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Vol. XV, No. 4
properties of things, but they are an order of things. "Absolute real space and time”, Leibniz maintains, “is an Idolon tribus of English philosophers."26 Leibniz denied the existence of any such thing as an absolute space, as he believed it to be a mere order or relation of things, which in itself is indicative of relativity. Also his space is only ideal--a product of mind, for it is a certain order in which the mind con-ceives the application of relations. Like the space of Descartes, though on somewhat different grounds. Leibnizs, space is also plenum, for it has no existence in the absence of things. To sum up, we can say that Leibniz's space and time are subjective reality and plenum.
Kant
The most important contribution to the philosophy of space atid time in the century following Newton and Leibniz was that of Kant (1724-1804). Being a supporter of the doctrine of idealism, Kant did not accept space and time as objective realities. In his view, space and time exist in the consciousness, antecedently to all experience-it is an a priori form of our sensibility or intuition. Kant presented space and time as analogous forms of visualisation and treated them in a common chapter in his major epistemological work.28 He has given four metaphysical arguments to prove his theory of space.
“1. Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward experiences. For, in order that certain sensations may relate to something without me (that is, to something which occupies a different part of space from that in which I am); in like manner, in order that I may represent them not merely as without of and near to each other, but also in separate places, the representation of space must already exist as a foundation Consequently, the représentation of space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena through experience; but on the contrary, this external experience is itself only possible through the said antecedent representation.
"2. Space then is a nécessary representation a Priori, which serves for the foundation of all external institutions. We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it'. It must, therefore be considered as the condition of the possibility of phenomena, and by no means as a determination dependent on them, and is a representation a Priori which necessarily supplies the basis for external phenomena.
"3. Space is no discursive, or as we say, general conception of the
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