On Relationship Between Dharmottara Santaraksita And Kamalasila

Author(s): Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269661/1

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On the Relationship between Dharmottara, Santarakṣita and Kamalasila
Helmut KRASSER
(Vienna)
A few years ago Prof. Iwata" and Prof. Matsumoto") drew our attention to the fact that in respect of the argument that a cognition and its object are necessarily perceived together (sahopalambhaniyama) there is a certain relationship between Kamalasila's Tattvasangrahapanjikā and Dharmottara's Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā." However, the relationship between the two was not considered in detail. Regarding these two authors Prof. Ichigo writes that Kamalaśīla (c. 740-795) in his Tattvasangrahapañjikā refutes a theory that is held by Dharmottara in his Nyayabinduṭīkā." Concerning Santarakṣita (c.725-788) and Dharmottara Prof. Tosaki assumes that Dharmottara in his Pramanaviniścayatīkā refutes a theory held by Śantarakṣita in his Tattvasangraha. In order to provide support for their assumptions I would like to add some additional material.
1) Prof. Iwata assumed that Kamalasila probably used some material from Dharmottara's Pramanaviniscayatika for his explanation of the sahopalambhaniyama: TSP 693, 19-21 PVinT 185b5-7: TSP 693, 23-24 PVinT 185b7 (cf. Ernst Steinkellner, "Miszellen zur erkenntnistheoretisch-logischen Schule des Buddhismus: 1. Zur Datierung Karnakagomins." WZKS 23, 1979 [141-150]: 148 n. 30). Additional parallels are listed in his book Sahopalambhaniyama, Wiesbaden 1991.
2) Cf. Shiro Matsumoto, "Sahopalambha-niyama". In: Sōtōshi Kenkyuin Kenkyusei Kenkyu Kiyo 12, 1980 [298-265]: 278. The passages referred to are: TSP 693,1-3 PVinT 185b3-5; TSP 693,19-21 PVinT 185b5-7; TSP 692,8 PVinT 186a7-8.
3) Another passage which is similar in both texts is to be found in Hideomi Yaita, "Dharmottara no Pramanaviniscayaṭīkā - Sanskrit dampen to shiyaku." [Dharmottara's PVin'T- Sanskrit Fragments and Translation]. Mikkyōgaku Kenkyu 16, 1984 [17-37]: 231, no. 5 (TSP 483,14-17 PVinȚ 44b4-6); cf. also nos. 1, 6, 7, 9, 15. 4) Cf. Frauwallner 1961: 141; 146.
5) Cf. Masamichi Ichigo, "Zoron no ishu ni kansuru Santarakṣita, Kamalasila no kenkai o megutte" [On S.'s and K.'s opinion regarding the aim of a treatise]. In: The Mikkyögaku 13/14, [66-761: 72ff. The passages he is referring to are: samyagjñānaparviketyädinasya prakaranasyabhidheyaprayojanam ucyate NBT 5. 1 and yat punar acaryena samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapurusarthasiddhih iti (= NB II) yat prayojanam nirdistam tat prayojanaprayojanasya kathanam, nabhidheyasya prayojanam... TSP 10,10ff. The following corroborates Ichigo's assumption that Kamalasila also knew the Nyayabinduțika. In NBT 76,8f Dharmottara explains: prapakam jnanam pramanam. prapanasaktis ca na kevalad arthāvinābhävitvad bhavati, bijādyavinābhavino 'py ankuräder aprapakatvät. = "A cognition which makes one obtain (the indicated thing) is a valid cognition. And (this) ability of making one obtain is not due to the mere fact that it is necessarily concomitant with the thing, for a sprout etc., although it is necessarily concomitant with a seed etc., does not make one obtain (the seed)."
=
The same statement using the same example is to be found in TSP 488,23-489,7: jüanam hi viṣayākāram utpadyamanan visayam paricchindad iva savyāpāram iväbhāti (: ivāstīti). ayam evarthaprapanavyāpāro jñanasya, na to avinabhävitvamätram. na hi bijadyavinābhāvino 'nkuradayo [nal** bhavanti, yena jñānam eva pramanam syat. TSP, 48a7f: shes pa yul gyi rnam par skye ba na yul yongs su gcod bzhin pa na bya ba dang beas ba lta bur snang ste / don la shes pa'i shes par byed pa'i bya ba ni 'di nyid yin gyi med na mi 'byung ba tsam ni ma yin no ll gang gis shes pa nyid tshad mar gyur ba myu gu la sogs pa sa bon la sogs pa med na mi 'byung bar 'gyur ba ni ma yin no I="For, inasmuch as cognition when arising in the form of the object (appears) as if it were determining the object, it appears as if it were endowed with the function (of determining). Only this is the cognition's function of making one obtain the thing, but not the mere fact that it is necessarily concomitant (with the thing). For a sprout etc. which is necessarily concomitant with a seed etc. is not (endowed with the function of making one obtain the thing),** so that (yena) the cognition alone (eva) [i.e. without this function] would be the valid cognition."
