Refutation of Jain Darshan

Author(s): Vijay Pandya
Publisher: Z_Nirgrantha_1_022701.pdf and Nirgrantha_2_022702.pdf and Nirgrantha_3_022703.pdf

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REFUTATION OF THE JAINA DARSANA BY SANKARACARYA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SYADVADA IN THE BRAHMASUTRA ŚĀŃKARABHĀṢYA 2-2
Vijay Pandya
Sankarācārya has refuted some of the tenets of the Jaina system of thought in his bhäṣya (c. early years of 9th A. D.) on the Brahmasutra 2-2-33 to 36. The second quarter of the second adhyaya of the Brahmasutra has been traditionally designated. as the "Tarkapāda", indicating that its content is based on logic.
The main thrust of Sankarācārya's arguments is against Anekantavada or Syädvåda and Saptabhanginaya which, as terms though not synonyms, are interconnected as one philosopher of this system, Akalankadeva (c. 8th cent. A. D.) puts it: अनेकान्तात्मकार्थकथनं स्याद्वादः) Syādvāda and Anekāntavāda can be said to have the relation of 'Vacyavacakabhäva.' Anekāntaväda is intended to be expressed with the help of Syadvada, as one other work, the Syadavadamañjari of Mallişena (A. D. 1294) explains स्यादित्ययमनेकान्तद्योतकं ततः स्याद्वादोऽनेकान्तवादः 12
The most singular contribution of the Jaina system to Indian thought is Anekāntavāda or Syādvada; and the Jaina system of thought has been almost identified with Syädväda, at times to the exclusion of other important ideas of the system; so, it is not surprising that Sankaracārya has specially targeted Syddväda, arising out of the Saptabhanginaya, for his attack on the Jaina system of thought. First of all, Sankarācārya directs his attack on the Saptabhanginaya, and says that one object cannot contain in itself contradictory attributes simultaneously: af with युगपत् सत् असत्त्वादिविरुद्धधर्म समावेशः संभवति । An object cannot be existent and nonexistent at the same time. Moreover, according to Sankaräcärya, the corollary of this doctrine would be that, even the seven padärthas, namely jiva, ajiva, śrava, samvara, nirjară, bandha, and mokṣa, would not have any definiteness about them. A doubt will arise regarding, first of all, about the number of the entities, and then their nature and so forth. Hence everything would be of indefinite nature, and so the knowledge would be of doubtful nature, which cannot serve as a means of knowledge. Resultantly, the tirthankara would not be able to lend any certainty to his preachings regarding the valid means of knowledge (pramana), the objects of knowledge (prameya), agent of knowledge (pramätä), and the resulting knowledge itself, all of which have a non-determinate form. If there exists any certainty, then alone the people can follow a certain path without any hesitation. So the teacher's preachings would not be acceptable to the people, and hence they are liable to be rejected like the prattling of a maniac'.
Sankaracarya's dialectics in his refutation of the Anekäntaväda is doubtless remarkable; however, it does not take the real position of Anekäntaväda into account. Sankarācārya's representation of the Anekantaväda is rather a simplification