On Term Antahsamjna

Author(s): A Wezler
Publisher: A Wezler
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269473/1

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ON THE TERM ANTAḤSAMJŇA
By
A. WEZLER
1. In most cases of antaḥsamjña-, and the term usually occurs in the plural, what is referred to are plants, i. e. the vegetable kingdom. As a rule it is explained by commentators by sthāvara, stationary [living beings]", or similar expressions. Far more important than their testimony is, however, the evidence found in some of the mula texts themselves. What I have in mind is a passage like Gaut. Dh.S. 1.8.2 (8.2): tayoḥ caturvidhasya manusyajātasyānlaḥsamjñānām calanapatanasarpaṇānām āyattam jivanam-where it is easily seen that the term antaḥsimjia- cannot (in spite of its position ) but refer to that which alone makes this enumeration of the various species of (earthly) living beings a complete one, viz. plants-; but it is Manusmrti 1.49 which is particularly relevant :
tamasă bahurupeņa vesṭitāḥ karmahetunā |
antaḥsamjna bhavanty ete sukhaduḥkhasamanvitāḥ //
My thanks are due to Dr. (Miss) G. Bühnemann for having copied for me the relevant cards of the collection on which the "Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles" is based, and, of course, to the authorities concerned for their kind permission to use their unpublished material.
1. One of the exceptions is perhaps Siddhantatattvaviveka (an astronomical work, on which cf. D. Pingree, Jyotiḥśastra. Astral and Mathematical Literature [A History of Indian Literature Vol. IV Fasc. 4], Wiesbaden 1981, p. 29 and 31), 9. 15. However, the meaning given is "that which is called end" so that, if this is correct, the word intended can only be antasamjña, formed like visnusamjña- (used by Vatsya Varadaguru in his Tattvanirṇaya), "bearing the name Visnu". For another exception see § 2. 4.2.
2. I prefer this, rendering to the usual "immovable", as plants, too, move, i. e. possess (even) various types of movements; and this has been observed by the ancient Indians themselves (cf. § 2. 4. 3).
3. The pronoun refers back to the two subjects (rājā brāhmaṇas ca bahufrutaḥ) of the first sutra.
4. The order of enumeration could be taken to form a descending climax if antaḥsamjñānām had final position. The position the term in fact has can nevertheless be accounted for, viz. by assuming that, after mentioning the four varnas, the author's attention was directed first to those kinds of living beings on which the life of all the others, including men, depended, viz. plants.

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- where ete is (contrary to the assertion of the Larger Petrograd Dictionary ) clearly used in place of the expression udbhijjah sthāvarāḥ of verse 46, as explicitly stated also by not a few of the commentators. The exact meaning of the term together with the reason why it is applied to plants, however, seem to call for a closer study which I now propose to undertake by examining the relevant passages.
2.1. In his Bhāsya on BS 1. 3.25 Sankara puts forward among others the argument: śāstram hy aviseşapravșttam api manusyān evādhikaroti sakta. tvād arthitvād aparyudastatvād upanayanādiśāstrāc ca ..., rendered by Thibaut? thus : " For the sāstra, although propounded without distinction (i. e. although not itself specifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its precepts), does in reality entitle mens only (to act according to its precepts ); for men only (of the three higher castes ) are, firstly, capable of complying with the precepts of the sastra ); are, secondly, desirous of the results of actions enjoined by the sāstra ); are, thirdly, not excluded by prohibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the precepts about the upanayana ceremony and so on."9 On the first 10 reason adduced by Sankara Vacaspatimiśra remarks in his Bhāmati: tiryagdevarşinām aśıktānām adhikāram nivartayati, " ( by this reason Sankara ] rejects that animals, gods and șsis are entitled [to act according to the precepts of the sästra ] as they cannot [ do so ]." What he says on the second reason is: antaḥsamjnanām mokşımāņānām ci lcāmyeşu kirmasv adhikāram nişedhati, “ [ by this reason ] he denies that plants and men who wish to free themselves [ from samsāra ] are entitled [ to act according to the precepts of the sästra or, as regards the latter to perform ] optional ritual acts."
Since animals are aleady excluded by the first reason, there can hardly arise any uncertainty as regards the expression antaḥsam jña : it is evidently meant to
5. Where it is said to refer to "animals and plants". This error was, however, oorrected in the Shorter Petrograd Dictionary.
6. I fail to uiderstand why Nandana explains et e by sthåvar å day ah, i. e. what be had in view when adding adi, especially as he declares the whole vorse to be an argument concerning plants only; cf. his statement : sthivirinam caitanyopilambhat (read: caitanyānupao?) karm ophulanubhsah kertham ity afskya pariharati - tam a seti . Perhaps what he intended to say was something like sthavari vr ksādayaḥ.
7. The Vedānta Sütrig of Bādarāyan with the Commentary of Sankara, Pt. I (SBE XXXIV), Oxford 1890, p. 197.
8. Io a footnote, Thibaut explains (following Vācaspatimisra): “I. e. men belonging to the three upper castes".
9. In a further footnote, Thibaut gives a detailed explanation of all four reasons ; but what he says about the second reason cannot pass for a convincing interpretation, and that not only because he does not even mention plants.
10. It should be noted that following Vācaspatimiára's order of explication this would be the second one.

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exclude plants. Therefore nothing is learnt from Amalānanda'gll explanation : antaḥsamjñānām sthāvarānām mokşam icchatām cānarthitvāt karmany ana. dhikāraḥ: One even feels left in the lurch by him as he does not touch upon the question why plants, too, are said to be anarthin, and whether it is with regard to their lack of desire that they are referred to as antaḥsamiña. And his help is in fact not necessary to realize that the anarthitva, though common to both, the mokşamāņa as well as the plants, must have quite different a cause in each of the two cases. Whereas those men who wish to attain mokşa are evidently not desirous of the results of the optional actions enjoined by the śāstral2 because they take them not to be instrumental to attaining liberation, plants had but to be included in this group because they lack this desire by their very nature, and perhaps because they even lack any desire at all. Therefore one cannot help gathering the impression that it is precisely because of this defect' that instead of one of the usual expressions for “ plants" the rather rare term antaḥsamina is used here by Vācaspatimiśra. Yet, this passage alone does not permit to turn a vague assumption into certainty, and thus stresses the necessity of taking a closer look at the term as such.
2. 2 Of some help, however, might be what Haradatta says in commenting on Gaut.Dh.S. 1. 8. 2 ( quoted above, $ 1):18 yeşām antaḥ saminā na bahis te tathoktāḥ," those [living beings) are called thus whose consciousness is internal [and] not external." It stands to reason that samjna, forming the last member of the bahuvrīhi compound, is used in a meaning well attested already in the early Upanişads and canonical Buddhist texts, namely "consciousness", reaching, in principle, from identifying perception over the formation of concepts to the naming of the objects perceived. Now, if Haradatta is right, and there can hardly be any doubt that he is, in explaining that the prior member is in implicit opposition to the contrary concept bahiḥ, it becomes at once clear that the two adverbs of place cannot by any means refer to the one substratum of consciousness as such. On the contrary, the distinction between beings whose consciousness " is antah” and others whose consciousness is bahih” is meaningful only if the reference is to the manner of its manifestation or if what is meant is that the consciousness is confined to the interior, i. e. the body only or perhaps a part of it,
11. The edition used is: The Brahmasūtra Sankara Bhāsys with the Commentaries Bbāmati, Kalpataru and Parimala ... ed. ... by M. M. Anantakrisna Sastrī, Bombay? (NSP) 1938.
12. As regards the obligatory sacrifices, Amaläpanda remarks: kamyagrahanena $uddhyartham nityesu kasyacin mumuksor asty adhikara iti sūcayati J.
13. Maskarin (of. Gautamadharmagūtram Maskaribbäsyopotam, ed. by L. Srinivasacharya, Mysore 1917) explains ant ahsañjāḥ by anuloma pratilomah -- and calanāh by sthāvarāh, and thus gives the impression of being not quite sane. RGB...15