* instead of präpanavyāpāra the Tibetan text reads shes par byed pa'i bya ba=*jñāpakavyāpāra **the Tibetan translation corroborates the deletion of the second negation na in this sentence.
6) Cf. Hiromasa Tosaki, "Dharmottara to Santarakṣita-go ni motozuku chi' o megutte". Dh. and S. - On Sabdapramanaf. In: Buddhism and its Relation to Other Religions. Essays in Honour of Dr. Shazen Kumoi on His Seventieth Birthday. Kyoto 1985, 273-284.

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At the beginning of the Pramanaviniscayatikā Dharmottara gives his clefinition of valid cognition (pramanalaksana). This work is extant only in Tibetan and the section on the pramāna-definition consists of five folios." In the Tattvasangrahapanjikā, in the chapter dealing with intrinsic validity (svatahpräminyapariksă), Kamalasila, by commenting on TS 2972), also gives :t very concise clefinition of valid cognition some formulations of which are close to those of the Pramānaviniscayaţikā and the relationship of which we are now going on to examine."
In the following I shall present the relevant textual passages. Words underlined in upright type indicate word for word correspondence. Words in upright type are wordings occurring in both texts with changes in the form of the words or their syntactical position. Words in italics are wordings which belong only to the respective text.
Passages from Kamalasila: TSP (ad TS 2972) 946.10-947.14
भ्रान्तिहे तोरसदापात् स्वतस्तस्य प्रमाणता) [bhräntihetor asadbhāvāt svatas tasya pramanata prathamasya tathābhāvea) pradveso bhrāntisambhavāt || TS 2972]
प्रथमस्य नयाभावे प्रदेब भानिसमवाना kasyacit lu yadiyyetetyadav (=TS 2854) aha: bhrāntihelor (=TS 2972al) ityadi.
nanu ca yat sandigdharthāvinābhävitvenāniscitarthaprapanasamarthyajñānam, tad anuminavan na praproti. latha ly anumānasyarthävinäbhāvasamsaye sati na pramanyam islam, evam pratyakse 'pi na prapmoti. naişa dosah; saly api samsayodaye bharaty cun pramanyam pratyakşusyai.
<*yat tu pratibhāsamānafradarthaviruddhākārāvasāyākrāntam udeti tan na pramānam, yatha maricikāgrāhijñānam jalāvasa yakranlam, lalra yathoklapramanavyäpäräbhāväl."> (=PV I 59)
latas cinumănasya talabhasasünyasyäpi nantariyakarthadarśanabalenolpalleh paramparyera vastuni pralibandhal pramanyam ily avasyam latrāvinābhāvaniscayo 'pekşaniyah, anyatha anumanasyoipattyasambhavad ili nānumänalulyam pratyakşam. «) Inthabhaiu corr.: uabhiur: cf. TS 2854. B) pratibhasamang corr.: pratibhasando; cf. 'I'SI, 299a1: sung bzhin pui don 7) PVin'!' 855-13a7. The text is cdited and translated in Steinkellner/Krasser 1989. 8) TSP 916,11-917.14. 9) Another passage parallel to the Pramāņaviniscayaţika is also to be found in the comments on TS 2968. Words
underlined in upright type indicate word for word correspondence. yudy rum katham uklam acaryena lokayalam adhikrlya sa khalu..., tad yathadrstasidharmyit lathaprasidhitam anumeyatām Hatiplatiti (=PVin 1 36,1-6) nois dosah svaparasantānavartinir ananubhūta visayi buclelhir adhikrtyaitad uktam, anyatranulhata visayålshya iti (=I'Vin 1 36,7+8) vacanál. 'T'SP 915,16-21 gang yang rjes su dpag par bya balas ma das sezhes boya ba de ni rang dang gzhan gyi gyud la yod pa nyams su myong 1: ma yin pa'i blo'i albang chu byas nas briox : yin leyul nyams su mnyong balas MALO h es XNINGS pati plugin ro || PVin!(a) 14,7-11.

