Role Of Meanings Uin Paninis Grammar

Author(s): Johannes Bronkhorst
Publisher: Johannes Bronkhorst

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JOHANNES BRONKHORST
2. {<puruşa> <<karman>> <eka>} {<abhi> <kopa> <asmad
<vartamāna> <eka> <<kartr>>} These two sets of semantic elements no longer have a group in common, as they did when we used only real meanings. The groups are now different, and therefore give rise to different utterances (puruşa ya and puruşam respectively). Again the groups have gained independence, in the sense that no information from outside the group is required in order to be able to derive an utterance from it.
These few examples must suffice to show that Pāṇini's grammar primarily generates whole sentences (or even combinations of sentences), but that the karaka device enables us to find sets of semantic elements (which now include pseudo-elements) that give rise to parts of whole sentences.
3. The outcome of our investigation can be summed up in two points. 1 Panini's grammar turns meanings into utterances. 2 As a result we must assume that this grammar primarily generates sentences, or even groups of sentences.
I have nothing to add to the first point. I know of no grounds to doubt its validity. I am less certain about the second point. It is true that a simple and straightforward application of Pāṇini's grammar will as a rule produce sentences, not single words. But this fact may not fully settle the issue.
Imagine that Pāṇini wanted to write a grammar that would produce single words on the basis of a semantic input. What semantic elements would underlie, say, bhavasi? If one tries to answer this question, he will realize how much trouble Păņini saved himself by bringing the accompanying word tvam into the picture. Similarly, in assigning meanings to case-endings, one is bound to take the context into consideration.
I therefore propose the following. The evidence at our disposal strongly suggests that Panini's grammar produces, as a rule, whole sentences (or groups of them). We stick to the conclusion that it indeed primarily produces whole sentences until and unless evidence to the contrary is procured.
One final remark. The presupposition that underlies Pāṇini's grammar as we have come to know it, is that the meaning of an utterance is equal to the sum of the meanings of its parts. A consequence of this would be that also preverbs are, by themselves, meaningful for Pāṇini. There is some independent evidence to support this. When Pāṇini informs us in P.1.4.93 (adhipari anarthakau) that adhi and pari are called karmapravacani ya provided they have no meaning, we conclude that adhi and pari do have meaning in other circumstances, i.e. when they are ordinary preverbs (upasarga). On the other hand, sometimes meanings are ascribed to roots which can only be expressed by those roots in combination with preverbs (Bronkhorst, forthcoming). This suggests that the preverbs somehow participate in the meanings of the
narthakau) hupport this. When su for Pāṇini. Ther