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ONCE AGAIN VAIŠEŞIKA SŪTRA 3.1.13
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Prasastapāda's buddhi in the statement cited above refers to sūtra 3.1.2 and/ or 13 (Vyomaśiva's position cannot be determined with certainty). Do we have to conclude that they still knew the earlier interpretation, perhaps even the earlier order of the sūtras in Ähnika 3.1? Did the two interpretations of Ahnika 3.1 exist for a while side by side? In this connection it is interesting to cite Hattori's (1968: 134-35 n. 4.3) paraphrase of some remarks from Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya: "Jinendrabuddhi remarks that the relation of VS, III, i, 13, to the preceding sūtras is variously interpreted by different commentators. He refers to the following two interpretations: (1) The universal apprehension (prasiddhi) is nothing other than knowledge (jñāna). It therefore follows that it is an attribute (guna), and is non-eternal (anitya). That which is non-eternal has a cause (kārana). Thus the sūtra in question indicates the cause of knowledge and also mentions that knowledge as an effect is different from its causes, as a pot as an effect is different from its cause, clay. (2) Since the preceding sūtras explain anumāna, one might consider anumāna as the only pramāņa. VS, III, i, 13, forestalls this by mentioning pratyakşa as a separate pramāņa. As Jinendrabuddhi says, VS, III, I, 13, can be understood as providing the definition of pratyaksa according to the second interpretation but not the first. Dignāga's implication when he says "by a certain relation [to the preceding sūtras)' (kenacit sambandhena) should be understood as referring to these different interpretation; (Pramāṇasamuccaya-ţikā] [Sde-dge ed., Tohoku, No. 4268] 53a.3-536.1 ([Peking ed., Tibetan Tripitaka, No. 5766] 59b.4-60a.3)." Note in particular the remark, in the second interpretation, "since the preceding sūtras explain anumāna" (rtags las byung ba tshad mar ba rjod la, which Muni Jambuvijaya (1961: 174 1. 5) translates into Sanskrit laingikapramāne 'bhihite). This seems to confirm our earlier supposition that a discussion of inferential knowledge (laingikam jñānam; perhaps better laingikam pramānam?) once preceded sūtra 3.1.13, not a discussion of the inferential mark (linga) as maintained, for example, by Candrānanda. Also Akalanka must have known two interpretations of VS 3.1.13, as has been pointed out by K. Preisendanz (1989: 152).26
Preisendanz (1989: 151 n. 39) also refers to *Vimalākşa's commentary on Müla-Madhyamaka-Kārikā 14.1, translated by Walleser from the Chinese into German (1912: 90). She observes that here "VS 3.1.13 is obvi
26 Compare Akalarka's remark cited above with Tattvārtha-Värttika p. 46 1. 6-8: yasya
matam - ātmano jñānākhyo guṇaḥ, tasmāc cărthäntarabhūtah, "ātmendriyamanorthasannikarsät yan nispadyate tad anyar" iti vacanäd iti ...; also p. 50 1. 9-14.