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Passages from Dharmottara:
ji ltar rjes su dpag pa med na mi 'byung ba'i con mthong bas nges pa tshad ma yin pa
bozhin dulmingon sum syi ishad ma nyid kyang bilang nyicl clon meel 11: mi 'yung bar nges par byeel palas ni ma yin le l'on kyang snang langes par byeel palas yin no ll con
thob par byed pa ni tshad ma yin la / PVin'!'(a) 15,2-7 <2> ... gang gi płyir thob par byed pa'i shes pas don gyi yul du skyes bu glong bar byed pa'am
skyes bu'i yul du don 'gugs pa ni ma yin te l'on kyang skyes bu 'jug par byed pa yin no II
PVin T(a) 9,9-12 <3> a)... 'ga' zhig lu 'jug par byed pa ni ma yin gyil on kyang 'jug pa'i yul ston par byed pa yin
no || PVin?(a) 8,15-17 b) 'di llar shes pa ni don byed pa'i thabs skyed pas thob par tryed pa ni ma yin gyi /'on kyang 'di la jug par byed pa yin la / skyes bu rang nyid'gro mi nus pa lag pa nas bzung nas 'jug par byed pa yang ma yin gyi'on kyang 'jug pa'i yul ma shes par jug par minus pa la yul nye bar ston
par byed pas so II PPar | 218a2 <4> des na ston par byed pa ni zhen pa yin syi 'dzin pa ni ma yin no || Prar 11 239a5 <5> rnam pa 'di lia bu'i the tshom ni thams cad kyang snang ba'i rang bzhin nges pa'i 'og rol du
yin te / de ma nges na yul de la 'dzin pa mi rigs pa'i phyir ro || PVin'!(a) 18,8-11 <6 > des na snang ba nges par byas pa ni bstan pa yin pa'i phyir 'jug pa'i yul la Ishad ma'i bya ba
yongs su rdzogs pa yin no | PVin T(a) 15,10-12 <7> med na mi 'byung bar the tshom za bas ni nam yang mngon sum gyi bya ba la gnod pa
ma yin no || PVinT(a) 15,16-18 <8> gang yang snang ba dang 'gal ba'i rnam pa nges pas gnod pa bskyed pa de ni tshad ma'i
bya ba ma rdzogs pa'i playir tshad ma ma yin tedper na smig igyu dzin pa'i shes pa la chur
nges pa jug pa bzhin no ll PVin?(a) 15,12-16 <9> ... dung la ser por shes pa dang nor bu'i'od la nor bur shes padang/shes pa'i ruam pa de
ita bu gzhan dag kyang tshad ma ma yin par brjod pa yin no // PVin'!'(a) 10,5-8 <10> mnam 'grel las mngon sum gyi gzung ba dang ma gzung ba ni snang ba'i dbang gis yin no
zhes (~ PVSV 31,21-23) bshad do // PVin T(a) 18,12-14 <11> de dag (=yul dang dus dang rnam pa) kyang tha dad par byed pa yin pa'i phyir le Lgzhan
clu na tha dad pa med par thal ba'i phyir ro // PVin'!(a) 10,11-13 <12> ruam par rtog pa ni snang ba'i albang gis yul rnam par jog pa ma yin le I'on leyang nges pa'i
bang gis ternam 'grel las nges pa rnams kyis ma nges gang. I zhes bstan to || PVin ? (a) 19,14-18
V
V
V
V
I shall discuss here only a few of these parallels. In the text Kamalasila says: "For, not like inference perception is assumed to be a valid cognition inasmuch as it shows itself as invariably connected with the thing, but inasmuch as it performs an ascertainment (avasya) of the thing appearing in one's mind). For (the cognition) which makes those striving for a fulfilment of a purpose (arthakriyrirthin) obtain the thing wishcel (by them) is called valic cognition." We can find the same statement in the Pramanaviniscayatika with slight variations - see no. .
Then Kamalasila continues <2 na ... upadarśayat."): "And this cognition) does not make one obtain the thing) by dragging the person to the place of the thing or by leading the thing to the place of the person, but by motivating (pravarlayal) the person. And it does not motivate having grasped that person by the hand, but by indicating the object of activity." The first of these two humorous formulations also occurs in the Pramānaviniscayatika (=no. <2>). The second is not found in the Pramanaviniscayatika. But in his longer Prämányapariksa Dharmottara goes into more detail. The text can be found under no. <3>b). The parallels are indicated by bold type. He explains: "For cognition does not make one obtain the object) by producing the means (*upāya)

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for the l'ulfilment of a purpose, but it motivates towards that means)."') And it does not motivate the person, who himself is not able to go, by grasping him by the hand, but by indicating the object to the person) who without knowing the object of activity is not able to act." This is the only sentence in this passage where the 'Tattvasangrahapanjika has at parallel in another text of Dharmottara apart from the Pramämaviniscayatikā.
