On Relationship Between Dharmottara Santaraksita And Kamalasila

Author(s): Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser

Page 6

156
Irma KRASSER
artha) is the valid cognition."1" Dharmottara's answer to this is as follows: "Isn't it the case th:11 (this) cognition is of no use for those striving for a fullilment of a purpose, for that (cognition) does not realize the fulfilment of a purpose." He goes on to explain that this cognition, if it is assumed to be a means (*upāya) for obtaining the thing, would be worth being examined by a scientific treatise (*sastra) for sane men strive just for that which makes one obtain (*präpake that thing which is capable of fulfilling a purpose, but the cognition of that which is capable of fulfilling the purpose is not to be examinec). "For", as he says, "although a cognition of that which is capable of a fulfilment of a purpose exists, it does not have to be examineel) because when this cognition takes place the striving of those striving (for a purpose) has come to an end" etc. Then he concludes his refutation with the words: "Therefore the non-clisgreement (*avisamwida) with that which is capable of fulfilling a purpose is the validity (*primanya), but not in case of the cognition of the fullilment of the purpose.
From the last two sentences it becomes clear what is meant in the parpaksa by the expression don Brya bar nus pa rtogs pa, namely the cognition of the fulfilment of the purpose (clon lya bar rlogs pa, *arthakriyūjñāna) or as he calls it in the Nyāyabindutikā and the Pramānaviniścayatika?!) "the cognition in which the fulfilment of the purpose appears" (arthakriyiinirbhisajnana). What he means by "non-clisagreement" has already been explained at the beginning of the Prámányapuriksā: mi slu bar loyed pa ni don byed nus pa'i dngos po (corr.: por) rab tu bstam pa thob par byeol pao // PPar 11 236b3.
The theory which is refuted here is to be found in TS 2958. There Santaraksita, answering an opponent's question, states: "Agreement (sam vāda) with the real thing (vast) is called valiclity. And there is no other characteristic of that agreement) than the cognition in which the fulfilment of the purpose appears." (ucyate-vastusamvādah pramanyam abhihiyate / trusy carthakriyabhasajñand 2) anyan na laksanam II TS 2958). Il one now looks at Dharmottara's conclucling sentence once again where he says that the non-clisagreement with the thing) capable for the fulllment of a purpose is the validity, but not in case of the cognition of the fullilment of the purpose, it is quite clear that this statement is directed against Santaraksita.?:)
19) de lia na ni 'orn don Dry Iner mu p rlogs pu ishu minyin o zhr nu / l'ar 11 237a1. 20) togs mus kyving done by on don du ghyer et la wkho by mire pre mayin ham / de las dou by bvi mi grubili Nyir ew Il dun lry Nur
was pretthob pa'i thabsyin so zhrnul de la na nio na don byc bur mus par thob pur byrd i wyid Hogs p dang dan pidon du gwyer luar by bus plugir de nyidl stan bcus las rret par drd par 'os kyi / don by lwy aus filoges i ni wu yin noll In ki prir don Irya Iner mas pe'i rogs ni yuldu zin kwing shrs la don du gwyrr ber lyse bei duu du gwyr Int wyil muga d i prvir ni mu yin gyil...... myir don Bryvilnur was feln mi blu Ini wyid Ishuu wa yin gyi don loger Iner slogs ni wu yin wlll'lar 11
237a1-5. 21) NI! 28.1: I'Vin'!'(a) 0.81. 22) carthakriyiblisi corr.: carthukriyiblisi: cf. 'I'S, P 5764, 12932: dr wing dow lyrilir lii ll shes me las gzhan aishan
syid can win Il; cl. also the next verse: arthakriyanıbhi sam u judi ... 'T'S 2959all 23) From the commentary on 'T'S 2958-2961 we can see that Kumalašila was aware of the fact that Santaraksita's opinion
was criticized by Dharmottara. He starts his comment by referring to Dharmakirti: "... Valie gnition is non-elisagreeing cognition". Then he explains: "And this non-elisagreement is only characterized by the fulliment of a purpose because the purpose of an examination of a valid cognition is that (fulfilment of a purpose). For at sane man lexoks for a valid or unvalid cognition inasmuch as he strives for the fulfilment of a purse, Dil TRH (just for fun (orysanitayi)" etc. (...pra avisam vidi jnanam (I'V 11 lab) ili nirunit. (: wa) Civi vido hukriyaluksna r.
arthaud prunurintyih. Ito 'ythakriyirthi premam aprama wimursair purksniu (<I> 1115 3.11'. He vysanitayi. TSP 9.12.17-19). This statement obviously follows the opinion of Santaraksita and Kamalasila's reason for the non-clisagreement's being characterized by the fullilment of a purpose is directe against Dharmotara for in the passage where he criticizes Santara kita le states: "Isn't it the case that this cognition of the fullilment of a purpose) is of no use for these striving for a fullilment of a purpose, for that (cognition) clocs o realize the fulfilment of a purpose." "Then Dharmottara goes on to explain that this cognition, if it is assumed to be a means ( Niy) for obtaining the thing would be worth being examined by a scientific treatise (*histo), for sale men strive just for that which makes one obtain (prank) that thing which is capable of fulfilling a purpose, but the cognition of that which is capable of fulfilling the purpose is not to be examineel). "For", as he says. "although it cognition of that which is capable of a fullilment of a purpose exists, it does not have to be examineel) because when this cognition takes place the striving of those striving for purpose) has come to an encl" etc. (For the text Nee bewe mete 20).
With regard to the first cognition which makes one obtain the object Kamalasila emments: "An which is previous in the cause. And the capability of making one obtain the (object) is called its validity. And this capability cannot be ascertained (
audharyi ) because the cllects are not knowi on account of the absence of