Paralipomena Zum Sarvasarvatmakatvada II

Author(s): A Wezler
Publisher: A Wezler

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288
ALBRECHT WEZLER
PARALIPOMENA ZUM SARVASARVĀTMAKATVAVADA II
289
selves; therefore, the exegete is thrown back upon his own understanding and his own endeavours to think along the lines of Sainkhya. Thus, the result cannot but be in part hypothetical. Starting from the observation that the sentence sarva sarvatmakam is paraphrased in the texts by the sentences sarvam ekam ekam ca sarvam and sarvar sarvatra (vidyatelasti), this ontological statement can be shown to mean that every phenomenon, and all phenomena are material by necessity, contains in itself at least one representative of each and every species of individual things. Yet it cannot be overlooked that this vāda is always exemplified or proved by explicitly referring to what nowadays would be called the 'alimentary chain'. The fact, easily to be observed that animal and vegetal life are mutually dependant, has obviously been interpreted by Samkhya philosophers on the assumption that e.g. a particular animal contains in itself the matter of all those animals and/or plants it consumes.
the peculiarity of this conception consists, however, in that the upholders of Samkhya philosophy evidently supposed that all the individuals who have been consumed are nevertheless still existent as such, - a point which will become still clearer in the light of the evidence found in the Mahabhäsya. On the other hand, it can be demonstrated that the statement sarvam sarvatmakam does not imply that every phenomenon consists only of all the others; i.e. every phenomenon at the same is an entity in its own right. Obviously the validity of the vida extends to the inanimate evolutes of prakrti, too. In connection with this latter question one would also have to take into account a fragment, assigned to the Varsaganah, "the followers of Varsaganya", by the author of the Yuktidipika which O. STRAUSS has dealt with; it clearly states that the exponents of Samkhya do not accept any annihilation, but only a disappearing out of being manifest (vyakter apa-1); this holds good for the 23 tativas (at the end of a kalpa) as well as for all the other minor evolutes of them (after a more or less limited time of manifestation). In passing it may be noted that the
ejoining of a phenonenon with its cause(s) after having been manifest for some time is denoted by the technical term samsarga, whereas the opposite process is called visarga in Samkhya-Yoga terminology. The next important point we have to consider is the additional element järyanucchedena, frequently met with the sentence sarvami sarvatmakam occurs; for this expression is clearly intended to
preclude the possible misunderstanding of the sarvasarvatmakarvavada as implying that by being sarvatmaka the individual phenomenon does not at the same time represent its own species. This vida has predictably been attacked quite early, and the argument, of course, was that if it were true, everything would then be visible everywhere and in everything else. As to the answer of the exponents of Samkhya, some of the relevant pasages say that they took recourse to their specific concept of abhivyakti, i.e. they accounted for the empirical fact that a particular thing is perceived as this and only as this by referring to place, time, shape, etc., as conditioning its manifestation. But there are still more fundamental problems connected with this vada which have to be taken up for discussion. FRAUWALLNER has made the interesting and important observation that the origin of a given doctrine lies elsewhere than in the reasoning adduced for it and that reasons are, on the contrary, adduced only at a later stage, in order to prove the doctrine, the origin of which lied in immediate observation and perception of things. From this it would follow that the sarvasarvatmakarvavada is posterior in relation to the doctrine of prakril, which, together with other reasons, it serves to justify. However, since it cannot have been solely deduced from empirical facts, since furthermore it cannot have itself been derived from the concept of primary matter, it might be the easier assumption that it is later merely in the sense that it was later used as one of the proofs for the existence of prakti. In quest of the origin of this vida one has, therefore, to take into account the fact that it is closely related to the sarkaryavida, i.e. that it forms an integral constituent part of the special theory of causation the Simkhyas adhere to and propound: according to the latter vida, a product already exists before it becomes manifest, and according to the former, i.e. the sarvasarvatmakatvavada, the fact of its existence is not affected by its disappearance. And both these vidas cannot be divorced from the specific Samkhya concept of being which was formulated by Vårsaganya, as is clear from a fragment thus preserved by Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmakosabhâsya' yad asti asty eva tad / yan násti nasty eva fod / asato násti sambhavah / sato nasri vinafah /. Now, regarding the satkaryavada FRAUWALLNER' seems to have taken the view that it was developed secondarily only, viz. in order to meet adverse criticism directed against reasons brought forward by Sårpkhya authors who wanted to prove the existence of primary matter. Thus, il FRAUWALLNER were right, it would
In passing, I should like to state here that I disagree with FRAUWALLNER (and others) as regards the reconstruction of the name of the famous Samkhya philosopher: I think the evidence is clearly in favour of "Vårsaganya' and not "Vragana'. I do not, of course, want to dispute that the proper name Vårsaganya denotes its bearer as a descendent of a certain Vrsagana.
"Eine alte Formel der Samkhya-Yoga-Philosophie bei Vätsyāyana" in: Festgabe H. Jacobi, Bonn 1926, 358-368 = Kleine Schriften, hrsg. v. F. WILHELM, Wiesbaden 1983, 207-217.
Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. 1, Salzburg 1953, 285. 'Ed. P. PRADHAN, Patna 1967, 301.2.
O.c., 1.c.