With and <9>
Kamalaśīla now continues <1"pratibhāsavaśād ... : "For the grasping and non-grasping of perception takes place by force of the appearance ..." and so on. This statement is presented by Dharmottara as a quotation from Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika - see no. <10>. However, he cloes not quote the text verbatim but paraphrases it.") Nevertheless, the formulation in both texts shows word for word correspondence except that it is not marked as a quotation in the Tattvasangrahapanjikā.
These instances may sullice to show the close relationship between these two texts.
Let us now have a look at how Kamalasila's explanations are related to the proposition of Śäntaraksita's that he is commenting upon. In TS 2972-bhräntihelor asadbhavil svatus tasya pramanata / prathamasya tathābhäve (corr.: Ladābhāve, cl. TS 2854) pradveso bhrintisambhavil II - Säntaraksita states that the validity (pramānala) of that (later cognition) is intrinsic (salah). because a reason for an error is not present and that there is clislike of the chusness of the first (cognition) on account of possible error.
Kamalasila comments that this verse bhrāntihelor etc. is a response to another verse beginning with kasyacit tu yadisyeta, that is a verse from Kumārila's Brhattikä corresponding to SV v. 76 (pratyaksaparicchede), 2) which is incorporated into the Tattvasangraha as verse 2854. Then he introduces his explanations with a pūrva paksa which says that cognition which is not able to make one obtain the determined thing (niścilārtha) because the fact that it is necessarily concomitant (avinābhāvilva) with the thing is doubtful, does not obtain (validity) as with inference. For, when there is doubt regarding the necessary concomitance with the thing, validity of inference is not assumed. In the same way (validity) is not obtained in the case of perception.
I will merely summarize the answer to this pārvapaksa: Kamalasila begins by saying that validity in case ol' perception and inference is ascertained in a different way ( na hy ...). Then up to the end of no. <11> he explains perception. He introduces his investigation with the general statement that a cognition which makes one obtain an object is called valid cognition (latha hy ... ucyale.')). After that he explains the terms prāpaka, pravartayal and spadarśayal. Then he states that cloubt does not obstruct the function of perception and that even when doubt arises the validity of perception is given (Syatra ... prutyaksasya). After this he enumerates different examples for incorrect cognition (<*yat ... syail.">). In the last passage he explains how validity is obtained in the case of inference and concludes that perception and inference are different.
From this analysis it is obvious that the whole passage beginning with the pūrvapaksa (nann ca...) is not a comment of Santaraksita at all but merely a digression. And it is also obvious that the succinct formulations of Kamalasila which contain in fact the essential parts of a very complex
10) CI. NIST 17.3-18.1: Intha hi un janam junayad artham prapamuli, aptarthr puimme pronuluyl prapryly artham. 11) The passage he is referring to reads: na pratyaksam kasyacin niściyekam, lad yam api gyhniti taw wa niscayena, kim tarhi.
Inkppalibhasma. Inn »a niścnyiniścumsat praiyaksasya grahanågrahane. PVSV 31, 21-23 (R. Guoli, The Promāna
wirttikam of Dharwakinti. The Mirst Chapter with the Aulocommentary. Text and Critical Neves. Roma 1960). 12) Cr. Erich Fritwallner. "Kumarita's Brhatikā." WZKSO 6, 1962 178-90): 856.

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On the Relationship between Dharmottara, Santaraksitu and Kamalasila
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theory regarding the clefinition of valid cognition (pramanalaksana), but do not even mention any of the problems that motivated the development of this theory, cannot be taken as the conceptual seed from which this theory sprung, but only as a collection of the most signilicant and conspicuous fruits from the harvest somebody else must have brought in. The barn in this case is clearly Dharmoltara's Pramanaviniscayatiki, as the parallels show.
Here the relevant textual unit of the Pramātaviniscayatika is itself alreadly an attempt to summarize the essentials of this theory for its particular context and therefore recommends itself as a source of information rather than the other works of Dharmottara that deal with this theme. The Nyāyabindutikā") and the Ksanabhangasiddhil) are too short, and the two independent Prāmānyapariksas's) that expound the theory and the problems involved in all details are much too long and differentiated. The extant textual volume written by Dharmottara on this subject as compared with the few notes of Kamalasila shows who worked the fields for this harvest and who harvested the fruits.
