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REFUTATION OF THE JAINA DARSANA BY SANKARACARYA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SYADVADA IN THE BRAHMASUTRA ŚĀŃKARABHĀṢYA 2-2
Vijay Pandya
Sankarācārya has refuted some of the tenets of the Jaina system of thought in his bhäṣya (c. early years of 9th A. D.) on the Brahmasutra 2-2-33 to 36. The second quarter of the second adhyaya of the Brahmasutra has been traditionally designated. as the "Tarkapāda", indicating that its content is based on logic.
The main thrust of Sankarācārya's arguments is against Anekantavada or Syädvåda and Saptabhanginaya which, as terms though not synonyms, are interconnected as one philosopher of this system, Akalankadeva (c. 8th cent. A. D.) puts it: अनेकान्तात्मकार्थकथनं स्याद्वादः) Syādvāda and Anekāntavāda can be said to have the relation of 'Vacyavacakabhäva.' Anekāntaväda is intended to be expressed with the help of Syadvada, as one other work, the Syadavadamañjari of Mallişena (A. D. 1294) explains स्यादित्ययमनेकान्तद्योतकं ततः स्याद्वादोऽनेकान्तवादः 12
The most singular contribution of the Jaina system to Indian thought is Anekāntavāda or Syādvada; and the Jaina system of thought has been almost identified with Syädväda, at times to the exclusion of other important ideas of the system; so, it is not surprising that Sankaracārya has specially targeted Syddväda, arising out of the Saptabhanginaya, for his attack on the Jaina system of thought. First of all, Sankarācārya directs his attack on the Saptabhanginaya, and says that one object cannot contain in itself contradictory attributes simultaneously: af with युगपत् सत् असत्त्वादिविरुद्धधर्म समावेशः संभवति । An object cannot be existent and nonexistent at the same time. Moreover, according to Sankaräcärya, the corollary of this doctrine would be that, even the seven padärthas, namely jiva, ajiva, śrava, samvara, nirjară, bandha, and mokṣa, would not have any definiteness about them. A doubt will arise regarding, first of all, about the number of the entities, and then their nature and so forth. Hence everything would be of indefinite nature, and so the knowledge would be of doubtful nature, which cannot serve as a means of knowledge. Resultantly, the tirthankara would not be able to lend any certainty to his preachings regarding the valid means of knowledge (pramana), the objects of knowledge (prameya), agent of knowledge (pramätä), and the resulting knowledge itself, all of which have a non-determinate form. If there exists any certainty, then alone the people can follow a certain path without any hesitation. So the teacher's preachings would not be acceptable to the people, and hence they are liable to be rejected like the prattling of a maniac'.
Sankaracarya's dialectics in his refutation of the Anekäntaväda is doubtless remarkable; however, it does not take the real position of Anekäntaväda into account. Sankarācārya's representation of the Anekantaväda is rather a simplification
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of its inherent intention and contentation. Sańkarācārya seems to identify Syādváda with the agnosticism which in remoter past (C.B.C. 5th-4th cent.) was articulated by one Sanjaya Belatthiputta (अस्थि पि मे नो, नस्थि ति पि मे नो अस्थि च नत्थि च ति पि में नो नेवेत्थि न नत्थि ति पि मे नो). Saijaya had said : "I cannot say if it is, and I cannot say if it is not.” Syādvāda would say 'I can say that the thing in a sense is, and I can say that the thing in a sense is not.' So, this is certainly not the Śansayavāda or agnosticism as Sankarācārya would make it out to be. Anekāntavāda purports to grasp the polarity of the truth. This leads us to Saptabhanginaya, namely, (i) स्यादस्ति घटः, (ii) स्यान्नास्ति घटः (iii) स्यादस्ति स्यान्नास्ति घटः (iv) स्यादवक्तव्यो घट: (v) स्यादस्ति वक्तव्यो घटः (vi) स्यानास्ति अवक्तव्यो घटः, (vii) स्यादस्ति नास्ति अवक्तव्यो घटः.
