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OCTOBER 2015
PRABUDDHJEEVAN
49
of anekanta are discernible in the early Jaina Agamas. a. Vibhajyavada :
Vibhajyavada which is perhaps the earliest phase of the doctrine is found mantioned in the Sutrakratanga (1.14.22) where a monk is asked to explain things through the principle of division of issues (vibhajjavayam ca viyagarejja). The Bhagavati Sutra provides many illustrations where a question is dealt in this way. On being asked by Gautama whether a person who says that he has taken the vow of desisting from committing injury to all sentient beings is a bonafidle observer of the vow or a malafidle imposter, Mahavira replied that if a such person was incapable of distinguishing between the sentient and the insentient, or between the mobile and immobile living beings, he is the latter, but otherwise he is a true observer of the vow (op. cit, VII. 2.27). Similarly, on being asked by Jayanti which of the two, viz. slumber and wakefulness, was preferable, he replied that for the sinful, it was the former, while for the virtuous the latter (XI12. 2/53-55). These and similar instances which are in galore in our text are obviously case of answer by division. It should be noted here that the alternative answers to the divided issues are sometimes introduced in the Agama by the particle siya (Skt, syad) meaning in a cetain reference'. The expression siyavaya in the Sutrakrtanaga (1.14.19): na yasiyavaya viyagrejja one should not explain anything without taking resort to siyavaya (Skt. syadvada, that is the principle of conditional predication) which also deserves mention. It is obviously synonymous with the expression vibhajjavaya noted above and is the forerunner of the syadvada of later times. This also confirms our views of vibhajyavada as the earliest phase
of anekantavada. b. The Nayas
The Nayas (standpoints) constitute the second stage of the evolution of the concept of anekanta. The earliest and most important way of judging the nature of things was to consider them under four heads viz., dravya (substance), kshetra (space), kala (time) and bhava (mode). Thus in the Bhagwati Sutra (II. 1.45), the loka (inhabited cosmos is considered as finite in substance and space, but infinite in time and modes. There were also other heads such as guna (op.cit., II. 10.126). bhava (XIX. 9.102) and
samsthana (XIV.7.80) which were analogous to bhava. But all these heads were not called nayas. The expressions used in connection with the nayas were however dravya and paryaya (equivalent of bhava). The material atoms are thus stated to be eternal qua dravya (davvatthayae) and non-eternal qua paryaya (pajjavehim, XIV. 4-49-50) and the souls are characterised as eternal qua dravya (davvatthayae) and non-eternal qua bhava (bhavatthayae, VII. 2.58-59). Another pair of nayas, viz. avvocchitti naya (Skt avyucchitti-naya, the standpoint of non interception) and vocchitti-naya (Skt. vyucchittinaya, the standpoint of interception) are also mentioned in the Bhagavati Sutra (VII. 3.9394). Thus the infernal beings are eternal from the standpoint of non-interception (of their existence as souls), but they non-eternal from the standpoint of interception (of their present state of being infernal after the expiry of that form of existence). A third pair of nayas is also mentioned in the same text, viz. vyavahariya-naya (Skt. vyavaharikanaya, the popular standpoint), and necchaiva-naya (naiscayikanaya, the factual or scientific standpoint). Thus from the popular standpoint the drone is black in colour, but factually or scientifically speaking, it is possessed of all the five colurs, viz. black, blue, red,
yellow and white (op. cit, XVIII. 6.108). c. Saptabhangi :
As the third stage of development of the concept of anekanta, we find a primitive saptabhangi and syadvada in the Bhagavati Sutra XII. 10.211-226. Here the things are judged under the categories of 'self' (aya Skt. atman) and 'not-self' (no-aya Skt. noatman). An object is characterized as self in some respect (siya-aya), not-self in some respect (siya no-aya) and indescribable, that is, both self and not-self in some respect. These three attributes are predicated of an object, noncomposite or composite, respectively from the standpoints of existent characters, non-existent character, and existancecum-non-existent characters. In this case of objects that are noncomposite (for instance, a monad), the attributes are only three in number, viz. self, notself and indescribable. Here `indescribable' means the impossibility of the object being spoken of or described exclusively as self' or 'not-self, because of the same object being both (self and non self) at