The other possible explanation for the close relationship between the two texts, that both of them copied the text of yet another author, is highly unlikely considering Dharmottara's remarkable efforts in this field.
Thus the assumption that Kamalasila based his exposition of the theory of valid cognition on Dharmottara's Pramānaviniscayatīkā seems inevitable. That he also knew Dharmottara's longer Prāmānyapariksă can be seen from the fact that he incorporated the passage am ... upadarśayat.. And as the beginning of the shorter Pramanyapariksã is a brief repetition of the main points from the pramāna-clefinition of the Nyāyabindutikā") and as there is a reference in the Pramānaviniscayatika (PVin T(a) 12,5) to the shorter Prämänyapariksa (Tshad ma brtag pa)'7) these two works predate the Pramanaviniscayatika and Kamalasila was probably familiar with the shorter Prämānyaparīksā, too. That he knew the Nyāyabindutika has already been shown by Prol. Ichigo. The question of whether he was also familiar with Dharmotara's other works, namely the Ksanabhangasilahi, the laralokasiclathi and the Apohaprakarama, still remains to be resolved. Nevertheless, we thus have a lerminus ante quem, the Tattvasangrahapanjikā, for at least four works by Dharinottara, among them his most influential work, the Pramanaviniscayatika.
Santaraksita's Tattvasangraha serves as a terminus post quem: In his Pramänviniscayatika Dharmottara refutes a theory on word cognition (sābda) held by Santaraksita in the chapter dealing with other valid cognitions (pramanāntarabhāvapariksa). As already mentioned above, this was assumed by Prof. Tosaki in his article "Dharmottara and Santara ksita-On Saldapramâna This assumption, that Säntaraksita was known to Dharmottara, can be corroborated by another passage from Dharmottara's shorter Prämânyapariksā where he refutes one of Santaraksita's theories.
Dharmottara begins his shorter Prāmānyapariksa with a brief summary of his definition of valid cognition (PPar II 236b3-5) which he has already developed in his Nyayabindutika." He states: "Valid cognition is non-disagreeing cognition. Non-disagreeing is making one obtain the indicated thing which is capable of the fulfilment of a purpose."18) After further explanation he refutes the definitions of the Naiyāyikas (PPar II 236b51) and of the Lokāyatas (PPar II 236b6-237al). Then he discusses one other possibility which he introduces with a pūrvapaksa which says: “If it is so then the cognition (*adhigali) of that which is capable of the fulfilment of a purpose (*arthakriyasan13) The praminalaksana-chapter in the Nyayabindulika starts from NBT 17,1 to NIT 34.7. The parallels of NB! and
PVint are shown in Steinkellner/Krasser 1989. 14) Kshsi 231,7-232,13 (=E. Frauwallner, "Dharmottaras Ksanabhangasiddhib. Text und Übersetzung." WZKM
42,217-258). 15) My critical edition with an imeotated tramslation of PPar 11 will be published in 1991. 10) CI. E. Steinkellner, "Methoclological Remarks on the Constitution of Sanskrit "Texts from the Bullhist
pramina Tradition." WZKS 32, 1988 103-129): 114 11. 38: Par 11 263135-5 corresponds to NIS! 17.1; 21: 3 - 18.2:
19,16T. 17) The reference is to PPar II 245b4 and the discussion around: cf. Steinkellner/Krasser 1989: 81 11.-10. 18) Ishad ma ni mi slu bar byed pa'i shes pa'o Il mislu bar byed pa ni don Dryed uus pa'i dngos po (corr.: por) rab tu bstam pa thob par lyril
po Il PPar 11 236b3.

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artha) is the valid cognition."1" Dharmottara's answer to this is as follows: "Isn't it the case th:11 (this) cognition is of no use for those striving for a fullilment of a purpose, for that (cognition) does not realize the fulfilment of a purpose." He goes on to explain that this cognition, if it is assumed to be a means (*upāya) for obtaining the thing, would be worth being examined by a scientific treatise (*sastra) for sane men strive just for that which makes one obtain (*präpake that thing which is capable of fulfilling a purpose, but the cognition of that which is capable of fulfilling the purpose is not to be examinec). "For", as he says, "although a cognition of that which is capable of a fulfilment of a purpose exists, it does not have to be examineel) because when this cognition takes place the striving of those striving (for a purpose) has come to an end" etc. Then he concludes his refutation with the words: "Therefore the non-clisgreement (*avisamwida) with that which is capable of fulfilling a purpose is the validity (*primanya), but not in case of the cognition of the fullilment of the purpose.