Now, when a statement is made that a jug exists, it does from its own nature स्वरूपेण अस्ति and पररूपेण नास्ति. i.e. it does not exist in the form of पट. घटः स्वरूपेण अस्ति and पररूपेण नास्ति. Both statements are possible at the same time about घट and similarly, other remaining it also can be worked out. So, as it has been explained प्रश्नवशात् एकस्मिन् वस्तुनि अविरोधेन विधिप्रतिषेधकल्पना सप्तभगी । तद् यथा स्याद् घट: स्वात्मना, स्याद् अघटः परात्मना । Everything exists from its own nature and does not exist from the nature different from its own, as has been elucidated in one verse :
सर्वमस्ति स्वरूपेण पररूपेण नास्ति च । अन्यथा सर्वसत्त्वं स्यात् स्वरूपस्याप्यसंभवः ॥
Syädvāda is not taken from this point of view, then, as pointed out in the above cited verse, everything would be everything and there would not be any difference between the two things. If the Syādvāda arising out of the Saptabhanginaya is taken literally, at its surface value, then there would be anarchy in the world. As Dharmakirti (7th cent. A. D.) would poke fun at the Syadvada in the following couplet:
सर्वस्यो भयरूपत्वे तद्विशेषनिराकृतेः । चोदितो दधि खादेति किमुष्ट्र नाभिधावति ॥4
With the differentiation removed, all things would be having dual nature, then, if somebody is implored to eat curds, why does he not eat the camel ? This indeed is an extreme view taking the Syādvăda in a very surfacial manner. If it is said that, an entity is of dual nature, i.e. existing and non-existing, it means applying to an illustration given by Dharmakirti, curds exist from the nature of curds and does not exist from the nature of a camel. So, if a person is asked to eat curds, then why should he run to eat a camel ?
Or as Akalanka had issued a rejoinder:
पूर्वपक्षमविज्ञाय दूषकोऽपि विदूषकः । सुगतोऽपि मृगो जातः मृगोऽपि सुगतः स्मृतः ॥
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तथापि सुगतो वन्द्यो मृगः खाद्यो यथेष्यते । तथा वस्तुबलादेव भेदाभेदव्यवस्थितेः । चोदितो दधि खादेति किमुष्ट्रमभिधावति ।।
"Without properly understanding the prima facie view, if a person criticises that view, then he is only a vidūşaka and not a critic. Buddha was born as a deer and deer was born as Buddha, and yet Buddha is adorable and the deer is only food. Similarly, due to the strength of an entity with its difference and non-difference specified, nobody would eat a camel if he is implored to eat curds."
As Amrtacandra (eally 10th cent. A. D.) elucidates : a aa aa 300 den तदेवानेकं, यदेव सत् तदेवासत्, यदेव नित्यं तदेवानित्यं, इत्येक वस्तुनिष्पादक परस्परविरुद्धशक्तिद्वयप्रकाशमनेकान्तः।
Or as one acärya clarified with an illustration of a cowherd woman churning the curds:
एकेनाकर्षयन्ती श्लथयन्ती वस्तुत्वमितरेण । अन्तेन जयति जैनीनीतिर्मन्थानुनेत्रमिव गोपी ।'
The Jaina system of thought, while de-emphasizing one strand of thought, emphasizes another thought, just like a cowherd woman, while churning the curds, straightens one end of a rope, loosening the other end. So Saptabhanginaya is employed either from the point of view of Sakalādeśa or Vikalādeśa, that is, from a holistic point of view or from a partial point of view. Syādvāda is a holistic point of view. Syädvāda is dependent upon the Saptabhanganaya as ācārya Samantabhadra (c.550600 A. D.) says : 794STTATT&T: PIETE: 18 So, Syādvāda attempts to accommodate all differing points of view and hence this characteristic is, in fact, an ornament or a plus point, स्यात्कार: सत्यलांछनः and not a flaw as Saikarācārya tried to make it out to be.
Further, Sańkarācārya argues that pursuing the Syādvāda to its logical conclusion would lead one to doubt the doubting self, as there would be indeterminacy regarding the number of astikāyas and their nature and so forth, and thereby Syadavāda would topsyturvy everything in the Jaina system of thought, by its own indeterminate nature. Sankarācārya's incisive logical faculty seems to be flawless; but, he does not seem to notice that such a situation is inherent in the doctrine itself. In fact, this possibility of Syādvāda applying its own doctrine to itself has been perceived in the Jaina system of thought. Samantabhadra, perceiving this possibility, or rather contingency, writes :
अनेकान्तेऽप्यनेकान्तः प्रमाणनयसाधनः । अनेकान्तः प्रमाणात्ते तदेकान्तेऽपितान्नयात् 110
From the point of view of pramāna, it is anekānta, and from the point of view
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Vijay Pandya
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of naya, it is ekanta. So, anekanta is anekānta as well as ekanta. As noted earlier, naya is a partial point of view. Naya has been explained as TEC CITIET To r fasta: 14: Naya grasps only a part of an object cognised by pramāna. Or naya leads an entity to its partial nature excluding various other characteristics as Devasena (c. early 10th cent. A. D.) held : 714 22: R Taf Treats
realfa 72: 111 So, naya is neither pramāna nor apramāņa. Naya is a part of a pramāna. Naya cognises a thing only partially and not wholly'. Thus Naya is a pramana as well as apramana. Similarly, Anekāntavāda is also anekānta as well as ekänta. Anekānta reconciles all differing partial positions 3. So, Anekāntavāda or Śyadväda boldly faces and does not shy away from facing its own logical consequences.