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and that it does not extend beyond these limits. Haradatta himself does not, howover, elaborate on this point; all be deems necessary is to adduce (the transition being formed by tathā ca manuḥ) the verse of the Manusmrti quoted above ($ 1).14
2. 3. This verse is, no doubt, very instructive in more than one respect (as will be seen later also ); but clearly it does not render much assistance in achieving a more accurate understanding of the term under discussion: As it is not formulated explicitly enough, all one can say is that it seems to intimate that the state of being antaḥsamina has to do with being wrapped by tamas."15 Besides, tamas is not a specific quality of plants alone as is also shown by Manu 12. 42-44.16 In the context of this Smộti alone verse 1. 49 does not allow to draw any definite conclusion, so that it is useful to go through the various commentaries17 on this verse and see if their authors have to contribute anything which might solve the problem.
2.4. Disregarding Rāghavānanda18 whose explanation would lead us off the track, attention may be turned first to Manirāma's paraphrase antaścaitanya (bhavanti), which is not however apt to arrest it as thus the only information given is that samjña is semantically equivalent to caitanya.19 For Medhātithi, however, quite the opposite holds good: His comment on antaḥsamjñā(h)o is very detailed and highly instructive : samjñā buddhis tullingasya bahirvihāravyāhāradeh kāryasya ceştārūpasyābhāvād antah samjñā ucyante / anyuthāntar evu sarvah puruşaś cetayate / atha vā yathā manuşyāḥ kanta kāditodam cetayante naivam sthāvarāḥ / te hi mahāntam pratodam paraśuvidāraņādi duḥkhasam. jñāyām apekşante / yathā svāpamadamūrcchāvasthāgatāḥ prāņinah II. " samjña [as second member of the compound ] means cognition; in as much as the effect indicative of it (i.e. cognition ), such as the outward behaviour, the uttering
14. The edition used by me, viz. Kashi SS 172, Varanasi 1960, contains a printing error (cestitah instead of vestitah).
15. The relation with the thgory of rebirth, which is forshadowed as it were by the attribute karmahetund of tamned at 1. 49, is made explicit by the next verse (et aidantas tu gatayo ...).
16. On these verses cf. L. Rocher's contribution" Karma and Rebirth in the Dharmaśāstras” to the volume : Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions, ed. by W. D. O'Flaherty, Berkeley / Los Angeles London 1980, p 63 ff.
17. This is now ossily possible thanks to the edition of the Manu-Smrti with Nine Commentaries by J. H. Dave (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan) - which gives, however, cause for & number of serious complaints and thus falls definitely short of a true edition.
13. I don't keep to the (probable ) historical sequence of these commontators. 19. Nandana's explanation is of the same type (cf. fn. 6 above). 20. Note the double sandhi of the pratika antahamjñeti.

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of (articulate or inarticulate ) sounds, etc., which consisting (in general ] in ( some form ] of activity is absent [in plants ], they are said to have inner consciousness'. [This should be the meaning of the predicate antaḥsamiñal "); for ] otherwise (this term would be meaningless as ] every individual soul has consciousness only within [ himself ). Or else [ the meaning may be that] plants do not experience pain etc. ) in the same way as men ( do ), e.g. the pricking of a thorn, etc. For with regard to experiencing pain they (i. e. plants ) stand in need of a massive stroke such as splitting with an axe, etc., just as other ] living beings (i.e. men and animals) when in the state of sleep, intoxication or swoon."
Kullūka does not mention the second of these explanations, but confinos himself to reformulating the first one : ete vrkşādayas... antascaitanyā bhavanti yady api sarve cantar eva cetayante tathāpi bahirvyāpārādikāryavirahāt tatha vyapadiśyante /; but to this he adds the remark : trigunārabdhatve 'pi caiņām tamoguņabāhulyāt tathā vyapadeśaḥ, "and they are given this designation because of the [relatively ) larger quantity of the constituent tamas (they contain ), although they are [ like all the other phenomena ] made up of tho three gunas.”
1. Govindarāja, on the other hand, does not deem it necessary to give but the gist of Medhātithi's first explanation : yady api sarva eva kvacid antar eva cetuyante tathāpy ete samjñākāryasya vyavahārādeḥ bahirabhāvād antaḥsamjñā ucyante 11.
The only commentator to pull out of the line is Sarvajñanārāyana who equates antaḥsamiña(h) with mānasajñānamātravantah, “ being characterized by mental perception only ", yet not without continuing : tad evoktam sukheti, " precisely this is stated in the verse itself, viz. by the attribute connected] with pleasure [ and pain ]'."
. 2. 4: 1. To start with this latter explanation : It has to be admitted that in terms of certain Indian theories of cognition pleasure and pain are indeed specific objects of mental perception; the concept of mānasapratyakşu has most probably even been developed to account precisely for this particular kind of perception. Though some philosophers maintain the existence of a special type of mental perception which is not conditioned by a preceding sense-pereeption, 21 the idea that certain living beings are by their very nature unable to have but mental perception is, as far as I can see, not mentioned in expositions of and discussions about (mānasa. )pratyakşa. Nevertheless, this idea is attested to in a philoso
21.
Cf. M. Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception (HOS 47), Cambridge, Mass. 1968,
p. 94.