From the last two sentences it becomes clear what is meant in the parpaksa by the expression don Brya bar nus pa rtogs pa, namely the cognition of the fulfilment of the purpose (clon lya bar rlogs pa, *arthakriyūjñāna) or as he calls it in the Nyāyabindutikā and the Pramānaviniścayatika?!) "the cognition in which the fulfilment of the purpose appears" (arthakriyiinirbhisajnana). What he means by "non-clisagreement" has already been explained at the beginning of the Prámányapuriksā: mi slu bar loyed pa ni don byed nus pa'i dngos po (corr.: por) rab tu bstam pa thob par byeol pao // PPar 11 236b3.
The theory which is refuted here is to be found in TS 2958. There Santaraksita, answering an opponent's question, states: "Agreement (sam vāda) with the real thing (vast) is called valiclity. And there is no other characteristic of that agreement) than the cognition in which the fulfilment of the purpose appears." (ucyate-vastusamvādah pramanyam abhihiyate / trusy carthakriyabhasajñand 2) anyan na laksanam II TS 2958). Il one now looks at Dharmottara's conclucling sentence once again where he says that the non-clisagreement with the thing) capable for the fulllment of a purpose is the validity, but not in case of the cognition of the fullilment of the purpose, it is quite clear that this statement is directed against Santaraksita.?:)
19) de lia na ni 'orn don Dry Iner mu p rlogs pu ishu minyin o zhr nu / l'ar 11 237a1. 20) togs mus kyving done by on don du ghyer et la wkho by mire pre mayin ham / de las dou by bvi mi grubili Nyir ew Il dun lry Nur
was pretthob pa'i thabsyin so zhrnul de la na nio na don byc bur mus par thob pur byrd i wyid Hogs p dang dan pidon du gwyer luar by bus plugir de nyidl stan bcus las rret par drd par 'os kyi / don by lwy aus filoges i ni wu yin noll In ki prir don Irya Iner mas pe'i rogs ni yuldu zin kwing shrs la don du gwyrr ber lyse bei duu du gwyr Int wyil muga d i prvir ni mu yin gyil...... myir don Bryvilnur was feln mi blu Ini wyid Ishuu wa yin gyi don loger Iner slogs ni wu yin wlll'lar 11
237a1-5. 21) NI! 28.1: I'Vin'!'(a) 0.81. 22) carthakriyiblisi corr.: carthukriyiblisi: cf. 'I'S, P 5764, 12932: dr wing dow lyrilir lii ll shes me las gzhan aishan
syid can win Il; cl. also the next verse: arthakriyanıbhi sam u judi ... 'T'S 2959all 23) From the commentary on 'T'S 2958-2961 we can see that Kumalašila was aware of the fact that Santaraksita's opinion
was criticized by Dharmottara. He starts his comment by referring to Dharmakirti: "... Valie gnition is non-elisagreeing cognition". Then he explains: "And this non-elisagreement is only characterized by the fulliment of a purpose because the purpose of an examination of a valid cognition is that (fulfilment of a purpose). For at sane man lexoks for a valid or unvalid cognition inasmuch as he strives for the fulfilment of a purse, Dil TRH (just for fun (orysanitayi)" etc. (...pra avisam vidi jnanam (I'V 11 lab) ili nirunit. (: wa) Civi vido hukriyaluksna r.
arthaud prunurintyih. Ito 'ythakriyirthi premam aprama wimursair purksniu ( 1115 3.11'. He vysanitayi. TSP 9.12.17-19). This statement obviously follows the opinion of Santaraksita and Kamalasila's reason for the non-clisagreement's being characterized by the fullilment of a purpose is directe against Dharmotara for in the passage where he criticizes Santara kita le states: "Isn't it the case that this cognition of the fullilment of a purpose) is of no use for these striving for a fullilment of a purpose, for that (cognition) clocs o realize the fulfilment of a purpose." "Then Dharmottara goes on to explain that this cognition, if it is assumed to be a means ( Niy) for obtaining the thing would be worth being examined by a scientific treatise (*histo), for sale men strive just for that which makes one obtain (prank) that thing which is capable of fulfilling a purpose, but the cognition of that which is capable of fulfilling the purpose is not to be examineel). "For", as he says. "although it cognition of that which is capable of a fullilment of a purpose exists, it does not have to be examineel) because when this cognition takes place the striving of those striving for purpose) has come to an encl" etc. (For the text Nee bewe mete 20).
