Sramana Tradation

Author(s): G C Pandey
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 75

Śramana Tradition
an uninterrupted tradition of pure heredity exists reliably and corresponds to a real physical difference of a genetic kind and that the Sastric pronouncements as well as social belief relating to such genetic distinctions do not furnish any reasonable ground for doubt. Jati is not a species or race but a distinctive heredity. It has a physical and genetic base but it is not a characteristic bodily form.
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This mode of argument was severely criticized by both the Buddhists as well as the Jainas. Thus Prajnakaragupta says in his Vārtikālankära that Brahmaṇahood may mean either a species or Jati or a lineage or Gotra, or a distinctive capacity (Kriyāsāmarthyātisaya). Since Brahmaṇas and Sūdras look alike, Jati is clearly not in question - 'na tavad gotvādi jātimiva tajjātimākāraviseṣādeva kecidavadhārayitumisate akṛtisankarasya darsanat | Sūdrādyabhimatānāmapi saiväkṛtirupalabhyate No one can determine the caste by the inspection of the physical appearance as we can determine the species of cows etc. In the case of men, appearances are all mixed up. Moreover, those who are held to be Sudras have the same form as others. As for lineage one cannot be certain of the past. In fact, it only pushes the problem to the unknown past. 'avicchedaśca gotrasya pratyetum sakyate na ca'. The uninterruptedness of the gotra cannot be known. What is more, one cannot know of the purity of distant heredity. Nor is any distinct capacity seen in the Brahmaṇas now. Brahmaṇahood connot be preceived without instruction where the instruction itself constitutes no authority. Nor can the Vedas establish the Brahmaṇahood of any given person since the Vedas have no relevance to particular persons at all. Hence-naivam brāhmaṇatvādikam pratyakṣādupadesãdubhayad vedädvāpratīyate tataḥ samvyavahāramatraprasiddham brahmanyam /'1 Thus Brāhmaṇahood is not known by perception or instruction or both or the Vedas. Hence it is only a social convention. Against this Kumarila has in turn argued that because the perception of something requires a special vantage point for the perceiver, it does not cease to be perceptible. Similarly the possibility of misalliance does not mean that one should hold it as an actuality without further evidence. 'na hi yadgirisṛngamaruhya gṛhyate tadapratyakṣam na ca strīņām kvacid vyabhicärdarsanat sarvatraiva kalpana yukta ' If something is perceived by 1. pp. 10-12.
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