantvad as truth in order to go on and explain the nature of truth as analyzed by anekantvad. However, if anekantvada philosophy notes the variety in meaning and interpretation of words, it has to apply to the notion of anekantvada itself. How can you expect anekantvada to have an absolute "ekanta" meaning?
It is like the problem of nonviolence against violence. Violence can, at least for a time, demolish the possibility of people to practice nonviolence. But, by fighting violence with violence, non-violence has already lost.
Lest we get too caught up in philosophical knots that I certainly cannot unwind, let's turn our attention to less technical matters. What does anekantvada mean for us, in our own lives, and for our own spiritual progress?
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