Reviews Of Diffeent Books

Author(s): J W De Jong
Publisher: J W De Jong

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REVIEWS
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Boden einer Frustration, eines Unterlegenheitsbewusstseins" (p. 21). In the case of Tulsīdās, a Rāmait who lived in Sivaītic Benares, Hacker sees an example of the opposite of frustration. Hacker discerns a similar kind of inclusivism in early Buddhism, into which brahmanic concepts are transformed and incorporated: "Der Buddhismus hat mit ungeheurer geistiger Kraft das Wesentliche, das er in den wichtigsten arischen Begriffen vorfand, in sich hineingeholt und dann das ihm Unwesentliche abgestreift" (p. 27).
Wilhelm Halbfass's paper bears the title " 'Inklusivismus' und 'Toleranz' im Kontext der indisch-europäischen Begegnung" (pp. 29-60). He begins by giving a survey of Hacker's statements on inclusivism, and points out that since Hacker's first publication on this topic in 1957 his views have become more peremptory. Halbfass makes some important remarks concerning tolerance, and rejects Hacker's later opinion that in India instead of tolerance only inclusivism existed. According to Halbfass one must distinguish between the concept of tolerance and the practice of tolerance. Halbfass writes: "... es kann doch gewiss tolerantes Verhalten und gelebte Toleranz' im Rahmen oder auf der Grundlage 'inklusivistischen' Denkens geben" (p. 46).
Two other topics discussed by Halbfass are the necessity to differentiate within the concept inclusivity, and the problem of whether or not it is limited to India as affirmed by Hacker. The first is briefly dealt with by Hacker in the concluding passage of his lecture: "Beim Inklusivismus bleibt meistens das Fremde unverändert bestehen, abgesehen von dem Inklusivismus der Stärke, den man, wenn man will, Umdeutung nennen kann. ..." (p. 28). In this context Halbfass pays particular attention to classical Indian philosophy. He disagrees with Hacker's opinion that inclusivism is to be found only in India. Halbfass quotes examples from classical antiquity, early Christianity and Islam, and discusses in some detail Hegel's scheme of "Aufhebung", in which the historical dimension contrasts with the ahistorical nature of Indian cyclical conceptions.
Critical discussion of Hacker's concept of inclusivism is continued in Albrecht Wezler's paper (“Bemerkungen zum Inklusivismus-Begriff Paul Hackers", pp. 61-91). Wezler begins by showing that inclusivism also occurs in other religions. He quotes examples from Japanese Buddhism and from a book by Father H. M. Enomiya-Lassalle S. J. (Zen-Buddhismus, Köln, 1966). According to the teachings of the eighth patriarch of the Shinshū school, Rennyo Shōnin (1415-1499), the Shinto deities were appearances of the Buddha, and when we call on the name of the Buddha all the Shinto gods are included therein (p. 65). Wezler remarks that "erst der 8. Patriarch - und nur dieser Schule des japanischen Buddhismus - auf die Ides verfallen ist, in dieser Weise zu werben, und nicht auch schon seine Vorgänger und die Vertreter anderer Sekten" (p. 67). The idea of the Shinto gods being appearances of the Buddha occurs in Japanese Buddhism long before Rennyo Shōnin. This scheme of honji-suijaku is well-known in Japanese Buddhism. According to M. W. de Visser it was already propagated in the beginning of the ninth century by Dengyo Daishi and Kobo Daishi.1
Wezler sees the historical roots of inclusivism in the Vedic practice of identification and substitution (ādesa). He explains the attraction of inclusivism to the Indians by the importance attached to tradition, and remarks that “die Häufung inklusivistischer' Argumente gerade im indischen religiösen Denken sehr viel, wenn auch wohl nicht ausschliesslich, mit dem ausgeprägt traditionalistisch-konservativen Charakter der indischen Kultur zu tun hat" (p. 87). Finally, Wezler points out that the tension between old and new is not an exclusively spiritual phenomenon and that one must also take into account psychological, social and similar factors.
Gerhard Oberhammer's epilogue contains a reflection not only on Hacker's concept of inclusivism but also on the contributions by Halbfass and Wezler. He begins by distinguishing between affirming the identity of foreign ideas with one's own and the actual adopting of foreign ideas. Furthermore, Oberhammer points out that inclusivism does not include the attempt to understand a foreign religious tradition or central idea from the point of view of one's own tradition. According to him, Hacker has not made this distinction, and Bhagavadgitā 7,20-23 and 9,23 must be seen not as an example of inclusivism but as a theological