On Term Antahsamjna

Author(s): A Wezler
Publisher: A Wezler

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ABORI: R. G. Bhandarkar 160th Birth Anniversary Volume
deliberately coined to counter them: It becomes fully intelligible if it is taken as an objection directed against the view that plants are not only internally (antah), but also externally (bahih aprakāśa -- and hence nihsamina; it is natural enough that such a view should be rejected, concisely and at the same time precisely, by stating that plants are on the contrary in reality (only) antah. samina.
Thus it may finally be concluded that the term antahsamjna was coined by a man or a group of people who wanted to dissociate themselves from a view about vegetal life held by others or perhaps even prevalent at their time; who thought it best to confront it by emphasizing that plants, in spite of the indisputable absence of outward activity in them, do nevertheless “ have internal consciousness"; and who chose a very Indian way for expressing their own view, viz. with a single term which makes use of central elements of their opponents' proposition, i. e. antaḥ and osamjña.
Now, this looks as if it were the "altogether new interpretation " of which it has been said above ($ 2.4.3) that there is no need to search for it". In reality, however, it is practically only another version of the first interpretation.
The correction which has now been made consists in the clarification that the stress lies not, or not so much, on the absence of outward activity, but on the existence of an inner consciousness. A statement to the effect that plants are antaḥsamina in this sense, problematic though it indeed would be if it were made independently, becomes fully understandable in itself -- and intelligible as to its motives - if only it is taken as opposed to a view according to which plants are denied this consciousness. Therefore, the decision which could not be taken earlier (cf. § 2. 4. 3 above) is now nonetheless a natural one : Of the two alternative interpretations it is clearly the first one that should be given preference, though in its new and revised form, emphasizing the possibility that originally the term intended the confinement of consciousness within the limits of the body' without reference to the absence of outward expression which should be, I suggest, a later development in the understanding of the term.
In conclusion, a final problem, namely if anything can be said about the origin and/or doctrinal affiliation of the term antahsamjna. However, all I am able to offer at the moment is a hypothesis, and one of which I can only give the outline: If the result achieved by Hacker in his analysis of certain Purānic texts is correct and holds equally good for the portions of these texts drawn upon by me, then it may safely be stated that the term in question is not of Samkhya origin, but is on the contrary opposed to the view about plants which upholders of this school of thought held. This supposition is supported by what has been