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JOHANNES BRONKHORST
lem is not convincing. A far more convincing solution presents itself if we assume that Prasastapāda already knew the beginning of Adhyaya 3 more or less in the form in which we know it. Sūtra 3.1.2 (3), in particular, uses indriyārthaprasiddhi as inferential mark to prove the existence of the soul. Indriyārthaprasiddhi is, of course, a kind of knowledge (jñāna) or consciousness.23 Sūtra 3.1.13, too, is interpreted by some commentators (C, U) as presenting consciousness as an inferential mark of the soul.
There is no evidence, on the other hand, to believe that already the author of the Carakasamhita knew the present order and interpretation of Adhyāya 3 of the Vaiseṣika Sutra. This text enumerates a number of inferential marks of the highest self (lingani paramātmanah) in Sarirasthana 1.70-72.24 A. Comba (1987: 54 f.) has pointed out that this enumeration draws upon two sources, the one being VS 3.2.4, the other Yajnavalkyasmrti 3.174-175 (Stenzler, 1849: p. 99 of the edition).25 The elements of VS 3.2.4, Comba suggests, were taken as basis, to which the elements of the Yajnavalkyasmrti have been added. The fact that buddhi 'consciousness' figures in the list of the Caraka-samhita does not, therefore indicate that Ahnika 3.1 of the Vaiseşika Sutra was read and understood as it is at present, for buddhi occurs in the list of the Yajnavalkyasmṛti. The fact that buddhi is added after the elements occurring in VS 3.2.4, agrees with the general procedure of the author of the Carakasamhita, drawn attention to by Comba, to add the elements of the Yajnavalkyasmṛti after those taken from the Vaiseşika Sutra.
It looks, then, as if the commentator who used sūtra 3.1.1 as an introduction to a discussion of the proof of the soul, lived before Prasastapāda, though perhaps not very long before him. Some facts suggest that his new interpretation of the sutras of Ahnika 3.1 could not impose itself immediately. There is, on the one hand, the ongoing tradition of authors who look upon VS 3.1.13 as a definition of perception. Equally interesting is the fact that both the commentators Śrīdhara and Udayana fail to understand that
23 This is precisely what Sarkara Miśra says in his Upaskära (p. 85 1. 17-19): yady api jñānam eva lingam iha vivakṣitam tathap Indriyārthaprasiddhe rūpādisäkṣätkärasya prasiddhatarataya tädrūpyeṇaiva lingatvam uktam.
24 Caraka Sa. 1.70-72: prāṇāpānau nimeṣādyä jIvanam manaso gatiḥ/ indriyantarasamcaraḥ preranam dharanam ca yat// desantaragatiḥ svapne pañcatvagrahanam tatha/ dṛṣṭasya dakṣinenākṣṇā savyenävagamas tatha// iccha dveṣaḥ sukham duḥkham prayatnas cetana dhṛtiḥ/ buddhiḥ smṛtir ahankäro lingāni paramātmanaḥ//.
25 Yajnavalkyasmṛti 3. 174-75 (ed. Stenzler): ahankaraḥ smṛtir medha dveşo buddhiḥ sukham dhṛtiḥ/ indriyantarasañcara iccha dharaṇaj Ivite// svargaḥ svapnaś ca bhāvanām preraṇam manaso gatiḥ/ nimesas cetanāyatna ādānam päñcabhautikam//.
