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| 309 ) connection that by the word Sárikhya we understand in this context the system of Kapila whose Sauklıya sūtras are available to us. To this school belong the ancient Ācāryas like Pañcaśikha, Asuri and others but Patañjali's yoga school though regarded as a form of Sārkhya with the conception of īśvara added to it holds a different view. Patañjali believes in the existence of Isvara distinct from Puruşa or Ātmā. In his opinion Isvara is not like an ordinary puruşa ( 25th principle) but is an extraordinary purusa ( Puruşaviseșa ) ( the 26th principle ) who is for ever free from the action of Klešas (ignorance etc. ) karmas ( right and wrong ) Vipāka ( maturity of karmas ) and Āśaya ( the psychic dispositions which are the after-effects of action ).
The yoga view of Patañjala unlike the Nyāyavaiseșika and Vedānta view holds that Isvara has nothing to do with the administration of human karmas which originate from Avidyā. He is rather responsible for the origin of pure knowledge which is destructive of karma and is therefore rightly considered to be the eternal world teacher, who is solely responsible for the influx of Saving Grace. He is the one Supreme Guru of the entire world immersed in the darkness of ignorance. Patañjali seems inclined to think that the so called world teachers ( Guru ) known to history are also indebted to īśvara for the saving knowledge they impart to humanīty. The Satra runs thus-Sa pūrveşāmapi guruh kālenānavacchedanāt. Tarafa ya: Feat7753 TITI
From a study of Indian philosophy we come across systems of thought which hold that īśvara is not the distributor of the fruits of karma performed by individual souls on their own initiative but he is rather the ultimate source of all inspiration to people in the path of karma. In other words, the responsibility for an action--good or evil-does not rest upon the person who has performed the action but falls back ultimately on īśvara who inspired the person concerned to do the particular action. In this opinion the moral responsibility of an action does not rest on the performer of the action but rather on the Supreme