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phical text also, and in a passage at that in which also the term antaḥsamiña occurs, viz. in Vijñānabhiksu's Samkhyapravacanabhäsya on 5. 121,92 translated thus by Ballantyne23 : “ It has been stated ", viz. in sūtra 5. 111, “ that there are vegetable Bodies. He repels the objection of the atheist, that, in the case in question, there is not a Body, inasmuch as there is no knowledge of the external : Aph. 121.24 Knowledge of the external is not indispensable ( to constitute a Body ) : trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, etc., [ which have internal consciousness ), are, also, sites of experiencer and experience; as in the former case. There is no necessity that that only should be a Body in which there is knowledge of the external; but it is to be held that the being a Body, in the form of being the site of experiencer and experience, belongs also to trees, etc., which have internal consciousness; because, as in the former case ', meaning the putrescence already mentioned ", viz. in sūtra 5. 114," of the Bodies of men, etc., ( which takes place ) in the absence of the superintendence of an experiencer [i. e. the living soul ), even in the same way do withering, etc., take place in the Bodies of trees, etc., also; such is the meaning. And to this offect there is Scripture", viz. ChU 6. 11.2: " But if the jīva leaves one of its branches, that branch withers ', etc.".
Vijñānabhiksu 25 is clearly of the opinion that plants cannot be denied a body in spite of the fact that they do not possess the faculty of perceiving exter. nal objects. He does not, however, adduce any reason for this view nor give
22. The original reads thus (according to Garbe's edition, The Samkhya-PravacangBhāgya [H03 Vol. II ], Cambridge, Mass. 1943, p. 145) [the orthography is modernized ) :
udbhijjam sariram astity uktam. tatra bāhyabuddhyabhāvac chariratuam năstiti nästikāksepam apakaroti : na bähyabuddhiniyamo osksagulmalatausadhivanaspatitrnsvirudhadinām aps bhoktrbhogayatanatvan pūrvavat // 121
na bāhyajñānam yatrūsti tad era sariram iti niyamah; kim tu vyksādinām antahsam jānām api bhoktrbhogayat anatoam sariratuim mantavy am ; yatah pūrvavat pūrvokto yo bhoktradhisthānam vina manusyadi farirasyn pūtibhau 18, tadvad eva orkaadi Fariresu api fuglatadikam ity arthah tatha ca frutih asya yad ekan sakham jāno jahati, atha să fu8yati' ityādir sti.
23. The Sankhya Aphorisms of Kapila with Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries, London 1885, p. 411 f.
24. In gpite of Udays Vira Shāstri's endeavours (Proceedings and Transactions of the AIOO II, Lahore 1931, pp. 855-892; cf. also his book Simkhyadarsan kā itibās, Dilli sam. 2007. p. 70 ff.) to prove its antiquity, the Sănkhyasūtra is a late work; cf. H. D. Sharina's “ Iotroduction" (p. 21 tf.) to G. Jha's translation of Tbe Tattva Kaumudi (Poona OS 10). Poonaa 1957 as well as H. Jacobi, ZDMG 62 (1908), p. 593 = Kleine Schriften, hrg. v. B. Kölver, Wiesbaden 1970, p. 677.
25. This holds good for the author of the Samkhyasūtra, too, as well as for those commentators who ditfer from Vijñāpabhiksu in taking n bahy buddhiniyamah ag a separate putra which thoy also interpret in another way.

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any additional explication which might render it a bit clearer.26 And, to be sure, such an elucidation is direly needed to understand the conception of living beings which as "sites of ... experience” have internal consciousness, but no "knowledge of the external" or, so one should say with regard to Sarvajñanārāyaņa, which feel pain and rarely 27 also pleasure, 28 but are nevertheless not able to perceive the object of these sensations unless it has quite penetrated their bodies. Vijñānabhiksu's silence is embarassing, especially because it is not at all easy to take his part and to try to account for the conception of a consciousness in living beings to whom the external world is absolutely uncognizable and hence nonexistent. But even if this question, and others likewise which come to one's mind, could be answered satisfactorily, one would still wonder why at all plants came to be denoted by the term antaḥsamiña in the first place. For, according to Vijñānabhiksu what is characteristic of plants is that they have only an internal consciousness — correctly explained by Sarvajñanārāyana by equating it to mānasajñāna mātra vant , in contradistinction to other living beings which in addition possess knowledge of the external" : What is most important on the level of meaning is hence not expressed by the term itself ! And the assumption that is implied is not only highly improbable, for the matter is too important, but also philologically not justifiable since Patañjali's dictum 29 santy eka padāny apy avadhāraṇāni, exemplified by a particular type of tatpuruşa compounds, refers to an expression in so far as it is used as a predicate and cannot therefore be easily drawn upon 30 to explain antaḥsamjna in so far as it is virtually a technical term.
The conclusion one cannot but arrive at is hence that Vijñānabhikṣu's testimony, interesting though it is for the history of the term antaḥsamina and above all for the history of the ideas about vegetal life in India, is not the right clue to the precise meaning of the term. It was either deliberately reinterpreted
26. That for which a reason is adduced instead is the āyatanat pa, i.e. the view that plants are also seats of experience, - & view of palpable importance for the theory of transmigration.
27. Cf. Medhätithi on Manu 1. 49: sattvasyäpi tatra bhävät kasyamcid avasthiyam suthalefum api bhur jate and the more precise explanation of Kullūka's : sattvasyāpi bhāvāt ksddcit sukhaleto 'pi jaladharajanitajalasamparkad esam jāyate.
28. Sarvajñanārāyana remarks that by suklo( dulkhasamanvitäh "knowledge, etc." also are implied (... 8 ukh eti / upalaksanam jñānāder apy etat); he might have in view Nyaya S. 1. 1. 10 or Vaidesika S. 3. 1. 4 (together with 1) when speaking of jrana di.
29. Mahabhigya ed. by F. Kielhorn, Poona 1892, I 6. 23.
30. Besides, if this dictum were nevertheless to apply to antahaa mjita, the meaning resulting couldn't but be " that the consciousness of which is only internal ” which is still different from what Sarvajñanārāyana says, apart from the fact that antaho could then hardly bo explained.

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by him so as to agree with his conception of plants as destitute of any bahyajñāna - or simply misconstrued. As for Sarvajñanārāyaṇa, he cannot, for all that is known about his date, 31 be dependent on the author of the Pravacanabhāṣya;32 yet, there is some likelihood that his interpretation of the term as used in Manu 1. 49 was inspired by the conception of plants as it is also attested to by Vijñānabhiksu. Nevertheless it cannot be definitely excluded that Sarvajñanarayana was only drawing on his own imagination.
Medhātithi's second explanation (cf. § 2. 4 above), on the other hand, cannot be denied a certain plausibility, irrespective of whether he intended a loose comparison, a partial likeness or a complete agreement when paralleling plants and men in a state of sleep, intoxication or faint (but cf. infra the end of
2.4.2). In any case, the phrase yatha sväpamadamürechāvasthāgataḥ präpinah renders assistance in clarifying the peculiar concept of plants on which this explanation is based: They do not totally lack the faculty of perception or rather of feeling pain, and this has significance for man's attitude towards plants; but it needs a massive stimulus to reach, as it were, their consciousness, just as a man sleeping can only be shaken out of his sleep, etc., or a woman fainted cannot be treated with a gentle hand in order to regain consciousness. What Medhätithi wants to intimate is obviously that the plants' sense(s) is/are by its/their very nature particularly dull, 33 and this naturally involves that plants are able to feel only a strong pain: A tree, e. g., feels the pain of being cut with an axe, but it is insensitive to the pain of a leaf being torn off or a twig being broken.
It is most probably by mere coincidence that in this case, too, a parallel in a philosophical text has to be taken note of, viz. Vacaspatimiśra's Tattvavaisaradi. In the course of his (rather strange )34 interpretation of YS 1. 10 (abhavapratyayalambana veltir nidra) and of the Bhasya on it, he states this sutra to mean: jāgratsvapnavṛttinām abhävas, tasya pratyayah käraṇam buddhisattvacchadakam tamas, tad evälambanam visayo yasyaḥ sā
Cooca
31. According to P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, Vol. 1, Poona2 1975, p. 1190, he is earlier than 1400 A. D.".
32. Who is said to have flourished in 1575 (cf. K. H. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I: Bibliography, Delhi / Varanasi / Patna 1983, p. 373).
33.
This could be compared to Udayana's view that the internal awareness of plants is extremely faint (atiman lantaḥsamjñata); of. Kiranavali, ed. by J. N. Jetly, (HOS 154) Baroda 1971, p. 39 and W. Halbfass contribution "Karina, Apurva and Natural' Causes Observations on the Growth and Limits of the Theory of Samsara" in: Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions, ed. by W. D. O'Flaherty, Berkely / Los Angoles/ London 1980, p. 280. All that Vardhamana has to say on the expression atimandantaḥsamjata is: antaḥ samjñā jñānam.
34. Quite in contradistinction to that of the author of the Patanjalayogaśāstra
vivaraja.

