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156
Eli Franco
Not only does he not do so, but, as a matter of fact, he argues (again according to Vadi) in favour of the opposite view : In order to establish the usage of pak şadharma (pakşadharma-vyavahāra-siddhaye), the word paksa has to / must be employed in its secondary meaning to denote the dharmin alone (pak şa-sabdas tad-ekadese dharminyupacaraniyah). But this presupposes that one should never use a word in its secondary meaning, which is nonsense.
Now, if an argument makes no sense it is always better to assume that we do not understand it, or that something went wrong with the transmission of its original meaning, rather than to conclude that the argument really is nonsensical. When we deal with Lokāyata fragments, we have to be even more cautious, because they appear to us not in their original context, but as pūrvapakşas in their opponents' works, and in such a case even a deliberate misrepresentation cannot be excluded. Therefore, before we can reconstruct the original meaning of a fragment, we have to take into account all sources where it is quoted or referred to. If a fragment is always interpreted in them in the same manner, and if this interpretation is acceptable within the general framework of Lokāyata, we can reasonably conclude that its original meaning is not misrepresented or misunderstood. This, however, is not the case with the Paurandarasūtra, for two more interpretations of it are to be found in Prabhācandra's Prameyakamalamārtanda (PKM) p. 473.8-97 yac-cāgaunatvāt pramānas yety uktam tatrānumānasya kuto (gaunatvam,) gaunārtha-vişayatvāt, pratyakşapūrvakatvād vā? "As for the (hetu) stated above, namely because a means of knowledge is not secondary', why does it apply) to inference? Is it because its object is a secondary (i.e. unreal) thing, or is it because it is preceded by perception ?"
According to the first interpretation given by Prabhācandra the word gauna directly refers to inference, and not indirectly through the word paksa as stated by Vādi Deva. In other words, the argument intends to show that inference is not a means of knowledge in the strict sense of the word. When formulated in this way, one immediately recalls that this is precisely the Buddhist position, because every inference involves universals, and universals, according to the Buddhists, are pure mental constructions. As Dharmakirti paradoxically puts it : "[an inferential cognition] is right cognition, inspite of its being false, because it is connected with the object."
Interpreted in this manner, the argument starts to make sense. It becomes convincing, for it shows up one of the weakest points in the Buddhist theory of knowledge. Indeed, the Buddhist logicians never quite managed to explain how an inference which has a fictitious entity for its object, is nevertheless connected with reality, and leads to efficient action.
Attractive though it is, I feel uneasy about this interpretation, because it limits the scope of the argument to Buddhist inference alone, as was also clearly realized by Prabhācandra, for he says (PKM, 473.9-474.1): na tāvad adyo vikalpaḥ, anumānasyāpy adhyaksavad västava-sāmānya-višeşātmakārtha-vişayatvābh yupagamāt. na khalu kalpita-sāmānyārtha-visayam anumānam saugatavaj jainair iştam ......
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