________________
approach has been called Naigama Naya-the way of pantoscopic observation.
Now all these different traits are present and real. The philosophers of the Nyaya-Vaiśesika school approach reality from this point of view, and the result is the discovery of these multiple traits varying in the scale of generalization down to the ultimate limit of specialized content, which does not admit of any unitive common bond. The fallacy of this approach, according to the Jaina philosopher, consists in regarding these diverse traits as numerically and qualitatively different from one another and also from the substratum in which they are embodied. The Jaina philosopher admits the reality of these distinctive traits, but insists upon their integration in a concrete real, which is incompatible with their absolute otherness and diversity.
They are necessarily bound with the substratum and one another only by virtue of their being related by way of identity-cum-difference. While appreciating the acuteness of the observation of the philosophers of the Nyaya-Vaisesika school, he accuses them of abstractionist outlook which prevents the consideration of the unitive bond subsisting inter se.
The second way of approach is called synthetic vision which ignores the concrete entity in which the unity manifests itself. Now, a concrete entity is possessed of generic, generic-cum-specific and purely specific characteristics. The most generalized character, which any entity exhibits, is existence, which is also the necessary characteristic of all existent facts. This is creditable for the philosopher who discovers the unitive bond in the diversity of multiple characteristics. But when he regards this as the sole and absolute characteristic of reality and dismisses the diverse attributes as unreal appearance, swayed by the dictates of formal logic, he is held guilty of extremism and exclusiveness of outlook. The Vedantist of the monistic school has approached reality from this angle of vision and arrived at the conclusion that existence is the only character of reality.
The diverse characters such as substantiality, cowhood and the shape, magnitude, colour etc. are dismissed as unreal appearance on the ground that they cannot claim reality if they be other than existence. The only reality they' can claim is due to their identity with existence. This facile way of condemning the plain testimony of experience and the preferential treatment of a part of its content are regarded by the Jaina philosopher as the result of this way of approach and observation. If, however, a person stops at this discovery of a common bond, and asserts it to be the character of reality without any commitment regarding the other characteristics, he will not be guilty of an aberration. Certainly the
तुलसी प्रज्ञा अंक 123
96
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