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tathokta vṛttir nidra; but he also adds the remark: buddhisattve hi trigune yada sattvarajasi abhibhūya samastakaraṇāvarakam avirasti tamas tada buddher visayākāra pariṇāmābhāvād udbhatata momayim buddhim avabudhyamānaḥ purusah susupto 'ntaḥsamiña ity ucyote, " for, when in as much as the buddhisattva35 consists of the three constituents - tamas by prepondering over sattva and rajas becomes manifest as covering and darkening all the organs [including the internal one], then because the buddhi does not [any longer] undergo changes into the form of an object [ of cognition ], the purușa, aware of the buddhi which [ then ] consists of intensified tamas, is said to be in deep sleep, inwardly conscious."
Woods, however, was apparently of the opinion that the scope of ity ucyate reaches at least as far back as buddhisattve hi...; for he renders its by a separate sentence and as follows: "Thus it is explained." But I don't see why the expression ity ucyate, very common as it is, should be used here in a sense other than that it normally has. The only disagreement possible here is that whether ity is to be construed with (a)ntaḥsamjna only or with susupto, too. A further difficulty consists in that purusaḥ, qualified by... buddhim avabudhyamānaḥ, can only be taken to mean "soul" as conceived of in Samkhya and Yogawhereas one hesitates to assume that it is the soul again which is said to be suşupto 'ntahaamjña(h); for in view of what is taught in YS 1. 10 itself, viz. that sleep is one of the types of functions of the citta, one would rather expect the expression suşupto 'ntaḥsamjna to refer to a subject like "person" or "man" which could likewise be denoted by purusa. In reality, however, these two ideas are not incompatible with each other, as the cetana subject of experience according to Samkhya-Yoga is nothing but what is technically called purusa.
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Yet, there is still more to be observed here. Vacaspatimiśra asserts that the purusa when in deep sleep is called antaḥsamjña". One wonders which texts he could possibly have had in mind. To be sure, he can't intend everyday language; for there is no corroborating evidence at all to be found in the vast Sanskrit literature.37 Obviously, authors of Yoga texts younger than the Tattvavaiśāradī asked themselves the same question, i. e. those who more or less heavily depended on Vacaspatimiárà; and the answer they give is that it is the śruti which is referred to, though they fail to identify it. Thus Vijñānabhikṣu says by way
35. This term is based on the idea that of the three gupas it is sattva that quantitively exceeds the other two in constituting the tattva variously called buddhi or mahant, etc. 38. The Yoga-System of Patanjali (HOS 17), repr. Delhi / Varanasi / Patna 1966,
P. 30.
37.
As far as it has been taken into account by the Poona Dictionary Project,

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of paraphrasing Vācaspati :38 tām ca nidrākhyām vrttim avabudhyamānaḥ puru şah su şu ptasthāno 'ntahprajña iti śrutibhir ucyata itz.39 Nāgesa has, according to one edition, 40 puruso 'ntahsamjna ucyate, 41 but, according to another," puruṣaḥ susu ptasthāno 'ntahprajna ity ucyate śrutibhiḥ; and Bala Rāmodāsina remarks, 3 apart from recording, for the Tattvavaisāradi, a variant reading antahprajñaḥ instead of antaḥsamjnah, that the srautah pāthah is suşuptasthāno 'ntaḥprajñaḥ. The term antaḥsamjña does indeed remind one of the very similar expression antahprajna, attested to first in the Māndukyopanisad ;44 however, it is used there in the context of a description of dream-sleep (svapna )45 - whereas the contrary bahihprajña 46 refers to the state of waking (jāgarita ) and there the ātman " when in deep sleep " ( su şuptasthāna) is given quite different qualifications also.47 Everything is put aright, as it were, by Nārāyanatīrtha by stating in his Yogasiddhāntacandrikā: tāni (i. e. vrtlim ) eva tatra jānānaḥ puruṣaḥ svapna ivānt iḥprajño 'pi drgdrśyabhedābhimānābhāvāt suşuptisthāna ekābhūta ity ucyate śrutibhiḥ.48 Yet, this doesn't help much to solve the problem posed by the Vaiśāradī, and as there is no critical edition of the latter text I don't see any chance for the time being that it could be solved independently.
Now, this is certainly an interesting theory of (deep sleep, but evidently also a very special one, as it is framed almost exclusively with the help of peculiar tenets of Samkhya-Yoga : To be in deep sleep means to be in a state where the functions of the citta are confined to having just tamas, “ darkness", as object.
38. Viz, in his Yogavärttika on YS 1. 10; cf. e. g. the edition and translation by T. S. Rukmani, Vol. I, Delhi 1981, p. 80.
39. Rukmani (o. c., p. 81) takes the fruti passage - on which she, however, adds tha remark « not traced” to mean: "He who stays in deep sleep knows 47 truth”,which reminds me of the Garman saying "Den Seinen gibt's der Herr im Schlaf" ("fortune favours fools ").
40. Viz Yogagūtram (Kasbi SS 83), Benares 1930, p. 14.
41. This is also what Pt. Baladewa Miśra says in his Yogapradipikā (Kasbi 88 85, Benares 1931, p. 6).
42. Viz, The Yogasatrag of Patañjali ... (Bombay S and PS 46), Poona 1917, p. 229, 43. Viz. in bis edition of the Yogadarśana .... Benares 1911, p. 33, fo. 3.
4t. Viz. 4 and 7. For later references cf. G. A. Jacob, A Concordance of the Principal Upanishads and the Bhagavadgitā, repr, DelhiVaranasi Patna 1963, 4. v.
45. Note that Vyomagiva (Vyomavati, ChSS 61, Benares 1930, p. 549 f.) gives two definitions of dream, but that according to both it is a particular mental perception.
46. Cf. 3: jägaritasthano bahihprajñaḥ ... sthūlabhug vaisvanarah prathamah padaḥ. 47. Viz. 5 : ... susupt asthána ekibhutaḥ prajñānaghana eva ...
48. Cf. Yogadarśana ... ed. by Pt. Ratna Gopala Bhatta, (ChSS 35), Benares 1911, p. 11.