En passent, it may be remarked that the Jaina system of thought is not anxious to prove their padārthas any more than the Vedāntin is inclined to prove the Brahman. The existence of the padārthas depends upon the authority of the Agama as a Vedāntin would depend upon the Śrutī. Of course, there is a difference, too, between the two systems. As God, the Creator of the Universe, is disrecognized and hence unavailable to the Jaina system of thought, as they do not believe in the creation and hence the Creator of the Universe, God does not lend any authority to the Agamas. But, Sankarăcărya, too, does not lay much stress upon this argument. As noted in the beginning of this essay, Sankarācārya's main thrust is against the Syadvāda. What is more, Sankarācārya finds fault with one of the Saptabhanginaya i.e. RIGORO: About this, Sankarācārya remarks that, if it is inexpressible, it cannot be expressed and if it is expressible, or expressed, it is not inexpressible : 7 9 पदार्थानामवक्तव्यत्वं संभवति । अवक्तव्याश्चेन्नोच्येरन् । उच्यन्ते चावक्तव्याश्चेति विप्रतिषिद्धम् 15 But Sankarācārya forgets at that moment that his conception of the Māyä is also open to the same charge.
Thus, it will be seen that sankarācārya has not been able to do justice to the multilinked splendour of Syādvāda. It is quite likely that the great acārya as he was, he might have been led by contemporary considerations (and compulsions) of his days, which were the days of great upheaval, affecting as it did the destiny of an entire nation. But, the Jaina system of thought, and especially its main plank the Syādvāda, is a distinct contribution to the Indian thought. In its Syādvāda tenet, the Jaina system of philosophy appears most vital and resilient. It can be said to be relevant even today, and Sankarācārya's refutation of it had a little impact on the subsequent course of Indian thought*.
* Paper originally presented at the National Seminar (Sponsored by Indian Council for Philosophical Research, New Delhi) on Jaina Logic and Epistemology at Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Poona, from 27th to 29th March, 1995. With some revisions it is presented here for the JCJ commemorative issue of the Nirgrantha.
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REFERENCES : 1. Laghiyastraya-tika 62. 2. Syadavādamanjari 5. 3. See the Sankarabhāsya on 2 - 2 - 33 : निरङकुशं ह्यनेकान्तत्वं सर्ववस्तुषु प्रतिजानानस्य, निर्धारणस्यापि
वस्तुत्वाविशेषात्, स्यादस्ति स्यान्नास्तीत्यादिविकल्पोपनिपातादनिर्धारणात्मकतैव स्यात् । एवं सति कथं प्रमाणभूतः संस्तीर्थकरः प्रमाणप्रमेय प्रमात प्रमितिष्वनिर्धारितासूपदेष्टुं शक्नुयात् कथं वा तदभिप्रायानुसारिणस्तदुपदिष्टे ऽर्थे :निर्धारितरूपे प्रवर्तेरन् । ऐकान्तिकफलत्वनिर्धारणे हि सति तत्साधनानुष्ठानाय सर्वो लोकोऽनाकुलः प्रवर्तते, नान्यथा।
अतश्चानिर्धारितार्थं शास्त्रं प्रणयन् मत्तोन्मत्तवदनुपादेयवचनः स्यात् । 4. Pramānavārtika3-181. 5. Akalanka in his Nyāyaviniscaya 203, 204. 6. Amrracandra in his Atmakhyāti commentary. 7. Amrtacandra in the Purusārthasiddhi 225. 8. Samantabhadra in his Āptamīmāṁsā 14. 9. तथा पञ्चानामस्तिकायानां पञ्चत्वसंख्यास्ति वा नास्ति वेति विकल्प्यमाना, स्यात् तावदेकस्मिन् पक्षे पक्षान्तरे तु
न स्यात्, ज्ञायतो न्यूनसंख्यात्वमधिकसंख्यात्वं वा प्राप्नुयात् | Sankarabhāsya. 10. Samantabhadra in the Svayambhustotra, 103. 11. Devasena, Nayacakra. 12. नायं वस्तु न चावस्तु वस्त्वंशः कथ्यते यतः ।
नासमुद्रः समुद्रो वा समुद्रांशो यथोच्यते || Tattvārthasloka vārtika 13. परमागमस्य बीजं निषिद्धजात्यन्तसिन्धुरविधानम् । सकलनयविलसितानां विरोधमथनं नमाम्यनेकान्तम् ॥
Amrtacandra in the Puruşārthasiddhi 2. 14. S. K. Belvalkar, The Brahmasutras of Badarāyana, 2-1,2, Notes p. 181. 15. Sankarabhāsya 2-2-33.
We regret, for want of time, we could not prepare the bibliography of works referred to in this article.
-Editors