With regard to the first cognition which makes one obtain the object Kamalasila emments: "An which is previous in the cause. And the capability of making one obtain the (object) is called its validity. And this capability cannot be ascertained (
audharyi ) because the cllects are not knowi on account of the absence of

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On the Rrlutionship between Dharmottarn, Santarakita anul Kawalafilu
157
Thus at least the shorter Prämányapariksa and the Pramanaviniscayatika were written aller the Tattvasangraha, and these two treatises as well as the Nyayabindutikā and the longer Prāmānyapariksā before the composition of the Tattvasangrahapanjika. And if we start out from the assumption that the Tattvasangraha was finished before Santaraksita's first journey to Tibet, that is c. 760 A.D., and that Kamalasila wrote the Tattvasangrahapanjika before his departure for Tibet, that is c. 790 A.D., as Prof. Frauwallner has shown21), the period of Dharmottara's main activity falls between 760 and 790 A.D.
Taking into consideration all these circumstances and assuming a life-span of 60 years I would suggest that Dharmottara lived from approximately 740-800 A.D.
The aim of this paper, of course, was not only to place Dharmottara ten year's earlier than the late Prof. Frauwallner did, but to establish dates for Dharmottara in the first place. For Frau wallner's arguments for dating Dharmottara from approximately 750-810 A.D. cannot be considered really conclusive.25) Moreover I also wanted to show that by analyzing and comparing
repeated practice (anabhyasa). Therefore (this capability) is known (nifciyate) when the second cognition of the effect arises. Thus the validity of the first (cognition) is said to be ascertained) by another cognition)." (yol panah prvkam tal karanabhatam jñanam. Insya ca (: na) tatprapanasaktih pramanyam ayatr. i ca Saktir anablysád aviditukargir avadharayitrem na Sakyale ity uttarakaryajanapravrttyi niściyata ity prathamasya puratah prawnym wyle. T'SP 9-13,13-16)
The difference between Dharmottara on the one hand and Santaraksita und Kamalasila on the other is as follows: Fer Dharmottara the terms avisamudda and präpanasakti have the same incaning and therefore the first cognition .which makes one obtain the object is the non-disagreeing, valid cognition (sce lis explanation in note 18). Kumalasila and Santaraksita apply here the concept of non-clisagreement only to the later cognition of the effect. It is interesting to notice that Kamalasila here strictly follows the opinion of his teacher although he adopts larmetara's Con i ll other passages: avisamvaditum carthakriydsamartharthaprapanasaktih na in pripram run, pratilindhádisambhal (IS 179,231) and arthaprapranasaktih samvidahprimanyam (TSP 569,131). The last sentence is a comment on wide hi pramanatuam sn carthad atmalabhatah (I'S 1628 cel; cf. Vin 1 38.11: wise line yang dr/don las inlng wird thol pili miyin le 1). *Ernst Steinkellner, Dharmakirti's Helubinduh. Teil 1. Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text. Wien 1967. ** ... dngos po nyid thob par byed pa nyid la Ishad mar bhad to Il mi slu ba'i ruam gyangsyin ili phyir ishad waisgra nyiil kyis rub
the bstan pa thob par byed pa'i don thub bo // PPar 11 23753 24) Cr. Frauwallner 1961: 1431. 25) Frauwallner argues as follows: "He is not referred to by Santarakṣita and Kamalašila and, therefore, he is obviously
junior to them. Moreover, we know from Kalhama's Rājatarangini (IV v.498), that he came to Kashmir during the reign of king Jayapida (c. 775-806 A.D.)*" (Frauwallner 1961: 147). A further argument for Frauwallner's dating of Dharmottara is that in the Illan kar-catalogue, in the section listing logical works (tarka'i phynx), Darmottara is representeel lwy lis Nyayalindurika and his Paralokasielelhi - to the latter title Prawallner ackes a question mark. The fact that Dharnottara in spite of the high reputation he enjoyed in "Tibet is only mentionel with two works in the catalegue levels Frauwallner to the conclusion that Dharmettara was still alive and at work at the time of the compilation of the catalogue - coreling to Frau wallner 1961: 146 in H00) er 812 1.1). Ilence he s e's Dharm to have lived from approximately 750-810 A.D).