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Since man in this state is, as is expressly stated, 49 not conceived of as being deprived of each and every form of consciousness, it might seem not unreasonable - in spite of the textual problem discussed in the foregoing — that he, or the puruşa, is said to “ have internal consciousness " then.
However, this theory is not easily connected with Medhātithi's second explanation of the term antahsamjnu. For this latter conspicuously lacks not only any reference to antallsamiña being used to characterize man when in deep sleep, but also all signs of an influence exercised on it by the / a Samkhya-Yoga theory of deep sleep. To do justice to it, it is sufficient to assume that the state of sleep, intoxication and swoon are pointed out primarily with the aim of exemplifying and thereby explaining the peculiar insensitiveness of plants by analogizing it to these states of consciousness, well known to every human being if not from his own experience then from observations in others.
The central question, still to be examined, is hence if Medhātithi by his second explanation as it stands really accomplishes what he claims to do, viz. to offer a convincing explanation for antaḥsamjna being used to refer to plants. The answer can, I think, only be to the negative. For, plants are always, i. e. by their very nature, antahsamgña, while man's consciousness is turned inwards or drawn back to the interior only when he is in deep sleep or a similar state; and this implies that the term was coined to characterize man when in one of these states and only thereafter transferred to plants also. For there is by far greater likelihood that what led to its coining in the first place was a particular state, palpably different from the normal' one, of that species of living beings to which consciousness in the fullest sense is intrinsic; and the idea of an “ interior", to which consciousness can be drawn back or (intermittently) confined, is ultimately intelligible only if it was conceived with regard to man. There is, however, not only no evidence whatsoever to warrant such an assumption, but the very nature of the available references also clearly points in the opposite direction, as has already been stated. It is hence not at all surprising that later commentators on the Manusmrti do not even mention Medhatithi's explanation.
2. 4. 3. That this explanation can thus be safely ruled out, does not, of course, mean that his first one bas by necessity to be accepted. But it has in any case to be examined next and should certainly be given full attention before I venture on my own on an altogether new explanation.
The concluding sentence, viz. anyuthāntar eva sarvaḥ puruşaś cetayate, refers clearly, though not necessarily intentionally, to a peculiar element of the
49. Cf. e. g. Vācaspatimigra's remark (1, c.): kasmāt punar niruddhakaivalyayor iva orttyabhāva eva na nidrety ata dha - 8à ca eam prabodhe prat yaramar fat ... pratyayanifesah 1. RGB...16

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Sāmkhya theory of cognition; for, the argument brought forward here is that if antahamiria were to be taken literally it could not form a specific property of plants only because each and every puruşa, whatever the kind of body he is endowed with, human, animal, vegetable or divine, etc., cognizes only internally, i. e. that which is presented to him by the buddhi as the last and highest element of the corresponding "inner organ” (antahkarana ). In fact, the phrase puruşaś cetayate 50 is found quite often, especially in philosophical texts of the Jainas; it forms part of a string by which the process of perception, etc., is described as a whole and which runs thus :51 indriyāny artham alocayanti ahamkāro 'bhimanyate manaḥ samkal payati buddhir adhyavasyati purusas cetayate. An exact parallel has not yet been discovered in any of the (few) extant Samkhya texts; but a passage in the Mātharavrtti62 is almost identical. Although it cannot hence be taken for granted that it must be a quotation in the strict sense of the word, there cannot be the least doubt that it represents a doctrinally and terminologically53 faithful formulation of the corresponding Samkhya tenet. The fact that Medhātithi expresses himself in a manner which strongly resembles the final clause of this quotation does not, however, by itself indicate that his first explanation is in toto Sāmkhyistic. Rather the Samkhya theory of cognition might have simply come first to his mind; and it should also be noted in this connection that the main part of his explanation (saminā' buddhis ... ucyante ) does not contain any element which would point to a Samkhya background; for buddhi is not a specific term of this school of thought and can easily be accounted for as meant to specify the meaning samjñā has as second member of the compound under discussion, without having to borrow it from any of the philosophical authors. On the other hand, there is also nothing which would definitely exclude any relation with the Samkhya..
Medhātithi's first explanation is attractive in that it starts from the assumption that antah is implicitly opposed to bahiḥ,56 But is it really absolutely flawless ? Or is it not rather equally open to criticism in as much as what is ultimately meant by calling plants antaḥsamjña is according to it that
50. The variant' buddhyadhyavasitam artham purusa$ cetayate, met with e. g. Siddhiviniscayatīkā (cf. fn. 57) p. 303 f., is to all appearances a partial reformulation by Auantavlrya. For further references see Nyāyakumudacandra (ed. by Mahendrakumar Nyāyaśāstri, 2 vols., Bombay 1931/41), p. 190, fn. 2.
51. Cf. Siddhiviniscayatika of Sri Anantaviryācārya... ed. by Dr. Mahendrakumar Jain (Bharatiya Jñānapitha Kāśi), 2 Vols., Varanasi 1959, pp. 99, 225 and 58r.
52. Viz, on Samkhyakärikā 36. — Cf, also Sāmkhyagaptativrtti (V1), ed. by E. A. Solomon, Ahmedabad 1973, p. 47.
53. Cf. e. g. Yuktidipikā, (ed. R. C. Pandoy Delhi/Varanasi/Patna 1967), p. 116, lines 22 and 29.
54. Cf. § 2. 4. 3.

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they " withbold consciousness, do not reveal consciousness" ;55 and was it not just this feature which appeared disadvantageous to Medhātithi, persuading him to look for an alternative explanation ?
Indeed, the first explanation is tantamount to stating that plants are said to have internal cognition or consciousness because they don't reveal its usual signs in form of outward activity, i. e. the well-known corollaries of perception, etc. Nevertheless, Medhātithi cannot be reproached, like Sarvajñanārāyaṇa ($ 2. 4. 1 above ), for expecting his readers to believe that precisely that which forms a or the characteristic property of plants is not denoted by the term antaḥsamiña as explained by him. For the matter is different in the present case : To call plants antaḥsamiñu because they lack the corporeal reactions usually caused by cognitive or other mental acts, is not at all strange; on the contrary, it cannot but be styled as absolutely plausible provided it is realized that plants were given this name precisely to prevent the misunderstanding that they lacked not only external but also internal consciousness and cognition. That is to say: If this assumption is correct, then the term antaḥsamjña was coined in order to empha. size that, as for plants, appearances are — once more -- deceptive, i. e. that in spite of the marked absence of the outward activity one is accustomed to observe in other living beings which possess the faculty of perception, like animals and men, plants too nevertheless do have internal consciousness. It should not also be forgotten that plants do not have the sense organs by which men and higher animals gather information about the external world so that they are e. g. able to flee from their enemies. The assurance that plants are nevertheless antahsamina is quite meaningful in this regard, too.
However, unlike the expression antahprajña of the Māṇdūkyopanisad, the term antaḥsamjña would not then stand in an implicit opposition to a *bahiḥsamiña, formed in analogy with bahihprajña of the Upanisad, but the opposition would be that stated most clearely by Kullūka (see $ 2.4 above), viz. thus: bahirvyāpārādikāryavirahāt tathā vyupadiśyante.
Hence one will consider the possibility - which perhaps Haradatta (cf. 2.2 above ) had in view — that samjna is used in the term antaḥsamjña as a synecdoche, meaning — not “cognition" or "consciousness", but — their effect( s). This interpretation, of course, implies the idea that plants, too, react in principle just as animals, etc., to sensory stimuli, but that these reactions are not observable externally. The term would in this case be meant to explain the absence of what Kullūka aptly calls bahirvyāpāra in plants, and thus stand
55. This is the English translation of the meaning as given in the Shortor Petrograd Dictionary.

