Parmatma Prakash

Author(s): Yogindra Acharya
Publisher: Central Jaina Publishing House

Page 26

29-30]
PARMATMA-PRAKASH.
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29. One who being united to the body, dwells in it, and who from the Nischaya (real or natural) point of view is separate and quite distinct from that body, know thou that one to be thy Atman; with other numerous objects which exist, thou hast no concern.
30. Do not regard Jiva (soul or intelligence) and Ajiva (non-soul or non-intelligence) as one: both of them are, by their own Lakshanas (distinguishing attributes), distinct; know that which is different from Âtman (soul) as different from it and know Atman alone to be the Atman.
NOTE.-Here the Acharya protests against the absolute one-sided Adwait system which believes in the existence of Jiva or Brahma only and regards the existence of matter as a mere dream or ignorance. This Ekantic Adwait (one-sided monism) when scrutinized into, appears to be a mere absurdity. The phenomena of the world cannot possibly be explained by one solitary existence. We do find both intelligence and non-intelligence in the world: thus to believe in the existence of one thing only is against Partyaksha Pramana (evidence of the senses). Jainism does not regard the knowledge acquired through the senses as false. Of course there is knowledge beyond the senses,-there are many Sukshma (subtle) things which cannot be perceived by the senses and the knowledge acquired through the senses is a very limited kind of knowledge,-but we cannot call it false. Knowledge derived through the senses acting in a normal condition, so far as it goes, is true knowledge, and the theory which is against this knowledge, cannot be accepted. My body and soul cannot be one object, the soul having Jnana (knowledge or consciousness) as its Svâbhâva (nature) and the body Sparsha (tangibility), Rasa (taste), Gandha (smell) and Varna (colour) as its nature. The pen, the inkstand, and the table, which I am using in writing, cannot be one with soul or a mere phantom. They are perceivable, material objects and do not possess Jnana (knowledge or consciousness); hence they cannot be Jiva (intelligence). Nor can they be mere nonentities, because we do perceive them through our own senses. Besides this, if there is one existence, soul or Brahma only, whence this limitation and ignorance? If there is no existence other than pure and perfect Brahma, whence this impurity and imperfection prevailing in the Samsâri Jiva (worldly soul)? If it be said that really there is no limitation, imperfection or impurity, it is only through ignorance that we see these things, then what is the source of ignorance? Ignorance is certainly not the Svâbhâva (nature) of Brahman. And if there is no existence other than pure Jiva, whence the bondage? Can there be bondage in one entity only? And if there is no bondage, there is no Samsâra (world), and it is useless to speak of Bandha (bondage) and Moksha (freedom, emancipation or salvation). Then it is also useless to strive after salvation. Then it is also useless to have recourse to Yâma, Niyâma and Yoga, and all the Shastras and Vedas become purposeless. Thus to believe only in the existence of Jiva (soul or intelligence) and reject the existence of Ajiva (nonsoul or non-intelligence) is against the evidence of the senses in the normal condition, dispenses with all the practices of religion and morality, and in the end results in a mere absurdity. This Aikanta Adwait (one-sided monism) is against all Vyavahara