The data on account of which Frauwalhner comes to this dating are, however, not correct, although he places Dharmottara in the right period. From the fact that only two works of Dharmottara are mentioned in the Illan sue, ils he assumeel, we can only inler that his other works were not translated at that time but not that they
1. Steinkellner has pointed out that the Paralokasicldhi listed in the Illan kar-catalogue has to be identified with that by Subhagupta and not with that by Dharmotarat (E. Steinkellner. "Paralokasiddhi-texts." In: Ittehism and its Relation to Other Religions. Essays in Ilonour of Dr. Shõru Kumwan Ils Sruentieth Birthday. Kyoto 1985 (215-224): 21617). In addition to this Prol. Yamaguchi las shown that the date of the compilation of the IHan kar-catalogue is 824 A.D. and not 800 or 812 A.D. as Frauwallner assumed (cl. Z o Yamaguchi, ***Denkaruma 824 nen seiritsusetsu." [Theory that the lHan kar-catalogue was compiled in 824 A.D.). Naritasan Bukkyo Kenkyrisho Kiyo 9. 1985,1-61.). It is correct, of course, that Dharmottara is not referred to buy Santaraksita and Kamalasila, but as we have seen, some of his works were known to Kamalasila. susunane pašcimalayam laksayınlayam ravrh drie dharmollarāciryaw pravistam sdh mengata. (Rajatarangini IV v.1998)
"When he jayapicla (11.K.) w in a clean the sun rising in the west, he approve of Dhanorachary Having entered the country (of Kašmir)" (according to E. Hultzsch, “Kritische Bemerkungen zur Rajatarangini. Nr. IV." Zeitschrift der Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 69,1915 (271-282): 279). It was E. Hultzsch who first recognized Dharmottara as a proper name in this verse and not Th. Stcherbatsky (cl. his Bruddhist Logic vol. I, 41 n. 1) as Naucou maintains (cf. Jean Naudou, Buddhists of Kasmir. [English translation of the French edition, Paris 1968 (H.K.) Delhi 1980: 68 n. 88).
**Two dates are accepted with regard to the reign of king Jayapida, a member of the Karkea cynasty. The first. Following Kalhana's chronology and corroborated by persian sources, is 751-782 A.D. The second, 1:scel information, is 775-806 A.D. These dates are cliscussed by N.N. Dasgupta, "On the Date of Lalitaclitya Muktapicla".

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158 llelmut KRASSER these texts we can reconstruct the literature and theories these authors drew on in composing their treatises, which not only makes it possible for us to establish the direction of the assimilation of certain ideas, as in the case of Dharinotlara and Kamalasila, but also provides us with a fascinating glimpse into the workshop of these philosophers. LITERATURE Frauwallner 1961 NBT PPar 1 PPar 11 PVint PVint(a) Erich Frau wallner, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic." WZKSO 5, 125-148. Nyayabindutika: Pandita Durveka Misra's Dharmoltarapradipx. [Bring a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyayabindulika, a commentary on Dharmakirti's Nyayabindu). Ed. D. Malvania. Patna "1971. Pramanyapariksa I (Dharmoutara): P, Vol. 138, No. 5746. Pramanyapariksa 11 (Dharmoltara): P, Vol. 138, No. 5747. Pramanaviniscayatika, Chapters I, II (Dharmottara): P. Vol. 136, No. 5727. PVinT 7b6-13a7: Dharmollaras Exkurs zur Definition gultiger Erkenntnis im Pramanaviniscaya. Tibetischer Text, Sanskritmaterialien und Ubersetzung von Ernst Steinkellner und Helmut Krasser. Wien 1989. s. PVin T(a) Tattvasangraha of Acarya Shantaraksila with the commentary 'Panjika' of Shri Kamalashila. fd. Dvarikadas Shastri. (2 Vols.] Varanasi 1968. Tattvasangrahapanjika: s. TS Tattvasangrahapanjika (Tibetan translation): P', Vol. 139, No. 5765. Steinkellner/Krasser 1989 TS TSP TSP, Indian Culture XIVII, 1947, 11-19. Ou Muktapida, who is the main ligure for dating the Karkota dynasty, cf. also Hermann Coetz, "The Conquest of Northern and Western India by Lalitaditya-Muktapida." Reprinted from the Journal of the Bombay Branch Royal Asiatic Sociely XXVIII/1, 1952, 4318. in: Hermann Goetz, Studies in the History and Art of Kashmir and the Indian Himalaya. Wiesbaden 1969, 8-22.