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in clear opposition to the contrary concept *bahihsamjña which is perhaps yet unattested only by mere coincidence. On the other hand, one has a feeling of uneasiness that the effects which are not observed externally should have been assigned to the interior of the plants. And this feeling becomes even stronger if the fact is taken into account that the meaning "sign, token, signal, gesture", rightly assigned to samjñā by the dictionaries cannot be derived from the original semantic nucleus "agreement ", " something regarding which there is an Agreement among men". Yet, for want of further arguments I should like to leave the question undecided for the moment as to which of the two alternative interpretations of what forms Medhātithi's first explanation is ultimately to be preferred. But to avoid misunderstandings, it should perhaps be stressed that both can, I think, be regarded as satisfactory in the sense that there is after all no need to start searching for another explanation, i. e. one not suggested or even directly given by Indian authors themselves.
Both alternative interpretations, however, call for further inspection, though now in other regards. It is not necessary to take a circuitous route - such as e. g. starting from Medhātithi's equating samjñā to buddhi and connecting this with Paksilasvāmin Vätsyāyana's dictum 56 arthagrahaņum buddhiḥ - in order to come to the conviction that the term antaḥsamiña does not in either case exclude the possibility of plants having the faculty of perception, but on the contrary clearly presupposes it.57 It is therefore by no means unjustified that one of the commentators on Manu 1. 4958 explicitly refers to a passage which in fact has to be regarded as the locus classicus in ancient Indian literature for the theory of the plants' possessing all the five senses, viz. Mahabharata (Poona ) XII 177. Space being limited, attention cannot be focussed here58 on this part of the Bhrgu-Bharadvāja-samvāda; one remarkable feature of it, however, has to be mentioned briefly : In this passage arguments are adduced which are meant to defend the thesis that plants, too, are made up of the five elements and are accordingly also endowed with a sense of touch, a sense of sight, etc. There
56. Quoted e. g. Siddhivinigcayaţikā (cf. fo. 51 ), p. 494 and correctly identified there as " from Nyayabhäsya on NS 3.2. 46", viz the sūtra or grahaņaväkya : helūpādānāt prati seddhavyabhyanujna. In the Nyāyakumudacandra (cf. fu), 30), p. 182, the reading is... buddhis cetani.
57. Cf. what has been stated above ($ 2.2) on the meaning of samjia.
58. Viz. Rāghavānanda - whose explanations are interesting also because of the fruti passages referred to by him.
59. Some of the problems posed by this text have been triedy discussed by me in an article entitled " Bemerkungen zu einigen von Naturboobachtung zeugenden Textstellen und den Problemen ihrer Interpretation " to be published in : Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 13/14 (1987) [ - W. Rau Felicitation Volume]; with the remaining problems - using additional material - I sball deal in another article still under preparation,

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is hence every likelihood that the central idea expressed here was not conceived for the first time by the author of this passage himself, but dates back to an earlier, perhaps even much earlier period.
The arguments of Mbh. XII 177 consist largely in inferences, explicit or implicit, their common charasteristic being that observations of certain properties of plants, like e. g. the movements of climbers, serve as empirical starting point to prove e. g. the existence of a sense of sight. Nevertheless this Epic text is not in contradiction with what has been stated to be the true motive for giving plants the name antaḥsamjña. For this term does not imply, as becomes clear now only, that plants absolutely lack every activity revealing their consciousness; to account for the formation of this concept it is sufficient to assume that it is based on the observation that the plants' signs of consciousness, of the faculty of perception are distinctly different from those of other living beings, and are in addition relatively poor 60 and perhaps also difficult to detect.
There would not seem to be anything hence to preclude the assumption that the term antaḥsamjña and Mbh. XII 177 are closely related to each other, at least in the sense that they belong to the same sphere of ideas about vegetal life and its peculiarities. Nevertheless it has to be noted that the term as such does not, of course, necessarily presuppose that plants are taken to have five senses; theoretically at least it could be compatible with a concept like that of the plants' ekendriyatva propounded by the Jainas.1 As regards this particular theory, however, Tattvārthasutra 2. 25 ( sam jñinah semanaskāḥ ) in connection with 2. 1242 — to give just one example -- seems to speak against the assumption that the term antaḥsam jña is of Jaina origin, because together with other living beings and the elements plants too are included in the group of asamjsins.65
60. It is, of course, at its highest in map as is already stated in AiA 2. 3. 2. 5 : puruse tv evävistaram at md, sa hi prejñanena sampannatamo vijnatam vadati...
61. Cf. J. O Sidkar's article "The Fabric of Lifo ao Conceived in Jaina Biology” in : Sambodhi 3 (1974), pp. 1-10.
62. Cf. also the Bhagya and later commentaries on both. In passing it may be noted that asam jrlinah is explained by Simhasüri (Dvādagaranayacakram...Pt. I, ed. by Muni Jambūvijayaji, Bhavnagar 1966, p. 182, 1. 20 ) to comprise accordingly : prthivy-abagni-vāyu-vandspati-dvitricturindriya-amanaskapancendriyah.
63. This term does not, however, mean that the beings denoted by it lack consci. cusness. Padmanath S. Jaini (The Jaina Path of Purification, Berkeley/Los Augeles/London 1979, pp. 110 and 337) renders it by “totally instinctive ” and “unable to reason about spiritual matters". The second of these trapelations does not do justice to the fact that the category of samnins includes certain species of higber animals, too; and the first one is likewise not satisfactory because the Indians did not know the concept of " instinct” and
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It should not, however, be forgotten that there is significant evidence 63a to warrant the conclusion that the idea of the plants' ekendriyatva was not specifically Jinistic, but rather a popular belief (though apparently in a comparatively early period of Indian thought ). Therefore, one has equally to reckon with the possibility that it is this belief, be it popular or not, of which the term antaḥsamjna is but another expression, and that the connection with Mbh. XII 177 is, if at all existent, only a very distant one.
2. 5. Returning now to the verse Manu 1. 49. itself, one question already raised above ( $2.3) has to be taken up again for closer examination, viz. whether the conception of the internal consciousness” of plants is perhaps directly connected with the idea of their “ being wrapped by tamas" (tamasā ... vestitah ). It is admittedly rather tempting to answer it in the positive; on second thoughts, however, one cannot help realizing that this assumption entails further problems: There is no evidence in extant Samkhya texts that upholders of this school of thought were of the opinion that the various types of living beings differ from each other with regard to the morphological or structural distribution of the three guņas in their organism; instead what is repeatedly, almost stereotypically recurred to is the well-known idea of the relative quantitive difference among the constituents of which a living being - or one of its organs ---64 is considered to be made.
Yet, the gaze should not, of course, be directed only to Sāmkhya texts in the strict sense of the word. It might well be rewarding to have a look at other sources, too. It is the Purānas which then come first to one's mind. For, it has been shown by P. Hacker in his meticulous study 65 of the composition of the first Adhyāya of the Manusmrti, that its compiler to a large extent used materials found in the Purāṇas also, viz. an account of cosmogony which was
( Continued from the last page) above all because the remark in the Bhagya on TS 2. 25 anyatha hy uharabhayamaithunaparigrahasa mjñübhiḥ sarva epa jivah samjiina iti clearly shows that " volitional and involuntary/unintentional mental acts" are considered to be common to all living beings. W. Schubriog (Die Lehre der Jainas..., Berlin/Leipzig 1935, p. 101 = $ 71 ) equates samjna to " Vernunft".
63a. Cf. L. Schmithaugen's article "Buddhismus und Nature" (in : Die Verant. wortung des Mensoben für eine bewoonbare Welt im Christentum, Hinduismus und Buddhis. mus, hrg. v. R. Panikkar u. W. Strulz, Freiburg/Bagel/Wien 1985), p. 123 and fn. 152.
64. See e. g. fn. 35.
65. "Two Accounts of Cognogony" in: Jñanamuktä vali. Commemoration Volume in Honour of Joh. Nobel, ed. by C. Vogel, New Delhi 1963, pp. 77-91 (= Kleine Schriften, hrg. v. L. Sebmithausen, Wiesbaden 1978, pp. 389-403). This article — as well as that mentioned in fa, 69 — has been ignored by J. W. Laino ("The Creation Account in Manu. smrti" in: ABORI Vol. LXII (1981), pp. 157-168, muoh to his own disadvantage.

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called Text-Group I by W. Kirfel.86 But it is not in the text of this Group – of which Hacker states that it is very similar to one part of the cosmogony given” in the Manusmrti –, but in Text-Group II, subdivided by Kirfel in the varieties II A67 and JI B88 - both of which have been partially) analysed by Hacker in a later article of his69-, that relevant material is found.
In describing the first of the various sargas, viz. the so-called mukhyasarga, i. e. the creation of plants as the main / most important70 beings", this sarga? is said among others to be samvrtas tamasā (IIA) / tamasā āvrtaḥ (II B), and to be besides bahir antaś cāprakāśaḥ (II A and B) and niḥsamjña eva (II A and B). Though the verb used here is different, the idea expressed is clearly the same, viz. that of being enveloped or wrapped. And this idea is met with again in the cosmogony as a whole, and not infrequently: In the portion analysed by Hacker it is e. g. stated that?" as a seed is enveloped (āvȚta ) by its rind, in the same way (the Mahān is enveloped by the Main Principle", or that73"it" (i. e. the threefold Egoity (ahamkāra ) " was enveloped (ävrta ) by the Mahān as the Mahān was by the Main Principle)', etc. One cannot but recall the definition of the guna tamas as it is given by Isyarakṛṣṇa,74 viz. guru varaņakam, and hence realize that not only that part of the Text-Groups II A and B studied comprehensively by Hacker is based on an “ Instructional Tract, composed in the third century A. D. at the latest, which expounded the evolution of the world according tɔ a form of the Sāmkhya system ",75 but obviously also the later part which I am myself referring to here. This assump
66. Das Purāna Paīcalak saņa. Versuch einer Textgeschichte. Leiden 1927, p. 2 ff. 67. O. c., p. 6 ff.; the chapter drawn upon by me is found on p. 20 ff. 68. O. c., p. 41 ff.; the portion drawn upon by me is found on p. 62 ff.
69. "The Saakhyization of the Emadation L'octrine Shown in a Critical Analysis of Texts” in : WZKSO 5 (1961), pp. 75-112 ( = Kleine Schriften... pp. 167-212).
70. In my opinion this sarga is given the designation mukhya. because plants are oorrectly recognized in it to form the basis of and necessary precondition for all other lifeforms. I deom it quito improbable that mukhya here should have the meaning "firet, initial ", and tbis not only because the surga in question is the first one of the so-called prajāsargas only - in its turp preceded by the creation of other entities , but also in view of the desigoations given the other sargas (cf. fo. 76 ) likewise subsumed under prajāsargaNote that to Udayana (of. the article of Halbfass' mentioned in fn. 33, 1. o.) this appears to be nothing but (jargama-)upakaranatda, and thut this expression indicates a considerable change in the evaluation of vegetal life.
71. I. , that wbich is created, the plants (naga ). 72. Quoted from the article mentioned in fp. 69, p. 101 (= 193). 73. Ibidem, p. 103 ( = 195). 74. Viz. in Kārikā 13 of his work. 75. Quoted from his article (cf. fn. 69), p. 111 (= 203).

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tion is further corroborated76 e. g. by the expression aprakāśa; for this cann course, be dislinked from prakā saka, one of the two predicates in Isvarak; definition of sattva.
The idea of being wrapped by tamas is retained or, to use a more nei expression, met with also in the verse of the Manusmrti under discussion. even in the light of the parallels cited above from Purānic texts?? it is qi difficult to decide whether veşțitāḥ in Manu 1. 49 and its various synonyms the Purānas are to be understood literally or figuratively. Originally meaning expressed will certainly have been that of being shrouded in darkness, at least this is an assumption which suggests itself most naturally. The exp] nations which e. g. the author of the Yuktidīpikā gives of the characterization the three gunas78 show, however, that expressions like vara na ka were taken & his time to have a much more general and abstract meaning. As for the Purāņi passages and Manu l. 49,79 one cannot hence evade the question if the verb: under discussion are still used in their original concrete meaning or else already in the figurative one derived from it.86 In order to answer it, if this is at all possible, it would, no doubt, be necessary to enter into a careful examination of these text portions in their entirety, but this cannot be undertaken here. Yet it may be noted in passing that the comparison with a seed which is " enveloped by its rind" and that met with in the passages referred to by me, viz. with "a seed in a pot /jar" (bijakumbhirat) certainly point in the direction of the literal meaning ; this argument is not, however, absolutely cogent as the author could equally well have intended to illustrate the abstract conception with a concrete everyday example. In any case, the Purānic parallels show that, for Manu 1.49, one should avoid to fall a prey to what seems quite plausible at first sight, viz. that the ideas of being wrapped by tamas" and that of having internal consciousness” naturally correspond to each other. But one should not, of course, exclude the possibility that this correspondence is only secondarily establi
76. In this connection it should also be noted that the designations of the various sargas of the Purānio texts, viz. mukhya-, tiryak-, urdhva., and aval-srotas, are met with also Yuktidipikā (cf. fn. 53), p. 127, and that this fact need not docessarily be taken - 88 it was by Frauwallner (of Guschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. I, Salzburg 1953, p. 333) - to reveal an influence " exercised by "religious sects” on the Sāmkbya.
77. Bhāgavata P. 3. 10. 19 (where plants are characterized as usrotasis tamahprāyā antah para vi fesinzh) diffre considerably from the texts collated by Kirfel and cannot be discussed here.
78. See p. 60, 1. 12 ff.
79. With which one has to compara Visna lharmottara P. I. 128. 22 ab: antahsam. jña bhavanty ele ghorena tamasi rstah
80. Note that in both cases the two alternative interpretations (of what forms Modhatithi's first explanation ) can still be sustained.

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shed at Manu 1. 49; for it may well be that antaḥsamiña- by itself expresses no more than that the consciousness of plants is entirely limited by their body', and that later a need was felt to give a reason for this limitation, and to this end ono recurred to the notion of being wrapped by tamas".
Proceeding to the next element of the description of the mukhyasurga, viz. bahir antaś cāprakāśaḥ, one is, of course, confronted with a similar semantic problem; but I think, it can be plausibly held, without swerving too far from the truth, that this predicate refers, at least among other things, to the lack of internal intellectual faculties and of the concomitant external activity, a lack by which plants are in fact distinguished from animals and men in a manner conspicuous enough to impress itself on any observer's mind and to make him believe that this is their essential characteristic mark.
The definiens nihsamjñaḥ finally does not therefore seem to be totally independent, i.e. to add something completely new to the description of this sarga; rather it is to clarify what is meant by at least a part of the preceding predicate (bahir antas caprakāśaḥ), namely that plants do not have conscious. ness, that they are, in spite of having a buddhi,81 by their very nature " dull" (stabdha ), 82 as is expressly stated. Admittedly the expressions niḥsamjña and stabdha are by themselves not unequivocal — so as to exclude the possibility that not a total lack, but only an extreme reduction is meant —; but in view of what is said of the animals (tiryaksrotas ), though in Text Group II B only, viz. that " they are all antah prakāśās ... avrtās ca bahih ", there is a great likelihood that the interpretation just given does in fact meet the intention of the author.
Considering Hacker's findings,88 viz. that the cosmogony handed down in the first Adhyāya of the Manusmộti is historically and doctrinally closely related to certain Purāņic texts - and to Mbh. 12. 224 — i. e. ultimately to a Sāmkhya “ Instructional Tract", it is not only legitimate, but even methodically necessary to take into account this background also when trying to understand the term antahsamjna at Manu 1. 49. And one cannot then help seeing at a glance that it not only stands in a dialectical relation to the expressions bahir antaś capra. kāśaḥ and niņsa mjñaḥ of the Purānas, but that it was also in all probability
81. Cf. II B (Kirfel, 0. C., p. 63, 1.2) : yasmát tesäm orta buddhir dukhāni karanāni ca.
82. Because of the context other meaninge can, I think, be excluded.
83. Cf. the two articles mentioned in fn. 65 and fn. 69.- Frauwallner's important contributions are duly referred to by Hacker only in his later article (fo. 69), viz. p. 76 (= 168) and fn. 2. Hacker's owo investigations have in their turu been partially supplemented and amplified by K. Rüping in : StII 3 (1977), pp. 3-10, RGB..,17

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ABORI: R. G. Bhandarkar 160th Birth Anniversary Volume
deliberately coined to counter them: It becomes fully intelligible if it is taken as an objection directed against the view that plants are not only internally (antah), but also externally (bahih aprakāśa -- and hence nihsamina; it is natural enough that such a view should be rejected, concisely and at the same time precisely, by stating that plants are on the contrary in reality (only) antah. samina.
Thus it may finally be concluded that the term antahsamjna was coined by a man or a group of people who wanted to dissociate themselves from a view about vegetal life held by others or perhaps even prevalent at their time; who thought it best to confront it by emphasizing that plants, in spite of the indisputable absence of outward activity in them, do nevertheless “ have internal consciousness"; and who chose a very Indian way for expressing their own view, viz. with a single term which makes use of central elements of their opponents' proposition, i. e. antaḥ and osamjña.
Now, this looks as if it were the "altogether new interpretation " of which it has been said above ($ 2.4.3) that there is no need to search for it". In reality, however, it is practically only another version of the first interpretation.
The correction which has now been made consists in the clarification that the stress lies not, or not so much, on the absence of outward activity, but on the existence of an inner consciousness. A statement to the effect that plants are antaḥsamina in this sense, problematic though it indeed would be if it were made independently, becomes fully understandable in itself -- and intelligible as to its motives - if only it is taken as opposed to a view according to which plants are denied this consciousness. Therefore, the decision which could not be taken earlier (cf. § 2. 4. 3 above) is now nonetheless a natural one : Of the two alternative interpretations it is clearly the first one that should be given preference, though in its new and revised form, emphasizing the possibility that originally the term intended the confinement of consciousness within the limits of the body' without reference to the absence of outward expression which should be, I suggest, a later development in the understanding of the term.
In conclusion, a final problem, namely if anything can be said about the origin and/or doctrinal affiliation of the term antahsamjna. However, all I am able to offer at the moment is a hypothesis, and one of which I can only give the outline: If the result achieved by Hacker in his analysis of certain Purānic texts is correct and holds equally good for the portions of these texts drawn upon by me, then it may safely be stated that the term in question is not of Samkhya origin, but is on the contrary opposed to the view about plants which upholders of this school of thought held. This supposition is supported by what has been

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WEZLER : On the term Antahsamjna 131 most convincingly shown by Frauwallner84 about the Bhtgu-Bharadvaja-samvada viz. that it is not Samkhyic, -- provided that the doctrinal relation between this part of the Mbh. and the term antah-samjna is at all acceptable. The identity of the people who regarded all plants as antahsamjna is still obscure also as regards the tradition to which they belonged. It cannot even be regarded as certain that they were philosophers in the narrower sense of the word. But I am of the opinion that their view, even if it should not stand the test of a critical examination by modern biologists, is not only very interesting with regard to a history of Indian ideas, but should also evoke our sympathy in that it directly leads to sensitive and perceptive respect for plants - the only living beings who do not generally subsist by destroying the life of others. 84. Cf. bis " Untersuchungen zum Moksadharma. Die nichtsam khyistischen Texte " in : JAOS 45 (1925), p. 59 ff. (= Kleine Schriften, hrsg. v. G. Oberhammer u. E. Steinkellner, Wiesbaden 1982, p. 47 ff.).